

THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A series of addresses presented at the Ninth Annual
Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, sponsored
by The Middle East Institute

March 4-5, 1955

Edited by
HARVEY P. HALL

PUBLISHED BY
THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

INTRODUCTION

GEORGE CAMP KEISER

Chairman of the Board of Governors, The Middle East Institute

IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE to welcome you this morning to the Ninth Annual Conference of The Middle East Institute. Some of you have known the Institute since its inception in 1946. Others have become interested in it as time went on, and have found various angles of the work that it is doing that were of particular importance to you. Again, some have heard of it more recently; and because you have known of it, your interests have found a place in it.

However, there are always many people at our conferences who are here for the first time. For those, I should like to say a few words about what the Institute is doing because many of you, I think, do not quite realize the breadth of its work.

In the first place, the aim of the Institute is to acquaint people factually with the modern Middle East. We have felt, since World War II, that this meets a particularly important need, and we have aimed to fulfill it as far as we were able to do so. The Institute is a nonprofit, privately supported, educational organization. Of course, we always need more support, which we are trying to secure, but we are also doing a good many things that those who are members can help with very much, thus making the Institute a cooperative effort.

Of the Institute's program, I would like to mention first publications, because *The Middle East Journal* was one of the first activities of the organization, dating from 1947. I would also like to mention it first because people can participate in publications wherever they are. They do not have to be here in Washington.

Besides the *Journal*, we have a newsletter type of publication known as the *Middle East Report*, which is gaining an increasingly wider circulation. Such institutions as the Bank of America and International General Electric are subscribers and seem to feel it worthwhile.

We have also put out books from time to time. One of these is *Essentials of Modern Turkish*, by Herman Kreider, published with the support of funds provided by Robert College. I would particularly like to call your attention to *An Annotated Bibliography of Books and Periodicals on the Near and Middle East*, edited by Richard Ettinghausen and published on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies, which many of you know. And this spring we are publishing a book entitled *Law in the Middle East*, which we have been working on for some years. Nor should I neglect to mention the *Survey of Current Research on the Middle East*, on which work was started last autumn and which will be published by next December. The *Survey*, to be issued on an annual basis, will be supplemented by a *Research Report* to be brought out a year from now.

To go briefly to other parts of the Institute: in its educational work, the library was the first activity to be started. It now numbers about 2,700 bound volumes. I wish I could say 27,000, but that is something to work for. There are also many periodicals, but expansion is necessary with any library to make it worthwhile.

Besides this, in the department of education and research we have a plan whereby grants are given from time to time to graduate students specializing in Middle East affairs. A program of substantive courses was recently initiated with an evening discussion group on "Current Problems in the Middle East." We have been carrying on language instruction for a number of years. These activities are especially for those living in Washington.

To turn to our informational services, the *Middle East Report* I mentioned reaches the largest number of people approached by this department, but we also offer spot information, a service with which some of you may not be familiar. Such organizations as the Department of Commerce, the National Geographic Society, and the American Institute of Foreign Trade, besides many others, have asked questions of us and appear to have been well satisfied.

Then there is our lecture series, which naturally benefits Washington residents and visitors to Washington most; and in recent years we have had a number of distinguished people as speakers. Among them have been the Ambassador from Pakistan; Cornelias van Engert, who many of you know; and Sir Reader Bullard, formerly British Ambassador to Iran.

In our new headquarters we also have art exhibits. One of these you will see this afternoon: paintings by Eliot O'Hara, who is one of the foremost water color experts in this country.

There are our conferences, as you know. Besides this annual one, we have smaller ones from time to time. But I do not want to take up too much time discussing the other work of the Institute, as we are eager to hear the speakers this morning on "The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East."

In this connection, I wish to call your attention particularly to the accompanying qualification of the theme, namely that it is a survey of current area trends in public responsibility toward political, social, economic, and international affairs. It is a rather long title to emphasize, so we are phrasing it in this way and hope that the fuller explanation will be freely borne in mind.

First Session, Friday morning, March 4th
Presiding: PHILIP W. THAYER, School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, The Johns
Hopkins University

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS SEEN BY AMERICANS

T. CUYLER YOUNG

Chairman, Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, Princeton University

ONE MIGHT SPEAK for several hours on the topic of the Near East as seen by Americans, it is so varied. But a selection must be made within the framework of the conference theme. Even within this theme a wider range than I can here cover would be possible, but I will limit my observations to two aspects of the subject: first, public responsibility as it is developing in the Near East in regard to external affairs and relationships; and, if I have time, secondly, public responsibility in regard to the domestic developments within the area.

When Americans view Near East governments as the better or worse representatives of their peoples, it is their tendency to think in terms of these governments' sense of responsibility to the free world. On the basis of this criterion, we can look at the Near East and the recent activity of its governments in external affairs with some encouragement and satisfaction. Let me give you a few illustrations of what I mean. For some time now, Turkey has faced West more than East. It has, as part of a long history, in the present nexus of the development of international affairs taken a stalwart stand in defense of its territory and people against what is its major threat, and in doing so has become the right flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. But more recently it has been turning Eastward to try to lead in the development of responsibility as the left flank anchor of a farther flung organization for security of the area under discussion.

In the last few years Turkey's sense of responsibility has been matched by Egypt and its Revolutionary Council, which has shown, in the midst of difficult and explosive problems, remarkable restraint in attaining a Suez agreement with the British without losing control of order and security

within the country. All of this has taken courage, discipline and, I submit, is a growing evidence of responsibility.

Since 1953 Iran, as well, has moved in this direction, embodying its new spirit in the new oil agreement, thus returning in a responsible fashion — a more responsible fashion as viewed from this part of the world — into the association of the nations. Yet I may indicate that this has been accomplished, perhaps, by the constraint of circumstances, not by the unified decision of the majority of the people. Optimistic though we may be, our optimism must be tempered with some understanding of the realities that lie behind the present regime in Iran; these may not make for complete confidence as one looks from without, though they increase hope and optimism.

Iraq has taken the initiative in allying itself with Turkey in recent weeks, unwilling to wait longer to move toward active cooperation with the free world in the building of mutual defense. Despite the Gaza incident of the last few days, I think it might even be ventured with temerity that there has been in recent months some increased restraint and evidence of responsibility on the part of Israel and the Arab states in meeting the problems that still face them in the midst of their uncertain armistice.

But at this juncture, I would hope that some of you are ethically keen and sensitive enough to be saying to yourself, "How smug and even self-centered — to view the evolution of public responsibility in this area from only this side of the coin!" I think it may be more becoming of me as an American, daring to make certain judgments about our friends in the Middle East, to reverse the coin and look at ourselves. For you would be right about the smugness and self-centeredness if this were all I had to say about the development of public responsibility in external affairs in the Middle East.

It is so easy in such matters for all of us to suffer from moral myopia. One of my sincerest prayers, repeated often, is: "From the blindness of pride and prejudice, from the subtle deceit of self-righteousness, good Lord, deliver me!" For there is an obverse to this coin that must be examined; and I think it might be well if we took an even longer and closer look at it, for the obverse concerns ourselves, and the evolution of public responsibility in the Near East is closely tied with the evolution of American responsibility in the Near East.

We Americans are responsible to the world public and to the free world for our part in the development of public responsibility in the Near East. No American can look at this subject without taking this into consideration if he is fair, sympathetic, honest and realistic. Viewed obversely, this latest development of what we Americans would deem public responsibility in

the Near East is partly the result, if I may say so, of Americans themselves developing their own public responsibility in the Near East.

Consider the fact, if you will, of the passing of Near East power leadership from our British friends to ourselves — for better or for worse, it is happening. It has moved so far during the last year, and is now moving at such an accelerated pace, that we must face up to what it entails and demands, in further discharge of our responsibility to the public in this area.

This shift of power was precipitated by the necessary role of broker in the Iranian oil negotiations and in the settlement of the Suez dispute between Egypt and Britain, but it is being embodied and set forth in the new defense arrangements of the area of which we are all aware — in the development of the so-called northern tier of defense.

May I say that one of the chief contributions to Near Eastern stability and the development of public responsibility on the part of Near Eastern states in recent years has been our acceptance of but partial responsibility in the area. Now this is understandable if we consider three facts that have limited the development of a clear-cut and fully developed foreign policy on the part of the United States vis à vis the Near East.

In the first place, there has always been a lack of knowledge and concern in this country in regard to the Near East as compared to the demands of Europe and the Far East. In interest in and understanding of areas outside our own continent, the Near East has always taken a tertiary position. This has not radically changed even in recent days or months, although signs of change are discernible. The Town Hall of New York, about to bring to this country a joint Near East-Asian Mission for a trans-continental tour, found it difficult to sponsor among groups across the country a completely independent Near East mission, for whereas most of the foreign policy and similar organizations in large cities in the country were prepared to back an Asiatic group, they hesitated to sponsor one limited only to the Near East. The continuing increase in activity in regard to the Near East in this country is encouraging, particularly when one realizes what has been accomplished in a short time, but we still have far to go. One of the limitations of developing a completely viable policy vis à vis the Near East in a democracy such as ours is the limitation among the people of real concern and adequate knowledge concerning the area.

The second limiting factor in the development of such a policy has been the primary responsibility of Britain as a Western Power in this area. This has been only natural in view of the necessities that have faced the Western alliance throughout the world in recent years. Because of history and its

continuation into the present epoch or decade, it was only natural that again and again our partial acceptance of responsibility in the area was dictated by the fact that we were very much a junior partner and that leadership rested with our British allies.

In the third place, I may point to the limitations in our own power — for we have, our jingoists to the contrary, simply not the power in force, in funds, in personnel, to meet all of the responsibilities that face us throughout the world and particularly in this area. But with the changing scene in the postwar world, we are now coming to the place where we have more appreciation of our responsibility in the area and also a little more power to spread there in order to meet such responsibility.

May I give you just a few illustrations of what I mean? We have been relatively successful where we have clear-cut, complete responsibility as enunciated by the Truman Doctrine vis à vis Turkey and Greece. But there have been other examples of only partial acceptance of responsibility: we partially supported Iran in Azerbaijan in 1946, issuing in 1947 in the rejection of the Soviet-Iranian Oil Agreement of 1946. But then, having put out the fire, so to speak, we turned elsewhere and did little more. There was partial interference in the Palestine question demanding, under our own pressures, certain points of establishment but then failing to follow through to the end what we had agreed upon in that partial responsibility. And this, I may say, is quite apart from any value judgment on partition or the establishment of Israel or the whole question involved. Again, consider our brokerage role in the Iranian oil dispute and the Egyptian agreement. This experience with partial responsibility, it seems to me, has precipitated the acceptance of a larger share of responsibility in the area that is now becoming embodied in the new defense arrangements.

There is really no such thing as an independent subject and object. In a sentence one may have a subject with a verb, without an object, but the object is implied. The philosopher knows that no subject and object can stand independently apart. The Persian mystic knows that if there is an *'ashiq* there is a *ma'shuq*: if there is a lover, there is a beloved. Any man facing life realistically knows that he is not independent apart from the objective reality without. Any answer that is elicited by a question depends upon the question and the way it is phrased. And I submit that this coin of developing responsibility in external affairs in the Near East has two sides, and that the answer depends much upon the question that is put and the way it is put.

I would press this if I may just a little bit further. We criticize the Near

East for neutralism, for a failure to see what seems to us to be its responsibility in the world today. Should we ask more of the Near Eastern governments that we do of our own, relatively speaking? Most Americans look upon such wider responsibilities in the world from the enlightened national point of view. This responsibility is accepted because of where we stand in the picture. Can we expect more of our Near Eastern friends or criticize them too much when we think they view the picture with too much isolation or unconcern to the danger that threatens them? After all, it was only a decade or so ago that we were isolationists ourselves.

I am not excusing the Near Easterners. I am only trying to understand them, and to help my fellow Americans understand them, to stand where they stand; in other words, to appreciate the mutuality of the question that is before us. Responsibility does not grow strong until the individual or the group is challenged, forced to face up to it. The trouble is that oftentimes independent and full responsibility comes either too early or too late. And the difficulty is that the parent or the trustee in international relations, whatever he may be called, is oftentimes loath to pass over power and real independence soon enough. We need to subject the maturing individual group or nation to the challenge and the shock of accepting responsibility. Many of us parents sometimes spend sleepless nights wondering how a particular child is going to meet responsibility, but such responsibility will never be met successfully if the opportunity is never given.

It seems to me, in this connection, that the ratio of touchiness, of public irresponsibility, is directly proportional to the attainment of real nationhood and true self-consciousness. The problem before our friends of the Near East is to develop such nationhood and such self-consciousness; then in time, the touchiness, the sensitiveness will pass and the ratio of their passing be inversely proportionate to the length and intensity of the dominance of the hand of authority from the outside.

And here I may go on to say that we have in this area a great opportunity, for with the passage of time and the change that is now in process, there is an opportunity for a mutuality and a partnership between our Near Eastern friends and ourselves for the development of our mutual responsibility, the responsibility of each of us to the larger public of the world of which we are a part. That mutuality and good will in the near future is assured.

As usual, when I have been unable to subject myself to the discipline of a text, there is more to say than time in which to say it. The professor can always continue with the class next day, or next week, but unfortunately

this does not hold today. I would like, therefore, in a few last moments to sketch what seem to me to be some of the factors involved in the development of public responsibility in domestic affairs in the Near East, the responsibility of the governments to their own people whom they are supposed to represent and for whom they govern. One wonders sometimes if progress is so marked here. Unfortunately, it is not always all of the people to whom the government shows a sense of responsibility; yet it is a significant development in the area under consideration that lip service must be paid by all governments and rulers to all the people. The very fact of such lip service, if not real action, is considerable progress, for, as one of my friends once remarked in discussing hypocrisy, even hypocrisy is the inevitable tribute that is paid to virtue.

I may give some impressions of where in the area it seems to me there is some real development of public responsibility. Two or three illustrations must suffice. I think we all agree that one of the reasons for Turkey's strength in the midst of its international situation and development of maturity has been a large degree of responsibility on the part of its people to the whole. Yet, even the best of us slip. Anyone who listened to much of what filled the newspapers and television and the radio in America not too many months ago will know that we all slip. It seems to us in this part of the world that the Turks have slipped a bit in regard to granting full freedom of all institutions to all the people, including the opposition. Nonetheless, we may believe that their slips will be remedied as, thank God, we are able to remedy some of our own. Egypt, in this field, has made remarkable progress in recent times, really tackling, under the present Council, some of the deeper social problems, even that of land reform — and developing new anchorage for the people facing up to the democratic facts of life. It is also showing resistance in the process to pressures of extremists on both the left and the right. Iran, of recent months, would seem to be doing better; yet I keep wondering if there is that degree of unanimity in affirmation of this policy by enough of a majority of the people to make it effective. Fortunately there have been some events of recent months that seem to indicate a settling down. The Iranians face one of the best opportunities in their modern times, and many of us hope and pray that it will be met with increasing responsibility to all of the people.

Iraq, for me, is difficult to judge. Talking to some, one would think the government does little for the people. Yet a Westerner, looking at the Development Board, the plans it has worked out, and its resistance to pressures for short time measures, is encouraged by its ability to stick to certain lines for

the long term good. There is, of course, a necessary psychological balance as to how much can be withheld for the future and how much must be done now.

And so one might go on, but I must close by simply pointing out that one of the difficulties in the whole development of public responsibility within the societies of the Near East is the problem of the individual in his responsibility to the public as a whole, his nation. Here you have the fundamental problem of conflicting localities, of a pattern of society, of values and loyalties, that has come down across centuries and is now in the process of changing. These societies face the necessity of setting up a larger group — that of the nation — which must constantly receive the final loyalty when there is a clash between it and the religious community, the tribe, or the family within which the individual stands. And here, we should always remember, is the positive contribution and value of nationalism in the Near East.

There are many of us who get exasperated at times with the touchiness of young nations and allies. But let us remember that we were young once ourselves, that this is the price that must be paid if there is to be an over-all enveloping framework or context demanding a higher loyalty beyond the family, the clan, the tribe, or the religious community. We Americans still have our own difficulties in deciding whether we can appoint a justice on our highest bench if he appears too friendly to more government on the global scale. But all of this developing public responsibility in the younger nations and nationalisms of the Near East as well as in our own — which in our pride and smugness we think is mature — has yet to undergo for all of us a metamorphosis before there can be real public responsibility to humanity as a whole.

First Session, Friday morning, March 4th
Presiding: PHILIP W. THAYER, School of Ad-
vanced International Studies, The Johns
Hopkins University

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS SEEN BY MIDDLE EASTERNERS

ANWAR ALI

Director, Middle East Department, International Monetary Fund

I FEEL HIGHLY HONORED to be called upon to address this session of the Ninth Annual Conference of The Middle East Institute. This organization has rendered a valuable service in stimulating interest in Middle Eastern affairs in this country and its expanding activities hold promise of promoting harmony and understanding between the two regions.

The geographic area commonly referred to as the Middle East I shall, for the purpose of this talk, consider as extending from North Africa to Pakistan and from Turkey to Aden. These countries vary a great deal as to historical background, race, and stages of economic, political, and social development. In all of them, however, common characteristics do exist which justify referring to the area as one of common heritage and similar prospects. The common ties are those of religion, geography, the need for national development, and a more or less common political outlook.

The Middle East thus defined covers an area of 13 million square kilometres and has a population roughly equal to that of the USSR. The vast majority of the people are illiterate and live at a mere subsistence level, with an average per capita income of about \$80 per annum. Extremes of riches and poverty may, however, be witnessed in every country, the contrast being symbolized by what has commonly been called "the camel and the Cadillac." There is thus a large mass of the poor and a small number of wealthy families, with an almost nonexistent stable middle class. The pattern of governments ranges from absolute monarchy to forms that are close to Western democracy. The general tendency is, however, toward a progressive democratization of the political structure.

The chief importance of the Middle East in world affairs today is strategic and dates from the time when the expansion of Europe turned the whole

world into a theatre of power politics. The region constitutes a land bridge between three continents. A glance at the map of an international airline would reveal just how important the area is commercially and strategically. More recently, the discovery of large reserves of oil has enhanced the importance of the Middle East in both peace and war. These factors have alternatively led to the domination and the wooing of the Middle East by the larger powers. The young and struggling countries of the Middle East today find themselves cast into an era of global struggle between two conflicting ideologies.

It is against this background that the relations of the Middle Eastern peoples with the Western world have been, at most, a source of mixed blessing. Unfortunately, they have not been based on a voluntary association of free peoples. The strategic importance of the region and the rising power of the West have involved a long and chequered record of occupation, interference, and economic exploitation. Nevertheless, the association with the West has had certain incidental benefits for the area, such as bringing it closer to modern political institutions and introducing a measure of technological and educational advance. Above all, the very resistance to foreign domination has given rise to a new consciousness and the birth of a renaissance. Although the older order is changing, it will take time for bitter memories to fade out.

In the postwar period, the relationship of the West with the underdeveloped countries of the Middle East and Asia has witnessed a change of far-reaching importance. Owing to the political upsurge of these countries and assisted by moral pressure from the United States, the pattern of this relationship is fast changing from one of political domination to a free and voluntary cooperation of peoples for economic and ideological ends. The extent to which the peoples of these once dominated territories have readily aligned themselves with the West has depended upon the willingness with which European powers have relinquished control and abandoned economic exploitation.

