

A PALESTINE ENTITY?



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SPECIAL STUDY — 1

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PUBLISHER'S PREFACE

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE inaugurates herewith a new series of monograph-length papers, designed to treat important contemporary problems of the Middle East. They represent research done under the auspices of the Institute and may be prefatory to studies at greater length to appear later.

In addition to the authors of the several Parts named in the Study, the Institute also wishes to thank Mr. Simha Flapan, editor of *New Outlook*, who contributed important materials to Parts I and III, and to express its gratitude to others who prefer not to be named here.

The theme *A Palestine Entity?* was chosen for the first of the Studies primarily to constitute background reading for the Institute's 24th Annual Conference on "Violence and Dialogue in the Middle East: The Palestine Entity and Other Case Studies." We have put the title in the form of a question, being well aware there are those who believe that the word "entity" is quite inadequate to describe the reality and goal of Palestinian Arab nationalism, and that there are those who affirm that no such thing exists. The Institute holds that there is an important issue to be examined, and in this spirit presents Special Study Number One to its readership.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
OF ARAB NATIONALISM IN PALESTINE

DON PERETZ

IN A DISCUSSION of the nationalism of the Arabs of Palestine, the question can properly be raised, is it "Palestinian-Arab," or "Arab-Palestinian." Is this sentiment primarily rooted in the land of Palestine, or is it derived from and linked to the more widely prevailing sentiment of Arab nationalism? Is Palestinian-Arab particularistic, with special characteristics of its own, or is it derived from the strong urge for Arab unity? Perhaps there is no clearly defined demarcation between these sentiments. Since the emergence of strong nationalist sentiment among Palestine Arabs they have received backing from leaders in the surrounding Arab states; Palestinian goals have been linked with those of other nationalist movements; the more fervently they articulate their own goals the more they seem inextricably linked with the broader aspirations of Arab nationalism. However, since 1967 the Palestinians have developed a nationalist credo that is distinct, that differentiates, but does not separate, them from other Arab nationalists. The bases for identity are obvious in the Arab character of Palestine and the majority of its people prior to 1948 in their language, culture and historical background. The dissimilarities have only recently become obvious with development of a distinctive Palestine Arab nationalist movement, and they are becoming increasingly evident.

Nationalist sentiment among Palestinian Arabs, channeled into an organized movement, has passed through three easily identifiable phases: from its origins shortly after World War

I until the "disaster" of 1948, from the "disaster" until the 1967 war, and from 1967 to the present. The patterns of nationalist organization, leadership of the movement, the social foundations, and the prevailing attitudes of Palestinians differed greatly in each of these phases.

Phase One — From Syrians to Palestinian Arabs

In the more than twelve centuries that had passed since the Arab conquest of Palestine, the country had "virtually dropped out of history."¹ Throughout the Ottoman era from 1517 until the end of World War I, Palestine was an unimportant backwater of the Turkish empire. There were no political frontiers defining the country. Both the land and its people were regarded as part of the Ottoman-dominated Syrian provinces.

During the latter nineteenth and early twentieth centuries there were among the Arab nationalists of Syria, participants from Palestine. Those from Jerusalem, Jaffa, Nablus and other Palestinian towns regarded themselves as Syrians, not Palestinians. They were among the founders of several Arab nationalist groups formed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the Ottoman Decentralization Party formed in Cairo in 1912 included Ali Nashashibi from Jerusalem, Salim Abd al-Hadi from Jenin and Hafiz al-Sa'id from Jaffa. All three were members of families which later led the Palestine nationalist movement. Another Palestinian, Najib Azuri, published in Paris in 1905 a book entitled *Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe* demanding reestablishment of an Arab empire from Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. He was also among the first to proclaim inevitability of a Jewish-Arab confrontation determining the destiny of the Middle East and the Arab world. Those who were loyal to the Ottoman sultan were represented in Constantinople by "Syrian" representatives.

Syrian nationalism was greatly intensified during the war by harsh Turkish policies which regarded the Arabs, even though most were fellow Muslims, as an unruly occupied people. Many Palestinians were imprisoned and the above

mentioned three notables were executed by the Turks for "rebellion." Palestinians were also among the dozens of Syrian nationalists hanged in Beirut and Damascus during 1915 and 1916.

Hopes for Arab independence were raised by various Allied wartime promises made to subjected people so that by 1918, with defeat of the Turks, expectations among the Arab gentry of British occupied Palestine were as high as those among Arab leaders in the surrounding countries. After the 1918 armistice and growing awareness among the gentry and urban middle class of the conflicting Allied promises, Muslim-Christian Associations were organized in Arab towns to represent them at the new Syrian parliament in Damascus and to support demands for a unified Syrian kingdom including present day Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan.

After separation of Palestine from Syria, with imposition of British hegemony on the country in the guise of a League of Nations Mandate, and aroused by the spectre of a rapidly rising and competitive Jewish nationalist movement, the Palestinian Arabs began to form their own separate national organizations.

When British military authorities turned over government in Palestine to civil servants working under the mandate in 1920, population was sparse, having declined during the war from famine, disease and emigration. Only 83,000 Jews remained. Of the 660,000 non-Jews (mostly Arabs) 589,000 were Muslim and 71,000 Christian. The structure of Arab society, according to mandatory authorities, was still quasi-feudal.

The small aristocracy of mostly Muslim landowners who had served the Turks as the "*effendi*" or governing class dominated Arab society. Many were wealthy, well educated, and had acquired through extensive European contacts a Western sophistication. Their cohesion as a politically effective class was hindered by traditional rivalries among the leading families, the two most influential being the Husainis and the Nashashibis. Members of these and a few other families of

Muslim notables had assumed leadership during Ottoman times, and during the mandate they continued to control the organized religious, political and social life of the Arab community.

Next in influence was a small middle class of urban professional and business men. They controlled the few small industries such as the Nablus soap factories, owned fruit groves in the plains, operated the local newspapers, and generally cooperated with one or another of the notable Muslim families. A number of middle class professionals—physicians, lawyers, editors, educators, government employees and the like—were Christian. The traditional social distance between Muslims and Christians was considerably lessened as a result of common opposition to the two non-Arab foes—the British rulers and the Zionist establishment.

The great majority of Palestinians were peasants, or fallahin, some owners of small agricultural plots, but mostly tenants or hired labor on estates of the gentry. At the lowest social level were the bedouin desert nomads, still largely pastoral, although many engaged in primitive dry farming. In 1922 they were estimated to number about 100,000.

Throughout the era of British mandatory government, Palestine was a predominantly agricultural country, with Muslim Arab peasants comprising the overwhelming majority of the population. Whereas nearly three quarters of the Jews and Christians lived in towns and cities, three quarters of the Muslims lived in rural areas. The outstanding characteristic of the peasant class, according to the 1936 Royal Commission and the 1946 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, was its poverty.² The barrenness of the soil, antiquated agricultural methods, insecure land tenure, an outdated land holding system, limited markets, and an ever increasing rate of population growth conspired to impoverish the fallahin. In 1930 the Johnson-Crosbie Report showed that 30 per cent of rural families were landless and that more than a third of Arab peasants had less than the minimum required for subsistence.

On the other hand there were several Palestinian families which owned between 30,000 and 60,000 dunums. In the country as a whole the 250 largest landowning families owned about the same amount of land as that cultivated by 60,000 peasants at the bottom of the ownership scale. Land shortages were particularly severe in Jerusalem and Nablus where 77 and 63 per cent of the farmers respectively owned less than 50 dunums. While landlords and merchants accumulated wealth, large numbers of small farmers and landless peasants were drawn to the towns to search for scarce employment opportunities. The result was a process of rapid urbanization in which Arab city population increased by 85 per cent between 1931 and 1944, a period during which the rural population increased by only 40 per cent. Many of the unemployed urban proletariat and those paid at extremely low wages contributed to urban unrest and the discontent which fed the fires of nationalism and xenophobia.

There were still great disparities between the Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities, especially between the fallahin and the urban dweller by the end of the mandate, but there was considerable improvement in the rural sector. Through efforts of the mandatory government extensive progress was made in raising Arab health standards, in eliminating malaria which had claimed many victims during the Ottoman times, in extending the roads, in constructing government hospitals and a network of child-welfare centers and clinics, and in expanding education at the village level. An outstanding feature of mandatory educational development was inclusion of agricultural training in the village school and its transformation into a dynamic center for community development and political activism. As a result of improved health conditions and elimination of the compulsory draft which, under the Turks, had drained away village youth, the Arab population of Palestine nearly doubled between 1920 and 1940. During the mandate, despite many economic setbacks, Palestinian Arab income rose to the highest in the Arab world. In 1937 it was

£St. 27 as compared with £St. 12 in Egypt, £St. 16 in Syria-Lebanon and £St. 10 in Iraq. *Per capita* government expenditure in 1936 for Palestinian Arabs was £St. 4.45 compared to 2.30 in Egypt and 1.8 in Lebanon. However, the greatest benefit of the country's economic development accrued to the new middle class and new industrialists created during the period of prosperity. The majority—small farmers, landless peasants, the beduoin and the urban proletariat—benefited very little. It was the latter who supported the most radical nationalist tendencies culminating in the series of armed uprisings during the mandate.

The improved status of the fallahin was also reflected in changing social conditions. By the end of the mandate many of the large landlords, including many who were not Palestinian Arabs but Syrians or Lebanese, sold their estates, not only to Jews but to local Arabs. Although approximately a third of the farmers remained landless, land ownership was mostly by small holders who lived in the villages. In many cases, land was commonly owned by villages and yearly rotated from farmer to farmer, a practice which tended to disrupt the pattern of cultivation and cut down productivity. Between the 1922 and 1931 censuses the number of beduoin decreased by about a third to some 66,000, whereas the total Arab population had increased by a third to over 800,000.

The wide social and economic gap between the fallahin and the Arab élite, against a background of remaining illiteracy (around 75 per cent) despite extensive government improvements in education, did not prevent the coalition of gentry and urban middle class from keeping political control or rallying a large following. The 1929 Royal Commission observed that:³

The contention that the fellah takes no personal interest in politics is not supported by our experience in Palestine. No one who has been about the country as we have been and who has listened to the applause which greeted many passages in the addresses read to us by village heads and

sheikhs could doubt that villagers and peasants alike are taking a very real and personal interest both in the effect of the policy of establishing a national home and in the question of the development of self-governing institutions in Palestine. No less than fourteen Arabic newspapers are published in Palestine and in almost every village there is someone who reads from the papers to gatherings of those villagers who are illiterate. During the long season of the year when the soil cannot be tilled, the villagers, having no alternative occupation, discuss politics and it is not unusual for part of the address in the Mosques on Friday to be devoted to political affairs. The Arab fellaheen and villagers are therefore probably more politically minded than many of the people of Europe.

The views of the Royal Commission were confirmed by active participation of both the peasantry and lower class urban Arabs in political confrontation and armed struggle against both the mandatory authorities and the Jewish community. Their activities frequently set the pace for and aims of Arab political factions, sometimes pushing them to greater extremes than the political leaders would have liked.

From the first attempt to organize anti-Jewish demonstrations in 1918 immediately after the British occupation, until the end of the mandate in 1948 Palestine Arab nationalist claims remained essentially unchanged. Although there were rare individuals who sought to compromise with the British or the Zionists, demands of all nationalist leaders regardless of party or social strata were: repudiation of the British promise to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, establishment of a national government responsible to a representative council elected by the Arabic speaking people of Palestine on the same basis as governments established in the surrounding Arab countries, termination of Jewish immigration into Palestine, ending land sales to Jews, withdrawing recognition of Hebrew as an official language, and banning use of the Zionist

flag. Above all was the quest for national independence under control of the Arabs resting on the premise that the Arabs owned Palestine. All Arab political groups rejected acceptance of an equal footing with the "alien Jews."

There was little if any social or economic content to the programs of most Arab political groupings. Since they were led by those with vested interests in the *status quo*, they had little inclination to urge changes of the type in programs of post World War II Arab socialist groups or of new leftist commandos. Minor exceptions to this generalization were programs such as those of the Communists, and of the League of Arab Students in Jerusalem formed during the 1930s. Its members—teachers, officials and students—had specific socio-economic goals including campaigns to improve rural health and literacy. During World War II it was anti-Fascist and sought to break away from political domination by the notable families. Although willing to meet and discuss problems of mutual concern with Jews, and even to cooperate in social and cultural activities, the group differed little from other Palestine Arab nationalists in its opposition to the Jewish national home. It, too, insisted on immediate establishment of an independent Palestine in which Jews, Muslims and Christians would have full equality. The student progressives strongly opposed either numerical or constitutional parity between Jewish and Arab communities, expressing fear that once parity had been obtained, there was danger that the Jews would then seek to become a dominant majority jeopardizing the Arab position. Talks between the Arab progressives and Jewish representatives finally broke down over the question of Jewish immigration when the Arabs refused to acknowledge any special prerogatives for Jewish immigration into Palestine.

During the 1920s several attempts were made to organize peasant parties, but they too were usually formed by urban notables or middle class professionals, and frequently reflected the quarrels of the leading family political factions.

Attempts to emulate Jewish colonization activities in Pales-

tine through public acquisition of land and rural development were also tried. During the 1920s as well Arabs were asked not to sell their land to Jews, but rather to the Supreme Muslim Council as a religious endowment of the Arab people in Palestine. The Husaini faction set up an Arab National Fund in 1931, modeled on the Jewish National Fund, to purchase land which might otherwise fall into Jewish hands. An Arab Agricultural Bank, later called the Arab National Bank, was established to assist in financing land rescue operations. During the 1940s leadership of the land saving movement passed from control of the Husainis to leaders of a competing political faction, the *Istiqlal*, which directed much of its effort to rallying support for the Arab National Fund. Although the National Fund rallied a large favorable public response, divisiveness among the leadership and attacks by political factions opposed to it prevented any extensive success. By the end of the mandate it was estimated that it had purchased less than 4,000 acres.⁴

A highly successful training project was undertaken in the villages of Palestine between 1931 and 1948, in which the American University of Beirut, the Near East Foundation, and the Palestine Department of Education cooperated. Briefly, it involved the training of village school teachers for one year in agriculture and related activities, and then reassigning them to their schools. Motivated by the desire to serve their communities, and adequately supported and recognized by the central authorities, these teachers succeeded in introducing agricultural training into the curriculum, setting up a school garden for practical demonstrations, organizing classes for adults and stimulating community services.⁵

Musa Alami, a Palestinian notable known for his positive approach to nationalism, adopted a somewhat different tactic based also on rural development rather than outright land purchase. Land sales to Jews could be obviated, he believed,

through raising the socio-economic level of the Arab village, thereby enabling the peasant to take a stand against the incursions of the rapidly developing Jewish economic sector. By raising standards of health, education, social welfare, child care, farming and the like and through establishment of model centers, Arab rural life could be established on more secure foundations. Only one requirement would be made of Arab farmers participating in these projects: a legal guarantee that they would not sell their land to Jews.

In a plan outlined during 1945 and presented to the newly formed Arab League, Alami estimated that it would cost approximately \$150,000 to "redeem" an average Palestinian Arab village.⁶ With a fund of \$5,000,000 he proposed to "save" a minimum of thirty villages a year. Although agreement was reached between leaders of the National Fund and Alami not to compete, his plans were subjected to accusations of being too little and too late. Some critics maintained that since only 15 per cent of land sold to Jews was owned by peasants and the rest was sold by large owners, the proposal was far too limited.

During 1946, Alami, representing the Palestinians in the Arab League, induced the organization's Economic Committee to form an Arab Development Society to carry out his projects. However, less than a quarter of the seed money was raised through an initial contribution from Iraq. Other League members evaded payment. Within Palestine Alami received support from a number of young progressives, non-aligned with the political groups controlled by the notable families. But actual work through the Development Society never was initiated because of the Palestine war and subsequent refugee flight. The Arab Development Society did serve as a basis after the war for refugee training programs on the West Bank near Jericho, and still operates under Israeli occupation.

Given the narrow urban base of Arab society, the insignificant industry, the sparse number of employees per plant, and the fact that a relatively large number of Arab city inhabitants

had only recently migrated from the countryside, the urban labor force of less than 100,000 was not smaller than expected. Not more than 40 per cent of it was permanently urbanized. Barely a tenth of Arab urban workers were organized in labor unions. Even organized labor was torn by the factionalization among family-led political groups. There was no organized socialist movement among the Palestine Arabs, and the Palestine Communist Party, an illegal underground movement until World War II, was divided between Jews and Arabs over nationalist goals. Arab Communists were ardent supporters of the same anti-Zionist programs of all other factions and a number of them joined the guerrilla activities of the 1936-1939 Arab rebellion.

The principal factions tended to group around notable families, having few of the organizational mechanisms or programmatic formulations of Western parties. Leadership was usually self-appointed. There were no countrywide party elections, elected congresses or representative executive bodies. Membership tended to be determined by family ties rather than on an individual basis. Toward the end of the mandate there were deviations from this pattern as younger members of various notable families attempted to organize groups with specific political programs rather than clan relationship as a basis for membership. Since there was little difference in the national goals of the various groups, the fact that villages supported one or another clan or family should not obscure the overwhelming support for the national movement, divided as it was.

Of the two most influential families, the Husainis and the Nashashibis, the former were by far dominant, tracing their ancestry and influence back through the Ottoman era. The Husaini position was even further enhanced after one of its younger leaders, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem and President of the Supreme Muslim Council, the authoritative Muslim religio-political body of the country. This position gave him access to the entire Muslim community

and considerable financial support which abetted his political efforts. Followers of the Mufti were known as the pro-council party or the *Majlisin* in opposition to the anti-councilites or the *Muradin* led by the Nashashibis. These groups became, respectively, the Palestine Arab and the National Defense parties.

Rivalry between these two principal groups was often reflected in political and social differences. Followers of the Mufti and his party represented the more prestigious and older established families and this was evident in the rôle of the Mufti himself. He and his followers initiated the World Islamic Conference of which the Mufti became President. Through his Islamic connections, he cultivated extensive contacts with pan-Arab leaders in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. He was by no means a provincial figure, but enjoyed the prestige of a central personality in inter-Arab politics; for example, he was the mediator between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in their 1934 war and before that in the conflict between two rival Syrian groups during 1926-1928. During World War II he played a significant rôle in the nationalistic revolt in Iraq against Great Britain. The Nashashibis, on the other hand, although commanding less prestige, commanded an extensive following in the new rising middle class. Their followers included many of the new citrus growers and emerging entrepreneurs, merchants and industrialists. Although the socio-economic bases of both groups were landholding, commerce and money-lending, the proportion of *nouveaux riches*, including plantation owners, wealthy farmers, bankers, middle class professionals, etc., was considerably higher among the Nashashibis.

Both groups were equally opposed to Zionism and each attempted to outbid the other in anti-Zionist activity. However, the Nashashibis being more a product of local development than pan-Arab tradition, and representing more interests connected with capital development of the country, tended to view compromise with the British authorities as a more effective and realistic way to achieve independence.

By the late 1930s four other parties had crystallized around other notables. They were the Reform Party, associated with the Khalidi family, the National Bloc based on a grouping of Nablus leaders, the Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth established to encourage participation of youth in the national movement led by a notable Ramlah family, and the *Istiqlal* (Independence) party led by a Jerusalem lawyer, Awni Bey Abd al-Hadi, with a following in Jenin and Nablus.

Only the *Istiqlal* had what resembled a developed political program. It was a local faction of a larger pan-Arab movement created in Damascus during 1919. Its program still envisaged the merger of all Arab states, and was most militantly anti-British and anti-Zionist. To the extent that any party was non-family oriented, it was the *Istiqlal* which appealed more than other groups to the young Muslim intelligentsia of lawyers, physicians, teachers and government officials. Formation of the *Istiqlal* in 1932 was a harbinger of conflict with the Husainis. The new party formulated as its chief aim immediate and full independence but as a part of Arab unity, including Palestine as an integral part of Syria. The new *Istiqlal* opposed family interests and feuds because they prevented solidarity with the national struggle. It succeeded in attracting many of the young radical intellectuals, including Arab members of the newly-formed Communist party. While it never rallied mass support, the *Istiqlal* party slogans helped to recruit many new young radical nationalists. *Istiqlal* members were active in efforts to raise monies for the Arab National Fund, and a number of its leaders were close to Musa Alami, supporting his efforts for rural development.

A series of Palestine Arab Congresses convened between 1920 and 1928 represented a measure of unity. The first two Palestine Congresses were in reality the general Syrian Congresses of 1919 and 1920. However, after collapse of the Syrian Arab régime under King Faisal, the Palestinian representatives formed their own separate body, called the Third Palestine Arab Congress convened at Haifa in 1920. Whereas

former congresses took place under the banner of Syrian independence, the 1920 congress reflected division between pan-Arab elements who were not ready to accept separation of Palestine from Syria and those who were ready to adjust to the replacement of Faisal's rule in Damascus and the French mandate.

With the onset of large-scale Jewish immigration after the rise of Hitler, tension in the country rapidly escalated. At the end of 1935 a near state of hysteria in the Arab public was stimulated by discovery of arms smuggled to the *Haganah*. Radical elements called for an immediate strike but the political parties hesitated. Strike committees emerged spontaneously in Nablus, Jaffa and Jerusalem in November 1935. These independent committees evolved into a nationwide network which put pressure on the political party leadership. Also, in November 1935, one of the first Palestinian guerrilla groups, a forerunner of *al-Fatah*, emerged. It was led by Shaikh Izz al-Din al-Qasim who has since been glorified as the founder of Palestinian Arab resistance. Under slogans of militant pan-Arabism, anti-Westernism and anti-Zionism, he rallied an underground organization in the outskirts of towns among dispossessed landless peasants who were living in urban poverty. The Shaikh's revolt was crushed by the British but he became a legendary hero whose message was carried to the independent national committees in towns and villages.

The peak of unity was achieved during 1936 when all Palestine Arab groupings joined in the general strike against the British mandatory authorities and in boycott of the Jewish community. The movement was sparked by incidents of armed violence between the Jewish and Arab communities. Within days of the first outbursts, an Arab National Committee was formed to back nationalist demands. National committees were formed throughout the country with support of all factions except the *Istiqlal* which demanded immediate independence. This united front was represented by a newly formed Arab Higher Committee.

