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Pointing to a number of historical examples across the globe, Garon argued that democratic transitions are extremely fragile processes and, as a result, the world has witnessed few democratic transition success stories. Garon explained that the failure of democratic transitions in the under-developed world can at least partially be explained by what she refers to as “dangerous alliances”, or coalitions that form between the state and civil society forces in a period of political uncertainty that typically follows the fall of a dictator. These dangerous alliances, she explained, have allowed for the creation of politically oppressive environments and a significant reduction of freedoms even though they often coincide with staunchly pro-democratic rhetoric on the part of the ruler.

Garon focused primarily on Tunisia to make her point, arguing that although President Ben Ali came to power in 1987 promising the people of Tunisia democracy and democratic reform, his policies have taken the opposite direction, and today Tunisia is a police-state ruled by a dictator. Garon explained that even under his predecessor, President Bourguiba, Tunisia was a pluralist society as compared to the repressive political environment, dominated by fear and intimidation under Ben Ali. After deposing Bourguiba in a silent coup, Ben Ali's strategy has been to eradicate notable opposition forces by either completely destroying them, as in the case of the Islamist parties such as Al-Nahda, or by emasculating them through the formation of alliances with opposition leaders, offering them incentives in exchange for political acquiescence. To illustrate her point, Garon used as examples a number of the leftist, socialist forces, such as the workers unions, as well as democratic forces, like the human rights groups, both of whose influence have been very much marginalized in current Tunisian politics. Furthermore, as part of his strategy, Ben Ali, through propaganda and media campaigns, has created an image of himself as the benevolent leader. This has resulted in a general acquiescence on the part of the Tunisian people, and to some extent the international community at large, which believes in this father-figure image and, as a result, does not take issue with the total absence of democracy. Garon went on to explain that because the political institutions that allow for checks and balances, such as a balanced judicial system or a truly representative parliament, do not exist in Tunisia, one could hope that opposition or dissenting voices might find an outlet in the media. This, however, has not occurred because Ben Ali has used his position as the Tunisian patriarch to co-opt the domestic media, reducing the news to stories about his travel schedule and social engagements. Internationally, Ben Ali has also used propaganda to both fight criticism as to the nature of his regime as well as to advertise Tunisia's impressive economic strides as compared other developing countries.

Garon went on to describe a similar process of dangerous alliances that have occurred in Morocco and Algeria. The differences between Tunisia and its western neighbors is that whereas the coalition between the state and civil society forces in Tunisia occurred at the outset of Tunisia's democratic transition, and as a result civil society was never given the chance to develop, in Morocco and Algeria the dangerous alliances (in Morocco in the 1950s and in Algeria in the 1990s) did not fully obstruct the development of civil society, but rather only traumatized it. This is why we continue to see a lively press in Algeria and tolerance for opposition parties in Morocco, as opposed to Tunisia, where we see neither.