Related Resources

Helena Cobban, author of the recent Boston Review article “Hizbullah’s New Face: In Search of a Muslim Democracy,” opened her discussion of Hizbullah’s role in Lebanese politics by taking issue with her editor’s choice of title. She argued that Hizbullah’s political wing is hardly a new face of the organization. Since entering the 1992 parliamentary elections, Hizbullah has become a permanent feature of the political landscape, while strengthening its role in numerous communities as a social institution and a force for development.

Yet Cobban predicted that Hizbullah’s institutional strength is unlikely to translate into a larger parliamentary bloc following the Lebanese elections because the electoral system limits the number of Shi’i seats in the Majlis an-Nawaab (which she described as “not totally dysfunctional but not fair”). At best, Hizbullah's twelve members (out of 128 total in the Majlis) might only pick up a few more seats from Amal.

Is the prospect of Hizbullah attaining political power something to be feared? If so, Cobban asserted, the worrying should have begun a long time ago. She recounted Hizbullah’s long evolution, beginning as an armed resistance movement against Israel’s presence in Southern Lebanon and eventually expanding to charitable and philanthropic activities. Through mosques, hospitals, and schools, Hizbullah became a community organization, focusing on development and providing many basic services to the people of Southern Lebanon. Even before it formally entered the parliament in 1992 and municipal governments in 1996, Hizbullah had gained experience in organizing, governance, and politics.

This experience led Cobban to see Hizbullah as a stabilizing force in Lebanon. While it has not abandoned its arms, the use of force has taken a backseat to the organization’s other activities. While Hizbullah may have driven Israeli forces out of Lebanon, it ceased its cross-border attacks and began to focus on deterrence, fortifying Lebanon’s borders along the “blue line” established by UN Security Council Resolution 425. The notable exception to this rule is the Shebaa Farms territory, whose control is disputed by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Cobban maintained that this area serves as an outlet and training ground for youth attracted to Hizbullah, a way of releasing violent fervor with minimal impact, and as more of a secondary concern than a primary issue.

Hizbullah’s work across sectarian boundaries, as evidenced by the inclusion of two Sunnis and one Christian in its parliamentary delegation, highlights the role it may play in future Lebanese governments. Cobban noted that Hizbullah did not act violently against Christians or the Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) following Israel’s withdrawal in 2000. Rather, it exercised a “strategic restraint and discipline,” which she said was characteristic of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. Combined with its ritualization of certain aspects of the conflict, as in Shebaa Farms, this approach indicates a shift in Hizbullah’s strategy. Regarding the eventual disbandment of Hizbullah militias, Cobban suggested that it might be possible for the Lebanese government to finesse the disarmament issue by incorporating the militias into the Lebanese army. She also raised a rather pertinent question regarding the possibility of disarming Hizbullah – who is capable of doing so other than Hizbullah itself?

Given its ability to reach out across sectarian lines and its apparent willingness to act within the political system and perhaps even to disarm, Cobban saw a prominent and changing role for Hizbullah in the near future. She recommended a policy of engagement that would treat Hizbullah like any other political party in Lebanon. Hamas’ entry in recent Palestinian elections indicates the applicability of this strategy in other countries as well. She argued that this normalization approach would likely yield better results than a forced disarmament, such as Shimon Peres' failed attempt in 1996 to punish the South Lebanese into abandoning Hizbullah. In Hizbullah, Cobban ultimately sees a movement whose transformation since its inception may serve as a model for the peaceful incorporation of other armed resistance groups into democratic political structures.