The strike proved to be far more effective than even Arab leaders themselves thought possible. Passive resistance modelled on Gandhi's Indian movement was organized and received support from the whole Arab community, but it soon degenerated into full fledged revolution. Trains were derailed, bridges blown up, and armed bands including volunteers from Syria and Iraq took over parts of the country. Although there were many villagers who did not join the armed revolt, it had support of most peasants who joined in attacks on British police and Jewish colonies.

The initial strike was supported by Arab officials employed in the mandatory government who petitioned the British authorities stating that unrest was caused by the fact that ". . . the Arab population of all classes, creeds and occupations is animated by a profound sense of injustice done to them. They feel that insufficient regard has been paid to . . . their legitimate grievances. . . . As a result, the Arabs have been driven to a state verging on despair; and the present unrest is no more than an expression of that despair."⁷

The first phase of the Arab rebellion, from the end of August until the general strike in October 1936, achieved a great measure of order and discipline, with the guerrillas recognizing the authority of the Arab Higher Committee and the latter giving political support to the "peoples' struggle." The Arab population at large provided the guerrillas with money, arms and hide-aways. However, the first signs of intra-communal strife appeared where irresponsible elements seized the opportunity to settle old accounts, resulting in the murders of Nasser al-Din Nashashibi, Deputy Mayor of Hebron, Hajj Khalil Taha, Chairman of the Jaffa National Committee and Michel Mitrie, head of a Jaffa trade union.

Most of the 6,000 to 10,000 guerrillas were recruited from the villages and the urban proletariat while the strike and boycott in the cities were organized by the middle class.

By the end of 1936 the strike was called off and violence declined as a result of intervention and attempted mediation

by the rulers of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Trans-Jordan, and because of agreement by Great Britain to send a Royal Commission to investigate the unrest. These developments quickly brought to an end the short lived era of national unity. While some leaders agreed to call off the revolution, others decided, after the Royal Commission had recommended partition of the country, to continue the struggle. Those favoring a halt to violence included the Nashashibi leader who resigned from the Arab Higher Committee, abandoning it to domination by followers of the Mufti. The Husainis, encouraged by widespread support from leaders throughout the Muslim world, decided to oppose partition and to renew the revolt. The revolt spread not only against the British but against "traitors," the leaders and members of the Defense Party who had called for moderation. It soon degenerated into a civil war which forced the Nashashibis to set up their own armed units, the "Peace Corps," which answered Husaini terror with their own forceful retaliation.

A new aspect of the rebellion was outbreak of inter-Arab hostilities caused by Husaini attempts to compel all Palestinians to follow their lead. Several hundred Arabs were executed by fellow countrymen for resisting Husaini leadership during the later phases of the uprising.

By 1938 organized Arab guerrilla bands had become so successful that they took over parts of the country including Hebron, Beersheba, and Jerusalem's Old City. In many areas civil administration was nearly paralyzed. As a symbol of national identity the guerrillas adopted the native headcloth or *kafiyah*, still used by present day Palestinian commandos. Even Arab town dwellers were required to abandon the traditional red fez as an indication of their support for the national cause. Several guerrilla chieftains of that era became folk heroes whose exploits entered the mythology of Palestinian nationalism and they have become part of the present day guerrilla mystique.

By the end of 1938 the guerrilla effort was considerably

weakened because of an influx into the country of major British military forces and an all out effort to suppress the movement, because of increased dissension within guerrilla ranks causing the usual political fragmentation, and because of loss of popularity by the guerrillas resulting from extreme measures against those suspected of insufficient nationalist ardor.

The period of national unity achieved during the early part of the 1936 uprising was never again achieved by Palestinian Arab leadership. Instead, the trend was toward disintegration and continued inter-factional quarrels. By the beginning of World War II what was left of the movement was in complete disarray. A number of leaders had fled from the country; British force was increasing as Palestine became a major base in the eastern Mediterranean, and the Jewish community was growing not only in absolute but in relative terms as a major competitor both within the country and abroad. During the early 1940s there was an abortive rally of Palestine Arab nationalism in which the *Istiqlal* leadership attempted to replace the Nashashibi faction whose strength had declined after withdrawing from the Arab Higher Committee. But the breaches in unity were not closed. Even efforts by the Arab League to bring Palestinian Arab leadership together failed.

Despite failure of the Arab revolt in the 1930s the uprising did achieve major political objectives. It forced the British to withdraw the Peel partition plan, to resume negotiations with the Arab Higher Committee headed by the Mufti at the 1939 London Round Table Conferences and, most significantly, culminated in the 1939 White Paper sharply limiting Jewish immigration and land purchases and guaranteeing an Arab state of Palestine.

As far back as 1937 the Mufti had issued a warning to Great Britain that continuation of pro-Zionist policies would compel the Arabs to ally themselves with the powers opposed to Great Britain. Following this the Mufti's secretary, Uthman Kamil Haddad, was sent to negotiate with Franz von Papen in the

name of the Arab Higher Committee to propose a revolt against Great Britain and France.

During the Second World War Palestine experienced unprecedented prosperity. The expenditure by Great Britain of £St. 160,000,000 between 1940 and 1946 led to great expansion of the economy including agricultural and industrial development, full employment and high wages. Rural agricultural debt entirely disappeared and the Arab trade union movement developed new political direction with greater emphasis on social problems. Increased prosperity corresponded with growing indifference toward the nationalist parties. As hostilities began to intensify between the *Yishuv* (the Jewish community of Palestine) and the British, Arab political activism seemed to diminish. The Arab Higher Committee lost much of its support and the national committees throughout the country had difficulty in raising funds and support.

In the course of the development of Palestinian nationalism between 1917 and 1948 two distinct tendencies seemed to emerge: (1) a radical nationalist trend, although socially conservative, with more popular appeal because of its pan-Arab character and uncompromising rejection of agreement with the Zionist movement, the central target of the Arab struggle; (2) the less popular trend was also less pan-Arab, favoring independence even at the price of concessions to British imperialism and Zionism. Although more developed in an economic and social sense, it had less popular support. Its leaders also had close relations with—and many of them urged unification with—Trans-Jordan. This dichotomy was reflected in differences between the Egyptian supported All Palestine government headed by the Mufti in Gaza during 1949 and by the Palestine Congresses in Amman and Jericho where former leaders of the National Defense Party gave their support to the Amir Abdallah and unification of the East and West Banks.

The nadir of Palestinian Arab nationalism was defeat suffered in the 1948 war with the *Yishuv*. Whereas Palestinian Arabs had reached the peak of unity during the 1936 uprising

and then rapidly declined in strength, the *Yishuv* was in a stronger position than it had ever been by the end of World War II. The Jewish population had increased by nearly a thousand per cent since 1918 from a tenth to a third of the total; the economic, political, social, educational and other communal activities and organizations of the *Yishuv* had emerged from pioneer type experimentation to strength of truly national proportions; its paramilitary and security forces, although sparsely armed, were well trained in the Jewish underground, in the mandate police services, and in the various Allied armies. Leadership of the *Yishuv*, looking forward to possibilities of establishing a Jewish state, had begun to organize or had plans for governmental services and functions paralleling those of the British mandatory authorities. When the British precipitously withdrew from Palestine in 1948 after the United Nations partition resolution, there was even a Jewish postal service in operation to replace the suddenly defunct Palestine postal system.

Growth of Jewish nationalism affected the Palestine Arabs in a number of ways. Jewish immigration in such relatively large numbers intensified Arab anxieties about being swamped and soon outnumbered by a foreign, European population with a radically different culture and way of life. While a handful of Arabs believed that there was much to be learned from the Western technology, organization and material achievement brought by the Europeans, the vast majority feared that their traditional way of life would be substantially altered if not obliterated. These fears were reinforced by rapid physical development of the *Yishuv* evident in its expanding cities, industrial and commercial spread, and ever increasing appetite for land. Arab fears only served to strengthen positions of the most militant nationalists and to weaken if not completely undercut those who advocated some form of compromise. The Nashashibis, originally considered moderate, lost their political position by the end of the 1930s. A handful of Arabs who entered parleys with a somewhat larger handful of Jewish

advocates of binationalism were regarded as traitors to the national cause. In a few instances the Arabs were murdered or beaten up by their foes.

Rapid development of the *Yishuv* with its ever increasing emphasis on establishing a distinctive Jewish communal identity and Arab nationalist response resulted in development of two separate national groups, neither with allegiance to Palestine, but rather to their respective communities, and to the community alone. Each national group had its own system of education, social services, youth groups and other means of identification. The blue and white flag with the star of David was the emblem of the *Yishuv*. The Arabs flew the green and black banner of Arab nationalism. Neither had respect for the British imposed Union Jack.

With outbreak of civil war in Palestine during 1947, followed by international conflict between the new State of Israel and the surrounding Arab states, the *Yishuv*, although still smaller in number, was far stronger, not only in relative, but in real terms, than the Palestine Arab community. Although the partition announcement in November 1947 helped to restore a measure of unity among the Arabs, it was more a unity of sentiment than one which found practical expression. With many of their leaders still abroad and quarrels still continuing between Arab political and paramilitary leaders within the country, many towns and villages were left in confusion. The Arab military campaign against partition, supposedly organized as a collective effort, had no real central command, supply services or unified plan. When Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Trans-Jordan entered the war, they too failed to coordinate their military efforts. The result was complete chaos, and defeat. As rumors and true stories of Jewish atrocities spread among the peasantry and townspeople of Arab Palestine, they fled from what they believed to be impending disaster. By the end of the first Palestine war in 1948 more than three quarters of the Arabs who had lived in areas that fell under Israeli control had become refugees in the surrounding Arab countries

or in the Jordanian controlled West Bank. The Arab remnant of some 160,000 remaining in Israel was a mere shadow of the community that had once lived in largely Arab sections of Jaffa, Acre, Haifa, Jerusalem, Beersheba, Majdal, Faluja, the "little triangle" and Galilee.

Phase Two — Diaspora, Palestinians Become Refugees

Defeat in the first Arab-Israel war of 1947-1948 seemed to terminate the Palestine Arab national movement. Its leadership was discredited and scattered throughout the Arab world. The people of Arab Palestine were also dispersed, more than half of them now refugees. About half continued to live in their own homes under Israeli, Egyptian or Jordanian rule. With morale completely shattered, self respect undermined, and their individual as well as national economies totally disrupted, the Palestinians became dependent on others for survival.

"The defeat of the Arabs in Palestine is no simple setback or light, passing evil," wrote Dr. Constantine K. Zurayk, noted historian, in *The Meaning of the Disaster*.⁸ "It is a disaster in every sense of the word and one of the harshest of the trials and tribulations with which the Arabs have been afflicted throughout their long history—a history marked by numerous trials and tribulations." Defeat was considered not only a tragedy for the Palestinians, but for the whole Arab world, and by many for all of Islam.

While some Arab leaders blamed Great Britain and the United States for the disaster, Zurayk was more introspective: "The explanation of the victory which the Zionists have achieved—and only a person who deceives and blinds himself can deny the victory—lies not in the superiority of one people over another, but rather in the superiority of one system over another. The reason for this victory is that the roots of Zionism are grounded in modern Western life while we for the most part are still distant from this life and hostile to it. They live in the present and for the future while we continue

to dream the dreams of the past and to stupefy ourselves with its fading glory."

The remedy, Zurayk, and most nationalist leaders, believed could come only from "a united, progressive, Arab national being. . . . The first principle, then, in the long-range Arab struggle is the establishment of this being, which . . . will not be achieved unless there is a fundamental transformation in Arab life. It follows that the external struggle to repel the dangers of aggression is linked with the internal struggle to establish a sound Arab being. In fact the latter is the pivot of the former and is essential to its success. . . ." In essence this meant that only through unified effort could the Arabs redress the tragedy of Palestine and that such effort would first require internal reform to meet the superior Western technology of Israel.

For the Palestinians this meant Arabization of the struggle and displacement of their rôle as primary antagonists to Zionism which had achieved its goal of establishing a Jewish state in "Arab Palestine." Arabization also meant internationalization of the conflict and transfer of major debates about it to the United Nations, and to the Arabic press in Arab Jerusalem, Cairo, Beirut, Damascus and Baghdad. Between 1948 and 1967 the Palestinians played only a secondary rôle in the struggle against Israel. Not only did they lack any effective leadership, but any specific territory in which they exercised political hegemony.

Israel took over some 8,000 of the country's former 10,000 square miles. The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan absorbed about 2,000 square miles and Egypt occupied the tiny Gaza Strip. The approximately 160,000 Palestinian Arabs remaining in Israel in 1949 constituted about 18 per cent of the new nation's 870,000 inhabitants. With the large influx of Jewish immigration the percentage of Arabs soon declined to between 10 and 12 per cent. In the Gaza Strip the nearly 200,000 Palestinian refugees outnumbered the indigenous population by about two to one. Palestinians totaled half the population of Jordan, and nearly a third of those were refugees. Pales-

tinian Arabs who fled to Lebanon made up about a tenth of the population. In Syria, although small in proportion to the total population, the 100,000 Palestinians were difficult to absorb in 1948-49. Since there had been no census of Palestinians since the 1930s there were only estimates of their total numbers; however, their birthrate, one of the highest in the world, soon increased the Palestinian population in refugee camps and in the non-refugee communities until by 1970 there were about 2.5 million.

The prevailing image of the Palestinian, on the international scene, in the Arab world, and among themselves, soon became that of a displaced person or downtrodden refugee. Since more than half the Palestinian Arab community had fled from their homes, the refugee presence in the surrounding countries was the most visible manifestation of continued Palestinian existence. Only about a third of the refugees lived in camps organized and operated by the United Nations, but the sprawling tent cities became symbolic of the despair into which the Palestine Arab had fallen. Initially the tent cities—mud soaked in winter, turning to desert encampments in summer—were dismal places. But within a decade the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) converted the camps to less makeshift places. Most tents were replaced by shelters with roofs, walls and floors; sanitary facilities, water, and in many cases, electricity were introduced; a network of social welfare and child care centers, clinics, supplementary feeding stations and an elementary school system, one of the best in the Arab world, were established.

Fewer than 100 non-Arab administrators headed this system after its establishment, leaving day to day operations to local personnel—most of whom were Palestinian. Thus the Palestinian Arab community, cared for and taught by its own physicians, nurses, social workers and teachers, had one of the most efficient and extensive welfare systems in the Near East. These operations were run on a scanty budget of about

ten cents per day (of which nearly half was for education, and less than half for food rations). UNRWA successfully avoided any major epidemics, or serious increase in death rates. On the contrary, the Palestinians were as healthy as, if not in better physical condition than, populations in the host countries which accounted in part for their high birthrate.

The relatively satisfactory physical condition of the refugees was no indication of their psychological situation. Initially most were unemployed and lived in extremely crowded conditions. All had great expectations of returning soon to their homes in Israeli held territory. Resistance to their exile was evident in strong opposition to construction of permanent shelters in refugee camps. Only after several years of negotiations was it possible for UNRWA officials to persuade the refugees that construction of weather proof shelters did not mean abandonment of "the right of return."

Throughout more than two decades of international effort to resolve the refugee situation, mere mention of "resettlement" has been sufficient to undermine any of the numerous refugee rehabilitation projects. Even though increasing numbers of refugees have found employment within the framework of economic development of the Arab world since 1948, and living conditions for many have improved, the vast majority continue to regard themselves as Palestinians, temporarily displaced from their former homes. Tensions generated by this state of impermanence and continued but frustrated expectations have been evident, according to UNRWA medical authorities, in the high incidence of psychosomatic illness prevailing in the camps. The ever widening gap between realities of every day refugee life and the constantly verbalized vision of return to home and security, idealized as this vision may be, has developed among the Palestinians a diaspora mentality not unlike that of Jews living in European displaced persons camps after World War II, or among Armenians living in areas surrounding their former homeland after World War I. The state of expectation and impermanence was evident among refugees from the

youngest children to the elders. The former, who never saw Palestine or whose parents might have been too young to remember the country, when questioned about their identity usually answer with the name of a Palestinian city, town or village. Elders talk of return to their village, farm or ancestral burial places. After 1948 there seemed to be intensification of Palestine national consciousness among the country's former Arab inhabitants rather than decline in feeling of identity with the country.

There were both social and political reasons for the growth of Palestine consciousness. In most areas where they lived, Palestine Arabs continued to maintain the social organization based on family ties and clan connections which had been the basis of village life before the "disaster." In refugee camps, headed by young Palestinians of some organizational skill, the *hamula* (clan) network was used to relay information and as a basis for distribution of UNRWA services. Throughout the Arab world, and of course in refugee camps, refugees intermarried with other refugees, social contacts were largely with other Palestinians, and frequently old business and commercial contacts were continued. Among refugees there was little contact with Arabs who were not Palestinian. The physicians, welfare workers, distributors of rations, teachers and supervisors in the UNRWA schools were Palestinian. Flags, symbols and slogans in the UNESCO supervised UNRWA schools constantly reminded both teachers and students of the lost homeland. The distinctive Palestinian identity of the refugees was also encouraged by the population of the host countries, which for a variety of political, economic and social reasons resented the intrusion of the disruptive outsiders.

A UNESCO commission of experts made observations about the strength of nationalist sentiment engendered by the educational system in terms reminiscent of comments about the Palestine Arab school system by the 1936 Royal Commission.⁹ The UNESCO commission pointed out that in UNRWA schools, "the choice of historic events selected is almost always centered

on Palestine, but an excessive importance is given to the problem of relations between the Prophet Mohammed and the Jews of Arabia, in terms tending to convince young people that the Jewish community as a whole has always been and will always be the irreconcilable enemy of the Muslim community." It was observed that there were frequent examples taken directly from present day Palestine and obviously meant to maintain the nostalgia for the " 'usurped homeland' and to strengthen the desire to reconquer it one day." In both history and geography books, there was frequent emphasis on the Arab identity of Palestine. ". . . the term Israel is never used and never featured on any map to designate a State entity. The territories constituting the State of Israel are frequently designated as the 'usurped portion of Palestine.'"

"The description of Palestine is a mere summary list and description of towns and areas as they were in 1947, without the slightest reference to their defacto situation since the establishment of the State of Israel."

The Commission commented that in many textbooks: "The Israeli Arab conflict holds a central place. Palestine is always in people's thoughts, even if not always mentioned. It influences the choice of poetry or prose for anthologies, the kind of examples and exercises pupils are set, as it conditions the tracing of maps and the wording of their captions." Although in the education they received the Palestinians were identified as Arabs, the identification was that of a distinctive entity which was part of the greater Arab world. Love of the homeland, therefore, remained deep in Arab consciousness during the post-1948 era even among children who had never seen Palestine.

The close identity of Palestinians with the actual physical land was evident in a survey conducted by sociologists from the Hebrew University among Israeli Arabs during 1967.¹⁰ They noted that:

Being in the main rural population, Israeli Arabs have a close, almost mystical relationship with their land. In rural

societies possession of land has always symbolized authority and security. A man who acquired wealth, reinvested it in land, and similarly, the sale of land symbolized impoverishment and loss of status.

Even families which stopped working in agriculture did not leave the zone of influence of rural tradition; the more educated among them could give a more sophisticated expression to their love of the soil and countryside.

This individual (or family) bond between Israeli Arabs and their land was frequently transformed into a collective bond. Holding on to the land which is a national Arab possession turns the fact of remaining in Israel from a routine personal attachment into a national aim.

In the literature created by Israeli Arabs during the past 20 years, there is frequent use of agricultural symbols with a national connotation. Love for a girl, for the village and the homeland, are perceived by the Israeli Arab poet as a single indivisible emotion. The 1948 war is described in this literature as the shattering of a rural idyll (conceived in romantic and nostalgic images) and a severance from a familiar and beloved landscape. Those who remained behind must watch over the inheritance for those who are scattered. In this way the Israeli Arabs who did not take refuge with the majority of their brethren in Arab countries found a legitimation of their minority status in a Jewish country.

When a nationalist movement was founded among the Israeli Arabs in 1963 (to be banned finally by the authorities), the name 'El Ard'—'The Soil'—was found to be the most natural expression of national aspirations.

Nostalgia for the homeland has been evident in the work of Palestine Arab writers and artists during the twenty-year period after the exodus. The themes of regaining the fatherland, of return, and of despair with conditions in exile, are widely prevalent in Arab literary and esthetic themes during this period.¹¹

A survey of refugees on the East Bank conducted after the June war by sociologists from the American University of Beirut also emphasized strong attachment to the homeland.¹² By far the vast majority of both new and old refugees stated that return to their homes was their chief desire. According to the researchers one of the most evocative responses was: "Your country is like your child. . . . You cannot be separated from it for a long time. Your country is where you were born and no other country could be dearer to your heart." The survey found that names given to infants born in refugee camps were another indication of the nationalistic state of mind among the Palestine Arabs. The names included Zeezyz (name of a refugee camp), Jihad (struggle), Harb (war), and Aida (the one who is returning).

Despite great pessimism among refugees about possibilities of immediate return—only 19 per cent of the new and a mere six per cent of the old refugees thought they would return soon—only three per cent believed that they would never return.¹³ The inevitable conclusion of most was that still another war with Israel would be necessary to regain their land and homes. The interviewers maintained that few of the Palestine refugees with whom they spoke thought in terms of a war to destroy Israel. "Only one family spoke of revenge when discussing the probability of war, whereas others talked of a war to win back the rights of Arabs and their honor. As one respondent put it, when asked what he thought Arabs should do in the future: 'peace . . . if that is impossible then war.'"

The host countries, except Jordan, encouraged the Palestinians to maintain their distinctive identity for economic, political and social reasons. Because most refugees were Muslims, they were unwelcome as citizens in Lebanon where they threatened to upset the delicate balance between local Muslims and Christians. Many Syrians regarded the Palestinians as an unruly element, undesirable as citizens. To grant them citizenship would furthermore be tantamount to conceding permanent Arab loss of Palestine. Egypt, already one of

the most overpopulated nations, could not spare space in its teeming cities or thickly populated Nile Valley for the Gaza refugees. Political instability in Iraq blocked implementation of any extensive development plans in that country which would have facilitated a large immigration. Elsewhere in the Arab world, in Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf principalities where many Palestinians found employment, the host governments made acquisition of citizenship difficult for foreigners; or the Palestinians were reluctant to adopt a new nationality in a radically different society. Furthermore, all Arab countries regarded return of the refugees to their homes as a right, denied by Israel, which had to be restored. Once the Palestinians were settled, the Arab states maintained, the refugee issue would disappear. Even in instances where they accepted foreign citizenship and found upward social mobility and economic success, most retained their Palestinian identity, regarding as only provisional their new "temporary" status.

