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Mr. Afshari began his talk by emphasizing that the democracy movement in Iran is not a new phenomenon. It began in the early 20th century with the constitutional movement, whose supporters sought to establish parliamentary rule in Qajar, Iran, and more recently gained momentum during the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, a moderate who attempted to liberalize Iranian politics. However, this climate of reform ultimately ended with the election of Mahmud Ahmadinejad as President in 2005.

Mr. Afshari explained that the democracy movement is in an inherently weak position in Iran as a result of the governmental structure outlined in the Constitution. The Constitution gives about three-quarters of all political power to the executive branch, which is dominated by the clerical position of Supreme Leader (currently held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei). In addition, the powers of the elected legislature are hamstrung by an appointed clerical body, the Council of Guardians, which must approve all bills. According to Mr. Afshari, in such a political climate, “the greatest opportunity for reform allowed … is less than the least such opportunity under a Democratic constitution.”

Operating under the current restrictive governmental structure, would-be democratic reformers are forced to adopt a new strategy of political protest. Although the Iranian government would be likely to deny protest permits in response to such a strategy, Mr. Afshari argued that peaceful protest in favor of political reform should occur nonetheless. He labeled this approach a “radical reform” strategy, necessitated by a government that denies political freedoms and human rights.

Mr. Afshari also discussed the current political climate under President Ahmadinejad, whose worldview he described as messianic. President Ahmadinejad has expressed the desire to bring about the coming of Imam Mehdi, a major figure in Shi‘a messianism, and to establish an Islamic world government. In the pursuit of this ideal, he has been more than willing to silence legitimate domestic opposition and block many paths to political reform. In response, Mr. Afshari advocated the expansion of political protests, citing the recent protests against the President at Amir Kabir University in Tehran as an example of the approach that should be taken by the democracy movement.

Another obstacle that reformers must overcome is public apathy, as many Iranians of the middle and lower classes see democracy as simply a luxury of the elite that does not have real-world applicability to their lives. Therefore, in order to succeed, the democratic movement needs to show the people that governmental reforms would substantially improve the lot of the average Iranian.

Focusing on Iran’s relations with the international community, Mr. Afshari noted the increased impact that foreign pressure has had on Iranian domestic politics as a result of President Ahmadinejad’s nuclear program. He outlined three possible outcomes to mounting external pressure on Iran: 1.) In order to gain more control over the domestic population, the government could increase its suppression of dissent. 2.) The government might have the opposite reaction and loosen its restrictions on political freedoms in order to improve its image internationally. 3.) External political and economic pressure could lead to the use of military force and the situation in Iran, particularly in regards to the economy, could become substantially worse.

Mr. Afshari stated that the single-minded focus of the international community on Iran’s nuclear program was not conducive to facilitating a peaceful democratic transition. He elaborated that the status of Iran’s nuclear program is not a daily concern for the average Iranian; therefore, in order to gain popular support, the international community needs to center its protests with the Iranian government on issues that are of more concern the people, such as human rights.

Mr. Afshari concluded by reiterating that democratic reform in Iran faces many obstacles, most notably the natural resistance of the constitutional structure to serious reform and participatory politics. Democracy is not a cure-all for all of Iran’s ills, but it is a starting point from which the Iranian people can begin to improve their country on their own terms.