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Dr. Aiham Al Sammarae opened his discussion on the insurgency and Iraqi politics by commenting on the contemporary political makeup of Iraq. He argued that Iraq is dominated by a relatively small group of political parties that have shown signs of an authoritarian streak. Al Sammarae also asserted that towering Iraqi political figures have grown increasing out of touch with the economic and sociopolitical realities of the Iraqi people. These factors, coupled with the US occupation and de-Ba‘athification (what he referred to as the “worst policy in Iraq”), have helped to create an alienated, frustrated, and irascible Iraqi population.

On May 23, 2003, the former US civilian administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, abolished several ministries and institutions of Saddam Hussein’s regime and disbanded the Iraqi army. Intended to rid Iraq of Ba‘athist influences in the military and security institutions, these policies led to the unemployment of an estimated 400,000 people. Al Sammarae argued that state-sponsored de-Ba‘athification is a major destabilizing policy, in a country where an estimated 4 million out of 24 million people were or are Ba‘athists. Highlighting the pragmatic, open-market policies pursued by ex-communists in Eastern Europe, he asserted that the US and Iraqi governments should not exclude Ba‘athists and military personnel who in many cases are extremely educated and technologically savvy.

Despite increased attempts on the part of the insurgency to thwart coalition building and the reconstruction process, Dr. Al Sammarae has held talks with Iraqi leaders close to major elements of the ongoing insurgency. Al Sammarae believes that bringing insurgent leaders into the political fold is the main way forward for Iraq. Unable to specify which groups have carried out attacks, he said the Iraqi government should be willing to talk with any armed insurgent with the exception of foreign extremists like the Zarqawi group. While the ‘Allawi government was willing to negotiate with the insurgency, the al-Ja‘afari government is not and has not taken a particularly positive view of his efforts to include insurgents in discussions with either the Iraqi government or the Americans.

Referring to the insurgency as the “resistance,” Al Sammarae asserted that while Sunnis make up the bulk of the insurgency, there is also Kurdish and Shi‘ite opposition. Seeking to de-emphasize the Islamist rhetoric of the insurgency, he believes that, based on meetings and a letter sent to him by various leaders of the insurgency, the vast majority represent a “nationalist resistance” and are “genuinely willing” to accept the establishment of a secular Iraqi state.

Despite the commitment of a relatively small group of insurgents, which Al Sammarae refers to as “mainly foreign,” to inflict widespread chaos and the inability of larger groups to form a united front and develop a coherent political strategy, he said four major insurgent groups--Jaish Muhammad (Army of Muhammad), Jaish Mujahidin (Army of Freedom Fighters), al-Jaish al-Islami (The Islamic Army), and the Ansar al-Sunnah (Supporters of the Sunnah)--have been able to develop specific policy demands. While Al Sammarae stated several times that he could not speak on behalf of the organizations, he said that their demands included a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops and steps to reduce the growing influence in the south of neighboring Iran, whose Shi‘ite-led government has close ties to Iraq’s new leaders.