In the Hashimite Kingdom where any Palestinian could become a citizen, where they were represented in parliament, the cabinet, and where they constituted a high proportion of all ranks in the civil service, there was little feeling of loyalty to the Hashimite dynasty. Despite the grant of "equal rights" there was always a deep reserve separating Palestinians from the royal family. Throughout the era from 1948 to 1967 there were numerous instances of West Bank civil disturbances which were put down by the King's army. West Bank inhabitants charged that the government's development program favored the East Bank, making the Palestinians in effect second class citizens. They maintained, with some justification, that King Husain had established most development projects on the East Bank, neglecting the industrial potential of West Bank Palestine.

As the environment of the host countries was transformed through economic and social change during the 1950s and 1960s there was corresponding economic and social change among the Palestinians. Having left the country twenty years ago as a

largely unskilled agricultural population, few raised families that remained illiterate fallahin. The younger refugees, taking advantage of opportunities offered in the UNRWA educational and technical institutions, broke out of the framework of traditional Arab society. Since most Palestinians, including the refugees, lived in or near to urban centers, they rapidly adjusted to modern city life, developing aspirations for upward mobility and economic security found among all modern urban minorities. This explains the hunger for education among youth, the attendance of some 50,000 Palestinians at higher educational institutions, the large enrollment in basic education comprising 80 to 90 per cent of the eligible age-group compared to 53 per cent in the Arab world as a whole, and the orientation toward city occupations rather than toward farm labor.¹⁴

Many of the non-refugees continued their professional pursuits in the surrounding countries after 1948, and thousands of Palestinians from the former fallah class also became lawyers, physicians, engineers and technicians. Like diaspora Jews and Armenians, Palestinians became a quasi-élite in many Arab countries, providing professionals for rapidly developing countries such as Kuwait, Libya and other oil states which were short of skilled labor. Estimates ranged to over 100,000 Palestinians employed as skilled labor in the Persian Gulf.

Despite the strong grass roots attachment to and nostalgia for their homeland among diaspora Palestinians, despite the relatively high level of education and large numbers of professionals, there emerged relatively little political leadership within the group. The nationalist movement was controlled by other Arab leaders, such as those of the Ba'th, or by supporters of Nasser. Instances where there were attempts at forming a Palestinian movement with its own leadership were aborted by political manipulation or by withholding necessary material support. Since the Palestinians had no territorial base under their own control, no large funds at their disposal, and were themselves dispersed throughout the Arab world, it

was difficult to compete with stronger Arab leaders such as Gamal Abd al-Nasser. After the emergence of Nasser from his rôle as an Egyptian to an Arab leader, he dominated the Arab political scene, setting the goals to be reached, the means to reach them and the pace at which they would be pursued.

Zurayk explained why Israel was considered a threat not only to the Palestinians, but to the whole Arab world:¹⁵ "The other dangers either threaten some limited part of their being or else they include both the Arab world and the rest of the world. This danger threatens the very center of Arab being, its entirety, the foundation of its existence. All other [dangers] are simple in relation to it and may, for the sake of repelling this most serious and all-important danger and for the sake of preserving one's self from it, be endured, or at least have their solution postponed."

After calling attention to the "danger of Jewish power in the United States," he warned that: "The forces which the Zionists control in all parts of the world can, if they are permitted to take root in Palestine, threaten the independence of all the Arab lands and form a continuing and frightening danger to their life. The facilities that the Zionist forces have for growth and expansion will place the Arab world forever at their mercy and will paralyze its vitality and deter its progress and evolution in the ladders of advancement and civilization—that is, if this Arab world is permitted to exist at all."

Defeat of Arab armies in 1948 and warnings such as those of Zurayk helped spark political upheaval or revolutions in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen and Jordan. While many Arab leaders put increasing emphasis on internal reform with positive effect evident in economic growth, all efforts toward unity failed. Even a second major defeat of Egypt by Israel in collaboration with Great Britain and France during 1956 failed to bring the Arab states together. Their common fear and hatred of Israel was insufficient to overcome the many obstacles to unity—political, economic and military-strategic.

A variety of new political movements emerged, many emphasizing socialism with an Arab approach. Palestinians tended to gravitate toward one or another of these, such as the Ba'th which in Jordan was led by Abdallah al-Rimawi and Kamal Nasir [the latter now official spokesman for the PLO], the Arab Nationalist Movement founded by another Palestinian George Habash, later to become chief of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or to become followers of Egypt's President Nasser. A number of Palestinian organizations were formed including the Palestine Labor Union, the Palestine Student Organization, the Palestine Red Cross, the Palestine Women's Organization and others. These no longer represented primarily the *hamula* network but a new emerging middle class.

The Egyptian leader became the most attractive symbol of unity, and to the Palestinians, the most likely hero to fill the rôle of leadership in redeeming the homeland. Whereas the Ba'th attracted a handful of young Palestinian intellectuals, the masses in refugee camps, in the towns and cities, and even among the Israeli Arabs, responded to Nasser's call for Arab unity. The Egyptian President's picture could be found in Palestinian homes, both Muslim and Christian, throughout the Arab world. Defeat in the 1956 war only raised his prestige since he was able to snatch political victory from military defeat. Creation of the UAR in 1958 raised Nasser's prestige to an all time high making him the most distinguished hero since early Arab history. Whereas unity attempts and efforts against Israel through the Arab League had failed, Nasser, it was widely believed, had been successful in taking the first step toward victory.

Nasser's charismatic image among masses throughout the Arab East, including the Palestinians, failed to elicit similar responses from Arab leaders. On the contrary, fear of the Egyptian tended to polarize inter-Arab politics into at least two, and probably several, political groupings. As a symbol of Arab socialism and the new radical régimes, Nasser inspired

distrust among the remaining conservative monarchies in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Yemen. Because he was the leader who concocted his own ideology, he was mistrusted by the Ba'th and other Arab leftists. The Egyptian President's success in winning a popular following outside his own country—in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan—only caused more divisiveness rather than greater unity, for socialist and nationalist groups in these countries often split into pro- and anti-Nasser factions.

This polarization among the Arab states was reflected in reactions to the Palestine problem. No leader advocated negotiations with Israel, but each had his own distinctive approach to the problem. Syria tended to favor immediate and militant action. Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt were more respectful of Israel's military power, therefore tended to forestall military activism. Iraq, while less militant than Syria, was more activist than Israel's other neighbors.

Competition and rivalries among the various Arab governments on the Palestine problem were reflected in their support for a variety of different Palestinian organizations backed less with a view to helping the Palestinians than in the hope of using them for political profit against some other government. In effect the Palestinians were actually prevented from developing their own effective political organizations, becoming in many instances tools of intra-Arab political bickering.

Opposing trends in Palestine Arab consciousness were evident in divisions within the refugee population. The more moderate Palestinians representing the urban élite and upper middle class were pro-Jordanian in opposition to the camp refugees who represented mostly rural peasants and the urban proletariat. These differences were often reflected in disputes which have shaken the Arab world since 1948: quarrels between Jordan and the other Arab states, discussions about the Palestine entity *versus* the PLO, and conflict between the PLO and the Jordanian government.

Immediately after the 1948 war in an attempt to frustrate

King Abdallah's claims to the West Bank, the Egyptians sponsored in Gaza the Arab Government of All Palestine under "premier" Ahmad Hilmi Pasha. Soon after the Jerusalem Mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, arrived to be elected President of an Arab Palestine national assembly claiming authority over "free democratic sovereign Palestine." By the end of the year it was recognized by all Arab League members except Trans-Jordan. The government never extended its authority beyond Gaza, and within the Strip it soon faded into obscurity as Egyptian military control was imposed. True, Gaza was never incorporated into Egypt, but was governed under laws of mandatory Palestine by the remaining Arab local officials who operated under close supervision of the Egyptian army's Palestine Office. Soon after it was established, the Gaza All Palestine government was removed and established its headquarters in Cairo where it disappeared. However, in 1959 the Mayor of Gaza proclaimed a Palestinian Charter containing essentially the substance of the future Palestine Liberation Organization Charter. This may have been a move by President Nasser to undermine influence of Hajj Amin al-Husaini who was still presiding in Cairo over remnants of the old Arab Higher Committee. As a result the Palestine entity became one of the two major issues in inter-Arab politics, the other being the question of Algerian independence.

Not to be outdone by the Egyptians, and in direct opposition to an Arab League resolution, King Abdallah declared that the security zone of his government extended from the Egyptian frontier to the borders of Syria and Lebanon. To further strengthen his position, he convened a Palestine refugee conference of some 5,000 notables in October 1948 at Amman to repudiate the Mufti's government and to invite Abdallah to accept a protectorate over Palestine. In a next step Abdallah was proclaimed "King of Jerusalem" by the city's Coptic bishop. In December of 1948 still another Arab Congress was convened in Jericho by the Mayor of Hebron, Muhammad Ali al-Jabari, calling for immediate annexation

of the West Bank.

In the dispute that followed between King Faruq of Egypt and King Abdallah the ulema of al-Azhar and the Arab League Council denounced the Hashimite moves as paving the way "for annihilation of the Arabs in Palestine." Al-Jabari broadcast an open letter to King Faruq denouncing the Egyptians and proclaiming that the Arabs of Palestine, "who cannot bear their sufferings any longer, have decided to proclaim Abdallah King of Palestine." With the help of cooperative Palestinians, Abdallah finally completed his annexation by appointing a new Jordanian parliament in April 1949. Despite Arab League threats to expel Jordan from the organization, Palestinians in Jordan cooperated, accepting seven of the twenty seats in the new chamber. In defiance of his enemy, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, Abdallah appointed a new Mufti and made the chief antagonist of the Husainis, Raghیب Bey Nashashibi, Minister of Refugees and Deputy Governor of Arab Palestine with the title of Pasha. The act not only strengthened Abdallah's hand against the Egyptians and the Mufti, but added legitimacy to his claims as the successor to leadership of the Palestinian Arabs. Shortly after these actions Abdallah was assassinated in Jerusalem by one of the Husaini clan, indicating that Hashimite title to leadership was not as secure as Abdallah believed it to be.

After the demise of King Abdallah, the expulsion of King Faruq and the rise of Gamal Abd al-Nasser as the central figure in the Arab world, many Palestinians turned to the new Egyptian President for leadership. Because of his success in flaunting the Western powers who were held by many Palestine refugees to be responsible for their plight, and because of the international prestige he attracted as a "Third-World" leader, President Nasser gained wide popularity. His picture replaced that of former leaders such as Hajj Amin al-Husaini, in many Palestinian homes throughout the Arab world.

Although Egypt and Jordan led in competition to use the Palestinians for their own purposes, Syria and Iraq also joined

the game. Each country had its own group of Palestinian "leaders" to which it gave financial support and political backing. At one time Iraq supported a delegation of Palestinian representatives with an office in New York. Syria organized a Palestine Arab Refugee Institute in Damascus to assist the refugees, print propaganda and represent the Palestinians. The Syrian army assisted in organizing and equipping commando groups, and adopted *al-Asifa*, the military arm of *Fatah*, in an attempt to embroil Jordan with Israel. The most successful venture of this type was Israel's retaliatory attack on the Jordanian West Bank village of Samu' in November 1966 in retaliation for an *al-Asifa* raid.

Fearing danger of premature involvement in a war with Israel for which he was not yet prepared, President Nasser attempted to counter Syrian precipitous moves at the 1964 Cairo Summit Conference. Ostensibly the conference was convened to plan an all Arab strategy to prevent Israeli diversion of the Jordan River. A joint technical plan was devised, but never implemented. More important from the Palestine Arab viewpoint were decisions taken to recognize a Palestine entity on an international level; to organize the people of Palestine in bases for action; and "by making them assume the responsibility of their national cause and the liberation of Palestine."¹⁶

Ahmad Shukairy, a former upper middle class lawyer from Acre who had been active in Palestinian youth movements, and who after 1948 had represented first Syria then Saudi Arabia in the United Nations, was appointed as the Palestinian representative to the Arab League and charged with forming a new Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO represented convergence of agreement between the cautious policies of President Nasser, symbol of Arab radicalism, on the one hand, and King Husain, one of the few remaining monarchs, on the other. Both rulers agreed in advance on selection of a group of Palestinians to counteract the militantly precarious policies being pursued by the Syrian Ba'thist leaders, and

carried out in the field by *Fatah*. Recognition of a "Palestine entity" was a concession by the Jordanian king since it acknowledged an authority other than his as a possible successor to leadership of the Palestine refugees.¹⁷

Under Shukairy's leadership the PLO would nominate a "provisional national leadership" to include an executive council and committee which would study the draft of a charter to be presented by Shukairy. All Palestinians would be members of the PLO which would "become responsible for carrying out actions that would lead to liberation in every field." Palestine military forces would be organized and trained under the auspices of the Unified Arab Command headed by an Egyptian Commander-in-Chief. A Palestine National Fund would be revived, financed by a tax on all Palestinians, financial assistance from other Arab states and peoples, and by sale of a liberation stamp.

After visiting Jordan, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Egypt and Sudan, Shukairy convened a Palestine Congress in Jerusalem during May 1964, which unanimously elected him Chairman. The Congress met under the auspices of King Husain and the Arab League, with 242 Palestinian representatives and official delegates from all Arab Kings and Presidents with the exception of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, whom Shukairy had once represented in the United Nations, viewed the proceedings with a jaundiced eye and did not permit the twelve Palestinians selected by Shukairy to attend the Congress.

After opening speeches by King Husain and Arab League Secretary General Hassuna, Shukairy made it clear that the Palestine entity did not aspire to sever the West Bank from Jordan. Its goal was to liberate Israeli held Palestine.

The National Charter of the PLO proclaimed by the Congress in June, defined Palestine within the boundaries of the British mandate as "an indivisible unit." Palestine, it stated, "is an Arab homeland, bound by the ties of Arab nationalism to the other Arab countries—which, together with Palestine, con-

stitute the greater Arab homeland." Palestinians, "are those Arab citizens who, until 1947, had normally resided in Palestine, regardless of whether they have been evicted from it or have stayed in it. Anyone born, after that date of a Palestinian father whether inside Palestine or outside it—is also a Palestinian." Jews "of Palestinian origin shall be considered Palestinian if they desire to undertake to live in loyalty and peace in Palestine."

The Charter avoided endorsement of socialism or any of the other competing nationalist ideologies, emphasizing that: "Ideological systems—whether political, social or economic—shall not divert the attention of the population of Palestine from their primary duty: the liberation of their homeland. All Palestinians shall be one national front, working together—in complete dedication, and with all their spiritual and material power—toward the liberation of their homeland." After liberation, "the Palestinian people shall be free to adopt, for its public life, the political, economic or social system of its choice."

Arab unity was endorsed as complementary to liberation: "Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine; the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity," the Charter affirmed. Liberation of Palestine is a responsibility "which lies upon the Arab nation as a whole, governments as well as peoples, with the people of Palestine in the vanguard. Accordingly, the Arab nation must mobilize all its military, material, and spiritual capabilities for the liberation of Palestine."

The Balfour Declaration, the mandate for Palestine, the Zionist movement, partition of Palestine in 1947 and establishment of Israel were regarded as contrary to international legal practices and morality according to the Charter, therefore the people of Palestine deserved the backing of the international community in resisting them. The document reaffirmed Shukairy's disavowal of claims to "any territorial sovereignty over the West-Bank (region) . . . the Gaza Strip, or the Himmah area."¹⁸

The PLO, in large measure a creation of, and supported by, Egypt and Jordan for their own political purposes, was the most representative Palestinian group since the 1948 "disaster." Yet it failed to galvanize either mass support or the backing of all Arab leaders. Remnants of the old Arab Higher Committee, still led by the Mufti, denounced Shukairy for seeking a "faked entity," charging that delegates to the Congress had been hand picked. Election, insisted the Mufti, was the only way for the Palestinians to choose true representatives (Shukairy had discarded elections as "impossible and unfeasible"). Support of the former Jerusalem Mufti received by Saudi Arabia aroused antagonism to him by President Nasser who charged him with being a reactionary.¹⁹

The Syrian Ba'athists also opposed the new PLO, demanding elections and full sovereignty by the Palestinians over all Palestine, including those areas disclaimed by Shukairy. Six underground organizations including the Palestine Liberation Front, the Palestinian National Liberation Front, the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Palestinian Commando Bloc, the Arab Liberation Front for Palestine, and the National Liberation Organization, announced that they would merge to find a "military way" to liberate the homeland.²⁰

After the Jerusalem Congress, the PLO initiated a number of activities, including offices in New York to compete with the Mufti's Palestinian representatives at the United Nations. The PLO formed an Arab Professional Union, and started military training of Palestinians under the Unified Arab Command.

The UAR remained true to its promises of aid to the PLO, and was the mainstay of the organization until the June 1967 war. It facilitated organization and training of the Palestine Liberation Army in the Gaza Strip, supplying its soldiers with uniforms and equipment. However, relations between King Husain and Shukairy soon broke down. Efforts by the PLO to organize military units in Arab towns and refugee camps along the frontier with Israel were regarded as likely to spark inci-

dents which would result in massive Israeli retaliation and subversion of the Jordanian government. The disagreements soon became acrimonious, turning into charges by Shukairy that the Jordanian King was selling out to Zionists and imperialism. On the other hand, the Syrians also made use of their Palestinian protégés to subvert stability along the Israeli-Jordanian frontier and within Jordan. To counteract these attacks from the direction of Syria and Egypt, King Husain took the unusual steps of adopting the Arab Higher Committee, guaranteeing that one of its leaders, Emile Ghuri, would be elected to parliament, and welcoming the Mufti back to Jerusalem for a visit.

Not until May 1967 was a measure of superficial unity restored when the crisis leading to the June war built up to a pitch of hysteria. As the crisis approached, most of the Arab world envisaged a smashing victory over Israel. Egypt was to be in the vanguard of the struggle since it had obtained hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Soviet military equipment. All the Arab states were psychologically primed for the kill and an era of Arab brotherliness seemed at hand. A week prior to the war Nasser and Husain once again restored relations and signed still one more military pact. As part of the accord, Shukairy was formally reestablished in the good graces of King Husain and accompanied him on the return flight from Cairo to Amman on May 30, 1967. The PLO was to be allowed to operate once again, and the various Palestinian units were to cooperate in the Unified Command. Only Syria held out in continued opposition to the Jordanian monarch, sending its Palestine commando units into Jordan as late as May to strike not only at Israel, but at the Jordanian government.

In this second phase of the development of Palestine Arab nationalism from 1948 to 1967, strong roots of attachment to their homeland developed among the Palestine Arabs. Actually there were several Palestinian communities—in Gaza, West Bank Jordan, the East Bank, Lebanon, Syria and Israel. Each differed from the other in its relations with local government,

in the economic and social status of its members, and in the extent of its political influence and activity. However, they all had in common a deep Palestinian consciousness. What they lacked was an effective, responsible and respected leadership. Such Palestinian leaders as existed followed in the footsteps of the *hamula* notables who had led them into the first "disaster" in 1948. The Mufti, Shukairy and others who acquired influence with Arab governments or the Arab League were not elected, but either self-chosen or hand picked by non-Palestinian Arab rulers for their own political purposes. This was also the case with the numerous "commando" groups employed, mostly by Syria, to heat up the Israeli-Jordanian frontier.

In the final analysis, it would be fair to say that there was no genuine Palestine Arab nationalist movement from 1948 to 1967, but that there was a truly popular Palestine Arab consciousness; that there was a rôle in search of a hero. Many Palestinians believed that President Nasser filled that rôle, thus the growing trend toward emphasis on Arab unity as the way to liberation of Palestine. But the UAR also naturally placed its own national interests above those of the Palestinians, finally leading to frustration with the hero as well as with his rôle.

Furthermore, the Palestinians during this period of dispersion aroused wide spread interest in and concern about the Palestine question throughout the Arab world. It became a significant issue even in countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Sudan and the Persian Gulf states which prior to the 1950s had no political involvement and only indirect interest in it.

Phase Three — Refugees Become Palestinians

Israel's defeat of Egypt, Syria and Jordan in the Six Day War of June 1967 also had a traumatic effect on the Arabs of Palestine. Over 400,000 were displaced from their homes, about half of them for the second time in twenty years. Most

of the new and second time refugees fled to the East Bank of Jordan where tens of thousands began life anew in hastily constructed tent camps. At first the situation resembled that in 1947-1948, with the same bewilderment, feeling of hopelessness and resentment against all outside authority. Again, UNRWA had to negotiate with refugee leaders to persuade them to accept more permanent shelters than the flimsy tents used during the first winter of 1968; again there was great confusion about the numbers of refugees and their status; again there were urgent appeals through the United Nations for international assistance to the hundreds of thousands of newly displaced persons.

Many aspects of the new situation differed from that in 1948. Whereas after the first "disaster" only a tiny remnant of Palestine Arabs remained under Israeli control, now there were about a million and a half, the two largest concentrations being on the West Bank and in Gaza. Added to the rapidly increasing Arab citizenry of Israel those on the West Bank and in Gaza comprised over half of the two and a half million Palestine Arabs living in the Middle East. In East Jordan, at least three quarters of the population was Palestinian, and over half were refugees. In Lebanon, Syria and the Arabian peninsula where there were large numbers of Palestinians, the proportion remained essentially unchanged.

The geopolitical-strategic situation was also radically altered, with Israel now holding all of Palestine, in addition to the Egyptian Sinai and the Syrian Golan Heights. Israel's immediate security position *vis-à-vis* the Arab states was vastly improved, with all its large population centers far removed from direct strikes by Arab armies.

The substantially strengthened military-security position of Israel against the background of shameful defeat of Arab armies surpassing it in manpower and modern equipment, and the renewed upheaval within the Palestine Arab community would have seemed to indicate a situation of despair. In Arab capitals, political leaders seemed bereft of any constructive

answer to the defeat. At first there were attempts to blame the United States once again, but they failed when American military intervention was disproven. The summit conference of Arab chiefs of state held at Khartoum in the Sudan in September 1967 was unable to produce any concrete suggestions for coping with defeat other than economic support for defeated Jordan and Egypt from Libya, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. As for Israel, the conference reiterated a policy of no negotiations, no peace and no recognition.

