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Mr. Segev opened his discussion by describing 1967 as the “longest year and still lasting.” As the repercussions of 1967 are still central to the Israeli-Palestinian crisis, it is crucial to understand the motives behind the events of that year. This is possible, Mr. Segev argued, through an examination of the Israeli psyche during that period. Only by understanding the “Israeli story” can one comprehend the 1967 War.

In the early 1960s Israel experienced a cultural and economic boom, becoming one of the most dramatic success stories of the 20th century. Not only had Israel survived since its creation in 1948 — despite hostile and tense conditions with its neighbors — but it had also flourished. Overall, the public mood was one of intense pride and satisfaction with the situation and direction of the nation.

However, beginning roughly in 1965, this optimism began to diminish. Israel entered an economic recession, resulting in a dramatic increase in unemployment and a decrease in immigration — a particularly demoralizing blow to the Zionist vision of Israel as a refuge designed to attract, not repel, the world’s Jews. Israel also underwent many political and social changes, as the Ashkenazic Jews began to lose their majority status and the leadership changed over from David Ben-Gurion to Levi Eshkol. In addition to domestic malaise, Israelis were further troubled by a noticeable increase in attacks by Palestinians, particularly involving fighters coming across the Syrian border. When Egypt signed a mutual defense agreement with Jordan, therefore, Israelis were so psychologically worn down that they perceived Arab posturing as a threat almost equal to that of Nazi Germany.

Also described in detail by Mr. Segev was a series of meetings lasting from December of 1966 to January of 1967 between leading Israeli policy planners, who debated the consequences of militarily taking the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The resulting policy paper clearly stated that it was not in the national interest of Israel to seize these territories because this would require taking control of the sizable Palestinian population. The authors of the paper warned that this would encourage Palestinian nationalism, endanger the Jewish majority, and eventually lead to armed resistance. Before the outbreak of the 1967 War it was therefore clearly established that the capture of these Palestinian territories would be detrimental to the safety and security of Israel.

Nevertheless, in response to the Jordanian artillery attack on West Jerusalem on June 5, 1967, Israel conquered East Jerusalem and continued to rapidly seize other territory until it also had control of the West Bank, Gaza, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. Mr. Segev argued that this decision, given the earlier finding of the policy paper and the fact that no legal experts were called in to brief Israeli ministers about the advisability and legal implications of taking these lands, ignored reason and prudence. He posited that Israeli leaders acted from their “guts, hearts, not from their heads,” placing history and centuries of Jewish identification with East Jerusalem before Israeli national interest.

Once taken, the West Bank and East Jerusalem particularly could not be given back. As a result of the War of 1967, Israeli is not in a position to solve the crisis. Given the current situation, Mr. Segev contended, instead of chasing the dream of conflict resolution while accepting and maintaining the status quo the best hope is to “manage” the conflict, making daily life for Israelis and Palestinians as bearable as possible.