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Professor Milani claimed that although Iran has been accused of extremism, in the case of Afghanistan it has sought to create moderation and stability. “Moderation,” he said, “is a relative term.” Iran does not seek a western style state, but it contributes to making Afghanistan modern and stable enough to reduce security threats and instability in the region, especially along Iran’s northeastern border.

Iran’s foreign policy is security-centered. With a huge power differential between Iran and the US, Iran seeks to create buffer regions along its borders to enhance its security. During the 1980s, Iran sought to protect its western borders by fighting against US-backed Iraq. Iran also funded groups opposing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Rather than backing the main opposition, Iran backed mostly moderate groups while the US supported primarily Sunni fundamentalists.

Iran came to oppose the Taliban and funded the Northern Alliance, which fought against the Pakistani supported Taliban. Moreover, Milani pointed out that Iran assisted the US during its invasion of Afghanistan. Before the invasion in 2001, Iran informed US officials of major Afghan fault lines and helped them target Taliban sites for bombing missions.

After the invasion, Iran pledged some $660 million for the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Although some might consider this a low figure, it constitutes a large portion of Afghanistan’s small GDP. Most aid has been concentrated in Herat, located close to Iran’s border. Despite increased aid and international attention to Afghanistan, the country still struggles with widespread opium production and a diaspora of Afghan refugees abroad, up to 1.5 million of which live in Iran. The refugee issue has created friction between the two governments.

According to Milani, Iran has exercised pragmatism toward the new Afghan government of Hamid Karzai. Although Karzai has engaged in a “pashtunization” of the Afghan government at the expense of traditional Iranian allies, Iran continues to view a stable, Karzai-led Afghanistan as crucial for regional stability. Milani concluded that the election of Iranian President Ahmadinejad will not significantly change Iran’s regional foreign policy goals, especially those toward Afghanistan. Iran will grumble over the continued presence of coalition troops, but its desire to build a stable Afghanistan under Karzai will not change.

Professor Maleki said Iran’s strategic geographical position allows it to be considered a country in the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. Iran’s foreign policy is therefore regionalist and takes advantage of its location at the crossroads of these three areas. A major change took place in this regionalist policy after the breakup of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, Iran did not have relations with half of its neighbors. Afterward, vast new markets opened for Iran’s goods. Additionally, the lack of a common enemy, the USSR, resulted in a further drift between Tehran and Washington.

According to Maleki, Iran reached out to its new neighbors after the Soviet collapse and pursued a foreign policy of “self-reliance among regionalist states.” It is a member of the Economic Cooperation Organization, which includes Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states. It has also become more heavily involved in the OIC and OPEC following intense US opposition during the 1990s.

For the first time since 1979, Iran is positioning itself to be an economic and technological power. Facing continued reliance on petroleum exports, significant corruption and a brain drain, Iran believes that if it “wants to survive, it has to be a regional power.” Iran has constructed a network of highways on its border with Turkmenistan, linking it to other Central Asian states. It conducts trade with Kazakhstan via the Caspian Sea, and has linked its power grid with the rest of Central Asia. Iran constructed a hydroelectric plant in Tajikistan to obtain further energy supplies.

Investment in Central Asian infrastructure has accompanied the creation of regional free trade zones, which have allowed the developing former Soviet states to access Iran’s large internal market. In turn, Iranian products succeed in the Central Asian market, where they are recognized by a similar language and cultural tradition. Iran is also situated at the heart of the “energy periphery,” located to the north and west of China, Southeast Asia, and India, allowing it to supply the fast growing demands of these countries.

Iran avoids conflict with Central Asian governments while seeking continued economic development and prosperity. Maleki concluded stating that Iran has “contributed to regional stability” in Central Asia, “and will continue to do so.” However, Iran is not “the regional power,” as the US has a large influence in the area.

Dr. Weinbaum stated that although Iran has sought stability in Afghanistan, the country has never been high in its strategic interests, and has always been a backwater. Iran’s main concern regarding Afghanistan was that another country would use it to its advantage as a way of pressuring Iran along the shared border.

Weinbaum emphasized that Iran is “anxious to have a Kabul government that can stand on its own,” and one that can have relations with Iran on an “even keel.” For this reason, Iran is worried that the US strategic partnership with Afghanistan could perhaps result in permanent American military bases.

Although President Karzai has largely governed from his Pashtun base, Weinbaum stated that the Afghan Parliament is becoming “more pro-Iranian than anything we’ve seen before.” With pro-Iranian speaker Yunus Kanuni and the influence of former Northern Alliance members in Parliament, Weinbaum believes that President Karzai will be pressured into becoming more pro-Iran. In the meanwhile, Iran and the US continue to share the policy that any problems for the Karzai government are detrimental to the region.