Among Palestinians living in the Arab world there soon began to crystallize a resentment of existing Arab leadership and of methods they had pursued for dealing with the Palestine dilemma. All Arab politicians, including the Ba'athists, Nasser and the Arab left, seemed to have failed. Conventional tactics of direct military confrontation by even large and well equipped armies had only worsened the Arab position. Years of indirect confrontation through boycott, blockade and diplomacy only seemed to have strengthened Israel. In spite of their boasts of May that they would score decisive victory against Israel, June revealed that the claims of Palestinian leaders such as Shukairy and the aging Mufti were built on foundations of sand.

Initial reaction against existing leadership and methods came from the young Palestine intelligentsia, including university students and graduates in Arab capitals and in Europe. The reaction was not organized in any distinctive pattern nor was it centralized through any known leadership. Rather it was sporadic and fitful, the reaction of proud young men who were determined to avenge the disgrace they had suffered. A new element was acceptance of women, many of them also students, as partners in the revolution. Within a year after defeat these groups of Palestinian youth were organized into more than three dozen different organizations.

Nearly all the groups had the common objectives of asserting Palestinian identity and attaining revenge for the years of Arab defeat through eliminating the State of Israel and its

Zionist apparatus and its replacement by a secular Palestinian Arab state. They believed this could be accomplished only through force carried out by *fedayeen* (guerrilla) tactics rather than through direct confrontation by Arab armies. Most believed that the struggle would last for decades, perhaps for generations. Major emphasis was placed on building Palestinian consciousness, self respect, and modern technological capabilities in preparation for the struggle. The new groups differed from previous Palestinian *fedayeen* in several ways. Not only were most members youths, including a few girls, but in addition to recruiting in refugee camps and among the most impoverished elements of society, a high percentage of the new activists were university educated professionals, including physicians, lawyers and engineers. The new groups disclaimed political and operational control by Arab governments, although Syria and Iraq again sponsored at least one of their own Palestine commando units, and all of them required financing, either directly or indirectly, from one or another Arab government. Whereas earlier Palestinian nationalist groups, both *fedayeen* and political, had disclaimed objectives other than Arab unity and Palestine liberation, many of the new groups espoused radical ideologies prevailing among leftist youth at Western universities. Arab students who had studied in Germany, France and the United States brought back to the Middle East philosophies of Mao, Che Guevera and Frantz Fanon. The Algerian revolution against France also provided a model for organization and action.

The attempt by the "organizations" as they were generically called to reverse the image of downtrodden refugee to Palestine nationalist was evident in the social and educational work undertaken in UNRWA camps and in the refugee centers of Beirut, Amman and other Arab cities. Women's sewing circles, clinics and other similar self-help organizations were established to supplement the military training initiated by the organizations. *Fatah*, largest of the post 1967 organizations, established a youth group called *Ashbal* (young lions) to instill

patriotic sentiment and military training among youngsters in grade school.

Tactics of the organizations varied from those which staged guerrilla attacks on Israel military units in the occupied areas to terrorist raids on civilian centers, including discharging explosives in the Hebrew University, a Tel-Aviv bus terminal, or a Haifa public housing unit. Outside Palestine some guerrillas hoped to weaken Israel by choosing targets including *El Al* airline offices, Israeli diplomatic and consular offices, and international air traffic headed for Israel. The most militant hijacked non-Israeli planes on their way to Lydda in an attempt to disrupt commercial air traffic vital to the enemy.

While these tactics had great psychological impact, they caused little more damage to Israel's economy or security position than such commonly accepted mishaps as automobile accidents or winter storms. Rather than frighten Israelis or cause despair in the country, the commando and terrorist attacks seemed to strengthen the hand of Israeli militants and to diminish the influence of moderates. Indeed, the commando activities, against the background of continued border warfare with Jordan, Egypt and Syria, led to greater emphasis on preserving Israeli superiority, building a self sufficient military establishment, maintaining a relatively larger standing army for border defense and occupation, and rallying support abroad from "allies" such as the United States and Jewish communities in the diaspora.

Three years after the June 1967 war, Israel's military power seemed to have become even greater, both in relative and in absolute terms, than it was at the time of victory. True, the heavy burden of military expenditure threatened to cause serious economic problems, but not disruption of the state. By early 1970 Israel was spending nearly a quarter of its GNP on defense, an amount nearly triple that spent in most countries in a stage of military alert; and the country's scarce foreign currency reserves were dwindling at the rate of about \$1,000,000 per day. Economists in Israel were urging devalua-

tion and other stringent economic measures, but there was at most concern that the country would have to give up luxuries and its high rate of economic growth, rather than a feeling of danger to national existence.

The major weakness of guerrilla tactics against Israel was not their inefficiency or the inexperience of the commandos, but failure of Palestine Arab nationalists to understand the nature of Israeli society. Consequently no matter how much the commandos perfected their military competence, their guerrilla tactics, like the anti-guerrilla tactics of the Israelis, missed the sought after objective. Unlike the French *colons* in Algeria or white colonial populations in Africa, the Israelis were concentrated as the majority population in small compact areas, usually not dependent on a non-Jewish local population for their livelihood. They were not dispersed among an Arab population which was hired to carry out their unskilled or semi-skilled labor although after June 1967 between 30,000 and 40,000 Arabs from occupied areas were employed in the Jewish controlled economy. While commando tactics could be successful, if perfected, in parts of Palestine occupied by the Israelis during June 1967, creating disruption and unrest among the local Arab population, they seemed to have no such effect in the Jewish inhabited regions within the pre-1967 frontiers of Israel.

More significant than their military escapades were the political activities and impact of the organizations on Arab society from Morocco to the Persian (Arab) Gulf. Throughout the Arab world the commando groups rallied support and a wide following among university students, intellectuals, professionals, labor unions, conservative religious groups and leftist organizations. The image of the Palestine commando increasingly replaced the figure of UAR President Nasser as the symbol of leadership and inspiration for nationalism. The several groups, with ideologies ranging from far left to conservative nationalist with no distinctive socio-economic creed, offered a range of viewpoints sufficient to appeal to a wide

spectrum of nationalists, acquiring a group charisma compared to the following rallied by Nasser based on his personal appeal prior to 1967.

The rebirth of Palestinian nationalism, largely brought about by the commando groups, was also evident among Israeli Arabs who since 1948 had not been considered a serious internal threat. Surveys conducted by Hebrew University sociologists after the 1967 war showed that a strong Arab nationalist sentiment was emerging among Israeli Arab youth. The survey pointed to a large increase in the number of Israeli Arab school children who thought that it would be necessary to wage still another war against Israel despite Arab defeat in the previous three. Many fewer Arabs felt at home in the country and latent opposition to the Jewish state was revealed in answer to the questions:²¹ "How, in your view, did the war influence the attitude of the Arabs to the State of Israel?"

	<i>Rose</i>	<i>Remained the same</i>	<i>Fell</i>	<i>N</i>
Respect	43%	17%	40%	299
Fear	52%	34%	13%	282
Hatred	73%	23%	4%	291

The extent of underground opposition to the Jewish state was indicated in the increased frequency of Israeli Arab arrests for participation in terrorist activities and for collaboration with Arab commando groups. By the end of 1969, more than 100 Israeli Arabs had been arrested as suspected saboteurs or enemy collaborators, a number larger than the total convicted of subversion during the decade before the 1967 war. They now included a significant number of young "intellectuals," that is, high school or university students, including Arab students at the Hebrew University.

These feelings also had emerged in 1965 when the Israel Communist Party split into the New Communists who were mostly, but not all Arabs, and the parent Israel Communist Party most of whom were Jewish. The division was caused by differences over Middle East policies of the great powers, Israel

and the Arab states. The New Communists, larger of the two factions, gave full support to Soviet policy in the Middle East and, after 1967, urged immediate and total withdrawal by Israel from occupied territories whereas the largely Jewish parent faction maintained that the war had been forced upon Israel and opposed withdrawal without a peace settlement.

The Israeli prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, Shmuel Toledano, warned Israeli Arabs against the dangers of internal opposition in December 1969: "According to our appraisal," he advised, "a contest is now in progress in Arab population centers between nationalist Arabs and positive elements. . . From now on, the Government and various public bodies will do their utmost to support these positive elements while, on the other hand, we shall fight to the bitter end against all nationalist factors." He emphasized that the government would not tolerate nationalists on any local government board or committee: "We shall work to bring about a situation where an Arab nationalist is ostracized in his own village."²²

By 1970 there were signs of cohesive organization and policy formulation among the various commando organizations. The number had declined from the more than thirty a year after the war to approximately a dozen of some significance. Because of the small number of individuals involved, their loose organization, the tendency to merge, fragment and remerge due to ideological, tactical, and personality differences, several organizations were difficult to identify. The largest and most significant group to emerge was *al-Fatah* (conquest, a reversed acronym of the *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini*—Palestine National Liberation Movement) led by Yasir Arafat, a Palestinian engineer educated in Egypt. An older brother of Arafat was believed to have joined the 1936-39 Palestinian guerrilla forces led by Abd al-Qadir al-Husaini. As a student in Cairo during the 1950s Arafat organized Palestinian students who had close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, and he was briefly imprisoned by the Nasser régime after the 1956 Sinai campaign.

Fatah's first members were young Palestinians who organized informally in the Gaza Strip to discuss the 1956 Israeli occupation. After Egyptian reoccupation of Gaza and Nasser's policy of avoiding direct confrontation with Israel, *Fatah* was forced to abandon its Gaza activities and was adopted by Syria. Arafat assumed leadership of the organization in 1957, recruiting members and establishing cells in Kuwait, among Palestinian students in West Germany, and initiating commando training in Algeria. The organization played a key rôle in the inter-Arab disputes over tactics against Israel since it was used by Syria before June 1967 to foster greater militancy and more aggressive anti-Israel tactics.

As noted above, the PLO was established at the Cairo Arab summit conference in 1964 by President Nasser and King Husain to counteract the risky confrontation policies of the Syrians and their Palestinian commando guerrilla clients. The military arm of PLO, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) established in the Gaza Strip under Egyptian control and equipped with Egyptian arms, uniforms and supplies played less a military than a morale rôle until the June 1967 war. During the week of fighting between Egypt and Israel the PLA joined the UAR forces, but after Gaza was overrun the PLA disbanded, its members fleeing with Egyptian troops, merging into the civilian population of the area, or leaving the area for Jordan. PLA supplies and equipment were either captured by the Israelis or hidden in secret caches for future use.

Initially *Fatah* as other Palestine guerrilla forces was small in numbers and carried out very limited operations. However, after the Israeli attack on the *Fatah* base at Karameh on the Jordanian East Bank in March 1968, the organization rallied a large following. The attack, staged in retaliation for Arab commando activities, resulted in substantially larger casualties than anticipated by Israel. *Fatah* forces, joined by the Jordanian regular army, made a firmer stand than the Israelis expected with the result that Karameh was considered a major victory despite Israeli claims that they had destroyed com-

mando bases in the town. More significant than the military success or failure of the operation was its morale effect throughout the Arab world. Karamah became a symbol of commando resistance, and a basis for extensive recruitment not only to *Fatah*, but to other organizations as well. By the end of 1969 estimates of volunteers trained by commando organizations ranged from 30,000 to 50,000. Since not all trainees entered combat and since membership in the organizations was fluid with volunteers entering and leaving or serving on a part time basis, it was difficult to determine even potential combat effectiveness.

In an effort to unify the proliferating organizations a Palestine National Council was convened in Cairo during 1968 attended by 115 representatives of whom 40 represented *Fatah*. At the meeting *Fatah* Commander Arafat was also designated as the leader of PLO resulting in a policy and command merger of the two organizations. Early in 1969 most of the other commando organizations agreed to coordinate their activities in the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) established in Amman. Only the second most significant commando group, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash, did not join. Early in 1970 a new umbrella organization, the United Command for the Palestine Resistance Movement, was formed in Amman to include the PFLP and later in the year a 27 member Central Committee was also organized, headed by the PLO and *Fatah* leader, Yasir Arafat. The Central Committee represented 10 commando organizations²³ which divided Jordan into military commands, each headed by a guerrilla leader. The Central Committee, headed by a six man secretariat or Presidium, met in Amman. It also designated political officers to represent the Nationalist Movement in each refugee camp, and was supposedly responsible to the 112 member Palestine National Council, an outgrowth of the original PLO Council, representing Palestinian students, workers, political and military groups. The National Council was much like a legislative body

or Palestine government in exile, although its members were not elected but designated by the various interest groups and political factions it represented. Although military activities of the various groups were ostensibly coordinated several retained their distinctive identities.

By 1970 the most significant of the organizations included *Fatah*, PLA (military arm of PLO), *al-Sa'iqah* ("Thunderbolt," Vanguard Liberation Battalions—Palestinian groups organized by Syria with a left Ba'athist orientation), the PFLP and four factions of Habash's Front which cooperated with *Fatah*. The major differences between *Fatah*-PLO and other groups were in size, organization, tactics and ideology. The *Fatah*-PLO groups were larger than all other groups combined, organized on a guerrilla basis to carry out commando activities, mostly in the Israeli occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza. Other groups engaged more in sabotage operations against civilian installations within Israel and abroad.

While *Fatah* accepted support from all sources including conservative Muslim governments, organizations of Maoist ideology and from former members of the rightist Syrian Social Nationalist Party, PFLP and its various off-shoots were definitely Marxist oriented. They stated among their goals not only destruction of the State of Israel and its Zionist institutions, but overthrow of conservative Arab governments, disruption of foreign enterprises and establishments operating in the area. Indeed, so successful were the efforts of the PFLP in May and June 1970, that they precipitated a major upheaval between commandos and government forces in Jordan, nearly toppling the monarchy and resulting in hundreds of casualties after weeks of street fighting. In Lebanon also, the commandos, insisting that they have free movement along the borders of the country, disrupted the government and nearly caused a civil war between pro- and anti-commando groups.

Using much revolutionary rhetoric, symbolism and slogans, many commando groups made contact with and won ideological support from leftist groups in Europe, America and the third

world, which in turn adopted the Arab leftist slogans linking Israel and the world Zionist movement with "imperialism," "colonialism" and "reaction."

While the various commando groups had some measure of success in winning support among Israeli Arabs, they failed in their goal to "radicalize" or to alienate Oriental Jews in Israel. Commando Hebrew radio broadcasts directed to the Oriental Jewish community were regarded with derision rather than as serious political statements. The above mentioned survey conducted by Israeli sociologists indicated that Oriental Jews, despite areas of discontent with Israeli policy, were more hostile to Arabs than were Israeli Jews of European origin. The tendency of Oriental Jews to be more hostile was attributed to "negative experiences during their previous life under Arab domination," and to aspirations "to close the gap between themselves and the Europeans in order to gain their full share in prestige, power and wealth in Israeli society. . . . What the Orientals most reject in the Arabs are the Arab elements which they still possess."²⁴ The intensity of anti-Arab feeling among the Orientals even increased after escalation of commando activities in Israel during 1968.

The future of the Jewish population in Israel should the Palestinians achieve their goal of destroying the state of Israel was an area of major ambiguity in commando objectives. While all the organizations stated that they aimed to establish a democratic secular state in which Jews, Christians and Muslims would have equal rights, none clearly articulated their proposed relationships with Jewish nationalism. Stating that their objective was to destroy Israel and its Zionist institutions, they generally failed to accord recognition to the concept of a Jewish national identity as distinct from a religious one. This neglected consideration of those attributes in Jewish nationalism which were identical to those of Palestinian Arab nationalism including such objective criteria as a common language, cultural tradition, attachment to a distinct territory and rootedness in a religio-social-cultural heritage.

More important than the objective factors was the subjective self-identity of Palestinian Arabs and Jewish Israelis which gave each a strong national consciousness. It was significant that both national groups, with few exceptions, tended to deny the national identity and claims of the other, thus leading to ideological conflict as well as a struggle for territories.

Although within Israel there were a few influential individuals and small groups of Jews who called for recognition of Palestinian Arab claims or who supported some form of compromise between Jewish and Palestinian nationalism, there were no identifiable voices in the Arab world which publicly responded. The commando organization which came closest to recognition of co-equal national rights for Jews and Arabs was the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a left wing faction of the PFLP, led by the Jordanian Nayif Hawatmah.

In occupied Palestine and elsewhere outside the Arab Middle East there were a few Palestinians who publicly disavowed the tactics and objectives of the commando organizations. They included a small number of conservative local leaders representing traditional families in Jerusalem and the West Bank, such as the Mayor of Hebron, Muhammad Ali al-Jabari, mentioned above. After the June war he joined a few other traditional leaders in calling for establishment of a Palestinian entity on the West Bank separate from either Israel or Jordan. Al-Jabari's group was unable to galvanize any extensive public support for his proposal since many Arabs regarded a West Bank "entity" as Israeli inspired and contradictory to the more radical and more popular proposals of the commando organizations. Still another proposal envisaged evacuation by the occupying Israelis and their replacement by an international force which would help to establish a Palestinian entity under a United Nations trusteeship during a transition period after which Palestinians would be given opportunity to opt for independence or for union with Jordan.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cmd. 5479 (*Palestine Royal Commission Report—1937*), p. 6.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
3. Cmd. 3530 (*Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929-1930*), p. 129.
4. Yaacov Shimoni, *Arevi Eretz Israel (The Arabs of Palestine—Hebrew)*, Tel Aviv, 1947, p. 357.
5. Afif I. Tannous, "Organizing Science and Technology for Agricultural Development" in Zahlan and Nader, eds., *Science and Technology in Developing Countries*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, p. 75.
6. Shimoni, *op. cit.*, p. 358. In 1969 Arab commandos claimed to have raised \$5.6 million and *Fatah* leader Yasir Arafat said he expected "to get \$19 million annually from now on." (*New York Times*, Jan. 4, 1970). This amount could have redeemed one in every seven of the 800-900 Arab villages in Palestine in 1946, or all Arab villages in less than a decade.
7. Cmd. 5479, pp. 401-402.
8. Constantine K. Zurayk, *The Meaning of the Disaster*, Beirut, 1956, pp. 2, 34-35.
9. UNESCO, Executive Board, 82 Session, 82 EX 8, Paris, 4 April 1969, *Annex I*, p. 3; *Final Report*, 24 February 1969, *Annex II*, pp. 3, 5, 9.
10. Yochanan Peres and Nira Yuval-Davis, "Some Observations on the National Identity of the Israeli Arab," *Human Relations*, 22, no. 3, pp. 221-222.
11. A. L. Tibawi, "Visions of the Return: The Palestine Arab Refugee in Arabic Poetry and Art," *Middle East Journal*, 17, no. 5, 1963.
12. Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat, *River Without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees*, Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1968, pp. 59-60.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Yoram Ben-Porath, "Some Economic Characteristics of a Refugee Camp, Preliminary Results," in *Middle East Development*, Truman Center Publications, No. 3, Jerusalem, October 1968, pp. 43-44. The survey which the authors believed was not uncharacteristic of West Bank refugee camps, indicated that "the distribution of workers by occupation reveals an occupational structure similar to that of urban wage-earners. There are very few farmers, and most workers are employed in construction, quarrying, industry, and services."
15. Zurayk, *op. cit.*, p. 16.
16. Leila S. Kadi, *Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem*, Palestine Books No. 4, Beirut: Palestine Liberation Organization Research Centre, 1966, pp. 102-104.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *The National Charter*, Beirut: The Palestine Liberation Organization, n.d., preamble and articles 1-29.

19. Kadi, *op. cit.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Eisenstadt, S. N. and Peres, Y. "Some Problems of Educating a National Minority (A Study of Israeli Education for Arabs)." Division of Higher Education Research. U.S. Department of H.E.W. Project No. OE-6-21-013. See chart on 27.
22. *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, XVII, no. 52, Dec. 26, 1969, p. 12.
23. The 10 commando organizations represented in the Central Committee are as follows:
 1. *al-Fatah*, the largest of the groups.
 2. *al-Sa'iqah*, the second largest group, which is sponsored by the ruling Ba'th party of Syria.
 3. *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, a Marxist group and also the most militant.
 4. *Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine*, which broke away from the Popular Front.
 5. *Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (General Command)*, which broke away from the Popular Front.
 6. *Palestine Arab Organization* which broke away from the Popular Front.
 7. *Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine*, which broke away from *al-Fatah*.
 8. *Arab Liberation Front*, sponsored by the Iraqi Ba'th party.
 9. *Popular Liberation Forces*, the military branch of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
 10. *Popular Struggle Front*.
24. Yochanan Peres, "Ethnic Attitudes among Jews and Arabs in Israel," draft paper based on above survey.

PRINCIPAL PALESTINIAN GUERRILLA GROUPS

(July, 1970)

<i>Estimated fighting strength</i>	<i>Main leaders</i>	<i>Arms sources</i>	<i>Income sources</i>	<i>Ideology</i>
*Al-Fatah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement	Yasir Arafat Salah Khalef Khaled al-Hassan Mohammed Najjar Hanni al-Hassan Zouheir al-Alami Farouk Kaddomi	Communist China Open market Captured Israeli arms Rockets of own manufacture	Mainly Palestinian private individuals channeling payments through governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Abu Dhabi	No political ideology except liberation of Palestine through armed struggle and creation of a democratic, secular Palestinian state
*Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Palestine Liberation Army (PLA); Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)	Yasir Arafat Brig. Gen. Abdel Razzak Yahia Shafiq al-Hawt Abu Mahmud	Same as Al-Fatah; East Europe and Arab governments	Same as Al-Fatah, plus Arab government subsidies decided by Arab League	Same as Al-Fatah
*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)	George Habash Ahmed al-Yamani Heytam Ayoubi	East Europe Iraq Open market Captured Israeli arms	Iraq Private	Marxist-Leninist in sense similar to Asian parties
*Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDF) (Broke away from PFLP)	Najif Hawatmah Salah Ra'afat Adib Abd Rabu Bilaad al-Hassan	Syria East Europe Open market Captured Israeli arms	East Europe Private	Trotskyist; committed to total revolution in Arab politics and society
*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command (Broke away from PFLP)	Ahmad Jabril Fadel Chrorou	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous	None except military struggle

<i>Name</i>	<i>Estimated fighting strength</i>	<i>Main leaders</i>	<i>Arms sources</i>	<i>Income sources</i>	<i>Ideology</i>
*Al-Sa'iqah (Thunderbolt)	7,000	Zouheir Mohsen Dafi J'mani Ahmad Shahabi Yusuf al-Berji	Syria Soviet Union Open market Captured Israeli arms	Syria	Baathist (Syrian branch)
*Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	3,000	Zayd Haydar Munif al-Razzaz	Iraq	Iraq	Baathist (Iraqi branch)
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP)	100	Not available	Communist China	Mainly refugees in camps in Syria	Maoist
*Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	200	Bajaj abu Gharbiya	Private	Private	Formerly Baathist; now devoted entirely to clandestine action inside Israeli-occupied lands
*Arab Palestine Organization (APO) (Broke away from PFLP)	100	Ahmad Zarour	United Arab Republic	United Arab Republic	Nasserite Socialist
*Action Group for the Liberation of Palestine (Broke away from Al-Fatah)	50	Dr. Isam Sartawi	Iraq Egypt	Egypt	Nasserite Socialist
Ansar (Partisans) (Newly formed communist group)	50	Fuad Nasr Khaled Bagdash	Soviet Union	Soviet Union	Soviet Communist

* Members of Unified Central Committee.