At one end of the scale in the Middle East is the example set by Great Britain in relinquishing authority in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent in August 1947. The transference of power was complete, with no strings attached, whether political or economic. The result has been that Pakistan has not only voluntarily aligned itself with the democratic forces of the free world but continues of its own choice to be a part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. At the other end, however, the Arab world is still suffering from the conflicting interests of the Great Powers, while the Palestine

issue has provided a source of almost unending bitterness. North Africa is still struggling for elementary political rights. Unless freedom is achieved, the forces of nationalism will continue to find their main expression in anti-imperialistic agitation. Viewed against its historical background, the deeply suspicious outlook of the Arab world toward the West is understandable.

In the economic sphere as well, the experience of certain countries, even in recent years, has not been altogether happy. In Iran, for example, the oil dispute was settled only in 1954 after three years of bitter controversy leading almost to an upheaval. It may be noted that the formula for sharing oil income on a 50:50 basis was first applied to Venezuela in 1942. It was not until 1950 that corresponding changes began to be made in the Middle East countries. I invite attention to these facts to show how a greater degree of statesmanship and a spirit of genuine economic cooperation can go a long way in promoting good relationship and mutual confidence.

Internally, there have been indications of political instability in many Middle East countries in the postwar years. In considering this aspect, it has to be borne in mind that after years of domination, many of these countries achieved independence and gained nationhood as recently as this postwar period. Under foreign domination, economic advancement and the emergence of political consciousness were allowed to develop only to the extent of their being consistent with the interests of the dominating power. In the main it was the richer sections or the privileged, on whom the foreign powers mainly relied for support, that benefited most. As a result, economic disparities within these countries and between them and the advanced West have grown wider; the people of these countries not only stare at the better face of the West—a paradoxical yet understandable sense of urgency and frustration also occasionally manifests itself in internal strains and upheavals.

In my view, therefore, the two basic causes of instability are the growing restiveness of the vast illiterate and economically underprivileged masses and the pressure exercised by the weakening, but still assertive, feudal or tribal social structure. A foreigner will meet in the Middle East a generation that is dissatisfied not only with the West but with its own shortcomings and that is brimming over with destructive criticism of both. If I may say so, such stresses are almost inevitable in any evolutionary process. The Middle East will witness the passing of the feudal system or the political stranglehold of the rich and the emergence of broadly based political parties with some accompanying pains. Likewise, in the economic sphere, the ushering in and implementation of long-range programs of development will take time. In the meantime, one has to reckon with the restiveness of the masses, which is

in my view a sure index that the evolutionary process, although accompanied by occasional stresses, will not be long in bearing results.

The Middle East is today in the midst of a profound social change. Its primary need is the furtherance of economic programs of development designed to remove illiteracy and raise the living standards of the masses. Education has to form an integral part of any program of national development, for it is on education that the emergence of a sound and enlightened socio-political structure would essentially depend. In the light of these considerations, let us turn to the resources, the achievements, and the limitations involved in the development process.

The natural resources of the Middle East lie in its land, oil, and manpower. The endowment in agricultural resources is generous but insufficient rainfall is a serious limitation imposed by nature. It is only through modern irrigation methods requiring large amounts of capital that regular high yields have become obtainable in a few good food crops and certain industrial crops, notably cotton. The area is endowed with large reserves of oil, recent discoveries placing them at more than half of the proved reserves of the whole world. Oil production has been stepped up in recent years, and under the revised formula for sharing the oil income, the Middle East countries received an income of \$515 million in 1953 from the oil companies. Despite some extravagant use of this new found wealth, it is being progressively applied toward schemes of economic advancement. The oil reserves are, however, unevenly distributed between various countries of the Middle East, and it is only through a pooling of resources and larger economic groupings that all countries in the Arab world can hope to share in the general prosperity of the Middle East. The plan for the establishment of an Arab Development Bank and the agreement reached on the promotion of inter-Arab trade are hopeful signs of a growing appreciation of this need. In the main, the fundamentals prerequisite to economic development in the Middle East is capital to provide better equipment for the exploitation of economic resources.

Nearly 75 percent of the people in the Middle East live upon agriculture. The cultivated area is less than 10 percent, although with extension of irrigation it is capable of considerable expansion. The methods of production have in many instances remained unchanged through the decades. Egypt, in the case of cotton, and Lebanon, in the case of mechanized cultivation, are good examples of the far-reaching results that can be obtained by the use of fertilizer, seed selection, crop rotation, and the proper use of capital equipment. Some form of land reform is essential if a general improvement

in living conditions is to be expected. In Egypt, for example, 94 percent of the landowners owned 35 percent of the land while the remaining 6 percent of landowners were in possession of 65 percent of the land. In addition, the organization of rural credit and facilities for marketing are also important in improving the peasant's lot. Today a dominant role is played by the moneylender, who literally supports the farmer as a rope supports the hanged.

The governments in the various countries are showing a growing consciousness of these problems. A notable advance has been made in certain countries with schemes of agricultural extension and establishment of consumer goods industries. In Turkey, a remarkable advance has been made in agriculture, which witnessed an increase in cultivation from about 11.3 million hectares in 1950 to 13.4 million hectares in 1952. The index of agricultural production in Turkey reached a level of 166 in 1952-53, compared with 134 in 1950-51. Pakistan has also already completed its first five-year program of national development and has made good progress in the industrial sector. It has achieved near self-sufficiency in cotton and woolen textiles, paper, cement, and matches, and its jute industry is expanding rapidly. Its long-term program of agricultural expansion, which will bring an additional 3.5 million acres of land under cultivation, is well under way.

With larger income from an increasing flow of oil, Iraq has launched a comprehensive plan of economic development. Iraq's foreign exchange reserves now stand at \$300 million and its income from oil is around \$175 million per annum. Its six-year development plan has been estimated to cost \$435 million, of which one third is intended for irrigation projects and the remainder for plans which include communications, education, and health. The Iraqi schemes include elimination of the recurrent disastrous flooding of the Tigris and Euphrates and extension of irrigation, which will bring an additional area of about 2.5 million acres under cultivation. The plan is now being expanded to cover an expenditure of \$850 million in the next five years. Egypt is shortly to embark on the construction of the High Dam at a total cost of \$600 million, which will bring an additional area of 2 million acres under cultivation and thus relieve the growing pressure of population on land. In Iran, with the settlement of the oil dispute, a comprehensive development program is shortly to be launched. It has been decided that the bulk of the revenue from oil will be earmarked for development projects.

A number of countries have also embarked upon schemes of land reform. In Egypt a law has been put into effect limiting holdings of land to 200 acres. About 750,000 acres were thereby released to peasant families. Some measures have also been taken in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran, but a lot more needs to be done on a comprehensive basis. I should mention in passing that the new regime in Egypt has not only achieved a considerable degree of success in handling the financial and commercial aspects of the country's economy but many of the reforms undertaken and projected are definitely aimed at improving the social and economic conditions of the general public.

These are crowded achievements packed within the space of a few years of independent living. A great deal has been done but a lot more needs to be done if the development programs are to make an effective impression on prevailing subsistence levels. I will illustrate this by the example of two countries. The per capita income in Pakistan was \$69 in 1948-49. By 1952-53 it had risen to but \$70. In Egypt the per capita income was \$100 in 1940 and \$112 in 1953. The last named increase reflects more the increase in prices than an improvement in real terms. The frustration of the general public, which had expected some improvement in living standards with the dawn of freedom, can be gauged from the figures just quoted. In general, with the exception of one or two countries, there has been little change in per capita incomes in the Middle East countries in recent years.

The existing programs, if carried out in accordance with present scales, will materially relieve the population cum production pressures in a period of about 20 to 25 years. In view, however, of recent fall in commodity prices, the implementation of these programs has started telling heavily on the domestic resources of a number of countries which are also witnessing the appearance of inflationary trends. This may result in a slowing down of the pace of development, whereas seen in the over-all context, it would seem that the programs are not being carried forward rapidly enough to bring about a noticeable improvement in living standards.

All this underlies the need for capital, the inadequacy of which has been and continues to be a vital factor limiting the pace of development. Most of the Middle East countries, including Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran, have recently made substantial concessions to attract foreign capital in the industrial sector. These measures are prompted by self-interest but they are also indicative of a desire to cooperate with the West and it is only to be hoped that they will meet with some response. It should be possible to encourage the flow of private capital into the Middle East if the Western

countries were to give guarantees to their prospective investors in return for similar guarantees from these countries. However, the bulk of the capital required by the Middle Eastern countries is for basic development; for schemes of irrigation, power, communications, etc. In the main, this capital can only be provided in the form of assistance or loans on a government to government basis. The dynamic philosophy of economic cooperation for common ideological ends, enunciated by the Government of the United States, gives rise to a new hope in underdeveloped areas. Time is, however, of vital importance and it is to be hoped that if such assistance is to be effective, it will be forthcoming in adequate measure and in time.

The Middle East countries, for their part, owe it to themselves and to the promotion of stability in a critical area, to concentrate every effort upon the improvement of their economic, social, and political condition. In the economic field, I would, even at the risk of seeming platitudinous, wish to see an emphasis on the following lines:

The programs should be well balanced and coordinated between the various sectors of a country's economy, with primary emphasis on immediate benefit to the largest number. In the industrial sector, the emphasis should be on those industries for which the country concerned has the necessary raw materials and a sufficiently large internal demand. The development of these industries is desirable for ensuring a balanced pattern of economy, as also for relieving the existing population pressure on land and absorbing any labor force that may be rendered surplus as a result of consolidation of existing small and uneconomic holdings of land.

Alongside with the expansion of consumer goods industries, appropriate attention should be given to schemes of agricultural extension and improvement of crop yields. It is perhaps not commonly realized how much can be done by the adoption of such measures as increased use of fertilizers, improved seeds, combating of pests and diseases, and better storage and marketing facilities. Such measures are capable of yielding quick results, provided the administrative machinery of the government is geared to a comprehensive program of rural uplift.

These measures should be accompanied by comprehensive land tenure reforms and provision of agricultural credit on an adequate scale. These are matters which have so far received inadequate attention. The tiller of the soil must necessarily have a sense of ownership and security of tenure. He should also be freed from the shackles of the moneylender and be provided with credit facilities for making improvements, at reasonable rates. If agri-

cultural production is to be raised from its presently low yields, the landowner would require a lot more credit than is available to him at present. There is a serious maladjustment in factors of production which can best be corrected by increasing the capital factor.

I have laid some emphasis on the importance of raising productivity in the agricultural sector, for it can and has happened in underdeveloped economies that unless due regard is paid to this aspect of the problem, the per capita income of the lower groups may remain unchanged and indeed register a fall in real terms, despite an advance in the industrial sector.

Another problem concerns the raising of capital in the domestic markets. Underdeveloped is a vicious circle and unless the economies are adequately developed, it will not be possible to raise substantial amounts of capital in the internal markets. All the same, it is desirable to set up a network of financial institutions in these countries in order to encourage the dehoarding of wealth and canalizing of available savings into productive channels. Furthermore, the fiscal systems of a number of countries are in general weighted in favor of the richer sections and an attempt needs to be made to raise money from direct taxation.

I believe that development in the Middle East will come in its own unique way. A middle path will have to be found, in conformity with the Islamic belief of the people, which, while recognizing private property, has a distaste for the concentration of wealth in a few hands. Maybe it is such a pattern which provides the answer to the present conflicting ideologies.

Politics is not my domain, but as a Middle Easterner, I would wish to see the formation and emergence of broad-based political parties with economic programs. A unification or confederation of the small states, accompanied by a pooling of economic resources, would materially help in promoting uniform development and political stability within the area.

One cannot fail to witness a growing improvement in the relations of the Middle East countries with the Western world, as evidenced by the accord reached on a number of outstanding issues. The willingness to grant self-government to the Sudan, the solution of the Iranian oil dispute, the agreement over Suez, the current negotiations for revision of the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Jordanian treaties, are welcome steps which point to a new era of friendship. The nationalist movements in many countries have realized their anti-imperialistic objectives and one may look forward to their energies being devoted to internal reform and development. Some points of friction still remain, but it may be hoped that enlightened statesmanship will make it possible to overcome them.

Let me conclude by saying that the Middle Easterner is by religious belief and outlook opposed to a godless ideology. Despite the feudal system prevalent over large areas, his inherent inclination is toward individual freedom and democratic ideals. All this naturally inclines him toward the West. All the same, I feel that it would be fallacious to take the Middle Easterner for granted. His growing consciousness and continuing poverty are elements to be reckoned with. It is unfortunately in such circumstances that Communism makes its dangerous appeal. Even if the strong religious beliefs of the people were to keep them away from Communism, there is the danger that unstable economic conditions may promote political instability. Against this background it is the duty of the governments in power to keep the interests of the masses in view when ushering in programs of economic and social uplift. The West can assist by making this possible by the provision of capital and technical know-how on an adequate scale. This is, it seems, the only means of promoting stability in an area which may well prove vital in an age of conflicting ideologies.

Second Session, Friday afternoon, March 4th
Presiding: SYDNEY N. FISHER, Department of
History, The Ohio State University

THE PROBLEM OF STABILITY AMONG MIDDLE EAST GOVERNMENTS

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CONSTANT OVERTURN in governments has been the principal headline news of the Middle East ever since the war. Syria has had its string of coups d'état ending with a restored parliament whose first, elected cabinet lasted a bare six months. In Egypt revolution has swept aside the century-old monarchy to place a military junta at the head of the new republic. Iran has seen the rise and fall of Mossadegh, and Lebanon, with less drama but no less urgency, has tried to sweep many of its old political leaders out of office. The American observer can be excused for seeing in such a record nothing but a growing irresponsibility and instability that holds little promise of security for the future of one of the world's most important areas.

Yet the present outlook is probably more hopeful than at any time since 1945. The new government of Egypt has been able to outlive its own internal strains, successfully negotiate a final settlement of the thorny Suez question, and face the challenge of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iran the threat of Tudeh party control has been moderated if not broken and the important oil question has been resolved. Iraq has a government with an overwhelming majority in parliament, sufficiently sure of itself to break with the Arab League and make independent defense arrangements. Even Saudi Arabia, so long the symbol of the Arabs' historic "strong-man" rule, has proved its power to outlive the dynamic leadership of its founder and transfer the government to his successor without imperiling either internal tranquility or the vast interests of the foreign oil companies.

Yet this record of present hope must not blind us to the fact that the basic struggle for political stability in the Middle East is still unwon. For what we face is not simply a wave of postwar restlessness or the clashing ambitions of political leaders. Behind these natural forces in political life there is a basic instability that has characterized the governments of the

Middle East ever since their emergence into the modern world. Egypt is an example of this, for the record of the rise and fall of Egyptian cabinets is almost as disheartening as the present situation in France. Since 1922, when Egypt's constitutional parliament was formed, the average life of a cabinet has been less than a year and a half—and no cabinet, so far as I know, has ever fallen through the usual parliamentary procedure of a vote of “no confidence.”

In turning to the basic cause for such conditions, I go back to an article written some months ago by Elizabeth Monroe, the British student of Middle East affairs. Her answer to the political confusion of the area lay in the word “mobs.” Her first reference was to the familiar student riots that are so well known in Cairo, Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran. But behind such demonstrations, Miss Monroe pointed out, is a more basic factor that is suggested by the original meaning of the word “mob” itself. For “mob” is the English contraction for the Latin phrase *mobile vulgus*, which means “common people on the move.”

Middle East observers will recognize at once the truth and penetration of this observation. That the ancient life of the Middle East is in the grip of rapid change is a truism that cannot be too often repeated. A friend of mine remarked that life in the Middle East is far more rapid than in America. “In America,” he said, “we pride ourselves on going sixty miles an hour. But the Middle East is trying to go a century a decade.” This accelerating change is penetrating ever more deeply into the life of common people. Political consciousness, social restlessness, a desire for modernity, are increasingly shaking the population loose from its age-old ways and its medieval social practice. While such forces are inchoate in the great mass of peasantry, they are conscious in the leaders of public life and in the middle class which is slowly being created.

The problem of stability in Middle Eastern governments must be viewed against this background of change and restlessness. For to be “stable” does not mean merely that a government is unchanging and immobile, able to preserve its authority and continue its structure despite the tides of popular discontent. The true meaning of stability lies not in immobility but in flexibility—flexibility in meeting the new demands that emerge when common people are “on the move.” If I recall the dim days of my philosophy teaching, Aristotle defines substance as “that which has the ability to persist through change.” If Middle East governments are to have real substance they must be able to persist through the rapid changes of contemporary life by remolding their structure and their policies to meet new conditions.

Thus the real problem of government instability must be sought in the relationship between governments and the new conditions which are being created in the Middle East with bewildering rapidity. Centuries ago the Psalmist described the problem when he called for an order that could be "founded upon the seas and established upon the floods." Governments of the Middle East will never provide their countries with tranquility and security until they are able to move with the floods of popular awakening and express in institutional form the desires that are rapidly invading the consciousness of their peoples.

What are these desires and what are the dilemmas in which they place Middle East governments? First is the obvious and urgent demand for *istiqlal tam*, "complete independence." The ramifications of this familiar cry are known to all students of nationalism. The demands of independence are frequently irrational and irresponsible, but they cannot be written off as merely the desire of self-seeking leaders for political spoils, which has all too often been the interpretation of the Western powers whose interests have been imperilled by this nationalism.

The difficulty is that the strategic position of the Middle East and the world dominance of the Western powers has made it extremely difficult for any Middle Eastern government to meet this demand. The long history of Western penetration, control, and occupation is not simply an expression of grasping imperialism; it is an inescapable concomitant of the international character of the world and the central location of the Middle East in it. Against this hard fact the nationalist governments of the Middle East have beat in vain and out of their frustrations has risen a permanent center of political instability.

Between the two world wars the adjustment of Western interests to Eastern nationalism was proceeding with fair progress. Under the mandate system Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon moved toward fuller independence. The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 carried the Valley of the Nile to the threshold of sovereignty, and the strong regime of Reza Shah in Iran counterbalanced the pressure of British interests.

But this progress was rudely, perhaps irreparably, interrupted by World War II. The military demands of the North African and Middle Eastern campaigns necessitated active Western interference in Middle Eastern affairs. In Egypt, Britain had to threaten the King with deposition in order to install a pro-Allied regime; in Iran, Reza Shah was forced from the throne because of his neutralist attitude; in Syria and Lebanon, the struggle between the Free French and the Vichy governments brought back the French

occupation. Thus the war set back the clock of international relations and the Middle East emerged into the postwar years irritated and suspicious, believing that the West would again control its life at the slightest pretext.

Unfortunately, the growing threat of Russia gave the West much more than an artificial pretext to continue its interests in the Middle East. Russia first tried to ring down the Iron Curtain in Azerbaijan and this threat was the opening gun for the Cold War in the Middle East. Such questions as the defense of Suez, access to military bases, defense pacts with the Western powers and pro-Western governments have been of increasing concern to the West, upon whose shoulders the defense of the world against expanding Russian imperialism rests.

The point of this familiar history is that Middle East governments have found themselves in an inescapable dilemma whose only result can be instability. Nationalist feeling continues to demand independence and self direction with increasing fervor, yet the world situation is such that no government can fully meet this demand. For if the demand is met (as in the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or successful negotiations with the British in Egypt), the government is either saddled with a new problem that it cannot solve (as the economic collapse of Iran) or brings down upon its head such nationalist political opposition that it is difficult to remain in office. The recent threat of the Muslim Brotherhood to capture the Egyptian government by agitation and assassination found its occasion in the Revolutionary Council's attempt to deal realistically with the problem of the British occupation.

