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Seth Jones emphasized the importance of his and Martin Libicki’s report given the seeming interminability of al-Qaeda seven years after President George W. Bush declared a Global War on Terror. According to Jones, the ineffectiveness of military force in eradicating terrorism has necessitated a reevaluation and reprioritization of US counterterrorism policy. The authors’ report entitled “How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al-Qaeda” examines data from 648 terrorist groups since 1968 and highlights the political, economic, and social factors contributing to their devolution. Jones contended that by examining the historical record of past counterterrorism endeavors, the United States could formulate a more efficient and suitable strategy for combating al-Qaeda.

Before elucidating the report’s findings, Jones summarized the state of al-Qaeda in the world today. He claimed that al-Qaeda’s organizational scheme resembles “rings of concentric circles” orbiting a “core” of key leaders like Osama bin Laden. These individuals plot and orchestrate terrorist operations like 9/11 from clandestine locations in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Due to their isolation, they rely heavily on several affiliated terrorist networks for providing and disseminating information, recruiting new members, and executing attacks. The third and fourth “rings” consist of individuals who are deeply influenced by al-Qaeda’s ideology and who occasionally perform acts of terror in the organization’s name. In addition to al-Qaeda’s large and diffuse membership, and concentric organizational structure, Jones emphasized the broad and largely unattainable goals of its leaders.

In the next portion of his lecture, Jones detailed the findings of his report. Upon testing various causal factors against historical data, Jones and Libicki concluded that the vast majority of terrorist groups have terminated due to political settlements (43%) or policing and intelligence activities (40%). Military operations, by contrast, accounted for only 7% of successful defeats. Furthermore, the authors discerned no statistical correlation between terrorist groups’ devolutions and economic conditions, political institutions, and breadth of goals.

What implications do these results have for current US counterterrorism policy? Jones asserted that military force continues to represent a counterproductive strategy for defeating al-Qaeda because it inflicts a high civilian death toll and emboldens terrorists’ “holy war” rhetoric. Instead, Jones posited, by leveraging legitimate local actors and surreptitiously targeting key players, the United States could more credibly and effectively pursue its strategic interests. In practice this means that the US government should support indigenous police forces, target key leaders, and engage in clandestine intelligence gathering and analysis. It should also empower organizations such as the State Department, CIA, and FBI, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, to develop and implement counterterrorism policies in the United States and abroad.

Thus far, these tactics have accrued auspicious success in places like Ramadi, Iraq where large numbers of Sunni insurgents, with American backing, have joined Iraqi police forces to help rout al-Qaeda in Iraq. Additionally, the use of local Pakistani informants and intelligence agents has led to the capture and arrest of key terrorists like Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad (in March 2002 and 2003, respectively). Although Jones admitted the potential failure of these strategies if local populations refuse to cooperate or possess conflicting strategic visions, he reemphasized that the “war on terror” could not be won by military force alone.