Note: The APO and the Action Group supported acceptance of the August 1970 UN cease fire opposed by other organizations.

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ROLE OF JERUSALEM IN A POSSIBLE ARAB ENTITY

EVAN M. WILSON

The Problem

THE QUESTION of Jerusalem is central to any discussion of a possible Palestine Arab entity, because of the close links — historical, economic and religious — between the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank of the Jordan and indeed the Arab world in general. (Throughout this paper, the term “Old City” will be employed to mean not only the Walled City of Jerusalem but the remainder of the municipal area which came under the Jordanian municipality as of June 4, 1967). It would be very difficult, if not impossible, to envisage any solution of the problem of a Palestine Arab entity without a corresponding solution of the problem of Jerusalem. It would certainly be difficult to set up any meaningful kind of Palestine Arab entity on the West Bank so long as the entire city of Jerusalem remains in Israeli hands. Conversely, it would probably be impossible to gain Israeli acceptance for the creation of a Palestine Arab entity on the West Bank with the Arabs regaining possession (as they would like to do) of the Old City. Thus a compromise between the two sides may be essential to gain a settlement.

The connection of Jerusalem with the Jews of the world and with Israel is well known, from the Bible and from the dominant place which Jerusalem has always held in Jewish religious tradition. We are all familiar with the story of the ancient Hebrew prophets, the kingdom, the exile, the return and the eventual dispersion of the Jews by the Romans in 70 A.D. We know that ever since in their prayers the Jews have

said "next year in Jerusalem" and that the city of Zion played a key rôle in the entire Zionist movement, to which indeed it gave its name. It is not surprising, given this background, that shortly after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 the Israeli government issued a proclamation (August 2, 1948) declaring the western portion of the city to be Israeli-occupied territory. In late 1949 and early 1950 most Israeli government departments were moved to the New City of Jerusalem and on January 23, 1950, a resolution of the Knesset (Parliament) proclaimed that Jerusalem was "once again" the capital.

Jerusalem, however, is a city which has likewise always had a special meaning for the Arabs. It will be recalled that when the ancient Hebrews or Israelites entered the land of Canaan, which we know today as Palestine, and established their capital, the city of David, in Jerusalem around the year 1,000 B.C., they dispossessed the earlier inhabitants, the Canaanites (who had themselves migrated earlier from the Arabian peninsula), the Philistines and other tribes. The Jewish Kingdom, however, lasted less than 500 years and the only other periods until 1948 when the Jews were in control of any substantial portion of Palestine or of Jerusalem were under the Maccabees or Hasmoneans, for a little over 100 years (from 167 to 63 B.C. and 40 to 37 B.C.) and again briefly under Bar Kochba (132-135 A.D.).

Throughout history, the country commonly called Syria, of which Palestine was always considered (until the end of the First World War) to be the southern portion, has been subjected to successive waves of invasion, with the result that its people represent a racial amalgam. The indigenous inhabitants of Palestine, whom we began to call the Palestine Arabs in the post-World War I period, are the descendants of all the various peoples who have occupied the country, beginning with the Canaanites and other Old Testament tribes and running through the Greeks, Romans, Muslim Arabs, Crusaders from Western Europe, Turks and, certainly, Jews. In this latter connection it is regarded by many scholars as unlikely that all

of the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine perished or were driven out of the country in 70 A.D. A number of them must have remained in the country and must have been eventually converted to Christianity. It is also incorrect, according to many historians, to regard the Palestine Arabs as having entered Palestine for the first time during the Muslim Arab conquest in the seventh century. The invading Arab force was relatively small in number but it seems clear that gradually, over the next few centuries, most of the local inhabitants were converted to Islam, mass conversions of populations being not uncommon in these times. At the time of the Muslim Arab conquest the population of Palestine was largely Christian and indeed a considerable number, amounting to at least 10 per cent, of the Palestine Arabs remain so today.

The Arabs of Palestine claim, therefore, and with some historical justification, that they are the descendants of the original inhabitants of Palestine and of the city of Jerusalem. They point to the fact that from the Muslim Arab conquest of the seventh century to the British conquest in 1917 the city was in Muslim hands (with the exception of course of the period of the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1099 to 1187 and again from 1229 to 1244). After the final expulsion of the Crusaders, the city was held by the Ayyubids, by the Mamlukes of Egypt, and beginning in 1517 by the Ottoman Turks, whose rule lasted just 400 years. During most of these 1300-odd years of Muslim occupation, Jews and Christians were tolerated in the city, although subject to certain disabilities such as the wearing of distinctive dress and the payment of special taxes. The dominant religion, however, was Islam, and the dominant culture, Arab. This is attested by the various monuments of the period still extant in the city, particularly those erected in Mamluke times.

While essentially Muslim and Arab in character, Jerusalem remained a site of Christian and Jewish pilgrimage and was the place of residence of small Christian and Jewish communities. It was not, however, until the development of Jewish

immigration into Palestine, beginning in the late nineteenth century, that the Jewish population of the city grew to any sizeable extent. In the 1880s Jews represented one-half of the residents of Jerusalem, and, in 1898, two-thirds. From then on, the city had a Jewish majority but this was never true of the whole of Palestine, even after the Balfour Declaration (1917) and the mandate (1920) gave official impetus to Jewish immigration: by the time of the 1947 United Nations partition plan Jews were still only one-third of the population of the country, with the Arabs accounting for two-thirds.

During the period of the mandate, the Arab and Muslim character of the city was maintained, and following the partition of the city in 1948 the Old City of Jerusalem developed as an important Arab center. It was the center of publication of the Arabic-language press of Jordan, it received thousands of Arab visitors each year and economically there developed the closest ties between the Old City and the West Bank. The road network on the West Bank had its center in the Old City, which was the commercial hub of the region—far more so than Amman. It was the marketing center for the fruits and vegetables of the entire West Bank and the inhabitants of the region made frequent use of its many Arab banks, all with headquarters in Amman. The Old City with its Holy Places was an important source of foreign exchange for the Hashimite Kingdom, whose income from tourism, a large proportion of which was accounted for by Jerusalem, was running in the neighborhood of 30-40 million dollars a year. In 1966, for example, the country's earnings from tourism were estimated at over \$31,000,000, with 85 per cent attributable to the West Bank, including the Old City. It was estimated that 70 per cent of the foreign tourists entering Jordan by air did so through Jerusalem's Kalandia airport.

Jerusalem, therefore, is a city which is important not only to the Jew but to the Arab—it might be called a binational city, with residents, both Jewish and Arab, who have connections with the city going back for centuries. The mayor of the Old

City at the time of the June war, for example, Rawhi al-Khatib, comes from a family which has lived in Jerusalem for eight hundred years. But Jerusalem is more than just a city with Arab and Jewish inhabitants, or an Arab and a Jewish city side by side: it has associations, religious, historical and archaeological, which make it unique and which make it an international, world center—no less an Eternal City than Rome. This uniqueness springs mainly, though by no means wholly, from the associations which the city has as the Holy City of the world's three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

The Question of the Holy Places

The issue here is that just as Palestine is the Holy Land of the three faiths, so is Jerusalem their Holy City. Their interests are focused on one particular site, which happens to be, tradition tells us, where Abraham prepared to sacrifice Isaac, Solomon built his Temple, Christ taught, and Muhammad began his miraculous night-journey to Heaven. This one spot, the Temple Mount or Mount Moriah or the Haram al-Sharif as it is variously called, epitomizes the whole problem of Palestine and of the Holy Places. It is sacred to Jews because it occupies a central place in their religious tradition and because it is the site of the Wailing Wall (actually the outer wall of the Muslim Haram al-Sharif or Noble Enclosure). To Christians, there is no other spot so closely associated with the life of Jesus, from childhood to death. And to Muslims, the scene of Muhammad's night-journey into Heaven is so sacred that they consider Jerusalem to be their third holiest city, after Mecca and Medina. Since the Arabs claim descent from Abraham through his first-born son Ishmael, just as the Jews claim descent from him through Isaac, it is understandable that when the Arabs came to Jerusalem in the seventh century they should have erected their great shrine, the Dome of the Rock, on the spot where Abraham went to sacrifice his son and where Muhammad started out on his mystical trip up to Heaven and back.

It is worth noting that in the years leading to the June war, several hundreds of thousands of Muslim pilgrims came here every year, from places as far away as Morocco or Indonesia.

While the Temple area illustrates in the most dramatic fashion the way in which the interests of the three religions are intermingled in the Jerusalem area, the shrines of the three are scattered about the city in such a way as to make their physical separation an impossibility. Other instances which come to mind are Mount Zion, the site of the Cenacle, or Room of the Last Supper (for which it is sacred to Christians) and also of the Tomb of David, sacred to both Muslims and Jews, David being one of those Old Testament figures who is revered by both faiths. The Mount of Olives and Bethany, both of which have special associations with the life of Christ, happen also to be the sites of Muslim shrines. Jewish tombs are scattered over the slopes of the Mount of Olives and are in close proximity to the Garden of Gethsemane, as are Muslim graves near the city wall.

This overlapping of the Holy Places has been a major cause of the rivalries and conflicts which have been a characteristic of the history of the Holy Land for so many centuries. These rivalries and conflicts, both between the different faiths, as for example the conflict between Muslims and Jews over the Wailing Wall, and among the Christian denominations, as for example the disputes at the Church of the Holy Sepulchre or the Church of the Nativity, caused endless problems for the Turkish and British administrators of Palestine in the past. The same rivalries and conflicts regarding the Holy Places were responsible for the fact that all of the proposals advanced over the years for the solution of the Palestine problem provided for a special status for Jerusalem because of its unique character as the site of the shrines.

In summary, it is submitted that so violent, so intense have been the passions and emotions that have been aroused that exclusive possession of the entire city and its Holy Places by any one of the three faiths will be contested by the other two.

And that is what is happening now. The belief that the conflicts over the Holy Places are so deep-seated as to make it unwise to entrust the shrines to the sole care of those immediately involved, and that some outside presence is required, is enhanced by the fact that today Jews, Christians and Muslims all have cause for concern at infringements of their rights in the past and possible infringements in the future.

Concerns of Jews, Christians and Muslims

Prior to the June war, the Jews were concerned at the denial to them for nineteen years of access to the Wailing Wall and other Jewish shrines in the Old City, at the desecration which undoubtedly took place, during the Jordanian occupation, of the Jewish cemeteries on the Mount of Olives, and the bad condition of the synagogues and other buildings in the Jewish Quarter of the Walled City.

The Christians, for their part, were unhappy at their treatment at the hands of both the Muslim Jordanians and the Israelis. In Jordan, they were particularly concerned at the effect on the many Christian schools of a new education law and at instances of discrimination against Christians in such matters as employment. In Israel, they encountered various bureaucratic obstacles and indeed closed most of the Christian schools in the country. There were instances of vandalism committed against Christian property, such as the American Protestant Cemetery in the New City of Jerusalem. An attempt by the Israeli religious authorities (discontinued after strong Christian protests) to close Mount Zion on the Sabbath, in the spring of 1967, caused especial anxiety as it would have amounted to denying access to an important Christian Holy Place (the Room of the Last Supper).

The Muslims likewise were concerned at instances of desecration by the Israelis of Muslim shrines, notably the Mamillah Cemetery in the New City, bulldozed to make a public park, and mosques at Ain Karim, on the outskirts of Jerusalem, and at Safed.

Since the June war, while the anxieties of the Jews regarding their Holy Places have naturally been relieved by the Israeli occupation of the entire city, those of the Christians and Muslims have not. Soon after the war, the Chief Chaplain of the Israeli armed forces conducted prayers (August 15, 1967) at the Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount, an action which the Muslims regarded as an infraction of their rights. They were also distressed when the Israeli Minister of Religious Affairs, Zarah Wahrhaftig, spoke on August 17, 1967, of rebuilding the Temple on this site. Both Muslims and Christians saw with dismay and concern the conduct, not always decorous, of the thousands of Israeli visitors who flocked to the churches and mosques of the Old City as soon as free passage back and forth through the city was allowed. And, finally, they have noted a marked falling-off in the pilgrim traffic. Under present conditions, it is unlikely any substantial number of Muslims or Christians from the Arab countries, or many Muslims from elsewhere, would come to visit their Holy Places while they are in Israeli hands. Many Muslims and Christians—and already some voices are being raised—will continue to be unhappy with the fact that Israel is in exclusive control of all the Holy Places and of all means of access to them. Thus it would appear that from the religious standpoint, as well as the political and economic, some change in the present status of Jerusalem merits consideration. It should be repeated, however, that the problem of Jerusalem is not simply a religious one and that the city has other associations, historical and archaeological, which contribute to its unique character as a world center.

Possible Alternative Solutions to the Jerusalem Problem

Any discussion of the problem of Jerusalem, in the light of present circumstances, must, it would seem, start from the premise that a solution for Jerusalem is not likely to be found except in the context of a pacification, a settlement of the issues outstanding between Israel and the Arab states. This would further imply that a solution is not likely to come for some

time. Nevertheless, there is merit in an examination of alternative solutions for Jerusalem, in the context of the possible establishment of a Palestine Arab entity. Such a review may throw some light on the problem of Arab-Jewish cooperation, since the interests of the two communities are inextricably entwined in the city. An effort will be made to take into account the economic as well as the political implications of the various alternatives under discussion.

It is the conviction of many students of the problem that a basic assumption underlying any solution for Jerusalem is Israeli withdrawal from all, or substantially all, of the West Bank of the Jordan. Whether the area would be returned to Jordanian control, or would form the nucleus of a future Palestine Arab entity, is a matter that will need to be determined. All that needs to be pointed out here is that if Israel is to remain in indefinite control of the West Bank—and it must be admitted that there are more and more indications that this situation will persist for an indefinable future—any discussion of a change in the present status of Jerusalem can hardly be regarded as leading to any practical result. If, on the other hand, some arrangement can be worked out for a substantial Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank, the problem of Jerusalem will immediately arise, because of the close ties between the Old City and the West Bank, already mentioned. It is within this context that the following discussion should be viewed.

It would seem that any solution to the Jerusalem problem could be expected to fulfill the following requirements: Jordanian (and Palestine Arab) interests in the city, and Israeli interests, and the interests of the city's Arab and Jewish inhabitants, would need to be protected; free access to all the Holy Places would need to be assured for all pilgrims and other visitors; and there would need to be full recognition of the international interest in the City.

By protection of Jordanian and Palestine Arab interests is meant not only the interest of Muslim Arabs in the Haram al-

Sharif and other shrines but the economic ties between the West Bank (and indeed the East Bank) and the Old City, including the revenue from tourism. There also should be taken into account the key rôle, described earlier, that Jerusalem can be expected to play in the setting-up of a Palestine Arab entity.

By protection of the Israeli interest in the city is meant not only the fact that Israel has established its capital there and attaches great importance to the question of access to the Wailing Wall and other Jewish shrines but also the historic ties that bind world Jewry to Jerusalem.

It goes without saying that in any proposed solution the interests of the people of Jerusalem, Jewish as well as Arab, as well as the city's international community, should be safeguarded.

By free access for all is meant to assure that members of the three great faiths, or indeed any tourist, should feel free to visit Jerusalem in the sense that many cannot do today.

By recognition of the international interest is meant not only the interest of the Christians, Jews and Muslims of the world (nearly one billion Christians, thirteen million Jews, and half a billion Muslims) but also of the United Nations itself. The Muslim interest is not confined to Israel's immediate Arab neighbors; during the 1967 crisis such relatively faraway Muslim countries as Pakistan and Morocco were vociferous in defense of Muslim rights in the Holy City. As regards the United Nations, it will be recalled that almost from its inception the UN has had before it the problem of Jerusalem and that the city has been the center of important United Nations activities in both the armistice and refugee fields.

Among possible alternative solutions, the one which might appear to be the most obvious under existing circumstances, and which indeed may persist for the foreseeable future, would be *continued Israeli control of the entire city*. Included in this might be some form of an international commission to represent international religious and other interests. Such a solu-

tion, while of course satisfying Israeli and Jewish interests, would not satisfy the majority of Christian and Muslim opinion throughout the world. It would obviously not satisfy the interests of the Arab residents of the city (who have been unhappy under Israeli occupation), or of the Arab world, or those who consider Israel's seizure of the Old City in 1967 to have been unjustified. A commission for the Holy Places would not be a sufficient safeguard in the eyes of the Christians and the Muslims, since the real issue for them is Jewish occupation and control of their Holy Places. Cooperation between the Jewish and Arab residents of the city is at a low point at present and can hardly be expected to improve if this is to be the permanent solution. It is difficult to see how such a solution could contribute to the establishment of a Palestine Arab entity. Indeed, it is not possible to think in terms of a meaningful Arab entity on the West Bank, so long as the entire city remains in Israeli control. Economically, the perpetuation of the present situation would mean that the Israelis would continue to experience a heavy drain on their financial resources, requiring continued aid from abroad, while the Arabs would continue to be deprived of the revenues from tourism and the other economic benefits which they enjoyed prior to the loss of the Old City.

Another answer to the problem would be the *return of the Old City to Arab control*, i.e. Jordanian or Palestine Arab, as the case might be. This solution would obviously be acceptable to Muslims and to most Arabs but it would surely be impossible to get Israel and the Jews of the world to agree, after the experiences of the 1948-67 period, to put the Jewish shrines back under Arab control. It would probably also be hard to get many Christians to agree in view of the increasing dissatisfaction which Christians in Jordan felt with their treatment at the hands of the Muslim majority in Jordan in the period leading up to June 1967. Furthermore, this solution would mean that the city would again be divided, as it was for nineteen years, and that the barbed wire, the barricades, and the

land mines of that era would return. Under such conditions, cooperation between Arabs and Jews in the City could be expected to be nonexistent. The Palestine Arab entity concept could no doubt be implemented with an Old City in Arab hands, and indeed this would be welcomed by many Palestinians, but Israeli opposition would be so intense as to make implementation of the concept completely unacceptable to the government of Israel and to the Jews in general. Economically, the renewed partition of the city along the 1948 pattern would entail the same problems as arose before: both the Israelis and the Arabs would have to bear the financial burden for their respective halves of the city and neither would benefit from the increased income from tourism that could be expected from an international as distinct from a local type of solution to the Jerusalem problem. Four variants of the so-called international type of solution will be discussed below.

The first variant, which might be termed a binational solution, strictly speaking, rather than the broader type which might be termed more properly international, would be a *condominium* over all or a part of the city, to be shared by Israel and Jordan, or by Israel and the Palestine Arab entity. This would have the advantage of avoiding exclusive control by either side and at the same time avoiding the need to have recourse to internationalization in some form or other, with the many problems that it entails. In view of the past and recent history of the relationship between the parties, however, it is difficult to conceive how this type of solution could be acceptable to either one. It would also be very difficult to make such an arrangement workable from the standpoint of administration. Israel would certainly oppose a condominium over the whole city as this would mean sharing sovereignty over the New City, where it has established its capital. The most that can be said in favor of such an arrangement, which would presumably have to be limited to the Walled City and the immediately adjoining area, i.e. to the part of the city which contains the most important Holy Places, is that it might possibly turn out to be

the greatest concession that Israel could be persuaded to make, in contrast to retaining control of the entire city. Even so, this would no doubt be for some time in the future, after present tensions have somewhat relaxed. Under a binational solution of this type it might be possible to work out arrangements governing free access to the Holy Places that would be acceptable to the three religions involved, but the problem of devising a workable administrative structure would remain, and this solution would not afford adequate recognition to the international interest in the city. In the long run, given a sufficient desire on the part of the two parties to work together in implementing a binational solution of this kind, it would be possible to think in terms of cooperation between the Arab and Jewish residents and of the successful setting-up of a Palestine Arab entity, but this would be for the future. Economically, the problems involved in a condominium arrangement (currency, taxation, movement of goods in and out of the binational area) and the economic relationship between the binational area and the Arab and Jewish areas that would presumably exist in other parts of the city, would not seem to differ in substance from those that would obtain in an internationalized Jerusalem, as will be discussed below. It would be on political rather than economic grounds, i.e. on the question of achieving cooperation between the parties, that this solution would encounter its greatest obstacles.

This brings us to the different forms of internationalization. It might be observed first that while it proved impossible between 1948 and 1967 to work out arrangements for internationalizing the city as had been provided in the partition resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (November 1947), the task was greatly complicated by the fact that the city had already become divided on the ground. Today the situation is different. It might be added that the unique character of the city can probably be best preserved through some form of internationalization.

The first example that comes to mind is *full territorial inter-*

nationalization of the entire area included in the so-called *Corpus Separatum* of the 1947 partition plan. This solution has the advantage that it would encompass all of the Holy Places in the vicinity of Jerusalem. It could also be argued that from the ideal standpoint, if internationalization is to be considered at all, it should be applied to the greatest possible extent. This argument, however, if pursued to its logical extreme would mean the internationalization of the whole of Palestine, as proposed, for example, in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. The area of the *Corpus Separatum* in any event is so large—100 square miles with a population of over 250,000—as to offer virtually insurmountable obstacles in terms of devising a form of government, as the UN discovered during its lengthy examination of the problem in 1948-50. It can also be expected that both Israel and Jordan, which divided the *Corpus Separatum* between them for so many years, would object to its being revived in its entirety. Conceivably, however, this solution would be compatible both with cooperation between Arabs and Jews and with the Palestine Arab entity concept, although the Palestinians would probably be opposed to it as taking too much territory from the entity. Economically, the complexity of the arrangements that would be required would of course vary with the size of the area to be placed under international administration. Two general principles which could be considered to define the context of the economic implications of an internationalized Jerusalem might, however, be mentioned at this point.