The immediate greater stability in Iran, Iraq, and Egypt is due to the fact that in these three countries a fresh beginning has been made in the problem of facing international interests realistically. By concluding the long struggle with Great Britain, Egypt has taken out of the heart of its life a storm center that has kept governments unstable for many decades. It could do this largely because its new government was less bound by the ties of popular opinion than the parliamentary regime. Iran has likewise settled her long dispute with the west's major influence in the country — oil. It must be noted that in both cases the solution was far more favorable to local nationalistic desires than to the West's historic interests, a factor for which Eastern governments can thank the present world situation and the importance of their area in the maintaining of world stability.

Iraq's move for alignment with the West is due to more realism in the government as to the threat of Russia — a realism soundly based on the

threat of a Tudeh party-dominated Iran and Russian interests in restless Kurdistan.

Yet one major factor of tension between Western pressure and Eastern nationalism remains — a factor so large that it may yet outweigh the gains in Egypt and Iraq. This is the instability that results from the Arab-Israel question. Perhaps more clearly than any other situation, this problem typifies the clash between West and East. For Israel is in no sense a genuinely indigenous state in or a creation of the Middle East. It is populated by emigrants largely from the West, supported by Western money and political influence, and forced upon the Arab world by the Western powers. Rightly or wrongly, the Arabs see in Israel the epitome of all the interference in the past with which the West has invaded their lands and their life. Yet the creation of Israel has posed the surrounding Arab states with a problem that no local government has been able to solve. Direct military action failed, yet subsequent peace negotiations have been impossible because of the depth and extent of popular resentment and the inability of political leaders to move in the face of this resentment, even if they desire to do so. Despite the recent carefully planned propaganda campaign aimed to convince the West that Egypt is on the verge of concluding peace with Israel, since Iraq's defection from the Arab League has broken the popular front, I do not believe that even the military government of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir could stay in power if it at this time tried to end its strife with Israel.

Here the West may have to choose between retaining its control of the area and accepting the resulting political instability, or relinquishing some of its more immediate objectives for the sake of assisting the long-term development of stable and responsible government. This is the current question in Egyptian defense relations with the West. I do not believe the present government is basically or permanently unwilling to join with the West in the defense of the Middle East. Current Egyptian coolness to this problem is due largely to the fact that the revolutionary government, having barely survived through the period of British negotiations, does not dare arouse further political opposition by an over-rapid alignment with the West.

A second problem of instability lies in the tension between Middle East governments and the pressure of their own people for a more adequate participation in national affairs. It is important to remember that the current wave of restlessness and government change has not been focused against old forms of oriental despotism. The governments that have been overturned or threatened are the so-called "democratic" regimes of recent years. These

regimes have been patterned upon Western models; their organ of government is a parliament resting upon popular suffrage and headed by a cabinet. Apparently this facade of Western political institutions has not worked in the Middle East, although the facade itself was often prescribed by Western influence. A recent historian has said that throughout the 19th century Europe thought that "a little dose of constitutionalism" would solve the problems of the colonial areas. It is against this "dose of constitutionalism" that much of recent political restlessness has been focused.

Yet the challenge to constitutional government has not come because the Middle East (like Fascism and Nazism) is seeking to repudiate democracy as an ideal or parliamentary government as a system. What is being repudiated is the failure of parliamentary regimes to accomplish what the growing political consciousness of the people feels should have been done.

When parliamentary government was first instituted in the Middle East it was naturally in the hands of the historic governing class. This was the class both open to Western ideas and accustomed to political power. The common mass of people accepted their leadership because no other leadership was available and tradition had assigned this role to such leaders.

It is precisely here that the inflexibility of past parliamentary regimes has been a cause of political instability. For political consciousness has been rapidly spreading from the "natural" governing classes of yesterday to the newly conscious middle classes of today. In many countries national systems of education have been introducing the upper levels of village life to the modern world, while the spread of literacy and mass communication has carried Western ideas deeper into the popular mind. Gradually an ever-increasing segment of the country is identifying itself with the nation and expecting its interests to be represented in and served by the national government.

But this representation has not been forthcoming. Despite the facade of democratic government, vested interests have been able to control elections so that final authority still rests in their hands. A good example of this comes from a recent statement about conditions in Iraq written by a young Iraqi student:

For the past thirty years the ruling class which has held power in Iraq has failed to provide the country with good government. It has manipulated elections through a sham parliamentary system which allows genuine opposition only a handful of seats for the sake of appearances. . . . True opposition, given no political platform within the government itself, has thus been driven underground where the politically dissatisfied fall an easy prey to the propaganda of any movement which has as its aim the overthrow of the present Iraqi regime.

This situation could arise in the Middle East partly because of an inevitable weakness in the machinery of popular government. Our Western democratic forms presuppose a level of political knowledge among voters sufficient for them to make an informed and individual choice. But in an area where illiteracy is often as high as 80% it is ridiculous to suppose that the masses of common people will express themselves through the vote either wisely or freely. An example of this situation and the paradox to which it leads is found in a largely unnoticed news item from Iran. It is reported that the Shah has been attempting to have legislation enacted which will deprive some of the peasant class of the franchise. On the surface this looks like an anti-democratic move; actually it is an attempt to make parliament more, and not less, representative of the people. For under the present system, the large landlord has little difficulty in controlling the votes of his share-crop tenants and can therefore ensure his own dominance of the country's political life. By limiting the vote of the peasant this power can be weakened and the landlord given a less dominant role in parliament.

In many Middle Eastern countries this situation has appeared in the increasingly irresponsible actions of party government based upon mob appeal and support. When a popular parliamentary party, such as the Wafd in Egypt, must depend for its power in office on the peasant vote it must naturally cultivate that vote if it is to remain influential. This easily leads to mob appeals for the sake of internal political power that finally force the government into ill-timed and irresponsible action. Of course, such a policy is not unknown even in the United States, where the incumbent party's desire to win an election has sometimes made it espouse a foreign policy that has not proved to the best interests of the country. In order to stay in power in Iran, during the closing months of his regime, Mossadegh relied more and more upon Tudeh party influence until the threat of Tudeh mob rule paved the way for his final defeat.

Thus the Middle East is in the dilemma of desiring wider participation in government and yet not having the basic conditions or the institutions under which this participation can be responsibly expressed. This is the situation that is deflecting the Middle East in the direction of "strong men" governments, such as Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir in Egypt and the former Shishakli regime in Syria. For these "strongmen" regimes were able to take control partly because parliament irresponsibly reflected mob opinion controlled by the old government class and did not represent or serve the true interests of the people.

It is upon this point that the struggle between Muhammad Nagib and

Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir has turned. Nagib wanted to return Egypt to parliamentary rule almost immediately, but the Revolutionary Council saw that to do this would merely bring back into power the discredited party leaders who had already failed. Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir continues his strong-man government, not because he and his group are dedicated to permanent dictatorship, but because they dare not yet trust the forces of parliamentary rule to carry out the new policies of the revolution.

One important aspect of this situation lies in the problem of developing a civil service and intellectual leaders adequate to institutionalize in civilian governments the objects of the new political consciousness. The best example of this is in Egypt. When the revolution took place there were perhaps some 2,000 — 2,500 Egyptians who by ability, training, and motivation were able to undertake efficient government administration between the level of departmental heads and under-secretaries of state. But with the revolution nearly half this group lost their place in political life because of their involvement with the discredited parliament and its parties. Of the remainder some are ruled out because of extremist political activities or a record of personal and official corruption. This means that the revolutionary government has a very limited number of people that can be entrusted with the task of making the revolution's objectives indigenous and permanent through a new parliamentary regime. Because of this lack, military leadership is playing an increasing role in the country, yet that leadership can never make the revolution's objectives permanent and self-sustaining.

Because of this general situation, I believe that a period of "strong-man" rule is inevitable and probably beneficial in many Middle Eastern countries. Yet strong-man rule in itself will not tide the Middle East over until it can reinstitute parliamentary procedures. There must be developed a new group of capable civic leaders who can form the link between the permanent machinery of government and the growing political and social demands of the people. So far as I know, no university in the Middle East now gives specialized training for government service; yet the framework of stable democratic regimes cannot emerge naturally from mass agitation. I suggest that this presents a need at least as important as the institution of programs of social improvement, which are now the chief objective of our technical assistance operation.

The third cause of instability that confronts Middle Eastern governments is that involved in the need for instituting programs for the social betterment of the common people. Anyone familiar with the Middle East today knows that beneath and through its political agitation lies the growing pressure of

social discontent. The peasant masses are gradually awakening to two very simple facts: one, that people in other parts of the world do not live as they live; the other, that man and not God is responsible for the constitution of society. This means that since man made society, man can also remake society — and remake it so that the common man is healthier, happier, better educated, and better fed.

It is true that the political expression of this social restlessness does not come spontaneously from the peasants themselves. The demand for social improvement is vocal in the politically conscious middle class that has already tasted political power, yet is near enough to the peasant group (from which it is being created) to understand and sympathize with their plight. Moreover, peasant discontent is a potentially political weapon that, properly organized, can be used to bring new political leaders and classes to power.

That this situation is a real factor in the current instability of government is clear when we study the legislation that the recent new regimes have introduced. One of the first acts of the Revolutionary Council in Egypt was sharply to limit land ownership and begin a program of land distribution to the country's landless peasant masses. In Syria, Shishakli attacked the problem of national education; in Iran, Mossadegh tried to force through radical social legislation while distracting the landlord's attention by keeping the British crisis burning at white heat.

For the fact is that no Middle East country today, with the probable exception of the states of the Arabian peninsula, dares overlook the strident popular demands for social improvement. This was strikingly illustrated in Syria after the overthrow of the Shishakli regime. While the overthrow was largely accomplished by the entrenched forces of landlordism that proclaimed to the world "now the country has been returned to its rightful rulers," the first popular election produced a parliament that was distinctly left of center, even containing one Communist. Someone has said that this is what happens when you let women vote, but women or men, it is the voice of popular Syria warning the "rightful owners" that the welfare of common people must be taken into account.

Yet the task of instituting social advance rapidly enough to keep pace with social discontent is far from easy. For one thing, there are few quick answers to social conditions. Set in an economy of natural scarcity, with limited state funds, governments have often done little more than provide some form of temporary relief. The basic problem of increasing the national income and distributing it more fairly has often been too difficult, or too

dangerous, to touch. Israel is often held up as the example of what can be done to utilize better the resources of the region, but the argument is inconclusive, for Israel has been created and supported by foreign gift capital that thus far has not needed to justify its investment in sound, economic terms. Prior to the war, it was estimated that the investment per farm in the Zionist colonies (exclusive of the cost of land) was about \$1,500. If this figure is correct, the Egyptian government would need to invest over \$3 billion in its farm lands to bring about like results — and this kind of money is not forthcoming, even if all the landlords were taken out and shot!

The problem of finding money for social improvement is further complicated by the mounting costs of the defense establishments. The new countries of Asia have learned that one major mark of independence and influence in the eyes of the modern world is military strength, and the development of a national army is therefore a natural concomitant of independence. This tendency has been strengthened in the Middle East by the historic insistence of the West that the area cannot defend itself or protect such vital spots as the Suez Canal. It is thus not surprising that a growing portion of state budgets goes for military expenditure. Yet many Middle Eastern countries cannot have both an army and an adequate social improvement program at the same time. It has been estimated that, were Egypt to provide free and compulsory education for all its children under the university level, it would take 35% of the state budget. When military expenditures are already consuming more than a quarter of the budget, it is obvious that Egypt cannot have both a strong army and universal education at once.

Finally, there is the further difficulty of discovering and instituting the kinds of programs that will spend the limited funds of the state wisely. While many useful programs have been set in motion, too often they blindly copy some aspect of Western technology in the belief that anything “made in America” is the panacea for all ills. This is as much the fault of the West as of the East, for many Westerners are patronizingly certain that they have all the answers and seem unable to grasp the grass roots character of the Eastern social problems and their solutions.

A particular reflection of this situation is found in the field of education. Most national school systems in the Middle East have been patterned on the primary-secondary-university ladder of the Western tradition. The emphasis has been on urban institutions preparing for professional life or government service, and not on village schools designed to help the peasant remain a peasant — but a better and healthier one. This has had two un-

fortunate and unstabilizing results: it has left the farming class relatively untouched by modern knowledge just when it needs it most, and it has syphoned off village youth for urban life where there is often no real place for them. This is one reason why students in the Middle East are in perennial discontent and have played such a major role in political instability. They are often the core of the "mobs" with which we started—mobs whose political riots have brought about the fall of more than one government.

The solution of these social problems lies beyond the scope of this paper. Yet it seems clear that, with the best will in the world, few Middle East governments are in a position today to achieve the social stability they so badly need. This is why I believe a wisely conceived, long continued program of technical assistance including the United Nations, the United States government, and voluntary agencies (like the Near East Foundation) is absolutely essential. For political stability will not be achieved unless we make available to the struggling governments of the Middle East the best experience and resources of the West for the involved and sensitive task of building a new society that embodies the new hope stirring in Eastern hearts.

The Arabs have a word for it. They call these days of change and confusion *nahda*, "awakening." It is because the ancient peoples of the Middle East are awakening, not because they are decaying, that they are restless and disturbed. And it is because they are awakening that I believe a great role awaits them in that world of peace, justice, freedom, and plenty that is the dream and the hope of us all.

Second Session, Friday afternoon, March 4th
Presiding: SYDNEY N. FISHER, Department of
History, The Ohio State University

MIDDLE EAST PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY TOWARD REGIONAL AND WORLD SECURITY

COL. S. G. Taxis, USMC

THIS SUBJECT INVOLVES so many factors that the more one studies the problem, the more one realizes that there are no easy answers. Even as I worked on this paper, the Middle Eastern situation was in process of change almost daily. By the time I leave this platform some new and major development may well have occurred. Thus, I am in momentary fear of finding myself in the position of the man who leapt upon his horse and rode off in all directions at once.

To avoid this dilemma, I will start by trying to set some terms of reference; by attempting to define the problem as it appears to me. When I speak of responsibility I refer to that which states, in their normal relations, have to neighboring and friendly states, and also to the mutual responsibilities which exist between governments and the governed. By state I refer to the body politic — to the entire political and geographic complex which comprises the national state.

My effort will be to show the reason for regional affiliations aimed at security, and the relationship which these have toward world security. My approach will be rather broad in nature. Because of the current relations existing between Israel and the Arab states, I doubt if it would be appropriate or helpful to touch upon this question. Major political problems first must be solved.

The Middle East presents a complex of states with every type of government from an absolute monarchy to a new-born democracy being represented. Governments vary from the theocratic to the secular. Jealousies exist between states which have everything in common but a common aim. Yet the truly complementary nature of the Middle Eastern states must be recognized. It is a subject for very sincere and necessary negotiation and reconciliation.

Continuing governmental stability and responsibility are essential if the citizens of the states concerned are to have those fundamentals of security which are required in order to preserve the legitimate ambitions and aspirations of individuals within the state. Regardless of what form a government takes, if it is to fulfill its duty to the people in the complete sense, it must provide, within its capabilities, for the security of the state. Security includes many things, no one of which can be discounted in favor of another—physical security, economic security, freedom of religion, freedom of enterprise, freedom to live as one wills within the tenets of the controlling society. All these are a debt of government to people and state, and of people to state and to government. And if one reflects for a moment, it becomes obvious that this relationship between people, state, and government is the very warp and woof of the free society in which we live.

My discussion today centers about the problem of physical security. Though I place emphasis on that specific subject, please do not feel that I have forgotten the importance of the many political, social, and economic factors which bear upon this problem. The close interrelationship of them all underlies the appreciation of any single one.

Now, how does a government provide for the physical security of the state? The external relationships of the state, its political and economic stability, its physical strength and military posture, its geographical location and the nature of any existing threat, all enter into the problem. When we talk of the Middle East, each of these items seems to take on an importance all its own.

We can isolate some of the ways in which security has been sought. Neutralism, as in the case of Switzerland, is one example. But how many small states have the geographic position of Switzerland, or its highly capable citizen army? A position of great military strength, or of overwhelming power on the part of an individual state was, in the past, another path to security. Abject political capitulation, something few people care to contemplate, has shown itself to be a most illusory means of security. Perhaps the most dangerous security concept of all is what, for want of a better expression, we might call the ostrich school of thought—burying one's head in the sand and stubbornly refusing to face realities.

The world situation of today holds little hope for the wishful thinker. A creed which adamantly presses forward in quest of subjugation of the entire world, a creed which denies religion, a creed which declares the inevitability of conflict between the ideology of the godless and the world of free men

is not something that can be ignored. Pretending that it does not exist won't make it go away. To pretend that co-existence is an acceptable guarantee of security on the part of a weak nation is to ignore the fate of Czechoslovakia, Albania, Rumania, Bulgaria, East Germany, China, Tibet, and all the other states behind the Iron Curtain. Co-existence in their case turned out to be co-habitation.

Security comes from strength, and the strength of the Free World today is being generated through a series of alliances, treaties, pacts, and the like, all dedicated to the existence of a united front which has sufficient power to oppose and frustrate the ambitions of the Kremlin.

One of the insidious facts about the advances of world Communism since World War II is that state after state had fallen under the domination of this malignant ideology before the Free World awakened to the nature of the threat. And the threat which faces the Middle East is just as real as that which faced the unfortunate nations of Eastern Europe and the struggling republics of the Baltic. Those states exist now only in the form of lines drawn upon a map.

The states of the Middle East can no more afford to ignore the harsh and bitter realities of this situation than they can afford to deny the very age in which they live. They are inextricably bound up in the conflict. They happen to inhabit a portion of the globe which has immense strategic value—a value which gives no promise of lessening, but which gains in significance year by year.

The strategic character of the Middle East derives from the fundamental factors of position, resources, and peoples. As to position—it is the land bridge connecting Europe, Asia, and Africa. The Middle East abuts the southern flank of NATO along the Turkish-Syrian border; abuts, but does not brace. Bordering, as it does, the entire eastern and much of the southern littoral of the Mediterranean, it can be the deciding factor in the control of that vital, inland, and central sea.

Further, the air bases of the Middle East remain on the southern, non-satellite buffered border of the USSR—a deterrent element which can reach deep into the course of potential trouble.

If the Middle East is of major strategic importance by virtue of its position, it is equally important because of the richness of its oil deposits. Broadly speaking, of all world oil-producing areas, only Venezuela and the Middle East have major petroleum exportable surpluses. Most Venezuelan oil is absorbed by the economy of this hemisphere; Middle Eastern oil supports the needs of Western European markets. Of the world's proven reserves, some

119 billion barrels, approximately 55 percent, are known to be in the Middle East. Should the present flow of Middle Eastern oil cease or be diverted, the long-range impact of such change upon both the peacetime economy and the war potential of the West would be grave.

The industrial might of Western Europe would be a valuable prize for an imperialistic invader, but the aggressor seizing European mills and factories would be able to capitalize on his conquest to a much greater extent if he could also control the petroleum resources of the Middle East and the sea lanes that lead from there.

The most important element of strategic consideration in the Middle East I have left until last — people. I am not able to include this element in my talk in the same manner in which I have referred to position and resources, for the worth of people cannot be assessed through the tabulating mechanisms of a computer. They are flesh and blood beings. In the final analysis, they answer only to God. They were given the definite ability to determine their destinies — and all material considerations aside, people will so decide.

