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Following the overthrow of Saddam’s regime, Chandrasekaran was hopeful that the US-led coalition could “pull it off,” which he defined as the establishment of a stable democracy, a functioning economy, and modest reconstruction. However, Chandrasekaran explained the lack of success in dealing with the continual challenges in Iraq by focusing on three major themes: people, place, and policy.

Chandrasekaran argued that partisan hiring techniques undermined the effectiveness of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Staff was hired on the basis of loyalty to the Bush administration and support of conservative positions on issues such as Roe v. Wade, rather than on professional qualifications. As a result, the CPA hired Republican loyalists despite the fact that many of them were not Middle East specialists, lacked Arabic skills, and did not have previous experience in their designated fields. Chandrasekaran presented numerous examples of inexperienced, yet loyal, ideologues occupying highly influential positions within the CPA. In a telling case, James K. Haveman Jr., who had extensive ties with the Republican Party and experience with faith-based organizations, was appointed to oversee the management of Iraq’s health care system despite the fact that he was inexperienced in international health management. He replaced Frederick M. Burkle Jr., a physician with a master’s degree in public health and who was an established expert on post-conflict reconstruction but not a Bush supporter.

The physical and cultural isolation of staff members within the Green Zone further exacerbated the CPA’s ineffectiveness. In contrast to the harsh realities of the rest of Baghdad, the Green Zone, which Chandrasekaran also referred to as “Baghdad’s little America,” had the “calm sterility of an American subdivision.” That is to say, Iraqi laws and customs did not apply. Women ran in the streets in shorts, and imported alcohol, pork, and pornography were widely available. Furthermore, few Iraqis had access to the Green Zone, and CPA staff members rarely ventured beyond its fortified confines. This environment reinforced the cultural ignorance and isolation of the CPA staff, most of whom had never before lived outside of the US or held a passport prior to traveling to Iraq. Chandrasekaran argued that the isolation of the CPA within the Green Zone limited its effectiveness.

Chandrasekaran also explained that the reconstruction effort failed because the CPA’s policies were overly ambitious. The CPA spread its limited resources thinly by pursuing many peripheral objectives such as revamping Iraq’s intellectual property laws. The author argued that the CPA should have instead concentrated its efforts towards accomplishing essential tasks, such as defeating internal threats and restoring power generation, both of which Chandrasekaran pointed out are still persistent problems today. Moreover, he believes that the de-Ba‘athification of the government and the dissolution of the army were overly intrusive and misguided policy decisions. Chandrasekaran argued that a coalition “support corps” with a limited mandate and better resources would have been more effective in assisting Iraqis towards self governance. In this way, the US could have fostered an organic government shaped by Iraqis rather than implanting a foreign model of democracy. Chandrasekaran conceded that even had we taken a less intrusive approach there still would likely have been an insurgency, but it would have been smaller and more manageable than the one facing the country today.

In light of the failures of the US-led reconstruction effort—in terms of people, place, and policy—Chandrasekaran agrees with a former CPA staffer that “if Iraq succeeds it will be despite what we did not because of it.”