First, the mechanics of setting up the necessary economic and financial arrangements for an internationalized city should not pose an insoluble problem, given the existence of a political climate which would imply the willingness of those involved to work toward the goal of an international Jerusalem. There are historic precedents (notably with respect to Danzig, Trieste and Tangier) which suggest that such matters as a currency exchange system, means of raising revenue, and maintenance of municipal functions and services can be worked out

satisfactorily.

Second, there is reason to believe that Israel and Jordan (or the Palestine entity) could each earn more foreign exchange from tourism under the concept of an internationalized Jerusalem than did Israel or Jordan from their respective sectors of the city prior to the June war. In other words, given participation by both sides in the earnings from tourism and given free movement of visitors throughout the area of Jerusalem, an internationalized city could be a better income earner from tourism than the sum of its separate parts. As the income from tourism in the Jordanian sector alone, before the war, was estimated at between \$20 and \$30 million, and if we can assume a comparable figure for Israel, the financial gain to both sides could be substantial.

Since, as indicated above, the prospects for implementing the complete territorial internationalization of the Jerusalem area along the lines of the 1947 *Corpus Separatum* appear remote, it hardly seems necessary to elaborate here the economic arrangements that would be required under this solution, aside from pointing out that they would be extensive.

An alternative solution for Jerusalem would be *functional internationalization* of the Holy Places only. This has the advantage that it does not involve any decisions of a territorial nature, as no particular area would be placed under international administration. It also has the advantage of taking into account, to some extent at least, the international aspect of the problem of the Holy Places. Lastly, an arrangement along these general lines was considered acceptable at one point (in 1949 and 1950), by one of the parties, Israel, and, briefly, after some modifications were made, by Jordan. There is, however, no evidence that either of the parties would deem it acceptable today. Presumably, what would be attempted under present conditions would be to draw up some kind of arrangement in the United Nations for placing the Holy Places under international protection while leaving Israel in full occupation of the city. If so, it would be difficult to see how this proposal would

be different in substance from the first alternative discussed above (continued Israeli control with an international commission) and it would be open to the same objections. The economic implications would be the same as those outlined under the first alternative.

A third answer to the problem would be *partial territorial internationalization*, under the United Nations, of the city, taking an area much smaller than the *Corpus Separatum* of 1947, with the remainder of the present municipal area to be administered by Israel or Jordan (or the Palestine Arab entity, as the case might be). This would in effect mean that there would be three cities. Under this concept, an international zone, starting with the Walled City of Jerusalem and the area immediately surrounding it, would be identified and placed under the United Nations. Such a zone would contain the principal Holy Places and yet be sufficiently compact as to offer a good prospect of being manageable in terms of international administration. There would be a UN administration for the zone with Jewish and Arab deputy administrators and an elected city council. There would also be an advisory board representing the different religious denominations and other elements having an interest in the city. Access to all the Holy Places within the original *Corpus Separatum* would be guaranteed by the UN, or by Israel, or Jordan (or the Palestine entity) and there would be the greatest possible freedom of movement in and out of the international zone and the Israeli- or Arab-administered portions of the city. The international zone would be demilitarized, as provided in the original partition resolution and other UN resolutions and statutes on the subject. Every effort would be made to avoid bringing back the barbed wire. Obviously, the smaller the area to be set aside for internationalization, the fewer the problems, economic as well as political, that would be encountered in setting up the international regime.

Under this concept, Israel could continue maintaining its capital in the New City (eventually the foreign embassies

could move there from Tel Aviv) and the Palestine Arab entity likewise could have its capital in the Arab-administered portion of the city. This latter point would be important in enhancing the Palestine entity concept, because of the importance which the Palestinians attach to the Old City of Jerusalem, and for economic reasons. In this way it would be possible to envisage a compromise between extreme Arab and Israeli claims to the city.

Of the three variants of internationalization examined in this paper, this alternative would appear to meet to the greatest extent possible the basic requirements set forth earlier for a Jerusalem solution: protection of Israeli and Jordanian (Palestine Arab) interests and those of the Jewish and Arab residents; free access; and the international interest. Israel can be expected to object to any UN presence in the city but it could be argued that in return for the general pacification which Israel needs and of which this would be a part, Israel would be asked to surrender physical control of the Jewish shrines in the Old City not to the Arabs but to an international body, with full access guaranteed. Under this proposal, cooperation between Arabs and Jews would be enhanced by the freedom of movement foreseen into and out of the international zone and the Jewish- and Arab-administered parts of the city and the surrounding area. Cooperation could also be expected to result from the participation of the Arab and Jewish residents of the international zone in the administration of the zone, through the elected city council and the advisory board proposed, also from the provision for Arab and Jewish deputy administrators. While the UN administrator would have an international police force to keep order in the zone (which as already mentioned would be demilitarized), Israel and Jordan (the Palestine Arab entity) would obviously retain residual responsibility for assuring the security of the surrounding area and this would offer another field of possible cooperation, always assuming that a solution of this sort would be achieved only in the context of a general pacification.

Economic Aspects

The economic and financial arrangements that would be needed under this type of solution would naturally be affected by those that could be expected to be in force if a Palestine Arab entity comes into being on the West Bank. This subject will be considered elsewhere in this paper. A key question will be whether the entity would have its own currency or would use the Jordanian dinar. If we can assume the latter, it would probably be best also to assume that both the Israeli pound and the Jordanian dinar would circulate freely in the international zone and that the zone would not have its own currency. Under these assumptions, the financial arrangements for an internationalized Jerusalem would need to include some flexible mechanism for assuring an equitable exchange relationship between the pound and the dinar. The differing price levels in Israel and Jordan (the Palestine Arab entity) and especially the current inflationary trend in Israel would need to be addressed. There is a possibility that under existing conditions the dinar might come to be preferred to the pound and this could lead to highly profitable but illegal trading transactions in an area, such as the international city, where both would be circulating. Special safeguards would have to be imposed to prevent such abuses.

As far as historic precedents go, that of Tangier is probably more relevant to the Jerusalem problem, since both Danzig and Trieste had their own currencies whereas Tangier did not. In Tangier, however, problems arose because of wide fluctuations between the value of the Moroccan franc and that of the Spanish peseta, the two currencies in general use in the international zone. In the case of all three international cities mentioned, there was a tendency on the part of foreign investors to avoid investment in the city, because of political uncertainties. This should not, however, become so important an issue in the case of Jerusalem, where the question of investment bulks less large and where any possible reluctance

on the part of foreign capital to come in can be expected to be offset by the very substantial income from tourism, which as already explained would be shared by Israel and Jordan (the Palestine Arab entity).

In general, the economic environment in an internationalized Jerusalem would be far less complex than was the case in the examples cited. The international zone would be set up as a small *Corpus Separatum* with barriers to prevent the illicit flow of goods and with entry points through which goods and people could pass and be checked. Both Jordan and Israel (the Palestine entity) would allow for the free flow of goods across their respective countries from the ports to the international zone. As all such goods would be exempt from import and export duties, the flow of such goods back from the zone to Israel or Jordan (the Palestine entity) would have to be controlled. The status of the international zone as a free trade area would help eliminate reorientation of trade resulting from the differences in import tariffs in Israel and Jordan. These problems, however, can probably be dealt with if both Israeli and Jordanian currency are in free circulation in the zone, if both Israeli and Jordanian banks operate in the zone, and if some mechanism is set up to account for the differences in internal price movements on the two sides.

To encourage tourism, a special tourist rate could be offered in both currencies, with exchange facilities provided on each side. Sources of revenue in the international zone could range from direct income taxes to various kinds of excises or special taxes, including a tax on tourists and sales taxes, license fees, and finally, the sale of stamps, as in Vatican City. The Holy Places and the various religious communities would be exempt from taxation, as provided in earlier United Nations plans. It would be simpler for revenue from all sources to be paid into the treasury of the international zone and then assigned to the needs of the zone, which would have the first claim on the resources, leaving the residue to be divided between Israel and Jordan (the Palestine entity) according to an agreed ratio,

rather than assign specific taxes to either side. This ratio would probably have to be 50-50, even though most of the Holy Places are in what was formerly the Jordanian sector, as it is hard to believe Israel would agree to less than 50 per cent. As already indicated, tourist revenue can be expected to increase, under this proposal, although the political atmosphere rather than economic considerations will be the most important factor to consider.

In conclusion, it is conceivable that as a part of the settlement of the Arab refugee problem which would be entailed in any over-all peace settlement, both Israel and Jordan might be asked to give financial assistance to the Palestine Arab entity, to enable the refugees settling permanently on the West Bank to improve their farming methods and even to develop light industries. Such aid would enhance the image of both countries in the eyes of the Palestinians and serve as an inducement to them to "live at peace with their neighbors." Since this activity would obviously be centered in Jerusalem, this would provide another link between the city and the West Bank.

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FORMS AND PROJECTIONS OF A
PALESTINE ENTITY

THE HISTORICAL survey in Part I has shown that the conflict between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries had roots in a struggle between the Jewish community, or *Yishuv*, and the Palestine Arab community prior to establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. Although the Palestine Arab nationalist movement seemed to have been extinguished with establishment of Israel during the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, this was in reality not so. During the next twenty years a new Palestine Arab consciousness awakened, leading to establishment of the various Palestine Arab organizations now in existence. While many of the issues at dispute between Israel and the neighboring states, such as passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of the Tiran or the Golan (Jawlan) Heights, are matters that must be settled between the Israeli, the Syrian and the UAR governments, there are many other issues which cannot be resolved without agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. The future of Jerusalem, which is both a Jewish and a Palestine Arab city, is a matter primarily of concern to Palestinians and Israelis, rather than to Egyptians or Syrians, as we have well seen in Part II of this study. Disputes over property abandoned by the Palestinian Arab refugees in 1948 which since then has been used by Israelis, must be resolved between Israelis and the Palestinians since the property is not Egyptian, Syrian or Lebanese.

Having surveyed the historical background of Palestine Arab nationalism, its growing significance, and trends toward

the future, indications are that it will continue to be a factor of major political consequence. While the Palestinians have not yet been a party to international negotiations and discussions of the Arab-Israel conflict, their significance as a political force is increasingly evident to the major parties involved. Although the Israel government has not yet recognized the Palestinians as a negotiating agent, more Israelis of prominence and many of political influence have concluded that there can be no solution of the conflict without considering the Palestinians. The major non-Middle Eastern countries involved in the dispute including the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France also have begun to recognize that the future of the Palestinians is a significant matter which is closely related to peaceful solution of Middle East problems. However, since the Palestinians do not yet have an international legal status and because they have not been admitted to the negotiations, their significance is frequently overlooked.

This third part of the paper will attempt to explore several options for establishment of a Palestine Arab political entity. Its purpose is not to come to any definitive conclusions on the future, but to offer for discussion a number of options and to examine them in the critical light of present realities. In addition to the five options which follow, there may be others which have not occurred to the authors. If such is the case they welcome additional suggestions which might be incorporated into any future additions or expanded studies of the Palestine Arabs.

The "West Bank" Option

The first option to be discussed is establishment of a Palestinian entity or state consisting largely of the so-called "West Bank," the area of Jordan which prior to 1967 was west of the Jordan River. This option might also include incorporation of the Gaza region, nearly all of whose inhabitants are Palestinians, and include an easement connecting Gaza with the West Bank. Since we are including as many possibilities as

occur to us, this option could include Arab Jerusalem or what has been generally known as the Old City, or it might exclude such a possibility.

Establishment of such an entity has been discussed by a number of Palestinian Arab leaders who remained on the West Bank and by many Israelis. However, no Arab leader of major importance outside the Israeli-occupied areas has come forward with such a proposal. On the contrary, Palestinians and other nationalist leaders in the Arab world have disavowed the concept, asserting that it is Israeli-inspired, intended to suit Israeli political and military convenience. There is no doubt that such a state would initially be overshadowed in size, population, potential economic growth, and in military potential by all of the nations which surround it, especially by a powerful Israel. Indeed, some Israelis have proposed establishment of a Palestinian enclave on the West Bank, severed from Jordan, as a way of maintaining Israeli control over, without Israeli responsibility for, the population that lives there and in Gaza.

The so-called Allon Plan proposed several months ago by Israel's Deputy Prime Minister, Yigal Allon, envisaged establishment of an autonomous Arab entity on the West Bank. According to this plan Israel would maintain military bases along the Jordan River and at other strategic points to be designated by Israel throughout the occupied territories. Local Arab leaders, including mayors of the various towns, would assume responsibility for civil functions such as social welfare, health, education, agriculture, and even local politics. Self-governing institutions would be developed for the West Bank as a whole from the local municipal authority which was held by Palestinians prior to the occupation in 1967.

The Israel government maintains that at present local authorities in the various municipalities and other regional bodies on the West Bank are being permitted to carry out functions for which they were responsible prior to 1967. According to this interpretation, the existing military government is a

form of indirect rule whose primary function is to oversee, rather than to administer, civilian life in the occupied territories. Various local level functions including education, social welfare, and the like are sustained by the Arab population under supervision of the military government. In effect, the military government has replaced the central or national authority that existed prior to the June 1967 war. Since there is no national government to coordinate these policies, the task is provisionally undertaken by the military government authorities in association with the respective Israel civilian ministries.

Under the Allon Plan an attempt would be made to upgrade decisions on these matters in the Arab community from the local to a regional level. Israeli officials have conducted informal discussions with a number of West Bank mayors and some religious authorities with the intent of involving them in such a regional or "national" government. However, the discussions have had no practical results since Israeli officials have, on the one hand, been unable to receive support from their government for establishment of a regional civil authority and, on the other, they have been unable to offer any guarantee to the Arabs concerning the type or amount of authority their leaders would receive if such a regional authority were to be established.

While several West Bank leaders have discussed these proposals among themselves, they too have been unable to agree on the type of authority that should be established, how it would be established, whether or not it would be a representative body or, even more significantly, whether or not such a political entity would be desirable. In most discussions regarding the future of the occupied West Bank, local leaders have been reluctant to make any commitments without consultation with and agreement by other Palestinian leaders and Arab governments outside the occupied territories. Furthermore, while there have been Palestinian Arabs who have been willing to enter into discussions about the future

of the West Bank, there have been few if any in Gaza who have been willing to discuss the future of that area with the Israelis. Because of the compactness of Gaza and the extent to which its population is crowded into refugee camps and urban areas, living conditions there have been much more difficult and restrictive than in the occupied West Bank. Guerrilla activity and terrorist attacks have been much more frequent, with the consequent imposition of much more severe military control than in the West Bank. A natural result has been greater intensification of hostility between the local population and the occupying authorities with considerably less discussion of political matters, especially those concerning the future of the area.

It would seem almost inevitable that an entity comprising the West Bank and Gaza would be dominated by a powerful Israel. Interconnection of the two areas would be contingent upon approval by and subject to control by Israel. Any narrow corridor or arrangement connecting the two areas would cross the strategic roads that connect the rest of Israel with the Negev and its Red Sea port, Eilat. There is serious question as to whether or not Gaza, attached to the West Bank in a common political entity, would be economically viable. Its population of nearly four hundred thousand, about half of whom are refugees, have lived at just above subsistence level since 1948.

During the period of Egyptian occupation from 1948 until 1967 (with an interval of Israeli occupation from October 1956 until early 1957) Gaza was governed as Egyptian-occupied Palestine. It was never incorporated into Egypt, but retained the framework of law and administration existing during the British mandate. Palestinian rules and regulations remained in force and many mandatory officials, including mayors, judges and other government officers, retained their posts.

By 1967 Gaza was beginning to experience a small economic revival as a result of an expanding citrus industry which was exporting between 1.5 and 2 million crates of fruit per year.

Other small industries also provided wages for several thousand Palestinians. Hard currency earned from citrus exports made possible import of luxury goods which were sold through a new free port established by Egypt. Both the United Nations Emergency Force of three to five thousand men and the United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) brought substantial infusions of foreign currency. But the June war shattered Gaza's pattern of emerging economic viability. The setback followed by stringent occupation measures of the Israeli army led to the beginning of an exodus by Palestinians from Gaza to the West Bank and to East Bank Jordan. When the number of Gaza residents who left to enter Jordan reached over fifty thousand, the Jordanian government, already flooded with a large West Bank refugee population, terminated the Gaza immigration. This combination of factors has made Gaza the center of a zealous Palestine Arab national consciousness. Palestinians in the area have adamantly resisted intrusion of Israeli authority or any suggestion that they be transferred *en masse* to the West Bank.

There have been a number of Israeli proposals, none of which has yet reached the stage of official implementation, calling for breaking up the large refugee concentration in the Gaza Strip. These included resettlement proposals in the West Bank and in the Sinai Peninsula. To alleviate the discontent aroused by poor economic conditions, several thousand Gaza residents are employed as day laborers in Israel, and the Israel government has encouraged investment of capital in the area, but guerrilla activity against participation in these projects has been an obstacle to their large-scale success.

It seems obvious that a Gaza component in an Arab West Bank entity would not be an economic asset.

An East and West Bank State

A second option for a Palestinian Arab state envisages unification of both East and West Banks within borders corresponding approximately to those of pre-1967 Hashimite King-

dom of Jordan. This option might also include the Gaza Strip. Since the 1949 annexation of the Palestinian West Bank by King Abdallah, Jordan had for all practical purposes become the successor state to Arab Palestine. Initially two-thirds of the population in the newly merged kingdom was Palestinian although 94 per cent of the territory was on the East or Trans-Jordanian side of the River.

On the eve of the 1948 partition Arab Palestinians had begun to be politically and socially conscious and were among the most advanced peoples in the Arab world. More than 25,000 had been organized in about thirty labor unions. At least half had some contact with non-agricultural occupations, a percentage that was unusually high. Nearly twice as many school aged Palestinian children (52 per cent), compared to Jordanian children, were receiving education. Twice as many Palestinians as Jordanians were urbanized. The Palestinians were a volatile and politically restive people compared to the East Bank Jordanians.

In East Bank Jordan there were only a handful of inhabitants who did not live from agriculture and most of them worked for the Iraq Petroleum Company or in British military camps. The four East Bank towns, with a total population of ten thousand, were hardly more than villages. Except for a few wealthy landowners and merchants, there was little, if any, East Bank political sophistication. A high percentage of East Bank Jordanians were nomads who had little if any contact with the world beyond Amman, which, although the capital of Jordan, was hardly more than a large town. During the 1920s, 30s and 40s as a result of efforts by the Arab Legion, the Jordanians had become a relatively manageable population compared to the Palestinians who were bitter, impoverished, seething with political impatience, and awaiting vengeance for the loss of their homes and land.

The trade, commerce, political and social relations that had prior to 1948 tied Arab Palestine with the cities, towns and villages along the Mediterranean coast were severed as a

result of the first Arab-Israel war in 1948. Access to Haifa port was lost; much of the land and employment sources of the Palestine West Bank population now lay across the armistice frontier in Israeli held territory and was no longer accessible.

When Palestine was annexed, there was no industry and Jordan derived nearly all of its income from the soil except for the subsidies it received from the British government. Prospects for the future looked dim indeed. Water shortages and primitive methods of agriculture confined use of the land to a narrow strip along the Jordan Valley and to isolated enclaves elsewhere. As a result of the Palestine war, more than half of the country's population was crowded into six per cent of its territory on the West Bank where population density was 580 per square kilometer compared to a density of 107 on the East Bank. The ratio of population to cultivable land placed Jordan before a dilemma not dissimilar to that of Egypt. Its agricultural regions were, as a result of the refugee influx, among the world's most overpopulated, producing a scanty living from the barren soil.

One in three occupants of Jordan was a refugee in 1949, receiving food, education, medical and social welfare services from UNRWA. About a third of this population lived in UN camps. Many observers at the time believed that the new Hashimite Kingdom was not viable. To many it seemed an artificial creation which would require substantial amounts of international aid to survive: a desert principality that had been endowed with a national status to suit the international convenience of its principal supporter, Great Britain.

During the late 1950s and 1960s Jordan experienced a remarkable transformation. Its economic growth expanded at an unprecedented rate, approximately 10 per cent a year, greater than that in any of the neighboring Arab countries except Saudi Arabia. With the decline of British support and investment in the country, American economic assistance was used to build up infrastructure such as roads, education,

expansion of the port of Aqaba and to improve communications generally. During the decade and a half prior to the 1967 war school attendance rose from 100,000 to over 300,000 with a corresponding decline in illiteracy from 69 per cent to 15 per cent among children between six and fourteen years old. By 1966 *per capita* income in Jordan was higher than in Syria and Egypt and nearly half that of Lebanon. The country even obtained a new university in the capital, Amman. Educational development made possible expansion of an active and well-trained civil service. The new network of roads linked most inhabited parts of the country and opened access to the modern new port of Aqaba in the south.

A major boon to the expanding economy was extension of the irrigated regions in the Jordan Valley. The new projects, utilizing waters of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers, made possible cultivation of an additional forty thousand acres on the East Bank providing employment for a hundred thousand people, most of whom were Palestinian refugees.

The expanded Jordan irrigation program was made possible through large-scale American economic and technical assistance and by an informal agreement with Israel on division of the Jordan River system water. The agreement had been negotiated during the Eisenhower administration by Eric Johnston after several visits to Jordan, Israel, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. Although there was no formally signed pact on division of the Jordan River system, both Israel and Jordan confined their use of water to those limits established by Johnston's survey. As a result Jordan proceeded with construction of the East Ghor irrigation canal which was completed in 1963.

The canal was to have been the first step to extend irrigation to both sides of the river and would have facilitated development of agriculture on a scale large enough to make possible settlement of at least an additional 100,000 people. Ancillary employment derived from development would have provided work and settlement opportunities for several additional tens

of thousands. The total would have been nearly a quarter of a million people, that is approximately 150,000 more people than were employed after completion of the first phase of development in the Jordan Valley.

Shortly after the project was initiated, the Jordan government established an independent East Ghor Canal Authority to plan, construct, operate, maintain and carry out all operations related to development of the waterway. The country's first land reform legislation was also passed to control tenure in the new developed areas. Under the new law, land holdings were limited to between 7.5 and 50 acres; on the other hand subdivision and fractionalization of land below 7.5 acres were forbidden. The intent of the legislation was to break up the prevailing pattern of large absentee land holdings and to prevent fractionalization into tiny farms that would not be economically productive.