The Middle East is a vital area in the world. It is an area of potential conflict, military or otherwise, between two major forces representing completely opposed points of view, and backed in each case by immense power. The Communist aim is world tyranny, while the Free World seeks not domination, but freedom to live in peace and security. It asks not to impose its political theories nor its religions upon others. It is adamant, however, in its opposition to any system which makes man the pawn of a godless state, refuses to man his prerogative of establishing and directing the aims of the state in which he lives, and rejects the divinity of God.

The foregoing should at least set us to thinking about several very difficult questions concerning the Middle East — questions such as: “What price neutrality?”; “To what extent are Middle Eastern nations meeting their responsibilities to themselves and to their people?”; “Is there to be a decision?”; “If a decision, will it be positive or negative?”; “Must area problems and differences continue to prevent the greater decisions?”

Lest someone think I am calling “wolf” or trying to exaggerate an already unpleasant situation, I would like to quote in part a very significant document. This is not classified; it can be obtained from numerous sources. It was one of the peculiar “happenstances” of World War II, when U.S. officials gained early and unexpected access to the German Foreign Office in Berlin.

VERY URGENT. STRICTLY SECRET. Telegram from the German Ambassador in the U.S.S.R. (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office. Moscow, 0534, 26 November 1940.

The Soviet Government is prepared to accept the draft of the Four Power Pact which the Reich Foreign Minister outlined in the conversation of November 13, regarding political collaboration and reciprocal economic (support) subject to the following conditions:

- (2) . . . The establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.
- (3) Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspiration of the Soviet Union.

For a moment, let us look back on Russian policy vis-à-vis the Middle East. Let us see what this policy has been over an extended period; let us check it for consistency.

The decline of the Persian and Ottoman empires in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries left a partial power vacuum in the Middle East. Although the influences of Tsarist Russia, Great Britain, and to a lesser degree France, all were felt at this time, the void was never completely filled. Generally speaking, Russian policy during this period has to accept control over the northern and adjacent parts of the area, and to avoid interference with Western influence and interest in the more remote parts of the Middle East. World domination, as promised by world Communism, was nothing but a whisper at the beginning of the 20th century.

Today these whispers have been transformed into bitter blasts which boom out from the towers of the Kremlin and echo throughout the world. Misunderstanding or underestimation of the nature of these threats can mean nothing better than capitulation and slavery. The Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist hypothesis of perpetual cold war and eventual hot war with the Free World gives one no room for wishful thinking.

The failure of two world wars to establish conditions under which men could live together in amity, and could settle disputes through the processes of law, can be blamed in part upon human nature. Yet both World War II and the threat which currently faces the world had their origin in the emergence of forms of totalitarianism completely repugnant to a social system based upon the dignity of the individual.

The totalitarianism of Communism has shown itself to be a sharper and more versatile weapon than those wielded by totalitarianism in the past. It moves in advance of armies, it undermines, it strikes at the minds of men and plays upon their hatreds, it uses poverty as a weapon against the poor. And always behind this insidious advance is the armed might of Communism, prepared to apply power when power is needed. This monolithic

structure has moved forward for too long, has successfully sought out and exploited too many areas of weakness in the world. The Middle East is on the time table somewhere and not at the bottom of the last page either — the pattern fits too well.

The Communist menace in the Middle East is an equal threat to both the Arab states and Israel, as well as to the several non-Arab Muslim states. To effectively combat this threat it must be recognized for what it is, and so dealt with. It is modern in techniques and weapons; it is ruthless in its unceasing search for power; its skill in exploiting areas of weakness is Machiavellian; it can be successfully opposed only from positions of strength. To a marked degree, the Middle East is an area of weakness; a power vacuum. Modern strategic concepts and weapons, both military and political, are essential to the defense of the Middle East. Physical strength must be generated. Similarly, one must not lose sight of the importance of social reform in the Middle East, for the conspiracy works also in the economic and socio-psychological spheres. It works through such apparatus as militarily conceived cadres which function throughout every facet of national life; cadres trained to capture control of street mobs, or to take complete possession of meetings of the populace conceived for entirely different purposes. For lessons as to how Communists infiltrate and gain control of nationalist movements, ally themselves temporarily with such movements and ultimately pull nations within the Communist orbit, one need only read Stalin and Lenin. Their works set the pattern very clearly.

The manner in which the Communists used nationalistic movements in Iran for their own ends is fresh in our minds — and should be a warning to every state in the Middle East. If there is a lesson in this, it is to the effect that firm control must rest in the hands of the forces of law and order, and that such forces must have the means adequate to the job.

As Communist aggression moves into the phase of active warfare, the weapons and means and strategies employed are modern in every sense of the word. Wars in Korea and in Indochina bear this out. The military threat of Communism cannot be countered and defeated by the uncoordinated efforts of single states within a region, or by unrealistic strategies and obsolete and inadequate means.

Regional recognition of the danger and a firm determination to meet it are essentials in this battle. These coupled with sound military organization, adequate equipment, and realistic international arrangements will produce the strength required.

It is clear that the United States and its allies appreciate the fact that strength lies in alliance and unity of purpose among the free nations of the world. It is also clear that alliances of this nature must be based upon an indigenous will to build realistically. The basic criteria for effective regional alliances might be stated as follows:

They must be oriented toward the common danger.

They must be indigenous and genuine in nature.

They must be completely realistic.

In the Middle East it is obvious that any military concept must start in the north, for there is the immediate danger. The hinterlands to the south are the natural backstop for the northern tier. If they are to play their part in the defense of the Middle East, a northward orientation is necessary, with all of the states concerned regionally allied and facing the major threat. A concept such as this can become strong. Effort would be united and coordinated; equipment supplied by the West would be effectively and economically employed in such manner as the situation dictated. The West cannot afford to dissipate its strength or resources in support of strategic concepts lacking in realism.

If we accept, even in part, what has been said up to this point, we come closer to the problem of security in the Middle East. Admittedly, these nations all are hard put if asked or expected to reconcile immediately their problems. There are simply too many factors involved.

Yet, if security is a part of public responsibility, and if, as I firmly believe, it is a responsibility which cannot be avoided by any government sincerely interested in the welfare of the state or the people, then some means of providing this security is essential.

Let us see where the Middle East stands today with relation to regional and world security by examining some of the more important international agreements which bear upon the problem. From this discussion, you may draw your own conclusions.

To begin with, attempts by the Western Powers to work out an acceptable defensive organization in the Middle East during the early 1950's were not successful. Many factors worked against the success of these efforts. The Suez problem, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the continuing question of colonialism, the North African situation, the Iranian crisis, and even the relations between the Arab states themselves, all had some bearing on the matter. By August of 1952 the initial concept of a "Middle East Command" had been abandoned in favor of a "Defensive Organization," with functions limited

to liaison with the states concerned and to joint consultation on defense matters. In turn this concept proved unacceptable, and thus does not exist in fact today.

The Arab League Collective Security Pact of 1952 could have given promise of greater strength throughout the area had it had more basis in reality. It was weakened, however, by political considerations, and by the fact that the states concerned had neither the arms required to create military strength nor the industry required for the manufacture of armaments. Further, the members seemingly were more preoccupied with the lesser questions than with the broader problems of area or regional security. All these considerations prevented the continuing growth of the pact as a source of strength.

Treaties exist between Great Britain and Iraq, and between Great Britain and Jordan. Important as they are, however, they still fall far short of providing anything like what is required in the way of effective regional security.

In spite of the unfavorable note I have sounded up to this point, some progress has been made. The progress has been slow, and it has not been very great to date. Yet when free nations discuss their problems things are apt to move rather slowly; such is the nature of negotiation between equals.

The solution of the Suez problem went far to lessen unfortunate tensions in the Middle East. The agreement reached in October of 1954 settled a thorny issue. Although Great Britain agreed to withdraw from the Suez base, the base is in turn available to Britain in the event of aggression against Turkey, Egypt, or the other Arab states.

During the same month agreement was formalized between Iran and the international oil consortium, and the long dispute over the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry was resolved.

In 1952 Turkey, along with Greece, became a member of NATO. Through this relationship Turkey clearly outlined its affiliations in the world conflict, and its continuing interest in developing a situation of strength along the southern flank of Russia. In June 1954 Turkey and Pakistan concluded a treaty of cooperation, and two important nations, each equally firm in their will to resist the pressures of Communism, were further united in purpose.

At the present time the United States and Britain are providing or about to provide arms to a number of Middle Eastern nations. Base agreements of major importance exist in several parts of the Middle East and in North Africa.

The Arab-Israeli impasse is far from resolved, but under the armistice

agreements, with the help of the United Nations and with the assurances given under the Tripartite Agreement of 1950, conditions exist which are certainly an improvement over those of 1948 and 1949.

A most significant step toward strengthening the security of the Middle East came last week, when on 24 February the Turkish-Iraqi Mutual security treaty was signed in Baghdad. Ratification followed swiftly, with overwhelming support being voted by the parliamentary bodies of both states on 26 February. Iraq's decision links it with the "northern tier" of states extending from Turkey to Pakistan. Indirectly, Iraq is joined with NATO and the West through its affiliation with Turkey. Its exposed position so near the borders of the USSR has been immeasurably strengthened, and aggressive intent on the part of the USSR faces increased resistance from indigenous forces as well as the deterrent effect inherent in the new alliance. The threat to Iraq was coldly assessed and accurately appraised.

The pact received immediate and unfavorable attention from other Arab states, with Egypt going so far as to threaten withdrawal from the Arab League. The pact nevertheless remains wide open for the inclusion of all members of the Arab League, and gives promise that Iran may later add further to the northern line of defense. It is certainly to be hoped that the apparently heated discussions among members of the Arab League will serve to clarify and emphasize the fundamental issues of regional security involved, and in the long run promote greater rather than lesser unity among them. If this is not the case, the future of Middle East security will continue to show those weaknesses which inevitably invite aggression.

A few moments ago I mentioned certain criteria for regional security pacts. Let us see how the position of Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey meet these criteria. First of all, orientation is definitely toward the real danger, Communist aggressive intent. Second, these pacts are unquestionably indigenous in nature. Finally, as to realism, the states concerned are in the immediate path of Soviet expansion to the south; they have lived long under the shadow of this menace, and they have seen the fate of the buffer states of Eastern Europe. Nothing could be more realistic than their moves toward a position of strength. In the final analysis, these treaties or other agreements of similar nature offer the greatest hope for Middle East security. They have the quality of realism — and although King Solomon was alleged to have had a thousand wives, quality remains a virtue.

To conclude: The nature of the threat has been exposed. It must be understood. It cannot be treated as if it were something that could be kept

forever in a dark closet, like a somewhat embarrassing family skeleton. It is an unpleasant fact of life which must be faced up to with courage, vision, and action.

The Western world can do much to help the nations of the Middle East in their quest for security, and so it should. The Middle East, however, must be a full partner in this matter of preserving world freedom, and partners must undertake responsibilities commensurate with their position. If strength and security are to be assured for this part of the world, the basic decision must be taken by the nations of the Middle East.

Second Session, Friday afternoon, March 4th
Presiding: SYDNEY N. FISHER, Department of
History, The Ohio State University

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF MIDDLE EAST INDUSTRIALIZATION AND RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT: A CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

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THERE IS NO responsible statesman today, either in the East or in the West, who would not subscribe to the thesis that industrialization and development of natural resources constitute the key to the solution of pressing economic and social problems in underdeveloped areas. This thesis is nowadays explicitly or implicitly accepted not only by leaders of the more advanced states such as Turkey or Egypt, but also by rulers of the patriarchal countries, who actively seek ways and means to create a greater wealth for their peoples by encouraging the penetration of Western technology and know-how into their hitherto closed domains.

These wishes and programs formulated in mid-20th century differ from similar projects of a quarter of a century ago in this important respect: they stand a much better chance of being put into effect than was the case of their predecessors. Three principal reasons account for this fact. First, there is no major political impediment of international nature to stop those countries from pursuing the path of industrialization. The political relationship of a backward, raw material-producing colony to an industrial metropolis largely belongs to the past. Today, no matter what the wishes of a particular self-interested group might be, the major Western Powers can no longer dictate the continuance of this classical colony-metropolis pattern. Most of the Middle East is composed of independent countries who are perfectly free to take sovereign decisions concerning their economic development. Secondly, those major Western Powers that have the technical and financial means to help the Middle East in development programs are willing and even anxious to do so. The motivation is of a mixed nature, but, undoubtedly, the political reasons for this attitude stand out as the most important. The West is seeking political stability based on a sound economy and a social

structure free of shocking contrasts and abuses in an area deemed important and vital from the strategic point of view. It is, therefore, prepared to offer more than military support or more than just "business" with the area in question. Funds and specialists are, consequently, made available to the Middle East either directly by the few Powers that can spare them, or indirectly through international agencies. The third reason accounting for a likelihood of success is the emergence of a new source of wealth in the Middle East itself. The unprecedented growth of oil production provides today a number of countries with means to execute even the boldest plans of development.

Thus, it would appear that Middle East development is based on solid foundations and that one may look toward the future with a good deal of confidence. If one were to attempt a somewhat oversimplified statement with regard to this situation, one might say that prospects are good because those who need economic improvement have the will to work toward it, while those who have the dollars and the specialists to assist them are ready to make these financial and human resources available for the execution of the task. Yet, when we look at the record of what has thus far been achieved, we discover that this record is not one of unmitigated success and that the road toward a brighter future is frequently strewn with formidable obstacles which, in some instances, tend to delay, if not actually arrest, progress.

The difficulties are due to a variety of factors of technical, economic, and social nature. But, while it would be lighthearted to underestimate the technical problems arising out of an ambitious irrigation and land reclamation scheme or economic dilemmas stemming from the development of native industries which, if government-sponsored, pose at once the problem of tariff protection as well as that of state socialism versus free enterprise, it is not the technical or the economic problems that are likely to cause most of the complications. The problems that truly tax the leaders' ingenuity and challenge their public responsibility are primarily social or, more precisely, political, of both internal and external character.

INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

The internal political problems attending any development program stem principally from the fact that such a development carries with it a connotation of social change.

One of the first manifestations of social change is a shift in the distribution and structure of population. Any significant industrial development has, as

a consequence, the growth of new urban or semi-urban centers. This means, at once, an increase of population in certain geographical areas and an emergence of new social classes. Thus, in a region that has hitherto known an agricultural or nomadic type of life, with a possible sprinkling of petty trading and artisan elements, new classes and new political forces make their appearance. The industrial proletariat, with new notions of workers' rights, new expectations and new loyalties, emerges together with a new managerial class or industrial bureaucracy, while an increased number of private contractors, frequently of *nouveau riche* type, view both foregoing classes with an eager anticipation of brisk business and quick profit. The political dilemmas posed by these population changes are hard to ignore.

In the first place, a question may be asked: is the new industrial population growth going to develop within the framework of social harmony, or is it going to accentuate the already existing social cleavages which industrialization itself was originally supposed to eliminate or, at least, reduce to a safe minimum? And, whatever the answer may be to this question, who is going to capture the political leadership of the workers, of the white collar class, and of the new bureaucracy? Are the workers going to be left alone, with no responsible political group taking an active and constructive interest in them, and thus be permitted to drift aimlessly until, finally, the extremist and subversive elements succeed in monopolizing leadership and building up a myth of being the sole defenders of workers' rights?

This is not a mere rhetorical question. Recent history bears an eloquent testimony of how different the results may be depending on the degree of social consciousness and responsibility of national political leaders and domestic or foreign industrialists. In Turkey, where the government and the dominant party have consistently pursued certain ideological objectives, the working class has not become alienated from the ruling elite, despite the fact that it has not yet secured the full legal and economic standards foreseen for workmen in an industrial society by the International Labor Organization. By contrast, in Iran, where political leadership was vacillating or paralyzed at one time or another, the leadership of the working class was captured by the Communists, and it took much time and effort, largely of coercive character, to replace the Communist labor leaders by the non-Communist ones. And, although the Tudeh Party seems to have lost both power and prestige as a result of shocking disclosures of its espionage activities and outright subordination to a foreign power, it is still problematical whether the present official leaders of labor organizations in Iran would stand the

chance of re-election under normal circumstances, free of the legacy of Communist inroads into the labor movement.

It seems that, in this respect, both the governments and the industrialists in the Middle East were frequently guilty of neglect and shortsightedness: neglect because they did not face squarely the truth that industrialization is a blessing only if it promptly attends to the labor and social problems that emerge as soon as an industry is born; shortsightedness because they preferred to forbid trade unions rather than to allow their gradual, non-violent development. This was like putting a lid on a boiling kettle — sooner or later an explosion was bound to occur. And, moreover, by making trade unionism an illegal activity, they were inviting this rather inevitable movement to go underground and to become dominated by elements of dubious loyalty to the state.

An argument that trade unionism has no place in a backward and illiterate society, that it would impose artificial forms of social activity upon people who have just left the stage of pastoral nomadism or primitive agriculture and are thus too immature to comprehend the processes of legitimate labor organizations, that it would only create dangerous ideas in their untrained minds, should not be accepted uncritically. The most dangerous ideas are born when there is a real gap between what the man wants and what he actually has, and when there is no legal and peaceful way of bridging that gap. As to the exposure of an untrained mind to an advanced form of social activity, we may reply that the education process has to start sooner or later and that the real problem is, who is going to be the educator: a scheming Communist agent or a man genuinely dedicated to the welfare of labor? It would be good to bear in mind that it is much easier to *prevent* the Communists from filling a vacuum by filling it oneself than to *dislodge* them from positions already captured.

There are instances in some countries and industries of the Middle East where an attempt has been made to deal with labor problems through a middle-of-the-road approach between trade unionism and a complete non-existence of labor organizations. This has usually taken the form of labor-management factory committees. It is hard to assess in a general statement the success of this sort of experiment, inasmuch as the situations may vary from locality to locality. It would not seem improper, however, to keep alert to the dangers of any oversimplified solutions and to subject a given practice to close scrutiny and revision. We should not forget that a demand for the right to form unions has usually figured prominently among the grievances

that led to prolonged strikes in the oil fields of the Persian Gulf area within the last few years.

What has been said about the political aspects of the emerging labor problems can, to a large degree, be applied to the position of the steadily increasing intelligentsia. In certain countries, such as Lebanon and Egypt, the principle of providing secondary and higher education has a long tradition behind it. Consequently, these countries possess impressive numbers of educated individuals who do not always become absorbed by the economy of the country. A well conceived development program might help a great deal in removing the unemployment of young intelligentsia and in providing them with a sense of fulfillment and a hope for the future. This, in turn, might result in a considerable easing of the political tensions and instability so characteristic of countries with an overproduction of college graduates. But there are different cases, too, of countries in which industrialization and resources development precede, instead of following, the formation of a secularly educated class. In fact, what happens in those countries is that a giant industry is established in the midst of a patriarchal society incapable of filling even as much as five percent of the clerical and technical positions. Consequently, there is an interim period during which these positions are filled by other than native elements while, at the same time, considerable effort is deployed by the industry itself to train as many natives as possible in various skills.

