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The Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa islands are situated in the Persian Gulf at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. The islands lie along the two main navigable channels in the Gulf, channels through which almost one fifth of the world’s daily oil passes. Despite their critical strategic importance, Mattair noted that the islands have been largely overlooked by the American government.

The Tunbs and the northern part of Abu Musa have been controlled by Iran since November 30th, 1971, when Shah Reza Pahlavi sent Iranian military forces to occupy the islands. His occupation of the Tunbs was unilateral, while Iran’s occupation of northern Abu Musa was the result of an agreement with the ruler of Sharjah to share the island. Mattair argued that the United Kingdom, the United States, and Saudi Arabia acquiesced in the occupation because Iran was seen as a barrier against both the Soviet Union and radical Arab socialist nationalism.

Mattair questioned the legitimacy of Iran’s occupation by highlighting the strong historical links between the UAE and the disputed islands. There is clear documentation dating as far back as the 1500s that Arabs, more specifically the Qawasim tribe from the emirates of Sharjah and Ra’s-al-Khaymah, used the islands for grazing animals, pearling, obtaining water, and other activities. In the 1880s, the British recognized the Qawasim’s continued use of the islands, noting that the Qawasim on the Persian Coast only used the Greater Tunb with the permission of the Qawasim on the Arab coast. In contrast, Iran has a tenuous claim to the islands; after long acquiescence to Arab control over the islands, Persia (Iran) laid claim to them starting in 1887.

Based on the UAE’s historical connection with the islands, Mattair argued that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would find in favor of the UAE claim to the islands if the matter were submitted for adjudication. However, Iran has refused to submit the case to the ICJ, and the ICJ cannot hear a case unless both parties agree to go before the court. Furthermore, Iran’s case has been severely undermined by its own unwillingness to produce proof of its historical connections with the islands.

Despite the strength of the UAE’s claim, it is politically unrealistic to expect Iran to transfer control of the islands in the immediate future, Mattair said. The islands form part of Iran’s defenses, protecting Iran’s coastline and its shipping. The nuclear impasse and deep uncertainty about US intentions heighten Iranian insecurity and increase the importance of the islands for Iran. In order to lessen Iranian security concerns, Mattair advocated comprehensive negotiations between Iran and the US. After reaching a settlement on the issues of Israel, Iraq, and the Iranian nuclear program, US-Iranian relations would be stable enough to envisage a transfer of the islands.

Iran’s strong military presence on the islands could also pose an offensive threat. However, Mattair indicated that Iran was unlikely to attack from the islands unless provoked. He also noted that the UAE was anxious to avoid military action over this issue and that it is committed to solving the dispute diplomatically. Mattair also speculated that any US military action over Iran could provoke retaliation in the southern Gulf by Iran. Such retaliation would have implications for the security of other Gulf states and for the security of important shipping lanes.