A second phase of Jordan Valley development initiated prior to the June 1967 war involved construction of a large storage dam at Maqarin. But all progress was aborted by the war and since 1967 not only has work been discontinued on further development, but much progress made prior to the war has been undermined. Most of the tens of thousands of farmers who worked or operated holdings in the Jordan Valley have fled from the region because of artillery exchanges between Jordanian and Israeli forces, and because of guerrilla activities in the region. On several occasions the East Ghor irrigation canal had been shelled bringing to a halt use of irrigation water. Informal agreements reached between Israeli and Jordanian authorities to restore operations of the canal were sabotaged by new outbreaks of military activity.

As a result of Jordan's rapid economic growth and increasing diversity of its economy prior to 1967 many Palestinians including refugees achieved economic standards far above mere subsistence. The Jordanian government not only refrained from blocking refugee economic integration, but actively encouraged projects that would provide employment.

Unemployment rates and subsistence level employment were still relatively large, however, many individuals in these categories received assistance from relatives working in the Persian Gulf who sent remittances to their families living in East and West Bank Jordan. According to some estimates there were as many as 100,000 Palestinians who were sending funds to relatives living in the Hashimite Kingdom.

The Jordanian government also tried to encourage political integration of the Palestinians. It was the only government that extended citizenship to all Palestinian refugees. King Abdallah and his successors attempted to encourage more active rôles for the Palestinians while maintaining Hashimite control of the kingdom. Although there were several constitutional changes extending powers of parliament and limiting the King's prerogatives, the changes were not really effective since the King and his cabinet (appointed by the monarch) could suspend all parliamentary legislation and place the country under military rule at any time. In the period since Abdallah's annexation of the West Bank, Jordan had been governed more by emergency legislation than by parliament because of continued war with Israel and internal instability.

In an attempt to encourage Palestinian support for the monarchy top government posts and parliamentary seats were divided equally between Palestinians and East Bank Jordanians in 1952. However, instead of mollifying hostility to the Hashimite régime, the division only intensified opposition. Palestinians maintained that they were still under-represented, since they constituted far more than half the total population. The country was plagued not only by continuous border incidents but by internal political instability necessitating frequent imposition of martial law and city-wide curfews. While many Palestinians played prominent rôles in the Hashimite government serving as cabinet ministers, ambassadors, top members of the civil service and government administration, mutual mistrust between the monarchy and the Palestinians continued. Few if any Palestinians served in top security or military

posts. While Palestinians were official advisors to the King, the number of non-Palestinian East Bank Jordanians in the official circle and in the Royal Court was far higher than their numbers would warrant.

At the grass roots, in refugee camps, and among the growing group of university educated youths and intellectuals, there was little loyalty to either the monarch as an individual or to the Hashimite dynasty as an institution. Egypt's President Nasser aroused far more enthusiasm than did King Husain among the younger generation, especially after creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958. There was much more support and enthusiasm among the youth for all-embracing Arab causes than for maintaining Jordan's distinctive identity.

Jerusalem was integral to the economic sustenance and to the political identity of Jordan for the reasons mentioned in the previous section on the Palestine entity. The Holy City and its environments including Bethlehem were central in expansion of tourism and they supplied much foreign currency. While an East Bank Jordan could survive within limited frontiers and with an East Bank population, it is doubtful that it could survive without Jerusalem if the country were to include its present large Palestinian population. As indicated earlier Jerusalem is not only of economic importance, but of great social, political and religious significance to Palestinian Arabs. Were it to be separated from the rest of Palestine as part of a Jewish state or as an international enclave, the fierce attachments of Palestinians to the city would probably stimulate an intense irredentist sentiment. Steps to sever all of Jerusalem from Arab Palestine would thus be counter-productive, for an Arab Palestine without Jerusalem would only stimulate rather than diminish possibilities of intense border hostilities.

The weight of evidence indicates that by 1967 Jordan was well on the way to becoming the successor state to Arab Palestine. This was more true in an economic than in a political sense. While the country's economic growth had exceeded all

expectations and Jordan's economic viability seemed to have been established by 1967 there was still serious question about the extent to which the Palestinians accepted the country's political status as a Hashimite Kingdom. The large Palestinian Arab population was still hostile to the less sophisticated but dominant East Bank social and political aristocracy.

The Hashimite dynasty had little inter-Arab support. By 1967 its only other Arab ally was Saudi Arabia. With the fall of one Arab monarchy after another the future of the Hashimite régime was quite uncertain. Growth of strong anti-monarchical sentiment and development of intense leftist or socialist ideologies also militated against a monarchy. While serious question could be raised about the success or lack of success of socialist and radical Arab régimes, there was also serious doubt about continued success of the monarchies. Could economic growth such as that of Jordan become the basis for a political régime which had little popular support? Economic development raised the level of political expectations among Palestinians to a point where they were nearly incompatible with political régimes such as the Hashimite monarchy.

By 1970 there were indications that the Palestine Arab political-commando movements sought not merely recognition but political coexistence along Israel's frontiers without political responsibility. While the Palestinians seemed capable of damaging if not undermining the Hashimite dynasty they were still reluctant to assume the responsibilities of sovereignty. To do so would necessitate policies toward Israel which contradicted their stated objectives of destroying the Jewish state and its Zionist institutions. To assume political power would require either a substantial increase in military strength sufficient to achieve their goals, or their reevaluation to accord with Israel's superior military capacity.

The following possibilities therefore emerge *vis-à-vis* any future Arab controlled Palestine: continuation of the Hashimite régime coexisting with a Palestinian government in exile; replacement of the Hashimite dynasty by a Palestinian Arab

régime which after assuming political authority and responsibility would be forced to come to terms with Israel; or a deferred decision in which the political future of Jordan would be determined by the outcome of hostilities with Israel.

Unitary State: Palestine/Israel

A unitary state to include all of mandatory Palestine has been proposed by both Palestine Arab commandos and by Israeli nationalists, particularly those in the Land of Israel movement. The major difference between the two conceptions is that the latter envisages Palestine as a Jewish state whereas the Palestinians proclaim as their objective a secular democratic state.

The Land of Israel movement, which emerged after Israel's occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai and the Golan Heights, descends from the Herut program which itself is an offshoot of the Revisionist Zionist movement. The Revisionist, and later the *Herut* party slogan was "both sides of the Jordan." Their claims were derived from Israel's ancient historical boundaries, which, although never clearly demarcated, included most of what is present day Palestine and Transjordan. The Revisionist ideology maintains that the original League of Nations mandate awarded to Great Britain in 1920 included not only the area west of the Jordan River but all of Transjordan as well. Therefore, according to this view, Palestine on both sides of the river should be included within the boundaries of the Jewish state. After Israel's expansion during the June war, many Israelis who had not previously been supporters of, or identified with, the Revisionist or *Herut* position enthusiastically supported retention of all occupied territories. Those who favored the extended frontiers represented a wide political spectrum, from former leftists and socialists to all members of *Herut*.

Many other political figures were ambiguous about their intentions or desires for Israel's boundaries. The question of future frontiers was so controversial that the Israel coalition

government was unable to make any definitive policy concerning it. The uncertainty was evident in the diverse proposals made by individual cabinet members after 1967. The Allon Plan seemed to combine the concept of maintaining a unified Palestine under Israeli control, with establishment of a West Bank entity. Under the Allon Plan, mentioned above, Israel would retain the Gaza Strip, substantial areas in the West Bank, as well as the Golan Heights and parts of Sinai, and Israeli troops would be stationed along the Jordan River. Even within the ranks of the Israel Labor Party there were those who asserted that if Israel had no right to remain in Hebron, it had no right to remain in Jaffa. Since political and military circumstances had led to incorporation of Jaffa within Israel's borders, there was no reason why they should not include Gaza, Jerusalem and a number of strategic Arab cities on the West Bank. Israel government policy, while not explicitly keyed to incorporation of the occupied territories, has taken into account "new realities" and "new facts." During the 1969 elections this position was underscored by Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, who insisted that Israel was in the West Bank, "of right and not of sufferance, to visit, to live and to settle . . . we must be able to maintain military bases there . . . we must of course, be able to prevent the entry of any Arab army into the West Bank." As for the status of West Bank inhabitants, Dayan stated: "If they accept our conditions, it seems to me of lesser importance whether the West Bank chooses to be a part of Jordan with some autonomy, whether it prefers to be independent, or simply to be part of Jordan . . . I am quite sure that we, for our part must decide what is essential for us and make our stand on it."¹ Arabs would not be forced to become Israelis, according to the defense minister, but would be permitted to retain Jordanian citizenship while living in Israeli surrounded enclaves.

The only party in the government coalition which explicitly denounced annexation of the West Bank was the *Mapam* left wing socialist faction. However, *Mapam* also advocated reten-

tion of the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

Within the Labor Party there was great concern among some members about the demographic differences between Israeli Jews and Palestine Arabs. Even former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion was concerned by the spectre of "Levantinization." Concern about the considerably greater Arab birth rate aroused fears that within a generation Israeli Jews would become a minority within the confines of a greater Israel if it included the West Bank and Gaza. Their arguments harkened back to the debate in Zionist circles prior to establishment of the Jewish state, when many feared the competition of lower paid Arab labor. Opponents of territorial expansion saw a danger to Zionist ideology in the practice after 1967 of employing Arab labor for unskilled agriculture and construction work.

On the other hand, those who advocated retention of all occupied territories tended to ignore the demographic question, pointing out that large numbers of Arabs in the occupied areas were refugees who might be resettled outside the borders of Palestine, finding economic opportunity abroad. They were therefore unconcerned by demographic arguments and the danger of Israeli Jews becoming a minority in a largely Arab state.

Still another version of a unified Palestine envisaged establishment of a binational state within whose borders the Palestinian Arab and "Jewish" nations would share equal rights. There were various blueprints ranging from a loose federation of Jewish and Arab cantons, to fusion of Israel, Arab Palestine and Jordan within the Hashimite Kingdom under King Husain. The latter plan was proposed by an Israeli official writing anonymously in the publication, *New Outlook*. It envisaged a Jewish Prime Minister under the Arab King and a system of government in which Arab and Jewish officials, including those in the security forces, would be balanced. In some respects the proposal resembled the multi-ethnic state system existing in Lebanon with a balance between Jews and Arabs rather than

among several groups. Another major difference is that in Palestine ethnic groups are generally concentrated in homogeneous territorial blocks, whereas in Lebanon they are more widely interspersed.

Generally the concept of binationalism had been disavowed in Israel and by Zionists, even by those who had supported it prior to 1948. The *Mapam* party, for example, which supported binationalism until 1948, now regards it as an unworkable solution.

Among Palestine Arabs there is also discussion of the binational concept. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine has urged the establishment of a new state with a federal or confederation structure of the Yugoslav or Czechoslovak type.² In an interview with reporters from the Columbia University *Daily Spectator*, a staff writer for the Washington based weekly, *Free Palestine*, a publication of the Friends of Free (Arab) Palestine, commented that he favored "a largely binational socialist state . . . socialism is the cement which would have to bind the two groups. When we talk about liberation what we really mean is the destruction . . . if you want to say it that way . . . of the institutional structure of the state of Israel as it stands today. But we also mean making every effort possible not to disrupt the society of Israel. We would like to preserve Israeli society because nobody, regardless if he is against the whole idea of Zionism, can deny that there is an Israeli society there which has its own fabric and institutions. However, the state, the superstructure, the Palestine Liberation Movement aims at destroying. Within the binational state the movement envisions two 'ethnic' groups having their special institutions as far as they relate to one group or another. That is, some people want to teach Hebrew or the Talmud and others want to teach the Koran and so on, but other than that, things that do not relate to any ethnic interests do not have to be separated. There will be one government."³

There are also many Palestinians who oppose binationalism because it would separate the population into two distinct

ethnic entities, and seems contrary to the concept of a democratic secular state where religious and ethnic differences would play no rôle in national identity.

The Palestinian National Covenant adopted by the Palestine National Council of the PLO in 1968 indicated that: (Article VI) "Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." The covenant, while calling for freedom of worship, emphasizes that Palestine is the "homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the great homeland, and the people of Palestine of the Arab nation."

The concept of union, federation, or some other political integration between Palestinian Arabs and Jews was advocated by some Zionists during the British mandatory era when the Arab-Jewish population ratio was approximately the reverse of the present ratio. At the end of the mandate in 1948, Arabs were approximately two-thirds and Jews one-third of Palestine's nearly one million eight hundred thousand inhabitants. While the concept of an Arab-Jewish, or binational, state failed to rally wide support among either Arabs or Jews, there were sufficient numbers of the latter who supported the idea to give it political viability.

The two principal binationalist groups were the *Ihud* organization, formed from a small but influential number of Jewish intellectuals, most prominent of whom were Professor Martin Buber, and Dr. Judah Magnes, the American president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; and *Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair* (the young guard), a left Zionist party which later became the core of *Mapam*, now part of the Israel coalition government. Both *Ihud* and *Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair* publicly presented their proposals to the Anglo American Committee of Inquiry in 1946, and again to the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine in 1947. Both stressed the need for a Jewish homeland to implement goals of nationalism. In the interest of achieving accommodation with the Arabs, the binationalists urged Jews to forego short term solutions to their plans so that

they could be developed taking into account legitimate Arab objections to, and fears of, a Jewish majority. Because Palestine was never meant to be a unisovereign state, only joint rule would be acceptable, they argued.

While advocating political parity, with Switzerland as a model, the binationalists differed, principally, on the thorny question of Jewish immigration. Fear of large-scale Jewish immigration and the rapid takeover of Palestine by a Jewish majority had been the key to Arab national sentiment since the 1920s.

Ihud proposed a compromise, recommending that Jewish immigration be suspended, pending agreement with the Arabs when numerical parity had been reached. According to *Ihud* estimates it would take several years for the two peoples to become equal in numbers, given the high birth rate of the Arab population and the proposed rate of Jewish immigration. After parity was to be achieved, Jews and Arabs in the binational government would jointly decide on the continuing immigration rate. *Ihud* believed that without mutual agreement on the ratio of Jews and Arabs, there could be no peace since there would always be danger that the majority would subordinate the minority.

Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair, on the other hand, saw no need to limit Jewish immigration if a balance could be maintained through political parity. Furthermore, they argued that the borders of Transjordan, an "artificial" state, be open to permit economic development of the East Bank by Jewish supported settlers. The party envisaged immigration to Palestine within the next quarter of a century of two to three million Jews. Rather than numerical equality, *Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair* emphasized political, social and economic parity which would raise Arabs to Jewish living standards. By gradually redressing the economic inequalities between Arab and Jewish communities, and by strengthening economic and social interdependence between them, it would be possible to obviate quarrels over differences in population ratio. According to this

view, the problem of numerical parity would become irrelevant if both peoples found economic equality at high living standards. Arab opposition to Jewish settlement and national rights in Palestine would dissipate with economic development, according to *Ha-Shomer*.

It was calculated that by 1970 Arab *per capita* income could be increased by 75 to 100 per cent and that 60 to 70 per cent of the Arabs would rise to the same income bracket as the Jews. Palestine, it was asserted, could support a rural population of nearly four million. While the country could triple its population during this period, national income could be increased fourfold. These estimates were based on the assumption that with increased education, the Palestinian fallah could substantially expand his agricultural production which was retarded because of primitive agricultural techniques. Furthermore, a general rise in national income could be achieved by shifting the occupational structure toward industry and manufacturing with a relative decrease in the proportion of those employed in agriculture.

After these proposals were published binationalism fell into disfavor in the new state of Israel among most of its original supporters. *Mapam*, successor to *Ha-Shomer Ha-Zair*, increasingly moved from its original program until the present leadership concluded that binationalism would endanger the Jewish state which emerged during the past two decades.

International experience with binational or multinational political structures indeed tends to support the observation that nations in which there is division of political power along ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic lines, tend to be plagued by internal conflict. Factionalism rather than compromise or willingness to share sovereignty seems to be endemic in such states. The examples of Cyprus, Canada, Belgium, Nigeria, Malaysia, India and other multinational states have not been encouraging.⁴

In the Middle East there is still a wide economic and social gap between Israeli Jews and Arabs. The rapid development

of the Palestine Arab community envisaged by those who supported binationalism twenty years ago has not occurred. Neither the Arabs who remained in Israel nor those who were in parts of Palestine taken over by Egypt and Transjordan have achieved the goals of economic or social parity with Israeli Jews.

Appropriate for purposes of comparison are differences in development between Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs and West Bank Palestinians. According to an Israel government census conducted in the West Bank shortly after the war in 1967, approximately 600,000 people remained.⁵ (The figure was considerably lower than the Jordanian government estimate of about one million West Bank inhabitants. Part of the difference could be attributed to the exodus of some 200,000 - 300,000 refugees during the June war and part to West Bank citizens living or working abroad.) The Israeli census enumerated only about 150,000 West Bank inhabitants who were 1948 refugees compared to an UNRWA estimate of over 400,000. This disparity was also caused by the June exodus and by differences in the Israel and UNRWA definition of Arab "refugee."

The West Bank occupational structure, characteristic of an underdeveloped country, differed radically from that in Israel. If all members of West Bank farm families working in agriculture were included, the proportion would approximate 50 per cent. Only 4.1 per cent were professionals, skilled workers and technicians.⁶

In Israel, 1966 statistics indicated that just over 10 per cent of the Jewish population was employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing; 27 per cent in industry, crafts, mines and quarries; and over 46 per cent in various professions, services and government.⁷

The occupational structure of Israel's non-Jewish population (nearly all Arab) in 1966 resembles more closely the structure of the undeveloped West Bank than that of Israel's Jewish population. The largest number of Israeli Arabs, nearly 40 per

cent, were employed in agriculture, forestry and fishing. In other employment categories a comparison of the 1961 Jordan census with the Israeli non-Jewish population employed in 1966 indicated little difference. The two major disparities were in construction—19.6 for Israeli non-Jews and 10.9 for Jordanian men—and in the 19.3 per cent of the male Jordanians whose occupation was “unspecified.”⁸

Per capita national product in the West Bank during 1966 was about \$280 compared to Israel's *per capita* product of approximately \$1,500. Differences between Jewish and non-Jewish *per capita* income in Israel, while not immediately available, would be indicated by differences in occupational structure and sources of income. During 1966, 8.5 per cent of Israel's national income was derived from agriculture while in Jordan 23.9 per cent of income was from farming. The figures were nearly reversed for industry, crafts and mining. Only 7.8 per cent of Jordan's income was derived from these sources whereas the percentage for Israel was 24.2 per cent. In other areas differences were not particularly startling except that Jordan showed 11.8 per cent of gross product derived from foreign production factors.⁹

A survey of facilities indicated that a higher percentage of households in the non-Jewish (nearly all Arab) sector of Israel possessed various types of equipment than were owned in the West Bank. For example, 63.6 per cent of the non-Jewish homes in Israel had kitchens whereas ownership in the West Bank was 45.5 per cent. On the other hand fewer Israeli non-Jewish homes—34.1 per cent—had inside toilets than in Jordan—40.5 per cent. The greatest differences were in rural areas where 41.5 per cent of the Israeli non-Jews and only 4.1 per cent of the West Bank inhabitants had running water. Electricity was available for 25.4 per cent of rural non-Jewish Israelis but for only 6.7 per cent of West Bankers.

Differences between Israeli non-Jewish and Jewish communities were indicated by 1966 figures showing that in Israel's total population, 88.2 per cent had kitchens for the use of one

family, and 89.0 per cent had a toilet inside the home. It might be observed that material conditions of the Arabs in Israel were generally better than those of the surrounding countries, however, they were more similar to those of the West Bank than to those of the Jewish population of Israel.¹⁰

The Arab community in Israel retained a distinctive character evident in its towns and villages resembling more those of Palestinian Arabs living in Jordan than Israeli Jewish towns and villages. Language, culture, social conditions and general mores of Israeli Arabs, as evidenced in the position of women, relationships between generations, life goals and family interrelationships, were more akin to the West Bank Palestinian than to the Israeli Jew. While there were many changes in the lives of Israeli Arabs during the past twenty years, possession of Israeli citizenship had not raised their level to the Jewish average. The gap existing between Jews and Arabs in 1948 still remained. Economic goals to which binationalists had aspired before establishment of Israel, when two-thirds of the population was Arab, had not been achieved for even an Arab minority of 12 per cent. The reasons might be attributed to the influx of large numbers of Jewish immigrants whose settlement commanded the energies and resources of Israeli government and national institutions; the large proportion of the national economy which had to be devoted to the military and defense; to a certain measure of resistance within the Israel Arab community, partly stemming from conservatism and traditionalism and partly from passive political opposition.

The economic, political, social and cultural disparities between the Israeli Jewish community, the Israeli Arabs, and the Arabs in areas occupied during June 1967 show that it would be no easy matter to bridge the gap between Jews and Arabs now living under Israel's control. The differences are greater than those between English and French speaking Canadians, Walloons and Flemish speaking Belgians, or Ibos and the Nigerians who control the central government of Lagos.

In consideration of a unitary state of all Palestine, the implications of severing East Bank Jordan from Jerusalem and the West Bank must be taken into account. There is serious question about the continued economic and political viability of a separate East Bank, especially if it were to retain its large Palestinian population which has extensive ties with the rest of Palestine. This is an additional factor which would present difficulties in a unified Palestine without East Bank Jordan.

An Entity Within the "Arab Nation"

Most Arab conceptions of a Palestine entity, no matter what form, envisage it as part of a larger Arab nation. The Palestinian national covenant and platforms of the various commando groups emphasize that Palestine, while it is the homeland of the Palestinian Arabs, is also an integral part of the larger Arab nation. This conception goes back to the early days of the nationalist movement when Palestinian Arab leaders were identified with the Syrian nationalist movement. It reflects in some measure, the dispute between the Husaini and Nashashibi factions prior to 1948 over identification with the Arab world. Hajj Amin al-Husaini was an Arab leader of international, not merely local significance, and his Palestine Arab party envisaged an independent Palestine closely identified with and linked to other Arab states. The *Istiqlal* party also strongly emphasized identification of Palestine with the larger Arab world.