Thus a new class of white-collar workers and middle-grade technicians is formed. This class, having tasted secular educational opportunities and a higher standard of living, tends to develop ideas and tastes which threaten the established order of the existing patriarchal society. Moreover, as time goes on, the initial docility of these employees gives place to an increasingly questioning if not actually rebellious attitude toward the industry which employs them. The longer these men are employed and the greater the distance that separates them from their original communities, the less they tend to compare their present status with their previous, less fortunate, stage in life, and the more they tend to contrast their present position with what they believe is due to them. The problem thus posed presents many difficulties for which there is no easy solution. On the one hand, the patriarchal state seeks the ways to increase its wealth and, not illogically, embarks upon the course of developing its natural resources. On the other, it soon finds out that this process results in the emergence of a steady threat to its fundamental institutions in the form of the newly educated people. There are, basically, two ways of dealing with this dilemma: either to persevere in the old forms

of society and government and enforce a rigid conformity of the new classes with those forms, or to adopt a policy of gradual concessions and changes. The second way is equivalent to a conscious evolutionary process which may end in substantial transformations of the existing body politic. However, neither way presents a foolproof guarantee against political tensions and upheavals.

These brief remarks should suffice to convey the magnitude of problems arising from shifts in population structure. But there is another category of problems which pertain to the newly created national wealth itself. Of these, the tempo with which the wealth increases and the way it is distributed are of major importance. Any development program should strike a reasonable balance between the production of capital and consumers' goods on the one hand and the long-range and short-range targets on the other. Both technology and economics should have a major role in determining the feasibility and appropriateness of these objectives, but it would be dangerous to think that technology and economics should constitute the only criteria of action. Here again the neglect or ignorance of the political issues may result in considerable upsets and disappointments. Good economics may recommend a well planned long-range development program in which the completion of one phase should serve as a prerequisite to the beginning of another. But a good internal policy may dictate a different set of priorities, depending on the actual mental position of the society for whose benefit these programs are intended.

If one were to look for some kind of a law which governs such political situations, one might be tempted to formulate it as follows: an economically sound development program entails certain sacrifices and may, depending on the actual wealth of a country, demand a more or less pronounced degree of austerity. Austerity itself may be expressed either by a decrease in the supply of consumers' goods or by a postponement of their expected increase. Both measures may go beyond the political capacity of the population to accept. Consequently, the government will have either to employ authoritarian methods to carry out the program or to compromise the program's economic purity for the sake of political expediency. Thus, ultimately, much will depend on the character of a given government. We may even go so far as to say that the more authoritarian the government the more chance it has to carry out an economically sound program of development, provided that it is motivated by considerations of public welfare. But, obviously, it is both difficult and ethically questionable to encourage governments which have practised a degree of democracy to curtail it for the sake of develop-

ment and reform. Moreover, it must be left to a given nation itself to make the basic political decisions in this respect. The Turkish example of twenty-five years of political tutelage, re-education, and development may appeal to many as worthy of emulation. Furthermore, the political tradition or authoritarianism in the world of Islam may lead many native and foreign observers to claim that only a strong government, free of the irresponsible pressures of public opinion and demagoguery, is capable of accomplishing anything of lasting value to the peoples concerned. But, while it is comforting to have some general law of behavior to go by, it is dangerous to overlook the particular local conditions, the genius of a particular people, and the many psychological intangibles which, combined, produce a political situation amenable or not amenable to an authoritarian or democratic solution.

The second major problem arising from an increase in national wealth is that of distribution of benefits. The problem may be presented both as a vertical and a horizontal one. The vertical aspect is the most obvious and the most often debated. It can be simply stated in terms of division of benefits among the ruling classes, the middle and educated classes, and the masses at large. It is difficult to formulate any generalizations as to what is happening to the surplus wealth in a given political structure of society. The safest generalization would probably be a negative one, that is, that there is no logical connection between the greater political democracy in the Middle East and the greater benefits to the masses from industrialization and development programs. And we may add that striking differences may exist between the authoritarian governments themselves in this respect. While in a patriarchal society the division between the ruler's private purse and the state treasury may be nonexistent or very tenuous, in a modernized dictatorship the reverse may be true, and the ruling group may even set a fine example of modesty and frugality.

In the horizontal sense, the distribution of added wealth — even the location of new projects itself — may favor one province and its influential leaders as against another. It may add to the financial and political power of certain regional groups and potentates and thus tend either to upset the existing political balance or produce new tensions. The location of an oil industry in al-Hasa has not been without effect on the distribution of political power in Saudi Arabia. The same could be said with regard to the location of Tapline's terminal facilities in southern Lebanon. The political influence of certain tribes in Iraq and Iran has also been enhanced by the fact that they have become guardians of pipelines in virtue of specific arrangements with oil companies.

Last and not least, some development projects, especially those connected with the harnessing of rivers, may entail forcible displacements of the population and affect individual property rights. A vigorous opposition to such schemes is then to be expected, and it would not be improper for the planners to investigate the political power and influence of such potential opposition groups before embarking on their work

To conclude these remarks on the internal political aspects of industrialization and resources development, we may observe that the fate of many a government in the Middle East — Syria being a good example during the past five years — has hinged on its ability to carry out a development program which would give tangible benefits to the people at large while being palatable to important political centers in the country. A number of dictators have come to power — and were given the benefit of the doubt in the initial stages — by appearing as champions of reform. Their demise was often due as much to their political mistakes as to their economic and administrative deficiencies. Politically, their major mistake seemed to lie in their inability to secure sustained support of a strongly organized political party to back up their reform and development plans. Their best intentions — granting that these were honorable — were of no avail when the only trump cards in their hands proved to be merely an elaborate development program and army support.

EXTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the external political problems weigh even more heavily upon the fate of development programs than do the internal ones. This is so because of the marked dependence of Middle Eastern countries upon some form of Western contribution. Unless an underdeveloped country decides to “go it alone” — as was clearly the case of Syria between 1949 and 1954 — it usually depends upon one or more of the following three types of foreign aid or expert advice: (1) foreign loans and grants-in-aid; (2) technical, administrative, and financial advice of foreign experts; and (3) revenue from foreign-controlled oil enterprises.

With regard to the first form — foreign loans and grants-in-aid — the big question is, from where are they going to be secured? The choices open to a Middle Eastern country are fairly limited. In the first place, the probability is that only the West will be willing to extend such financial assistance and that the recipient country will seek such aid in the West. This is due not only to the fact that the West seems to possess more of a surplus capital for

these purposes than the Soviet Union, but also to the fact that the latter has been loath to help financially the non-Soviet countries, preferring rather to offer the services of its experts. Moreover, despite the unwillingness of many a Middle Eastern country to align itself clearly with the West, there has been no evidence of desire to enter into closer financial relations with Russia. This was largely due to a legitimate suspicion that any form of Soviet aid would be hedged with so many conditions or implicit consequences that the recipient country could hardly make them compatible with its political integrity and independence.

Having thus, to all practical purposes, eliminated Russia as a giver or a lender, the question remains as to which Western country should supply the funds. Basically, the blunt truth is that whether the funds come from New York, Paris, or London, they all will have originated in Washington, owing to the heavy financial dependence of most of the Western world upon the United States. That there still are loans and grants to the Middle East other than those extended directly by Washington is partly due to the mutual respect and tolerance prevailing among the Western Powers — as in contrast to the boss-satellite relationship in the Soviet bloc — and partly to the preference of the recipient countries themselves. This preference, by the way, led them, in the immediate postwar period, mostly to seek funds in Washington because of American wealth and a conviction that the United States, as a country free of imperialist legacy in Asia, would not seek selfish political advantages in return. These considerations were surely well founded, yet, as time went on, this general trend, though by no means removed, has undergone some modifications. On the one hand, there has been a tendency to seek more loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; on the other, loans and credits were sought in, and accepted from, such countries as Britain, France, and West Germany. The reason for this slight change of policy is to be found in the attributes of power itself: an abundance of power repels as well as attracts. Even granting the non-existence of any political conditions attaching to a loan or grant, there will always be a suggestion of some degree of influence that the giver might secure in a recipient country. Yet, if we think of the intensity of anti-colonialist spirit in the Middle East and the proneness of its politically conscious classes to suspect the worst in their dealings with the West, we might become pleasantly surprised rather than dismayed by the basic, though not always openly averred, confidence in American decency and nonimperialism time and again manifested by their leaders. Even in Iran, at the time of the worst recriminations against the West as a whole, Dr. Mossadegh actively

sought American financial assistance and actually availed himself of the Point Four services.

There is still another, though seldom openly discussed, aspect of foreign governmental assistance. It is its relationship to foreign private investments. The question may be put this way: do government loans contribute to the success of a foreign enterprise in a Middle Eastern country or do they have an adverse effect upon it, and what exactly is the nature of their mutual relationship? A look at the recent record of intergovernmental loans in the Middle East seems to reveal some interesting yet contradictory phenomena. If we take Iran as an example, it would seem that the failure of the United States to grant a substantial loan to Iran during General Rasmussen's term of office had an adverse effect on the relations between the oil company and the government. While by no means the only cause of the deterioration of these relations, the nonavailability of the loan and the resulting frustration of Iran's political circles materially contributed to a radical solution through nationalization. What might have appeared to some as a situation which, due to the greater dependence of the government on oil revenues, would increase the bargaining strength of the company, proved to have an opposite psychological effect: instead of becoming more tractable, the Iranians resorted to solutions that seemed to defy logic and common sense. On the other hand, no one would deny that wealth which comes as a result of strenuous efforts is usually more respected than the "Santa Claus" type of income. Too much "easy money" is apt to imbue certain beneficiaries with somewhat irresponsible notions which may have an adverse effect upon the foreign private enterprise. The danger point is reached when a recipient country is solicited to accept assistance instead of soliciting it itself. A not illogical conclusion promptly jumped to by such a country is that its importance to the giver outweighs the giver's importance to itself. But, as regards the fundamental political realities, such a conclusion may often be fallacious and may, consequently, lead to considerable disappointments.

What has been said about foreign financial assistance and the delicate political issues which it is likely to raise, can be extended in a large measure to foreign technical assistance. The basic psychological relation between the giver and the beneficiary is essentially similar. The difference between the two types of aid is twofold: first, a technical aid program is usually less vital to the recipient country than a substantial foreign loan or grant; secondly, technical assistance is likely to pose more psychological dilemmas to both parties than a relatively simple transfer of funds. This second difference is

due to the greater prevalence of the human factor in the technical aid operations. To give and to accept advice is always one of the difficult functions in human relations, and the obvious and mutually recognized need for advice does not diminish, *per se*, the psychological delicacy of the operation.

Problem after problem is likely to pile up when a mission of foreign experts is undertaking a technical aid program. The exact definition of their tasks and responsibilities is one of the first issues that is likely to arise between the two parties, notwithstanding a clear phrasing of the original agreement. Experts, for understandable reasons, are usually anxious to seek some tangible accomplishments. But, if they are granted executive functions, they are apt to clash with the methods and the personalities of the host country's officialdom. If, by contrast, they are restricted to purely advisory functions, they might be exposed to public criticism for mistakes and delays not of their own. A few maladroit steps taken by one or another party may easily result in the foreign mission becoming an object of nationalist derision. The fundamental weakness of the local government may also prompt it to remain silent in the face of these attacks, thus leaving the foreign mission to its own devices so far as defense of its reputation is concerned. It is doubtful whether, under those circumstances, the best conceived public relations activity of the foreign mission will save it from becoming a public scapegoat. It is only the host government which is in a position to protect the mission from exaggerated criticisms. This should be made clear at a time when the initial agreement is signed, and the host government should be expected to carry its due share in informing the public of the objectives, competence, and activities of the mission.

Another human factor in any technical assistance program is that of the presence of a substantial body of foreigners in the host country. Their very number may cause resentment among the people whose memories of Western colonialism are still fresh. The foreign experts' superior financial status, the circumstance that they seek and secure more expensive dwellings for personal use, and are more generous toward their domestic servants than is the custom in the country, may easily add to this resentment. All of these are the incidentals of the presence of any larger foreign colony in the midst of a less advanced country, and there seems to be no ready-made solution for such difficulties. Two thoughts, however, may perhaps be suggested to those that send such missions abroad. One is that doing things in a more discreet way, with less emphasis on a big administrative overhead, might secure a more favorable reception in the host country. The other is that of

the properly timed indoctrination of the experts — and their families — in the ways and customs of the host country. The narrow provincialism rather proudly displayed by the spouses of certain competent officials has frequently outweighed the good done by the patient work of their husbands.

There is still another danger inherent in the presence of a foreign mission in the host country. It is the fact that the mission exists as a corporate, organized body. From the point of view of efficiency and coordination of efforts, it is probably true that an organized mission can accomplish more than individual experts scattered in the existing departments of the host government. But this is not always viewed so by the host country, and even if it is, considerations of national prestige and preoccupation with one's sovereignty may lead the host country to adopt a less efficient but politically more palatable method of hiring individual experts. Private experts, hired on an individual basis, are, moreover, more likely to adapt themselves to their new environment and to cherish the opportunity of gainful employment given them in an underdeveloped country. The secret of success of many continental European specialists in the Middle East may perhaps be traced to their willingness to act as subordinates in the local government hierarchies.

All the above-mentioned issues are capable of being magnified to a point of serious tension or reduced to a negligible quantity depending on the basic political framework within which a technical assistance program is undertaken. If there are grounds for political difficulties between the giving and the receiving country, it is highly probable that technical assistance will run into some rough weather. To launch a successful technical aid program requires, in the first place, a political receptiveness of the country for whose benefit such a program is intended. With regard to the Middle Eastern scene, three examples seem well to illustrate this point, those of Turkey, of certain Arab states, and of Iran. While the American aid programs in Turkey seem to have been uniformly successful as a result of a perfect political understanding between the two countries, technical assistance to some Arab states encountered considerable difficulties largely because of basic political issues pending between the United States and the Arab world. In one case — namely that of Syria — an American offer of assistance was met with an outright refusal.

As for Iran — the lending of American experts to that country has had by now a long history. Starting with Morgan Shuster in 1911, Iran has received, in succession, the first and second Millspaugh missions in 1921 and 1941, respectively, and the Overseas Consultants, Incorporated, in 1949. All

of these missions failed in their task not because of any lack of zeal or competence, but because their situation had become politically untenable in a very politically minded country. It was either an attempt to ignore foreign political pressures or to underestimate the domestic susceptibilities in Iran that led to the downfall of all four missions. In fact, at least three of these missions seemed to suffer from the "original sin" of being unaware that the initial Iranian request for their services had a political rather than a purely economic motivation. There is, of course, a different school of thought which claims that a grant of technical assistance may contribute to the improvement of political relations and that, moreover, what is aimed at is the fulfillment of a development program so as to pave the way toward a happier and more stable society. It would be unwise to reject such a view in a doctrinaire fashion. In fact, its spokesmen may point to the experience of Point Four in no other country than Iran itself in support of their thesis. Point Four has managed not only to maintain itself in Iran but also to pursue constructive activities even in the darkest days of political uncertainty and tension between Washington and Tehran. It thus seemed to serve as one of the last links proving to the Iranians the American willingness to help despite profound political differences, and to the Americans the Iranian refusal to burn all the bridges between Iran and the West. But it may be equally unwise to exaggerate the validity of this theory in obvious disregard of political realities in certain areas. There are undoubtedly situations in which more harm than good may be caused by an excess of zeal for good works.

The third form of relationship with foreign elements is expressed in the heavy dependence of certain Middle Eastern states upon the oil revenue. This form differs from the two previously discussed in that it is not a pure relationship between a giver and a receiver or a lender and a borrower. It is, by contrast, a business relationship in which one party provides what is its undeniable national resource, while the other supplies the capital and the skills requisite for its exploitation. Yet, the very fact that this business relationship can come into being is principally due to the virtual inequality of both partners — not the legal-political inequality, to be sure, but the inequality of organizational, technical, and financial abilities. This inequality tends to be taken for granted by the more advanced partner but not so by the less advanced one. The latter has a natural tendency to regard the arrangement as something more or less temporary which should be replaced by different forms of collaboration as soon as he feels capable of performing the more complex operations carried out by the concessionaire. On the other hand, the very nature of the petroleum industry — with its great

outlays of risk capital in the early, exploratory stages — leads it to ask for more than a routine margin of security and to seek this objective through concessions which are both long-term and exclusive. Although there is a meeting of minds of both parties on these points in the early stages of the concession — otherwise no agreement would have been concluded — the above-mentioned difference of approach carries within it a germ of future tensions and disagreements. These may assume major proportions or be dismissed as only minor irritants, depending on the outcome of the concessionaire's relations with three principal elements. These elements are: the host government, the public of the host country, and the concessionaire's home government and public.

It would be a truism to say that in order to preserve the concession the company's relations with the host government must be satisfactory. The real problem is not that of the objective itself but of the methods to achieve it. While no single "packaged" solution can be expected to apply to all times and all circumstances, it may perhaps be useful to mention a few principles that should be borne in mind with reference to this question. In the first place, one should not ignore the truth that governments change as time goes on. What might have been perfectly acceptable to one government may be viewed critically by its successor. Moreover, it would be helpful to remember that the pattern of change in the Middle East is revolutionary rather than gradual. Iran, Egypt, and Syria may here be cited as eloquent examples of this trend. Governments brought to power as a result of a coup have a marked tendency to disregard the obligations contracted by their predecessors, the usual explanation being that the preceding government did not really represent the people. It has been this writer's personal experience in his conversations with political leaders that at least five cabinet members in various Middle Eastern countries summarily dismissed the contracts signed by the earlier regime as obviously not valid in the new political situation. "For me," said one of them, "the only criterion is whether or not nationalization would prove profitable to us. Because I do not believe that at this stage it would, I am opposed to it." This is an eloquent testimony that not only changes in government produce modified attitudes but also that the legal concepts of people brought up in a different cultural environment considerably vary from our own. The principle of the sanctity of contracts still has a long way to go to be unquestionably accepted in certain areas of the world.

Two other observations should suffice to complete our review of company-government relationship. One is that relations with the government do not

stop at cabinet level, but go beyond it to embrace relations with central and provincial bureaucracy, as well as with the parliaments in the countries where they exist. Thus this relationship becomes much more complex than was originally intended by the signatories of the concession. It calls for special skills and perhaps a special organization within the company. There has been comforting evidence that certain companies have fully realized the importance of this problem and have adapted their recruitment, training, and organization to cater to this need. The other observation is that Middle Eastern governments are increasingly subject to public pressures and, as a result, some of their actions become understandable only if due account is taken of this fact.

This leads us to the second kind of relationship — that between the company and the public at large. It is another truism to say that today the preservation of good relations with the government no more suffices and that efforts must be deployed to secure the good will of the public. The companies' task is not an easy one. Peoples of the Middle East have experienced too many adversities of fate and too many frustrations to follow the patterns of relatively sober and serene behavior of the citizens of more fortunate countries. Whatever the political institutions of a given country in the Middle East, the chances are that public opinion is more likely to be against the government than for the government. If we add the long tradition of suspicion toward any foreigners in their midst, we have, at the very outset, a situation in which the two parties to the concession agreement — the government and the company — do not enjoy the initial benefit of the doubt. This calls for constant vigilance and sustained efforts to keep the public well informed and happy within bounds of feasibility. Tactful public relations activity has to be synchronized with an imaginative approach to employee relations. Policies affecting racial equality or segregation, advancement opportunities and scales of pay, housing development programs — especially the policy of the so-called integration versus company town schemes — will have profound repercussions on the public attitudes. At the same time it should be realized that conditions are never exactly the same in various regions, and that emphasis on one aspect of human relations in one country may not apply to another country. By way of illustration we may observe that employee relations within the company seem to play a relatively minor role in comparison with external public attitudes as expressed by the press and public debates in a country like Lebanon. By contrast, employee relations within the company are apt to play a decisively

more important role than the expressions of public opinion in a country like Saudi Arabia. Not that the latter should be ignored or neglected in the desert kingdom, but simply because the political structure of the country has not yet reached the stage in which newspapers and political pamphleteering can make or unmake the governments.

