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Kenneth Pollack opened his remarks by noting that with Iran’s complex and opaque regime, its intentions are far more important than its capabilities. He stressed that Iran’s words must be taken with a grain of salt, as even its most engrained officials do not fully know its entire system.

According to first panelist Gary Sick, American actions have caused Iran’s emergence as a leading power in the Gulf. After September 11th, the US removed Iran’s worst enemy to the East, the Taliban, and later its worst enemy to the West, Saddam Husayn. Enormously strengthened, Iran reciprocated only with a lowered willingness to cooperate.

To further explain American responsibility for Iran’s rise, Sick recalled the “two pillar policy” adopted by the Nixon Administration, which promoted Iran as a regional hegemon. During the Reagan years, America cut deals with Iran, despite prohibitive official policy. Sick believes that if Arabs see Iran emerge again with our direct assistance, they may be “entitled to wonder if we are in fact up to our old tricks”.

While Iran is certainly building a nuclear infrastructure, it has been remarkably slow in the process. Upon deciding to develop covert nuclear capabilities, countries typically need five to six years, but more than 22 years have passed since Iran decided in 1985. Still, Sick warned that it will be very difficult to prevent Iran from going nuclear once it is determined to do so.

In the early 1970s, Nixon and Kissinger made a deal with the Shah to destabilize Iraq by supporting the Kurds. However, at a 1974 OPEC meeting, the Shah cut a deal with Husayn to stop supporting the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Without regard to American interest, the Shah saw an opportunity to support his own security and grabbed it. This showed that Iran’s goals are based more on security than ideology.

Second panelist Hooshang Amirahmadi summarized the goals of the Iranian Revolution as Islam, democracy, and independence. Islam was the ideological background, democracy opposed rule by Shah, and independence was intended against outside powers like the US. According to the constitution, elected institutions always come under the auspices of unelected institutions, and multiple power-centers prop up Islam while the population retains some voice. An assembly of experts decides the continuance or dismissal of the Ayatollah, and other institutions vet those who ultimately decide the Ayatollah’s fate. The Guardian Council is officially appointed half by the leader and half by Parliament, but really by the Ayatollah-appointed judicial assistant. In Amirahmadi’s words, “the leader already decides who should tell the leader to stay or not.”

Iran has operated like a unitary system since 1979, but Ahmadinejad has initiated a move toward federalism by empowering governors over ministers. Iran is becoming a militarized system where people with “guns and secret information” rule. Below the surface-continuity of all parts of the power system, great change is taking place. Amirahmadi believes hard power is rising at the expense of soft power, concurrently with the rise of non-clergy forces. He stressed that as militaries and economies expand throughout the region, Iran is not becoming a regional hegemon.

Third panelist John Limbert claimed that two basic questions of the Revolution remain unanswered: if the goal was for Iranians to become masters of their own house, which Iranians should become masters, and in what kind of house?

The aging elite inner circle that has run Iran since 1979 is now being challenged by veterans of the Iran-Iraq War and the fierce political battles of the 1980s. In response to his second question, Limbert described Iranians as a creative and alert people who have perfected indirect resistance. In order to build “the house,” rulers have intimidated, arrested, and murdered journalists, artists, and others who insist on posing inconvenient questions, but Limbert predicts that authorities will fail to quell Iran’s underground traditions of creativity, tolerance, and “love for the unorthodox.” He cited skyrocketing numbers of women in higher education and the creation of a world-class film industry, despite threats of censorship and limited technical means as evidence.

Pollack asserted that prior to Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, Iranian officials indicated desire to help US efforts in Iraq. While it is unclear if these officials were authorized to make such statements, Iran wanted Saddam removed more than it feared US involvement in Iraq. Having no problem with the creation of a democracy that would inevitably be Shi‘a-dominated, Iran’s leaders did exactly what the Bush Administration asked during the invasion and instructed its allies to cooperate with American efforts. Without Iranian assistance, Pollack believes the situation “could have been infinitely worse.”

Pollack also explained that Iran began building its own intelligence system inside Iraq in 2003. In 2006, Iran underwent many domestic changes at once, including the increased power of Ahmadinejad and the radicals, and Iran activated its dormant intelligence network in Iraq. However, during recent months, Iranian support for militant groups within Iraq has diminished just as rapidly as it began in 2006. Pollack attributes this transformation to US-Iranian talks in Baghdad, forceful American military measures to prevent Iran from providing supplies to groups inside Iraq, Bush Administration threats, and significant stabilization gains in Iraq. Now, with the beginning of what appears to be the upward ascent of Iraq, Iran feels less threatened.

Pollack concluded that Iran’s intentions are a circumstantial work-in-progress. Iran is “opportunistic and paranoid”, and not without its own internal politics to take into account. He relayed one final thought on Iran: while “the United States is their greatest adversary, we may not necessarily be their greatest threat.”