Some differences in commando ideology today reflect these nuances. The more radical groups aim not only at a revolution in Palestine and among Palestinians, but throughout the Arab world of which Palestine is a part. To some extent differences between Palestinian commando groups and the Jordanian and Lebanese governments reflect clashes between local and Palestinian nationalism linked to greater Arab unity.

Strong attachment to greater Arab unity was evident during the last decade and a half when there was great attraction to the UAR. While all Arab nationalist factions today

conceive of Palestine as part of a larger Arab nation, there is difference among them in priority to be placed upon Arab unity. The less radical movements such as *Fatah* and the PLO primarily emphasize Palestinian national independence, after which ideology and political identity of the Arab Palestinian nation will be more precisely defined. More leftist groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, while placing great emphasis upon Palestinian independence, also regard unity and larger Arab problems as immediately significant.

Among Israeli Jews of various political orientations there are many who conceive of Israel as part of a larger Middle East political federation, confederation, or other similar political configuration. Many in the Semitic Action group which has a membership ranging from individuals in the Greater Israel movement to radical leftists in *Matspen*, a left wing faction which broke away from the Israel Communist party, maintain that the country's orientation should be directed toward integration into the Middle East and that its identification with Jewish communities of the West and with the United States has undermined relationships between Israeli Jews and Arabs in the Middle East. They regard Israel's identification with its Arab neighbors in a larger political-economic entity as a prerequisite to acceptance by its Semitic neighbors.

Because of the vagueness in most conceptions of Arab unity and the lack of success in the unity movement until the present, it is difficult to speculate about the rôle that Palestinians might play in a united Arab political configuration. Undoubtedly the Palestinians would play a major rôle if such a configuration were to emerge. Their high level of political sophistication, technical ability, educational attainment, and experience in leadership throughout the Arab world for the past two decades would assure them a significant place in a greater Arab state. What that place would be, would depend upon the nature of the unified state and the relative strength of some 2.5 to 3 million Palestinians among 50 million or more other Arabs.

An Evolution of the Status Quo

Assuming that there is no political settlement and that the *status quo* continues, it is difficult to imagine that the importance of the Palestinians will diminish. On the contrary, the commando organizations will probably become stronger in the nations surrounding Israel, acting as a pressure against any compromise involving recognition of the Jewish state. Although the commandos may not achieve any major military success against Israel, their activities within the occupied territories will stimulate increasingly severe Israeli retaliation leading to a deeper rift between Jews and Arabs under Israeli jurisdiction, both those in the occupied areas and those who are Israeli citizens. The spread of national consciousness among Israeli Arab youth is already evident in their growing involvement in the commando movement, the increasing arrests, and the widening gap between the younger and older generations. A parallel factor will probably be sharper reaction by the Israeli public against dissident opinions in opposition to government military and security measures. There are already, only three years after the war, increasing numbers of Israeli intellectuals who are concerned about the perils to democracy in the country if the *status quo* continues.

Of major concern to those who value democracy in Israel is the future of the country's minority. Should the *status quo* continue, the present Arab numerical minority will become a majority—but with minority status. Arab birth rates are considerably higher with the result that they can become a majority within a generation.

Although, as indicated in a previous section, the gap in education, technological progress, and living standards is growing wider between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, the numerical superiority of the latter by the end of this century poses a serious dilemma for those Israelis who desire to preserve a Jewish state—but a democratic Jewish state. Many foresee the dangers of increasing racism and divisive-

ness within their country unless some settlement can be reached with the Palestinians.

* * *

The most immediate problem in establishment of a Palestinian entity is not its form but the procedures leading to acceptance of a political settlement acceptable to Palestinians, Israelis, Jordanians, and other parties not directly involved in the dispute. Without Israeli government recognition of the Palestinians there can be no negotiations. But adoption of such a policy would lead to collapse of the present Israel coalition government,¹¹ necessitating establishment of a new government whose members would recognize the existence and national rights of Palestinians. It will be equally difficult to designate a group of Palestinians with wide credibility who can negotiate with the Israeli government since this would necessitate recognition of Israeli national rights. Until there is mutual recognition of national rights by parties entitled to negotiate on behalf of a wide Palestinian Arab and a wide Israeli public, the future of a Palestinian entity with its own territory must be held in abeyance.

FOOTNOTES—PART III

1. *Jerusalem Post Weekly*, No. 470, October 27, 1969, pp. 6-7.
2. *Le Monde*, January 27, 1970.
3. *Free Palestine*, Vol. II, No. 2, June 1970.
4. Walker Connor, "Self Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1, October 1967.
5. Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), *West Bank of the Jordan, Gaza Strip and Northern Golan Heights, Census of Population 1967*, Publication No. 1, Jerusalem, 1967.
6. State of Israel, Prime Minister's Office, Economic Planning Authority, *Economic Survey of the West Bank (Summary)*, Jerusalem, 1967.
7. CBS, *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1967, No. 18, Jerusalem, 1967.
8. *Op. cit.*, *Economic Survey of the West Bank and Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1967.

9. According to Israeli sources, the income of Israeli Arabs was four times that of "other Arabs in the Middle East." See *Facts About Israel 1968*, Jerusalem, 1968, p. 65. This is a rather ambiguous assertion since *per capita* income in the neighboring Arab countries during 1966 ranged from \$168 in the UAR to \$475 in Lebanon, or \$3,208 in Kuwait. The Near East average was \$321 and that for Jordan \$262.
10. CBS, *Housing Conditions, Household Equipment, Welfare Assistance and Farming in the Administered Areas, Census of the Population 1967*, Publication No. 2, Jerusalem, 1968; *op. cit.*, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1967*.
11. Cf. earlier reference to *Gahal* participation in the government, and particularly to the *Herut* wing of the party.

THE ECONOMICS OF A PALESTINE ENTITY

RICHARD J. WARD

To determine with some degree of accuracy the economic elements pertaining to a separate Palestinian state, we need to define its geographic boundaries or inclusions. One generally accepted definition of a Palestinian entity is, first of all, coterminous with the West Bank of Jordan, from the Jordan River in the Jordan Valley to the border between Israel and Jordan existing prior to the June 1967 war. This territory contains 2,200 square miles, out of the pre-1967 war total Jordan area of 37,300 square miles.

The place of Jerusalem in a separate Palestine state also has important economic in addition to significant political consequences. (See above.) The economic assumption we make here is that whatever political arrangement might be established within the context of a peace settlement, the prospect of a separate and viable economic entity on the West Bank must include an arrangement for sharing the foreign exchange earnings and trade with the city of Jerusalem. Thus, the geographic boundaries of the entity would be roughly the same as the pre-1967 war boundaries, with the exception that a political arrangement for Jerusalem would differ in some way, affecting the economic relationship between Jerusalem and the West Bank to the degree that foreign exchange earnings to the new "entity" would be favorably or unfavorably influenced. We will first describe the economic aspects of this entity, and then deal with a Palestine entity which also includes the Gaza Strip as a part of the West Bank economy.

The West Bank Economy

The state of the pre-war 1967 economy—its national income, balance of payments, domestic budget—becomes an important consideration in estimating the economic viability of a separate West Bank economy as a Palestinian entity. The economic assessments of the value of the West Bank economy to Jordan have varied considerably in the literature.¹ One account describes the West Bank as “a heavy burden on the Government of Jordan’s budget and balance of payments” concluding that Jordan, having lost the West Bank, “is today a much more stable and viable State, demographically, politically, and economically than the Jordan of 1948-1967.”² Another opinion states that, “Of Jordan’s massive losses as a result of the June 1967 war, the most critical in terms of its economic potential is the severance of the West Bank.” The latter article refers to the “annual loss of \$45 million in foreign exchange earnings, or more than one-third of the total.”³ It reports that tourism earnings went from \$34 million in 1966 to \$18.5 million in 1967, and suffered a further loss in 1968. Jordanians abroad sent home remittances of \$27 million in 1966, and these were said to drop by as much as 70 per cent in the first quarter of 1968.

For its part, Israel has claimed that the occupation of the West Bank will cost her \$40-50 million to maintain, as an occupied area, much of it in Israeli merchandise and including about \$20 million in foreign exchange.⁴

To determine the economic viability of the West Bank economy as a separate entity, therefore, we need to seek objective criteria by which to judge the validity of the conflicting views, and to recognize the fact that the economy of an *occupied* West Bank would differ from that of an independent and free Palestine entity resulting from a peace settlement (whether one agrees or not that it is possible to establish such a state politically). The most objective economic criteria are those which characterize the West Bank economy prior to

the outbreak of the war in 1967 in terms of national income, balance of payments, and the fiscal relationship of the West Bank to the government of Jordan.

Prior to the 1967 war the GNP of Jordan was divided approximately such that 38 per cent of the income was generated in the West Bank and 62 per cent in the East Bank (Table 1). At the same time, somewhat less than half of the population of Jordan resided in the West Bank. Many of these were refugees. This means that the *per capita* income on the West Bank in 1966 was less than the *per capita* income of the East Bank. The total GNP of Jordan in 1966, including the East and West Banks, was \$550.8 million. At 62 per cent of the total, the East Bank GNP, therefore, was \$342.2 million, and that of the West Bank \$208.6 million, or 38 per cent of the total. The population of all of Jordan in 1966 was about 2.1 million, of which about 900,000 resided on the West Bank, 1.2 million on the East Bank. The *per capita* incomes on the East and West Banks would therefore have been respectively about \$285 and \$230 per annum. At the same time it is generally accepted that the East Bank economy was growing more rapidly than the West Bank economy, in view of its broader resource base in minerals, in irrigated agriculture, and in the concentration of development investment. Since the GNP for all Jordan as a whole was growing at about 10 per cent a year in current terms prior to the war, the West Bank growth was more nearly at 6-8 per cent a year.

As the result of the war of 1967, at least 250,000 refugees fled the West Bank, and the loss of trade and production caused a serious drop in the growth of the West Bank economy. According to a recent report the drop in output was about 25 per cent.⁵ However, since 25 per cent of the population fled to the East Bank or elsewhere, we may assume that the *per capita* income has not changed greatly from the pre-war year on the basis of population shifts alone. On the other hand, wages for West Bank labor have increased and prices for West Bank produce sold to Israel are higher than the pre-war prices.

Thus, estimates now claim a somewhat higher *per capita* income on the West Bank.

An Economically Viable Entity

To maintain a viable economic state in the long term the GNP of the West Bank must maintain at least its pre-1967 war rate of growth of 6-8 per cent a year. This requires certain assumptions about the resumption of economic activity in those productive sectors in which it was seriously affected by the war and its aftermath. First, we must assume that the 3,700 industrial establishments on the West Bank, which accounted for 48 per cent of the country's total number of such enterprises in Jordan before the war, and 20 per cent of the country's GNP employing 14,000 workers, or 37 per cent of all industrial employment, will resume their annual growth in production. Either the markets which absorbed the output of these industries on the East Bank must be reopened or new markets in Israel or elsewhere must be obtained. At the same time, agricultural production and sales will have to resume. Resumption of economic growth in these major sectors will be all the more necessary if, as part of a conceivable Palestine settlement, the Palestinians who fled are permitted or encouraged to return to the West Bank, and if there is an assumption that more Palestinians from East Bank refugee camps and/or from Gaza will also want to move to the West Bank.

It is not difficult to speculate that a peace settlement will make it possible for output on the West Bank to resume its growth performance of the pre-war years of about 6 to 8 per cent, if investment out of a GNP of about \$40 million (20 per cent of the 1966 West Bank GNP of \$209 million) is generated, and assuming markets in both East Bank Jordan and Israel.⁶ Even this resumption of growth of industrial production will not likely be adequate, however, to offset the total loss in foreign exchange earnings.

To overcome the \$40-\$50 million loss in foreign exchange due to the war (the pre-war 1965 deficit for the West Bank was

estimated at \$35 million—see Table 2), the West Bank economy will have to assume that revived or new sources of foreign exchange can be generated.⁷ The loss in tourism and remittance earnings will have to be made up out of an arrangement on Jerusalem, which would provide a resumption of the level of earnings of around \$30 million annually for tourism and over \$25 million or more from remittances which pertained prior to the 1967 war, most of which filtered through the West Bank of Jordan with multiplier effects on the rest of the economy. Without these two major sources of income for the West Bank or the Palestine entity, foreign aid from some sources will be necessary to maintain the growth in living standards, the absence of which would probably lead to instability.

In all likelihood, if a separate Palestinian entity would be organized within the context of a general peace settlement, both tourism and remittance earnings could resume at least at their 1966 pre-war rate of flow. In fact, it is possible that with an internationalized section of Jerusalem, provided there is a sharing arrangement on foreign exchange earnings from Jerusalem between Israel and the new entity, the total earnings from tourism could be considerably higher than the pre-1967 war period. This possibility would be encouraged if, as part of the peace settlement, open trade lines were established between Israel and the new state, allowing a duty free flow of both goods and tourists from Israel into Jerusalem and into the West Bank generally (this is already part of the Israeli peace proposal). In this regard a review of both Israel and Jordanian import items for potential market exchanges could be useful.⁸

A final major consideration is the governmental budget deficit of a new Palestinian entity. According to estimates developed from US Embassy data, the West Bank budgetary deficit in the fiscal year just prior to the 1967 war amounted to about \$12 million (see Table 3). This is based on a division of domestic revenues between the West and East Banks predi-

cated on the same percentage division as that of the country's total GNP between the two Banks. As the Government was located in the East Bank, expenditures for civilian personnel and capital outlays for development and for the military were heavily concentrated on the East Bank prior to the war. The estimate of the West Bank's budget deficit in pre-war Jordan does not exceed \$15 million and, therefore, need not be serious. Hence, provided the output of goods and services and the foreign exchange earnings can achieve pre-war levels of growth on the West Bank, there is no reason why this budget deficit could not be covered from an increase in earnings and taxation on the income derived from trade with Israel.

To sum up, the reduction of 25 per cent of industrial output which is reported to have occurred on the West Bank, the foreign exchange deficit of approximately \$35 million which existed prior to the war and estimated to be a minimum measure of the current need, and a budgetary deficit of at least \$12 million must be recouped if a Palestinian entity on the West Bank is to be viable. All of these areas of economic or fiscal decline must ultimately be revived and the deficits financed if a Palestinian state on the West Bank is to be independently viable in an economic sense. During the early years of such a state, foreign financial assistance could help bridge the period from infancy to viability, particularly if thousands of additional refugees are admitted from Gaza, Lebanon, Sinai or elsewhere.

If one assumes a permanently foreign aid-dependent state, then viability of the new state becomes a political rather than an economic consideration. This assumption could become realistic if access to Jerusalem tourism earnings and Israeli markets is denied in the political settlement, and trade with the East Bank lags, while thousands of refugees are admitted to the new state. *Economic* viability in this case is not a consideration, and foreign financial assistance of \$40-\$50 million or more (to cover the foreign exchange and domestic budget deficit) will be a continuing requirement of the new state for

an indefinite period. This could be reduced to \$25 million if tourism earnings and remittances combined brought in \$15-\$25 million a year. The degree to which tensions and unrest are prevalent or aggravated by the settlement will, therefore, have a considerable bearing on the prospects for economic viability of a new entity in the West Bank area.

A Liberal Settlement and the Palestine Entity

A liberal political settlement on the Middle East problem could assume the following:

- Gaza Strip granted to new West Bank entity, with access route from West Bank.
- Open duty free trading agreement *vis-à-vis* Israel. Free and open trade with East Bank and all Arab countries.
- A generous foreign aid investment program.

These could be granted in exchange for equally liberal concessions on the Arab side (free access to Suez, demilitarization of the new state, etc.). Economically, the trade relations between the new state, Israel and Transjordan would resemble those of a federation, where common obstacles to economic intercourse are worked out cooperatively.

In this environment, there are many options which would portend well for the self reliance of a separate Palestine state. Port facilities could be improved in Gaza, opening the West Bank (and East Bank) directly to the Mediterranean Sea route to Europe (instead of the longer overland and sea routes through Aqaba and Beirut). Israel may provide additional access to the Mediterranean through her ports. Tourism would rapidly far exceed the pre-1967 war earnings level, and new markets in Israel and, for Israel, in the new state and Transjordan would provide a dynamic stimulus to these economies. If this arrangement is supplemented by a 5 or 10 year investment plan, underwritten by Western and Soviet aid, the new entity would prosper far beyond the potential the West Bank had prior to the war. This investment input would be important, in view of the low *per capita* income of about \$100 in Gaza, and

the release of refugees from relief-bound camps. With all of these inputs, economic self reliance for the new entity is a distinct possibility, even in the short run.

Conclusion

Under the poorest prospects for cooperation in a political settlement which creates a Palestine state on the West Bank, where the state has limited access to Jerusalem's tourism earnings, where trade with Israel is nil, where there is no outlet to the Mediterranean, and where trade even with the East Bank does not achieve its pre-war potentials, *economic* self reliance seems out of the question. Annual foreign assistance of at least \$50 million would probably be necessary to support the necessary living standards, the flow of imports and the domestic government budget.

On the other hand, given the most liberal of cooperative agreements concerning the establishment of such a state, including a foreign aid supported investment plan, resumption of domestic and international trade, commitment of 20 per cent of its GNP to investment, revived remittances and tourism would be rapidly achieved and soon exceed the pre-1967 war level. In this environment, economic viability or self reliance for the new entity would soon be possible. The range of assumptions between these two cases would affect the financial requirements accordingly.

Finally, the classic economic caveat: The long-range economic problem that a diminutive separate entity could create is to perpetuate and increase the tendency toward small scale manufacturing operations, which is already plaguing Middle East enterprise by causing high cost methods and lack of capacity to attract modern technology. Basically, this is the economists' argument against political atomization which also produces economic atomization. The only counter argument to it is free and vigorous trade practices which broaden markets beyond the confines of the borders of small nations. This is not impossible and, in fact, has been successfully pro-

moted by other smaller states in Europe and elsewhere. But it would be a very much longer range planning, investment and export development problem for a new, small Palestinian entity on the West Bank.

FOOTNOTES

PART III (Continued)

1. Refer to E. Kanovsky, "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War" in the *Middle East Journal*, Spring and Summer 1968; "Is Jordan's economy dependent on the West Bank?" in the *Israel Economist*, October-November 1967; Oded Remba, "Why Jordan Can Survive" in *The New Middle East*, March 1969, and others.
2. *Israel Economist*, October-November 1967.
3. Oded Remba, *op. cit.*, *The New Middle East*, March 1969.
4. This is consistent with other recent assessments, *i.e.*, the Remba article and *London Financial Times*, May 5, 1970. The balance of payments deficit for Jordan's West Bank in 1966 is estimated at \$35 million.
5. *London Financial Times*, May 5, 1970, page 28.
6. The investment estimate is based on a capital/output ratio of 3 to 1 developed by M. Mazur, "Jordan Country Study" (unpublished draft of a Ph.D. Dissertation, March 1969), p. 12. However, public and private investment as a per cent of investment for Jordan as a whole in 1966 was 15 per cent. We expect that an optimistic settlement will promote a higher investment coefficient in GNP.
7. The balance of payments of the West Bank prior to the war validates the estimate made by Israel of a \$40-\$50 million support level for the West Bank, most of it in foreign exchange.
8. It is important to point out here that Israel would gain considerably from earnings on services at its own ports if most of the cross-Jordan trade went through Israel instead of through Beirut. Naturally, on the other side of the coin, Beirut would probably be a significant loser in port earnings. This could have the beneficial effect of reducing the profit on commercial port activity in Lebanon relative to earnings in industry, thereby attracting more long term capital to the industrial sector where it is badly needed.

TABLE 1

INDUSTRIAL ORIGINS OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
EAST AND WEST BANK
(\$ Millions)

	<u>Totals</u>		<u>East Bank</u>		<u>West Bank</u>	
	East and West Bank		% of Total		% of Total	
	1959	1966	1966	Activity	1966	Activity
Agriculture, Forestry, Livestock	42.2	108.4	65.0	60	43.4	40
Manufacturing, Mining	17.4	48.4	36.7	75	11.7	25
Construction	13.0	25.8	18.1	70	7.7	30
Electricity Supply	1.8	5.6	2.8	50	2.8	50
Transportation	30.0	40.3	26.2	65	14.1	35
Wholesale, Retail Trade	50.4	80.9	48.5	60	32.4	40
Banking	2.2	7.8	4.7	60	3.1	40
Ownership of Dwellings	17.6	31.4	15.7	50	15.7	50
Public Administration, Defense	41.9	61.6	46.2	75	15.4	25
Services	21.8	39.5	19.8	50	19.7	50
Total GDP (Factor Cost)	238.3	449.7	283.7	63	166.0	37
Indirect Taxes	23.4	58.5	35.1	60	23.4	40
Net Income Abroad	15.7	42.6	23.4	55	19.2	45
GNP (Market Prices)	277.4	550.8	342.2	62	208.6	38

Source: Government of Jordan, *The National Accounts, 1959-1967* and US Embassy Reports.

TABLE 3
GOJ BUDGET ESTIMATES
(\$ Millions)

	<u>East Bank</u>		<u>West Bank</u>	
	65/66	% of Total	65/66	% of Total
Total Revenues from Domestic Sources	44.8	60	29.8	40
<i>Expenditures (Locally Financed)</i>				
(a) Civilian	27.8	70	11.9	30
(b) Military	31.6	60	20.9	40
(c) Public Security	4.0	50	4.0	50
(d) Recurring Capital	<u>11.9</u>	70	<u>5.1</u>	30
Total Locally Financed Expenditures	75.3		41.9	
Deficit	30.5		12.1	

TABLE 4

POSSIBLE TRADE ITEMS IN OPEN TRADE POLICY

A. *Selected Israel Imports from Third Countries*
(Available from Jordan)


	<u>1965</u> (\$000)
Wheat	13,984
Tobacco	4,067
Wool	3,102
String Beans	1,058
Cigarettes	777
Skins of Goat, Sheep	394
Chick Peas	317
Wheat Flour	278
Lentils	157
Figs	116
Olive Products	75

B. *Selected Jordan Imports from Third Countries*
(Available from Israel)

	<u>1965</u> (\$000)
Fabrics (woven of wool or fine hair)	2,146
Electrical Apparatus	1,460
Yarns (man made, sheep fibers)	1,389
Garments of all kinds	1,112
Tools	500
Watches	347
Razor Blades	311
Jewelry	280
Pens, Pencils	182

PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Schematic structure in 1970, as set up by Seventh Palestine National Council in Cairo, May 30-June 4, 1970





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