It would seem that there are certain typical dangers which companies would be wise to steer clear of in their relations with the public. One is haughty isolation of the company from the people, and behavior suggesting that it is a state within a state. The difficulties involved in avoiding this danger are too many to be enumerated here, revolving, as they do, around the basic cultural and technological lag between the two peoples concerned. Yet the public will not be oblivious to manifestations of good will and gestures of genuine friendship on the part of the company, even if these should fall short of the ideal. Much will have to do with the basic mental attitudes of the management and Western employees of the company. Certain individuals seem to be organically incapable of adjusting themselves to foreign environments. The talents of such people should preferably be utilized at home.

Another danger is that of too close an identification of the company with one or another political group in the country. The seeming advantages of such a course may be swept away the moment an opposition group comes into power.

And last, but not least, the educated people of the host country should be convinced that opportunities for employment in the company — assuming they have proper qualifications — are not impeded by competition from imported foreigners. It is relatively easy to become quiescent about this problem, overlooking the educational progress in the host country and adhering too strictly to the slogan of maximum Western efficiency. Yet the example of Iran should again serve as a memento. At the time of the eviction of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from the country, the company employed about 4,000 British technicians, all deemed indispensable. However, the new international consortium plans to employ probably no more than 300 Western technicians and one may rest confident that its operations will not suffer a breakdown as a result.

The moral to be drawn from this brief review is that company operation in a region like the Middle East resembles navigation on rough seas more than an orderly activity on firm ground. There is nothing static in the picture, and the captain and the crew must be constantly on the alert. The

principal task is to preserve the concession — which probably calls for more subtlety and statesmanship than production or sales management. Moreover, the acceptance of the fact that, as the host country changes, so also the concession will have to undergo modifications would be a safer policy than a rigid insistence on its immutable legal character. Only a few years ago one might have been tempted to divide the Middle East into the safe and the unsafe areas from the point of view of oil investments. Time has shown that countries considered safe have turned out to provide major headaches, while those that were deemed clearly dangerous have settled down to a peaceful collaboration with the oil industry.

CONCLUSION

The political aspects of industrialization and resources development should present a major challenge to the political and industrial leaders of both the Middle East and the West. The responsibility of the Western leaders is great, because it is they who have the means to supply the tools to the underdeveloped areas and to give the latter the benefit of their superior know-how. A realization that what is called for is a delicate psychological operation in which no short-cut solutions can be adopted should help a good deal in the achievement of success. For better or for worse, political intangibles still claim primacy over purely economic or technical questions, and many a well-intentioned plan has foundered because of disregard for this truth.

As for the leaders of the Middle East, they have to be alert both to the domestic situation in their respective countries and to the foreign aspects of development programs. Their responsibility in the foreign sector is considerable and their position difficult. They have, on the one hand, to respond to the clamors of their rather impatient and easily excitable peoples, and, on the other, to preserve a sober outlook on the advantages of international collaboration which the West is offering them. If they abandon themselves to the pressures from below, they may achieve a temporary political advantage, but they also may see the dreams of reconstruction and development shattered or dangerously delayed. It is up to them to choose a steady course between reason and emotion. Their political survival will ultimately depend on their ability to strike this golden medium in their foreign and domestic policies.

Banquet Session, Friday evening, March 4th
Presiding: HON. HAROLD B. MINOR, formerly
United States Ambassador to Lebanon

THE UNITED STATES AND THE AWAKEN- ING OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

HON. GEORGE V. ALLEN

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs

THIS MEETING of a distinguished group, predominantly Americans, to discuss the Middle East causes one immediately to think of why the United States, which is some thousands of miles away from the Middle East, should be having seminars and discussion groups and institutions, such as this Middle East Institute, devoted to the study of Middle Eastern affairs. This is something which has developed in the United States, as you all know, fairly recently. But it is a study, I am very happy to say, that is growing rapidly and I think we are seeing now only the beginnings of a great flourishing of American interest in studies of this tremendously important part of the world.

I think we get a dramatic realization of the part of the world that we are studying today if we picture for a moment the map of Europe and Asia. I had to perform this exercise quite often during my last tour in New Delhi, India, following the decision of the American Government to reply favorably to the request of the Government of Pakistan for military assistance. When the United States decided to accord that request, as all of you know, there was tremendous excitement in India. I suspect that there were also certain questions in Afghanistan—the distinguished Ambassador of which is on my left. I don't know if this particular question was asked in Afghanistan—but I was asked very often in India why it is that we think Pakistan might be in need of military assistance? Who is threatening Pakistan? Who is going to attack? Do you mean to say that India is going to attack, or that Afghanistan is going to attack Pakistan? There must be that implication because we don't see that anything else is threatening Pakistan.

I think the answer is very simple and very clear. The position of the American Government is not that Pakistan is going to be attacked tomorrow, or next week, or next month, or even next year. I hope it's never attacked.

But bear in mind this: the policy of the government of Russia has been for 250 years to expand toward the south, toward warm waters. This isn't a recent thing. It dates from Peter the Great. Added to that fact is a settled policy of the present government of Soviet Russia to have the Soviet borders surrounded on all sides — if it can — by what Soviet Russia calls friendly states. Ever since 1917, when the present regime came into power, there has been a steady, constant desire on the part of Russia to satellize its neighbors. We all know that during the last war Soviet Russia succeeded in establishing, implanting, satellite governments in all of Eastern Europe — Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria — so that the part of Russia facing on Europe was given what the Russians referred to as a “protective layer,” a layer of fat, if you wish.

Now, since the fall of China to a Communist regime, all of the remaining border of Russia on the south and east has a protective layer of fat. So it results that today the only place between Europe and Asia where a Russian citizen can go to his land frontier, look over and see a free land is in that stretch of territory between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, where Russia borders on Turkey and Azerbaijan, Iran; and east of the Caspian Sea, where it has the border with Iran and Afghanistan. Pakistan lies right underneath Afghanistan. It's on that particular stretch of the world that anybody who has got his feet on the ground and is sensibly watching for where aggression might take place, would certainly have to keep his attention.

But it is not only a matter of speculation that Russia might be interested in that area — and I should hasten to interject that the fact that the Persian Gulf now has more than half of the proved oil resources of the world doesn't make those particular warm waters any less attractive to the Soviet Union. We have a remarkable document that was captured in Berlin in 1945. A formal document was presented to Nazi Germany by Soviet Russia at the time, when Soviet Russia was still neutral. It was signed by Molotov, and contained in so many words, in black and white, the statement that the territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union lie south of Soviet territory in the direction of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. So if anybody has his wits about him, he cannot say that this area, Mr. Ambassador, is entirely free from any indication of interest on the part of the Soviet Union.

What is to be done about it? The United States, after a long history of being content with concerning itself primarily with the affairs of the Western Hemisphere, learned after two world wars that wars, at the present time, seem to have a habit of becoming global. No nation can expect in the case of global war to remain outside the conflict. If nations wish to join together

voluntarily in a collective security program, we think that is a good way in which would-be aggressors can be warned that their aggression will be met with combined force. Many people have felt that if, for example, a NATO had existed in 1914, Germany never would have invaded Belgium, and that if such an organization had existed in 1939, World War II might not have been started. You know that the British Ambassador in Berlin at that time told Hitler: "We British have stood by (the French were saying the same thing) and have seen you reoccupy the Rhineland, take over Austria, take the Sudetenland and finally all of Czechoslovakia. And I must tell you, sir, on the most solemn instructions of my government, we will not submit to an attack on Poland." While the British Ambassador was saying this in one ear, Von Ribbentrop was saying in the other ear to Hitler that he need not have any fear, that Britain had no treaty obligation with regard to Poland. He had been in London, he knew that the people were all pacifists there and wouldn't fight. Hitler made a miscalculation. There was no solemn organization to give the assurance that an attack would mean a world war.

While collective security is perhaps the single outstanding element in the foreign policy of the United States today, I would like to make one point clear, particularly with regard to the Middle East. So far as the United States is concerned, membership in collective security organizations must be entirely voluntary on the part of any nation that joins. And we would not wish to urge, prompt, or pressure anybody into joining such an organization. Twelve of the nations of Europe decided voluntarily to join in NATO. Sweden and Switzerland decided they didn't want to join. That didn't make the slightest difference so far as friendly relations between the United States and Switzerland, or the United States and Sweden were concerned.

It is up to each nation to decide what it considers its own enlightened self interests to be. I personally do not hesitate to say that I would advise a country not to join in a collective security organization if it is not convinced that that is the best thing for that country to do in its own national interest.

I may say, also, while we are talking about this particular subject, that up to now the United States has never given any military assistance to any country which has used it in an aggressive manner. I do not believe the United States ever will. There can always be a first time—I am perfectly aware of that—but the United States will not take any reasonable chance that its military assistance will go to a nation which it believes may use that equipment in a hostile, aggressive manner against another nation in the neighborhood. That statement applies to the Arab states and Israel. Aggression is not the purpose of American military assistance, and never will be.

Now, when we speak of collective security, a great deal is said — and perhaps too much is said — about the military side. The military side has to be taken care of because, unfortunately, the enemy has very strong military potential. The best resolutions and goodwill and high economic aims or the religious devotion of any area, which are all very fine things, cannot stand against tanks and guns and the implements of war. I wish that were not so. I wish we didn't even have to have policemen. I wish people were so good they did not have to be forced to obey the law. But in a world as we find it today, we haven't arrived at that happy state. But at the same time, we realize that there are other things, and perhaps even more important things, that need to be done to develop the security of an area — the Middle East in particular. Those other things are not military; they are political, economic, social, psychological, and a half a dozen other things that the Middle East Institute, in its Conference, I am sure, has been considering.

Let's consider for a minute the political aspect. In the Middle East, there are unfortunately a good many quarrels between neighboring countries that have very little to do with the great threat of possible aggression from Soviet Russia. I refer to internal disputes inside the area. To take a quick run of some of the problems that exist today in our area, we can start with the difficulties between Morocco and Tunisia, on the African continent, and France. In the Mediterranean, the problem of Cyprus has been causing some difficulties recently. (When I was in Greece two months ago, all the window lights in the American Information Office in Salonica had just been broken by a mob. Then followed an attack on our Information Office and Embassy in Athens. It was a little difficult for me to understand why *American* window lights happen to be broken over the question of Cyprus.) There is, unfortunately, a dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan. There are, of course, disputes between the Arab states and Israel. Fortunately, two major disputes of this area have been settled during the last 12 months: the Suez Base question and the Iranian oil question. Let us hope that when this Conference meets here again next year, maybe two or three others of these problems will have been solved.

The ability of the United States to contribute to the solution of the political problems of the area is limited. I think oftentimes we get involved too deeply in trying. Maybe we try too hard, with the best goodwill in the world, to solve some of the problems between neighboring countries in the Middle East. The United States would like nothing better than to see the Kashmir question settled between India and Pakistan, or the water disputes, or the Arab-Israeli question, or the Cyprus question, or the North African

question. But to expect that we would be primarily responsible for those solutions is, I think, a mistake. The countries themselves are the ones primarily involved. They are the ones which have to live with it.

Now, I do not mean to give you the impression that I would favor the United States turning its back on any area in the world. I consider myself a thoroughgoing internationalist. But I have the feeling, particularly since taking over my present job, that some of the countries of the area turn a little bit too much to the outside to settle their own problems — particularly to the United States — and break our window lights if they don't get settled.

The economic problems of the area are also great, and are ones in which perhaps we can do more than in the political questions. And maybe economic solutions would be a way toward ameliorating some of the political problems. I have in mind, as an example, the Jordan River problem. Mr. Eric Johnston, who has been out to the Middle East three times and just came back a few days ago, gave us a very enlightening discussion of his latest efforts to bring about a solution of the division of the waters of the Jordan River. He was almost lyrical in his descriptions of the benefits which would come to the area of the Jordan Valley. He has technical data which show that the production in Jordan alone would be increased in the immediate future from about \$4 million to \$40 million dollars a year, just along the bank of the Jordan River that would be reached by the irrigation on the Jordan side.

Think of the development that can be accomplished by the use of human ingenuity in the economic sphere! The United States is carrying out a technical assistance program in most but not all of the countries of the area. When I was in Syria recently, the Prime Minister of Syria, Faris Bey al-Khuri, a grand old gentleman whom I first met at the San Francisco United Nations Conference, said to me in all friendliness but with a little aspersion in his voice: "Why don't you Americans go away? We haven't asked for you to come here. We don't need you. We are getting along all right; just go away." I said, "Mr. Prime Minister, nobody could respect your views on that subject more than I do." As a matter of fact, it was rather a relief to me because the other nine countries that I had visited on my way from New Delhi had quite the opposite attitude. They said, "Why don't you Americans give us ten times as much as you are giving now? You are giving the next fellow more than you are us." So when the grand old man of Syria said he didn't need any of our money or our technical assistance, I couldn't help admiring him for his self-respecting point of view.

At the same time, the United States is ready and stands willing, if a nation

wants our technical assistance, to provide it, and I think we should. I think it is one of the finest programs we have. There may be particular reasons why one country or another says it doesn't need our help or is not ready for it. I repeat that I have only respect for a nation that feels that way.

However, I have come to the conclusion that our technical cooperation program is highly useful at the present moment because something is happening in the Middle East today, and throughout South Asia, and perhaps in the Far East also, that has not happened in the 5,000 years of the recorded history of those areas. That "something new" is the awakening of the village. The agricultural villages of the Middle East and South Asia have come awake during the last 10, 15, maybe 20 years. They are like a great giant struggling at the leash. It can be a frightening thing, but it is here and it has got to be faced. Some people who get nostalgic about old customs say that this awakening is a terrible nuisance and even a danger, because the villages all want bigger and better things right away, and if they don't get them under the present government, they might go to Communism. These people wish the villages would go back to sleep. Some would even feed them opium or morphine, to put them back to sleep rather than be bothered with this nuisance — but we can't do it.

The problem is acute in India, but I have seen the same thing throughout the Middle East. I have been to village after village; as soon as the villagers see visitors coming they flock around and immediately want to know, "Why can't we have a new well?" and "Why can't we have a clinic?" and "Why can't we have a school? The next village has got one. We are in the same condition that we were before." I've said to these villagers many times, "Why are you so excited about having a new well? I know your well has got a lot of mud around it, and the drains are running into it, and cats and dogs fall in it and ruin the water, but your father lived this way and your grandfather lived this way. Why are you so much better than your father and grandfather that you have got to have a new well?"

Up until a few years ago, a man born in a rural village thought it was useless for him to try to improve it; it had been that way for 5,000 years. Not only was it useless but it was futile. If he tried to change his caste or the system or clean up the village, he was going against tradition. His only hope was that maybe in the future life he would be reincarnated in a better status, but in this life he had to stay as he was. He says today, "The reason I want a better well is because I want progress." Progress is a magic word.

I was asked recently by a committee of Congress investigating the technical assistance program, "Why has that suddenly come about; why is there a

new breath of wind sweeping through the world?" Perhaps there are many answers. One of them, particularly in the underdeveloped countries, is that for the first time the people of those areas feel that they are independent, that they have emerged from colonial rule, some from the Ottoman Empire, others from the British Empire or the French Empire. Therefore, the nation is theirs; they also feel they are living in their own villages, their own communities. Therefore, they can change things; they can do something about them.

Another part of the answer, I believe, is found in the development of mass communications—in the fact that people know in a village how people live on the other side of the world. Through motion pictures, radio, and the development of printing, people have learned how the other man lives. People in villages who up until 20 years ago never expected to see anybody who lived more than five or ten miles away know what is going on all over the world today.

What we do in answer to this problem will determine, in my opinion, the future of the world. If we fail to meet the challenge of the awakened village, if we refuse to do what we can to help to improve its status, then we will lose the respect, the support, and the friendship of the Middle East and all other underdeveloped areas.

Banquet Session, Friday evening, March 4th
Presiding: HON. HAROLD B. MINOR, formerly
United States Ambassador to Lebanon

EVOLUTION OF CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY REGARDING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS IN AFGHANISTAN

HIS EXCELLENCY MOHAMMAD KABIR LUDIN
Ambassador of Afghanistan

IT IS AN HONOR and a pleasure for me to speak before this distinguished audience. The theme of my talk is "The Evolution of Civic or Social Responsibility in Afghanistan."

The word "evolution" implies that the sense of civic responsibility among the Afghan people has undergone a progressive change from a certain point of reference in history up to the present time. The very concept of society and of responsibility has indeed undergone changes through the lapse of the centuries.

The speaker may project the modern meaning of these words in the present world context on the purposes and functions of a social order in the past. Therefore, at the outset, a brief definition of the purpose and functions of a social order will be given which may have been acceptable to the social philosophers of the past in our part of the world.

The advent of Islam in Afghanistan has been taken as the origin of historical reference, and I have chosen a few significant examples from the field of social and economic activity and traced their loci of progress to illustrate the process of evolution of civic responsibility among the Afghan people. Finally, the Democratic process amongst the Afghan people will be briefly outlined. The point of culmination of this process is the organization of the representative and responsible form of government which initiates and pursues action on behalf of the society as a whole. A society is constituted to provide opportunities and facilities for a people and encourage individuals and groups to exercise cooperative efforts with the aim of achieving a reasonably happy, prosperous, enlightened, harmonious, and meaningful life for all of its members. The social order must satisfy the physical, spiritual, intellectual, and esthetic needs and yearnings of the

human body and soul. The social institutions should satisfy these wants and cravings, as well as give direction to them.

The measure of satisfaction of the material, spiritual, and intellectual needs and desires of man, which are realized through the institutions of a society, provides the measure of magnitude of the emotional centripetal forces which draw its members to the center of social interests.

Social consciousness and humanitarian values have deep roots in the fertile soil of religious beliefs. Moral and ethical values, as determinants of the social behavior of man, are offsprings of his profound beliefs. On another plane, the knowledge that well-being and happiness for all may reasonably lead to the well-being and happiness for each, furnishes a strong incentive for the development of civic responsibility in all countries and at all times.

In Afghanistan the principles established by the teachings of Islam regulate and influence every phase of individual and social activity. The sense of civic responsibility is influenced by the precepts of charity and justice prescribed by Islam.

The most important human endeavor in Islam is the pursuit of knowledge and the search for truth. This is as it should be, for even moral precepts and civic responsibility can only be imparted through education in its broadest sense. Education is not confined to religious teachings. According to the traditions of the Prophet, study of physical sciences, medicine, mathematics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry has a high and honored place side by side with religious teachings. Since an early period in the Islamic era, Afghan society, similar to the other Middle Eastern and Muslim societies, has assumed the civic responsibility of providing for the education of men who devote their lives to the search for knowledge. This has been achieved through the establishment of educational foundations generously endowed by voluntary individual and group contributions. Donations have been in cash and in kind, as well as real estate, such as agricultural lands, orchards, vineyards, shops, and mills. Revenue from these sources has been used for the maintenance of mosques and schools and the payment of salaries and expenses of teachers. Students also have received a modest allowance for the purchase of books, food, clothing, and incidentals from charitable foundations.

There are quite a number of educational institutions of this type in Afghanistan today, and I am sure there are many similar to them in all Middle Eastern countries. These educational institutions have catered to the spiritual and material needs of the Afghan people for many generations and provided leadership in those fields.

