Related Resources

William Stuebner began by discussing his experiences in Bosnia. While working both with the State Department and The Hague for the investigation of war crimes, he observed that the 1990s were not a good time for peacekeeping and cited the UN-sponsored Brahimi Report that called operations in Bosnia a “qualified failure.” As a result of this experience, Stuebner identified five key principles necessary for a successful peacekeeping mission. First, national interest must trump international interests. Recurring conflicts between the nations involved in the peacekeeping effort are liable to interfere with the important mission at hand if their interests are neglected. Second, the peacekeeping mandate must be unambiguous. The absence of a clear mandate creates confusion over what is and is not allowed under the terms of the agreement, thus running the risk of making empty promises and creating false hopes. Third, there must be unity of command. In Bosnia, air strikes were called in under a “dual key” approach, requiring approval from both NATO and UN higher-ups. This ineffective structure negated the usefulness of the forces on the ground. Fourth, the force must have sufficient resources to complete its mission, as the absence of necessary equipment results in a totally ineffective force. Finally, and most importantly, there must be a mutual desire for continued, long-lasting peace. Stuebner stressed that without commitment on the side of the warring parties, there will be no peace to keep, and without commitment on the part of the peacekeeping forces, they will not accomplish their mission.

Turning to the situation in Lebanon, he indicated that peacekeeping operations are nearly always “mission impossible.” He cautioned, however, against undue pessimism, saying that it would be easy to write off the UN’s efforts before they can make an attempt. International parties should encourage a political solution, and give motivation to interested non-warring parties, such as Syria, to assist in creating a sustainable peace.

LTC Bailey followed with a discussion of Disarming, Demobilizing and Re-integrating (DDR) Hezbollah. Referring to his background in disarming soldiers in both Cambodia and Iraq, he listed a number of factors that are conducive to properly conducting DDR: creating an integrated effort, having effective supervisory structures, and establishing tracking mechanisms for demobilization, flexibility and transparency. So far he sees good signs in the tasking of the Secretary General with the development of UNIFIL’s mission of disarming Hezbollah.

Bailey strongly reiterated the need for transparency, saying that although DDR operations are complex, they serve to create breathing room between the two sides of the conflict. Without such operations, Hezbollah will be left as a powerful force, a lack of trust will perpetuate, human rights organizations will have difficulty conducting their work, and the way will open for hostilities to resume.

Ambassador Dobbins sought to clarify the role of the peacekeeping force, arguing that UNIFIL will have neither a peace-enforcement role nor a counter-insurgency role. The UN mandate authorizes the use of force only in self-defense or at the behest of the Lebanese government. Dobbins indicated that UNIFIL will not be able to keep an unwanted peace and will not succeed in doing what the Israeli army could not in fighting Hezbollah.

Dobbins was optimistic about the general success rate of peacekeeping operations, providing the examples of successful missions in Cyprus and the Sinai. He said, however, that peacekeeping forces can only work if the warring parties cooperate. The goal of a peacekeeping force is to prevent mistakes and misunderstandings, not to put a stop to intentional violations. Dobbins noted that UNIFIL will probably be able to halt raids from taking place by acting as an “early warning” to the opposing side. However, UNIFIL will not have the means nor the mandate to intercept missile attacks. Dobbins concluded by examining the overall situation, arguing that Hezbollah won by “not losing.” The US, as an ally of Israel, “lost,” thus placing the Bush Administration’s policy at a crossroads. Either the Administration must adopt a new approach and seek broad dialogue with the region, or hold fast to the idea that the original strategy of isolating Syria and Iran would have worked had only it been pursued more vigorously.

Ambassador Hughes spoke from his experience working with the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) in between Egypt and Israel in the Sinai. In many ways, Hughes pointed out, the MFO clearly illustrates certain formulae for a successful operation. As a separate institution created outside of the UN system, there was little question of the MFO’s mandate and no complications in the chain of command. The MFO could do what it felt was necessary, on its own accord, with the approval of the two sides.

Much of its success rested on the basic elements of good peacekeeping: it established high-level liaison officers and mandated constant communication between the two sides. In addition, there was a strong will on both sides not to resume the conflict. Israel was given the strategic depth it needed to feel secure, and a strong system of inspections helped build confidence. The MFO had plenty of resources to do its job and both Egypt and Israel wanted the operation to succeed.

Hughes recognized that Israel and Egypt in the case of the MFO pose a very different problem from that of Israel and Lebanon. The MFO operated in a benign environment with no conflict between the two sides. However, for any operation, Hughes emphasized the need for commitment, a strong mandate and an allowed flexibility to deal with problems as they arise.

Ambassador David Mack concluded the panel presentations by offering a look at the governance of Lebanon. According to Mack, Lebanon’s relatively free elections, history of constitutionalism and robust civil society all bode well for a successful democracy. However, negative signs also abound in a history of political instability, intrusive neighbors and weak borders. Although President Bush claimed that the Lebanese Army backed by international peacekeepers would be a “new force” in the South, Ambassador Mack doubts that such a situation will be sustainable without political agreements that reinforce Lebanon’s government institutions.