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The October 2000 riots produced a state of chaos throughout the state of Israel. Israeli-Arab citizens, acting independently of Palestinian leadership, waged violent demonstrations, destroying symbols of Israeli infrastructure. In response, Israeli police retaliated with live ammunition, causing 13 Palestinian deaths and a greater number of injuries. Soon after, the Israeli government established the Or Commission, mandated to investigate any unethical actions taken by the Israeli police and to outline underlying causes of the riots.

Three years later, the Or Commission Report’s publication revealed three key conclusions. First, the demonstrations were induced by the government’s repressive policy towards the Israeli-Arab community. Second, the confrontation was a product of decades of socialized discrimination. Third, the commission underscored the radicalization of Israeli-Arab politics, a shift in paradigm from tolerance to proactive — and often violent — methods of protest.

Dr. Reiter proposed that this contemporary clash is intrinsic to the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, these events must be analyzed in conjunction with the Palestinian national struggle, as the two resistance movements, he argued, are in fact one and the same. The first Intifada was led by Palestinians living under Israeli occupation, and the Israeli-Arab community cooperated on a moral and political basis. The fall of the Oslo framework radicalized the goals of the Israeli-Arabs, consolidating their aspirations for a bi-national, non-Jewish Israeli state. These collective demands — amplified by the collapse of Camp David II — were further advanced by the emergence of a unified yet diverse movement of Islamic political organizations, Arab intellectuals, and grass-roots interest groups.

As the plight of Israeli-Arab citizens and Palestinian-Arabs converged, addressing the conflict was prioritized higher on Israel’s domestic agenda. Israel’s policies regarding land allocation and development, economic opportunities, and equal participation in domestic politics were complicated by the deterioration of national security and public opinion. Conversely, the deprivation experienced by Israeli-Arabs directly led to the growing involvement of those citizens in Palestinian acts of terrorism (the number of Israeli-Arab collaborators increased from two incidents in 1999 to an alarming 68 in 2003).

Among the legal repercussions of the Or Report, authoritative measures are to be taken against several policemen and one government official. The commission suggested the reconsideration of Israel’s policies with regards to the redistribution of land, increased freedom of cultural expression, and equality under the law. Implementation — or lack thereof — of the Or Report has led scholars (Dr. Reiter included) to doubt the future of reform, and this skepticism is molded by the actions of Israeli officials.

There is a consensus, however, on what an ideal policy campaign must include: re-evaluation of the definition of the Jewish state to include an Arab minority, prioritization of national symbols, and a shift from a policy of confrontation to a strategy of negotiation — entailing the recognition of a unified Arab political leadership. While pessimism has proliferated in the modern stage of the Israeli-Arab conflict, Dr. Reiter indicates one can only hope that the Or Report will not be regarded as “yet another book on the shelf for historians.”