The invasion of Afghanistan and other countries of the Middle East by the Mongol Horde of Ghengis Khan completely disrupted the social order in the area. It destroyed the cities and reduced the schools and libraries to heaps of ashes and dust as well as massacred the men of learning. This was a blow from which recovery proved to be slow and exceedingly difficult.

In the meantime, momentous changes were taking place in the Western world, and important progress was being made in the fields of physical science, art, and craft, and in social and political concepts. The Middle East, in general, and Afghanistan in particular, remained outside the main current of this progress. The renaissance, the voyages of geographical discoveries, the industrial revolution in Europe, and the attendant social and political evolutions did not affect the philosophy and mode of life in Afghanistan.

Owing to the lack of direct physical contact with the West, the country remained isolated from the important historical movements prevailing there. Iran and the great Ottoman Empire to the west were the practical limits of the geographical horizons of Afghanistan in that direction. Toward the southeast, the French, British, and Portuguese had established colonies on the seacoasts of India, but their influence was rather limited at that time, practically nonexistent in social and intellectual spheres. In the middle of the 18th century the Mogul Emperor, though weak, still ruled in Delhi, and the Afghan monarchy, by comparison, was strong, energetic, and even prosperous, and at the same time smug and complacent. This was the period of relative external ease for Afghanistan that preceded the storms and struggles of the 19th and the 20th centuries.

The dawn of the 19th century disturbed the complacency of the country and forced upon Afghanistan a period of awakening and reckoning with the realities of the times. My country's experience does not seem to be unique in this respect. Other countries of the Middle East and Asia shared the same experience with various degrees of intensity.

Afghanistan was caught between two energetic, vital, and expansive imperialistic systems of Russia in the north and Great Britain in the south. Responsible and well-informed people became painfully aware of the country's backwardness in the fields of science, education, statecraft, and the art of organization and conduct of defense in the face of superior modern techniques and weapons. They became conscious of the severe punishments that the country's shortcomings in the various phases of human endeavor, individual as well as national, would impose upon it. The realization of these conditions moved responsible men to the pursuit of corrective actions. It was realized that the wide gulf existing in all fields between Afghanistan and

the West with which it had now come into contact could be bridged only through strenuous efforts in the field of education. This same realization led others to the conclusion that East and West were two separate and different societies "and never the twain would meet." The inadequacies and backwardnesses of the social and political order in that general area were similarly realized in other countries, and responsible and enlightened people were assiduously searching for ways and means of effecting social and political reforms.

In the 19th century, as in the past, the lingua franca of the Middle East intellectuals and men of learning was the Arabic language. The common religion and culture and the community of historical experience led some social thinkers to believe that the whole area could be considered as a unit in so far as the inauguration of reforms in the social, economic, and political fields is concerned, and that the success of reforms in one or more countries may very well lead to their acceptance and progress in other countries of the area. In this connection a justifiable pride may be felt by the Afghan people, as Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was the first social thinker and reformer who attempted to awaken a sense of urgency regarding the need for reforms in the educational, cultural, social, and economical life of the area as a whole. He may be considered the incarnation of the restless spirit of social progress and reform of the 19th century in the Middle East. He was born in eastern Afghanistan in 1838 and died on March 9, 1897, in Astana (Istanbul). His life dramatized that century of struggle and change in the East. His travels included India, the countries of the Middle East, Russia, France, Great Britain, and the United States of America. He visited this country to study its social and political institutions and their adaptability to the needs of the area.

First Sayyid tried persuasion on the Afghan ruler; but the social and political structure of the country was strongly feudalistic and did not readily lend itself to reforms which were much in advance of the times. He soon left his country for a pilgrimage to Mecca. He considered the sacred city the most suitable focus for his social and political teachings. However, he soon began to travel far and wide, and his life became that of a knight errant — a social and political reformer. He exhorted monarchs and rulers of the Middle East to lead their peoples along the path of unity, progress, and social justice. Wherever Sayyid went in the Islamic world, he was surrounded by an earnest, intelligent, public-spirited, and dedicated group of disciples with a sense of responsibility and mission. He was a writer, a teacher, a social and political philosopher, and a journalist.

The path of the reformer is seldom strewn with rose petals, and Sayyid had his share of thorns. However, the seeds of reform, which he had sown in the soil of the Middle East, eventually bore fruit. The land which gave birth to Sayyid was also to profit from the movements which he had launched for the benefit of the area.

Sayyid was buried in Astana (Istanbul); however, in 1945 his compatriots were moved to bring his earthly remains to Kabul, where he was buried on the campus of the university — a fitting surrounding for the final resting place of the man who spent his life for the education, social, and political renaissance of that area and enhancement of public responsibility and leadership.

As I said, the well informed people of the 19th century were aware of the social, economic, and political backwardness of their country, and were fully alive to the enormousness of the task that lay before them. They made strenuous efforts to remedy the defects through introducing an improved system of education and adopting measures that would improve and increase the industrial productive capacity of the country. This is the period of great change in Japan. It is being argued that while the insular position of Japan and its accessibility to the world, and especially to American influence, provided it with an opportunity for reform and progress, the continental position of Afghanistan subjected it to a tight squeeze between two powerful imperial neighbors, Great Britain and Russia, and deprived it of a similar opportunity.

The era of reform which was barely started during the reign of King Sher Ali in 1870 was soon cut short by the struggle for the preservation of freedom in which Afghanistan became engaged for the second time in the same generation. Even though the invader was driven out and the monarchy restored, a period of civil strife and turmoil followed which lasted until the dawn of the 20th century.

Only the first decade of the 20th century saw the establishment of normality in the country and of schools along modern lines. The newspaper came into current use, and a new group of intelligentsia came into being, which thought in terms of national independence, constitutional monarchy, expansion of modern educational systems, and the adoption of measures that would help create new industries and facilitate foreign trade and travel. In short, this group wanted Afghanistan to come out of its forced isolation and become a part of the free and independent world order, as well as a beneficiary of the scientific, social, and economic progress of the age. Following World War I, the doctrine of self-determination of nations, which was

expounded by the great Wilson, fired the imagination of peoples everywhere. People of Afghanistan looked forward to an era of freedom and independence characterized by a democratic, progressive rule. At the conclusion of the third Anglo-Afghan war in 1919, Afghanistan received her complete independence in foreign affairs.

A new regime attempted to establish a universal educational system. It improved the system of taxation; diplomatic missions were established in some of the important European and Near Eastern capitals.

For important segments of the society, however, the pace of the reform program proved to be too fast. The sensitivity of some people regarding a change in their traditional way of life was aroused. This, coupled with maladministration, gave rise to a strong reaction and antagonism on the part of those people to the new program. The King, who was his own Prime Minister as well, and consequently, in the eyes of the people, responsible for the new measures, was compelled to abdicate. A period of social strife followed.

Mohammad Nadir Shah, a scion of the Royal House and the hero of the war of 1919, who enjoyed immense prestige and popularity amongst the Afghan people, was duly elected king. He succeeded in establishing normal conditions. In his first year of reign, his Majesty Nadir Shah called the *Loi Jirgah*, the Great Assembly of the People. The Great Assembly confirmed him and his dynasty and drew up a constitution for the nation. This constitution provides that the Government be constituted by the consent of the governed. It provides for rule by law. It provides for a parliament, a responsible cabinet, and a judiciary system. It guarantees to the citizens the right of freedom and the owning of property; and it also provides for universal primary education. The government has been striving for the expansion of primary and secondary education. It has also established a state university where students pursue their studies in the various fields of knowledge with all of their expenses paid by the state. The first faculty or school which was established at the University of Kabul was the school of medicine, founded to provide physicians to minister to the health of the people. A modern hospital and clinic has been built and staffed as a part of the medical school. Later, colleges of arts and sciences and other faculties were added to the university. Meritorious students, both high school graduates and university students, are sent abroad as state scholars to study in different fields, and upon their return they help to raise the level of health, economy, administration, education, and scientific knowledge in their country. Some students are sent by private enterprises for the same purpose, while other

students study abroad at their own expense. In the latter case, the government provides the necessary foreign exchange at a reduced rate.

The thinking people in the field of trade and finance realized that the old method of individual trade was no longer workable in the present-day world. They understood that only through cooperation and the creation of joint venture enterprises and well-regulated concerns could the limited capital at their disposal work efficiently for their benefit and for the benefit of society as a whole. With the assistance of the government and parliament, banks and commercial enterprises were established and other facilities were provided to increase the flow of international trade. Also some light consumer industries were established through private enterprise to improve the standard of living of the people.

The people of Afghanistan, traditionally, considered building of roads, bridges, houses, and facilities for travel and trade as worthy social causes. The importance of adequate transportation as a prerequisite for good trade was not difficult to understand. In recent years the service of road building and maintenance has been better organized. During the reign of his Majesty Nadir Shah a difficult piece of road through the massive Hindu-Kush mountains was constructed. This road joins the north of the country with the south.

In the field of irrigation, which is synonymous with agriculture in arid Afghanistan, civic responsibility and cooperative effort of the people in the excavation and maintenance of irrigation ditches and canals date back to time immemorial. Also the excavation and maintenance of the underground water collecting galleries are the result of the collective effort of those who share in the common benefit.

Irrigation in Afghanistan has been so elaborate that there is little water of the run of the river left unused which could have been profitably used by the employment of the techniques and methods known to the local communities. The civic minded people in the different parts of the country are fast becoming keenly aware of the need for engineering and technological knowledge and construction methods which make the expansion of the irrigation systems possible. The government and parliament are being urged by interested groups to bring new lands under irrigation and cultivation.

The government has a large irrigation development scheme in progress in the country. An extensive irrigation and land development program has been undertaken in the southwestern part of the country, in the valleys of the Hilmand and the Arghandab Rivers. This is partially financed through the line of credit established by the Export-Import Bank of Washington,

D. C. Other power and industrial development projects are in the northeast, in the Kabul River Valley. The latter projects are financed by Afghan private and public corporations.

In the field of animal husbandry, the need for improvement has been felt and cooperative efforts are being made on a local level, as well as on a provincial and national level.

Afghans love freedom; they are a democratic people. The Afghan clans and tribes have a practical and workable system of democracy. When occasion requires, the council of people meet and discuss the important issue of the day. The routine issues are settled by the council of elders, but in discussions and decisions involving vital issues, such as a national emergency, where demands for supreme sacrifice may be made on the youth, young men also participate in the tribal councils. The Great Assembly or *Loi Jirgah*, which specially convenes to examine and settle vital national questions, is a national version of the local or tribal *Jirgah*, and corresponds to a national referendum. Parliament is the regular legislative body elected for a period of three years and functions according to normal parliamentary procedure. This body is in recess part of the year. The members are in close touch with their constituencies. Naturally they are responsive to the needs and desires of the civic groups at home. Social consciousness and the need for participation in national affairs have given rise to the establishment of parliamentary machinery that can translate the hopes and aspirations of the people and the requirements of their daily life into concrete action. Local and national needs are vividly brought to the attention of many who read the newspapers and many more who listen to the radio. It is a fact that leaders in government and society are impelled to take the views, interests, and sentiments of the people into account in the daily governmental decisions and actions.

Satisfactory accomplishment of this objective spells the salvation of society and the happiness of its members.

Third Session, Saturday morning, March 5th
Presiding: ROBERT F. OGDEN, Near East Section,
Library of Congress

SOCIAL DISCONTENT AMONG THE PEASANT AND WORKING CLASSES: A CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

STEPHEN P. DORSEY

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FIXED AT THE crossroads of three continents, the society of the Near East has been shaped and influenced by myriad currents over the millennia. Its people vary in many respects from one country to another because of differences in their indigenous circumstances and in the foreign influences to which they have been exposed. Yet they share a common experience of centuries of political instability and economic deficiency. Public response to these basic problems in Israel and Turkey will be considered later this morning. This paper will confine itself to a consideration of the challenge to public responsibility posed by social discontent among the peasants and working classes of the rest of the closely related and predominantly Muslim area extending from the western border of Egypt to the eastern border of Iran.

The period between the two great World Wars, that of partition and the mandates, was one in which the Near Eastern mind, as it found expression in the activity of popular leaders, was largely concerned with reunification and independence from Western imperialism, both economic and political. In the decade since World War II and the establishment of independent political units in place of the mandates, the outstanding development may be said to be the swing of the pendulum toward internal social and economic problems within the new countries. It is true that Near Eastern leaders have been occupied in Egypt with the control of the Suez Canal; in Iran with the major problems of Soviet-inspired internal strife; and with the struggle with Israel which has profoundly affected every Arab. Armed strife and political unrest, however, are nothing new in the Near East. What is new is the beginning of a real response by its leaders to the depressed lot of the masses, peasant as well as industrial worker, and the growing interest in most of the

countries in social legislation and economic development as approaches to the growing discontent arising from that condition.

THE PROBLEM AND ITS CAUSES

As Sa'id B. Himadeh wrote in the *Middle East Journal* in 1951, "The major social problem in the Arab countries of the Middle East is poverty, with its normal concomitants of malnutrition, poor housing, bad sanitation, and disease. It is also the chief social problem in the more developed countries, but there are differences in degree, extent, and permanence. Poverty in the Arab countries is so extreme that it often endangers physical subsistence; it embraces a very large proportion of the population; and for the most part it is chronic, not temporary or cyclical as it is in the more advanced countries." It is extremely difficult to set forth all the basic causes of poverty and unrest in the Arab East and in Iran, properly weighted in depth, proportion, and importance. A brief consideration of some of the principal elements, however, is essential, for without an appreciation of the causes there can be little understanding of the effects or of current measures to root them out.

In the first place, natural resources, with the exception of petroleum, are relatively meager. Water, which may be used as a source of power as well as for irrigation needs, is limited in comparison to the vast stretches of arid land which must remain unproductive without this life-spring. Moreover, the waste of available water supplies, erosion, and salting of cultivable lands contribute to the increasing pressure of population. The effect is intensified by the illiteracy and immobility of labor; closely related is an outmoded system of land tenure which is as wasteful of manpower as it is of the soil. State domains in some countries are vast, yet they are subject to various confusing private and tribal claims. Excessive fragmentation and wide separation of small private holdings — with resulting difficulty of cultivation — derive from collective ownership and the waqf systems. Forms of share tenancy growing out of extreme inequality of land ownership and a semi-feudal tradition bring an inadequate share of income to the tenant. Moreover, the insecurity of his tenure and the fact that his rent is a fixed share of the product of his labor discourages the Near Eastern share-cropper from undertaking long-term improvements or even from fertilizing the land. Backward methods of cultivation, the absence generally of credit, except at exorbitant rates, and a lack of farm-market transport facilities added to marketing systems which tend to benefit the middleman at the expense of the cultivator, contribute to the difficulties of the peasant.

Another heritage from the past is a rigidly stratified class structure separating the small minority of landlords from the peasant masses, and the want of channels of communication between the two groups in regard to social and economic questions which are vital to the development of the new nations of the Near East and to their peoples. Moreover, during the past few decades the onset of Western industrialization has created a new laboring class—a rudimentary urban proletariat—drawn not only from the countryside surrounding the factories, but from the cities where laborers were driven by rural unemployment arising from increasing population pressure. Thus a second social class, or more properly a subdivision of the great body of workers, has come into being which tends to be more subject to discontent with its own state than are the fellahin whose tensions are relieved by traditional rural patterns and relationships. The relationship between these workers and their superiors is characterized by the same absence of certain paternalistic benefits, by an inadequate wage scale. Moreover, systems of public administration and services have tended to be inadequate to deal with the felt needs of the people and the growing possibilities for development.

These chronic causes of poverty and unrest among both peasants and workers in the Arab states have been aggravated by further pressures resulting from the mass migration of the Palestine refugees, who, in a sense, are an exemplification of the poverty, underdevelopment, and discontent which permeate the area. Communism is another cause of discontent which has been particularly significant since World War II, when relations between the Near East and the West began to shift so greatly. Communist techniques to date, however, seem to rely less on any mass movement than on the old pattern of a well trained elite corps. Communist influence does not seem to be particularly strong among the fellahin, nor even among the laboring classes, though it can be seen more clearly in the demands advanced in some of the not infrequent industrial and general strikes in the area than in such agricultural disturbances as have occurred. Whatever its extent among the farmers and laborers, Communist influence is still small in comparison to that among the intelligentsia.

MANIFESTATIONS OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT

Because of the factors discussed above, the vast majority of Arabs and Iranians live in a relatively deprived and frustrated state. Despite recent progress, illiteracy runs at least 70 or 80 percent in all of the countries under

consideration except Lebanon. Annual family (not per capita) incomes average \$200 to \$300. Infant mortality is exceedingly high. Chronic diseases like trachoma, bilharzia, hookworm, typhoid, and dysentery sap vitality. Population pressures in Egypt, Lebanon, and Jordan are among the heaviest in the world at a time when agricultural production per capita, although growing, remains very low. In the whole of the Arab world the land under cultivation is about the same as in the state of Iowa. The Near Eastern countries have from one-third to one acre of cultivated land per capita. A very small percentage of the population owns a very large percentage of the land; in one case 0.2 percent own more than half. Close to three-quarters of the farm population own no land or own plots that are too small to pay for themselves. Housing and sanitary conditions are for the most part deplorable.

Let us examine the effect that this traditional lot has exercised in recent years on the farmers and workers, on the one hand, and on the government leaders on the other. The peasants are clearly more restless than they were. It has been said that, due in part to the impact of Communist propaganda, the peasants in many countries are being converted from a state of passive misery to one of alert and active misery. In thinking of this remark one might consider the agricultural riots in the Talha, Sharkiya, and Mansura districts of Egypt during 1951; of those in the Homs and Hama regions of Syria in the same year; of those in the Erbil and Asmara districts of Iraq in 1953; and of others elsewhere in the Near East.

The Talha incident offers one interesting example. The exact facts concerning the riot on June 23, 1951, on a 30,000-acre estate in the Middle Nile Delta region are still obscure and may never be fully known. Apparently, however, a verbal dispute, prompted by an attempt of the general manager of the estate to collect more than the normal amount of wheat from a tenant farmer, deteriorated into a physical brawl. In a comparatively short time several thousand fellahin gathered and marched on the manor house to demand a hearing from the estate owner. The owner is reported to have fired a gun over the heads of the fellahin in an attempt to disperse them, and to have accidentally killed the captain of his guards when the latter stepped forward to ask him not to shoot at the crowd. In the ensuing riot, the manor house was set on fire, 18 peasants were wounded in a pitched battle with the police, and the owner, who hid in the trunk of an automobile which was later dumped into a canal by the crowd, was only saved at the last minute by additional police.

In my opinion, it is inaccurate to describe this incident of almost four

years ago either as "isolated" or as the beginning of a widespread movement. It arose from numerous accumulated causes, some of them peculiar to the estate involved. There is no direct evidence, incidentally, of outside stimulation of the specific situation or of Communist influence. It is significant, however, that the fellahin operated as a group rather than in their normal individualistic roles. They were being actively rather than passively miserable about their age-old unchanged lot. In an editorial just a week later, the *New York Times* described the incident as "symptomatic of basic major ills." It described the Near Eastern pattern of land tenure as "the fundamental problem in this vast area, whose people are growing restive and demanding a greater share of the wealth they produce," and it called upon the governments concerned to implement the needed reform measures voluntarily before turmoil broke loose. This incident, of course, took place before the Revolution of July 1952 and is in marked contrast to the relative quiet in Egypt since that date.

