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Mr. Leverett explained that much uncertainty surrounds the image and characterization of President Bashar Al Assad. A common question regarding the leader is, “Is Bashar Al Assad actually in charge?” According to Leverett, the answer is usually yes; however, Bashar neither commands the same authority nor rules in the same way that his father, Hafez Al Assad, did. After five years, Bashar is now facing challenges similar to those that helped his father consolidate his power. Hafez became the “Lion of Damascus” after dealing effectively with serious challenges to both his regime and Syria, such as his brother’s attempted takeover, a Sunni fundamentalist uprising, and the ongoing political bid for control of Lebanon. Bashar’s task now is to prove himself a leader, as his father did during critical moments for his regime.

Bashar has been characterized in three ways: first, as the “closet reformer” who earnestly wants to change the status quo but is constrained by the old guard; second, as the “loyal son” who seeks continuity in governance from his father’s rule to his own; and third, as a “neophyte” who is an inexperienced and ineffective national leader. Mr. Leverett warned that there is truth in all three portrayals and that each can be misleading and inaccurate alone.

Mr. Leverett elaborated on the perception of Bashar as a closet reformer. In his analysis, Bashar is in fact a reformer but does not have a clear vision. The president’s choice in spouse is one such indication of his dedication to reform. Against his mother’s wishes, he married the Western-educated daughter of a Sunni expatriate doctor. His wife, Asma, is a patron of many causes and has proven to be a partner in reform. Still, the old guard, a relic of his father’s rule, limits Bashar’s push for reform. Mr. Leverett clarified the structure of this group, explaining that, in Bashar’s words, “they are not two, or three, or four guys but rather thousands of mediocre and fossilized bureaucrats” who are also wrapped up in the nascent private sector. Adapting to this situation, Bashar has been installing a network of technocrats with limited success since his presidency began.

The Ba`ath Party Congress in June should reveal what steps Bashar will take vis-à-vis reform and relations with Lebanon. All the while, he hopes to avoid confrontation with the old guard by making use of his "biological advantage" and outliving them. This tactic may be compromised by events in the short term, however, if Bashar makes decisions that risk his regime’s collapse.

This is a critical moment for US policymakers in their dealings with Syria. Mr. Leverett criticized the Bush Administration for lacking a comprehensive policy towards Syria. He explained that currently the Administration is finding its way to a policy position in an evolutionary process. It has used UN Resolution 1559 as a basis from which to formulate ad hoc policy; thus far, the resolution has contributed to concerted international pressure on the Syrian government and the full withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon.

The Administration has also taken advice from France on the issue. Leverett explained that President Bush himself was taken with the assessment given him by French President Jacques Chirac, which predicted the unraveling of the Al Assad regime after the Syrian troop withdrawal from Lebanon. This scenario would lead to “regime change on the cheap,” Leverett explained, an outcome the Bush Administration would likely consider favorable. Still, the current US course is more a litany of complaints than a comprehensive strategy.

At this point in the evolution of US policy towards Syria, there remains much ambiguity. It is uncertain whether the US prefers to change Syrian behavior, as has been the apparent ongoing policy stance until now, or whether it prefers regime change. To end this uncertainty, Mr. Leverett suggested that the Bush Administration “get serious about carrots and sticks” in its approach to dealing with Syria. Bashar Al Assad wants to make a deal, but only one that is fair to his regime. Mr. Leverett made it clear that, in Bashar’s words, “Syria is a state, not a charity.”

Looking ahead, Mr. Leverett elucidated some of the Bush Administration’s plans. He stated that they are not planning military intervention in Syria. Furthermore, he did not see any concerted efforts by outsiders to convince the Administration to take such action. This leaves Bashar with the reality that he faces a pivotal moment, and that if he is up to the challenge he will come out much stronger.