A broad comparison might be made in the labor field to the extent that evidences of restlessness are greater in recent years than in earlier decades. Two striking differences, however, are the much greater degree of organization of the industrial workers as compared with farm workers and the greater influence of Communism among the former as opposed to the latter. Strikes greatly outnumber peasant riots and their announced aims are much more varied. The general strike in Bahrein last year started with dissatisfaction of Shi'i laborers with working conditions and later was supported by certain young Sunni political elements seeking judicial and legislative reforms. It was well organized and could be started and stopped with almost automatic precision. The Aramco strike of a year ago originally involved protest against the Government's anti-strike attitude as well as objection to housing and wages, and ethnic minority problems. The extent of Communist influence in either case is difficult to gauge. The general strike in Basra last spring, however, was an example of Communists' capitalizing on the general discontent that existed among the workers.

Several interesting manifestations of labor objectives were revealed at a major disturbance at a modern textile mill at Kufar-el-Dawar near Alexandria on August 12-13, 1952. This uprising, in which 10 were killed, was a general one, apparently not related to any specific incident. The complete destruction of the three-room police guardhouse at the gate was a direct protest against the searching of all workers by plant guards at the end of each day. In the personnel office, steel filing cabinets containing the records

of 10,000 workers were smashed and burned in the widespread, though perhaps quite exaggerated, belief that they contained material which would be used against individual workers. Twenty-two executive automobiles were burned as a symbol of resentment against the wealthy. The Company's medical clinic was destroyed in part because workers believed that it was used, not to promote their health, but rather as a means of dismissing them as medically unfit when other reasons for dismissal failed. Although the destruction of laboratory equipment for testing tensile strengths cannot be explained with accuracy, it is known that some workers viewed the laboratory as an instrument for testing the quality of their individual performances and consequently resented its existence. After the riot the Company granted pay increases, more holidays, and pay bonus for the end of the year.

PUBLIC RESPONSE TO A CHALLENGE

There is little doubt that a broad and tangible effort has been made to meet the challenge which social discontent presents; that is, to root out the causes through the passage and implementation of reform legislation. Some of the responsibility has of course been assumed by private individuals. On the agricultural side, I think particularly of Husayn Ibish, who in the past four years has turned the title of lands in his villages south of Damascus over to the farmers who work on that land. In Lebanon, a group of financiers have raised a significant amount of capital for a "100-village plan" under which they hope to stimulate farm improvement and higher rural living standards by means of private loans. As to private efforts in the labor field it is perfectly possible to find private plans in the Near East with modern attitudes as well as modern machinery. Factory clinics, cafeterias, playgrounds, vacations with pay and other mutual benefits to labor and industry that took long years to develop in our own country are making their appearance under private initiative in the Near East, even if the pace is not as rapid as could be desired.

So far as the government response to the challenge is concerned, perhaps the clearest indicators of intent are the national budgets. Generally speaking, expenditures for items relating to social and economic development have increased not only on an absolute basis for the past several years, but also, and perhaps more significantly, on a basis of percentage of total expenditures. Anywhere from 20 to 40 percent of Arab and Iranian budget expenditures appear under the ministries of agriculture, social affairs, education, public health, national economy, labor, communications, public works, and the like.

In most of the budgets the percentage for this type of expenditure is higher than that for defense purposes. In several of the countries separate development or production budgets have recently made their appearance again, reflecting in a general way the awakening of the legislatures and governments to the need for improving the economy and the standards of living. In Iraq 70 percent of the country's revenues from oil company operations is by law devoted to development purposes. In Iran present legislation requires that all oil revenues go to the Plan Organization for development of the country.

The degree to which benefits resulting from these expenditures reach directly down to the peasant and working classes naturally varies, and in most cases could probably be considerably improved. The amounts involved, however, are much higher than ever before and are a tangible demonstration that a new concept is gaining ground in the Near East; namely, the idea that progress can be made through programs of general economic improvement based on raising the living standards of farmers and industrial workers.

LAND TENURE LEGISLATION

Near Eastern legislation and decrees pertaining to land tenure during the past five years are probably greater in volume than those of the preceding several decades. Moreover, the objectives have been greatly broadened so as to fit in with over-all development of the country as well as to benefit individual peasants by such measures as improved tenancy rights or eventual outright ownership, liberal credit, better marketing conditions, and technical guidance. Among the particularly noteworthy legislation, one may list the Shah of Iran's decree of 1951 turning a quarter of a million acres of royal lands over to peasants on liberal credit terms. Another is Iraq's subsequently expanded 1946 "Law for the Development and Cultivation of the Dujaila Lands," under which Dujaila and five other projects for the settlement of landless peasants have been put into effect with six more in preparation. A million acres of state lands are being prepared for future distribution to landless peasants with an opportunity for eventual ownership. Others are Syria's Decree No. 96 regarding the distribution of state lands to peasants; Egypt's Law of 1939 for the establishment of rural social centers (in which Egypt's present Ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Hussein, and his wife, were so active); and Egypt's land reform law of 1952 — one of the earliest instituted by the present regime. The latter limits individual ownership to 200 feddans (207 acres), provides for compensation to landowners and distribution of the excess among peasants, and guards against further

fragmentation of plots under five feddans. To these might be added numerous agreements for technical assistance in the field of land tenure with the United States (private foundations as well as the government), the United Kingdom, and the United Nations, particularly FAO and UNESCO.

In Iran both FOA and private foundations took advantage of a program started with Iranian initiative, that is, the Shah's land distribution program. They provided technical assistance to the twelve villages which were first distributed under the Shah's program. This assistance has demonstrated how far, through a system of village community development workers, the provision of supervised credit and technical aid can go toward creating independent farmers out of poverty-stricken peasants. To date over 5,000 farmers have received lands under the land distribution program and a bank initiated with FOA help is serving the needs of the more than 50,000 families in Crown Land villages.

The degree of success with which these and related laws and project agreements have been implemented has varied considerably. There are grounds both for optimism and pessimism. There are technical, financial, psychological and political obstacles to them all in the search for an improved substitute for the old system. Nevertheless, they reflect an unprecedented effort on the part of current Near Eastern leaders to give the mass of peasants better leases on their lands and on their lives.

LABOR MEASURES

Basic labor legislation is not quite as new or dramatic as are land reform measures in the Near East. The labor codes of Lebanon, Syria, and Iran were enacted in 1946; Iraq's code was importantly revised that same year; and the Saudi decree for hours, age limits, and disability compensation was issued in 1947.

The mere existence of ILO and the desire of the Arab states to become members have been a stimulus to measures which meet the challenge of labor unrest. Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Egypt are all members. The last state also holds an Assistant Director Generalship. In addition to ILO projects, several of the states are engaged in technical assistance projects with FOA in such fields as statistics, workers education and vocational training, industrial safety, and arbitration methods. Although improved laws regarding strikes, unionization, and other aspects of labor are clearly needed, generally speaking the need in most Near Eastern countries is for improved implementation of existing legislation (through the several relatively recently

created Ministries of Labor or Social Affairs) as much or more than it is for new legislation or objectives.

The one Near Eastern country which has very recently introduced rather sweeping labor legislation is Egypt. The Egyptian Trade Union Act of 1942 expressly excluded the unionization of agricultural workers and also prohibited federations of individual workers' unions from joining a single national federation. These situations were reversed by decrees of the new government in December 1952, less than six months after it took office. As a result, more than 60 groups of agricultural workers have applied for union charters and the establishment of a general confederation of unions is receiving serious study. The latter may well enable Egypt's more responsible and effective labor officials to lead poorly organized unions into effective operation. The land tenure program may also benefit Egyptian labor. Paternalism on the land was carried over into Egyptian industry, which grew particularly quickly during the war, and as it falls off on the farm it may also decline in industry. Moreover, an announced hope of the government is that landowners compensated for confiscated lands over 207 acres will invest the bonds they receive in new industry.

An unresolved problem is presented by the legislation which prohibits the dismissal of an employee, if he chooses to appeal, without permission from the courts. This is of particular concern to foreign investors, though it is a potential financial and administrative burden on all firms, especially those in seasonal manufacturing. The Egyptian Government has been described by some observers as pro-labor, though not anti-business, and the trend is toward a modification of this legislation. Egypt is gaining experience daily in the field of industrial relations and it has undoubtedly accepted the challenge of labor unrest and the conditions underlying it.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Over and above the mere awareness of government leaders that peasants and workers can be helped by development programs, is the composition in recent years and months of engineering blueprints for many actual projects. There is much less pointing to a river or port that should be developed — given the funds — and much more pointing to plans on which cost estimates can be based, firms hired, and money appropriated or borrowed. A recent UNRWA bulletin devoted 145 pages to an inventory of major economic development programs (underway) and projects (for the future).

In Iran plans have been practically completed calling for the expenditure

of \$700 million for economic development. While these figures may at first glance appear somewhat fantastic, they are actually well within Iran's financial ability, based on its potential oil income. This income will reach \$160 million by the end of 1957; and as stated above, Iranian legislation requires that all of it be devoted to economic development.

This month the Lebanese Government is inviting selected firms to bid on the engineering plans and supervisory contract for the first phase of the Litani River Basin project, which has taken a 42-man team (financed by FOA) three years to draw up. Well over \$100 million is contemplated as the eventual expenditure on this self-liquidating power and irrigation project.

Some of the world's greatest engineers have recently pronounced Egypt's High Aswan dam project feasible. Expenditures over the next decade may exceed \$500 million for the largest dam and reservoir in the world. The project is known to every fellah in Egypt and as conceived would increase Egypt's acreage by at least one-fourth and probably more. UNRWA engineers have recently completed a study under which sweet water from the Nile will be siphoned under the Suez Canal and used to irrigate Sinai lands, which can support more than 50,000 refugees. The Unified Plan for the Development of the Jordan Valley is not yet adopted and still faces important obstacles, though Ambassador Eric Johnston, who returned from the area late last week, is optimistic. The value of crop production in the valley could conceivably increase tenfold in less than a decade if all went well.

Syria is developing the port of Latakia with its own finances and is well advanced in the engineering of its Ghab Swamp irrigation and drainage projects, not to mention others. Iraq's Wadi Tharthar flood control project on the Tigris is expected to be complete next year, and its Development Board is plotting expenditures of well over \$100 millions a year from oil revenues. Other important projects in the Near East include the improvement of transportation and communication between urban districts and the countryside and the building of research laboratories and extension stations.

Development, production or planning boards or councils have been established in recent years in Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt, and one has been in existence in Iran for years. In several of the countries, these boards are considering investment and development surveys made by the IBRD. In Iran there has been substantial United States economic aid for three or four years, and in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, U.S. economic aid programs over and above technical assistance have been inaugurated in the last few months with a U.S. contribution of \$59 million. Those who dismissed such projects

as unrealizable dreams ten years ago must now take account not only of the tremendously augmented oil revenues, the availability of U.S. and IBRD funds, and the increased file of completed blueprints, but also the desire of the Near Eastern leaders to avail themselves of these new factors as a means of reducing the unrest and attaining stability. Granted that it is only a beginning, it is an answer to a challenge. It is significant, I think, that a new word is on the tongues of Near Eastern engineers and officials: "scheduling"; that is, the synchronization of many phases of land reclamation, resettlement, and other projects toward the proper culmination of the program.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AS REFLECTED IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Although the major development projects involve external financial and planning assistance, the recent growth of international cooperation as a means of improving the welfare of peasant and worker is more widely revealed in the field of technical assistance. Well over a million dollars a year is being spent in the Arab countries and Iran by the UN Specialized Agencies for regional meetings and individual advisory projects in fields covered by the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and UNESCO. The economic studies and recommendations made in Syria and Iraq by the IBRD paid considerable attention to the social aspects of agriculture and industry and this is likely to be the case in the Bank's forthcoming survey of Jordan. U.S. technical assistance programs, now in their fifth year, will involve U.S. expenditures in excess of \$22 million in the current fiscal year in five Arab countries and Iran. While the proportion of projects with direct and early benefits to peasants and workers is difficult to calculate precisely, there are many such projects testifying to the growing cooperation between Near Eastern leaders and international and foreign technical assistance organizations in the interest of resource development and the popular welfare.

EDUCATION, PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The desire for improved education and broader opportunities is hardly new in the Near East. It is more than a thousand years since al-Azhar University was founded in Cairo. It was almost 20 years ago that the Government of Iraq offered teaching positions to every member of the graduating class

of the College of Arts and Sciences at the American University of Beirut — at starting salaries higher than in most professions. It is in the last decade, however, coincident with the attainment of political independence by most of the countries under discussion, that the broadest and most concerted effort has been made. In Lebanon, for example, 100 Government primary schools were established in the 21 years between World Wars I and II, whereas more than 700 such schools have been established since the end of World War II. Moreover, action on the need for vocational training has increased greatly. It is particularly clear in the numerous requests for technical assistance in this field.

Near Eastern governments have also taken steps toward the establishment of public health and public administration practices which will be of tangible benefit to the masses. Surface evidence of this is to be found in recent regional conferences on both topics in Beirut; in the enrollment of students from throughout the area in the public health and public administration schools established at the American University of Beirut in 1951; in the percentage studying public health and administration among the more than 2,000 Iranian and Arab students now in the United States; and in the numerous demonstration projects and special studies under technical assistance programs in these fields. The new emphasis on environmental sanitation measures such as drainage and malaria control, as well as the clinical work in rural social centers, is reflective of the grass roots approach. How effective it has been to date seems to me a less important question than how effective it will be after a little more time has elapsed and the infinite problems of training and tradition have been more fully dealt with.

CONCLUSIONS

We have considered the problem of social discontent among the peasant working classes of the Near East and its causes as well as examples of its recent manifestations. I have discussed at some length the public response to the challenge of social discontent. In conclusion one must ask whether the sum total of response is effective, for this is the question implied in the title of my remarks this morning.

Obviously such discontent has been a stimulus to the assumption of public responsibility long seen by some Near Eastern leaders, but now recognized by increasing numbers. Although the extent to which the causes of unrest have been reduced is open to question, certainly effective approaches to a solution of these causes now occupy the thoughts and energies of a signifi-

cant number of Near Eastern leaders. In my opinion they have walked a rough and circuitous path, but they have come upon the right road. I dare say that the distance behind them on that road must be measured in rods while the distance ahead is a matter of miles. The important thing, however, is that they are on it in force and with growing energy to finish the race. I am glad that there are Western way-stations, both private and public, along the way, where the helping hands of free men will be extended to aid them.

Much remains to be done to meet the needs of the people of the Near East but already great and encouraging steps have been taken. A new wind is blowing, and I am convinced that if, as a result of progressive measures by his own countrymen, the average peasant and worker can continue to find new hope, he will not turn to the Kremlin for a solution to his problems.

Third Session, Saturday morning, March 5th
Presiding: ROBERT F. OGDEN, Near East Section,
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THE INTERACTION OF EDUCATION AND PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY

ALFORD CARLETON

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WE SOMETIMES FORGET, when we ask the schools to train students to be responsible citizens, that they are the victim of the social system from which they are drawn. A school spends much of its time correcting social irresponsibility brought into it from the home environment. This problem is familiar to all who carry responsibility in the Near East—government officials, school principals, teachers, and all the rest. So I speak not as an outsider but as one who has wrestled with these problems, and they are difficult problems.

There has been laid out before you at this Conference much of the situation which prevails: the long centuries of insecurity and foreign rule; the provincialism and individualism; the degree of illiteracy; and of course, the great rapidity of change in that part of the world. Those changes which we and our ancestors have passed through for 500 years have been rushed through in the Near East during the last 30 years—that is, since the end of the Ottoman regime.

Because of this rapid change we face many problems, both in school and out. I remember a student in my class at Aleppo College who was charged with being an incurable bully, kicking and beating the children in his group. Finally, he was suspended and told to bring his father in. He did bring his father in; he also tried to get the Chief of Police and the Mayor to do something for him. I turned to his father and said, “Do you promise that if your son is in trouble again you will not make any objection to our sending him home?” The father turned, not to me, but to the boy and said, “If the phone rings and Mr. Carleton says you were bad, I’m not going to call you home, I’m going to strap on my gun, come here, and put six shots in your stomach and bury you where you fall.” Do you see why his son was a bully? That is why I say, do not put all the blame on the educators if they do not turn out good citizens in the next generation.

The schools are doing a lot. They are doing their best. One can have a lot of admiration for the skill with which the governments of the states have faced up to the problems; they are pouring millions of pounds into educational programs. The rapid expansion of the programs against illiteracy and of the general programs of education has been really remarkable. But in some cases the very success has revealed new problems.

For example, the government of one Middle Eastern state, in order to stretch its money further, planned a program of 3-year elementary schools in the villages. Three classes are the most one teacher could handle. So all across the landscape they set up 3-year schools, only to find that three years of education is not enough. The student who had only three years of education soon relapsed into illiteracy. So it was necessary to step it up to a 5-year program at greater expense in funds and in teaching staff.

Much has been done to improve standards. There have been experiments in village education and vocational education, although that is a special subject by itself. I think of Aleppo College as typical of work being done in all systems of education in that part of the world. We put effort on the methods of instruction to teach responsibility. It is amazing how many students come to school believing they are something empty to be filled with knowledge and there is no duty upon them to think. By the methods of instruction we must get across the principle of give and take, and the idea that the student has to do his own thinking.

I remember what a shock it was—I was teaching in philosophy or history—when I told the students at the beginning of the year that I would never give them a quiz where they could not bring their textbooks along with them. They would say, “What’s the use of memorizing the textbook after that?” The whole principle of thinking something through on the basis of consequences is one on which the school is working hard. I think that applies to every teacher and school that I know.

The whole program of activity in support of the student council is improving. If any of you have lived in the Near East you know what a delicate matter it is to organize a student council. In Aleppo College we have managed very well. Never have we had to suspend a student council. On the whole, we have supported this student council against any other student if they were willing to play the game, even to a limited extent, with the administration of the school. I remember representatives of other student bodies, who wanted to take our students out on strike, being told by the heads of our student body that they would be invited in to talk it over with

the President of the College. They objected at first, but went away convinced in the end, by our student council, that that was not the particular day to call a strike.

But while there is progress, and much that is being done, we don't always succeed. I remember one student who was called into my office because he was doing absolutely nothing in the way of real education. The college was just a hotel to him, not a school. I said to him, "What did you come to school for?" He said, "My father sent me." I said, "That's true, but your father had a purpose in sending you. What was his purpose in sending you to school?" He said, "To get me out of the house." At least we had taught him sincerity and frankness, and they, too, are elements in public responsibility!

I believe that by mingling and mixing the different minority groups in the various school systems in the Near East we are, by example, dealing a blow to one of the great problems of the area and building something solid in the direction of social responsibility and good relationship of one community with another, to a greater degree than has obtained in former years.

There are other invisible improvements which come out of the rising level of education. I am convinced that the educated landlord is not the same kind of landlord that his grandfather was when he owned the same farm. There is a definite sense of responsibility on the part of many landlords that did not exist some years ago. I know two particular farmers in the neighborhood of Aleppo, each a graduate of the American University of Beirut. In both cases they have waiting lists of would-be tenants, for by serving as tenants under those men they have more security and gain more income than they could possibly achieve if they operated their own farms. There is progress being made by educated landlords, and by educated industrial leaders; and also by the owners of many industries. There is much to be done, but let us not say nothing has been accomplished.

In the field of child psychology, it has been observed that each of the children who comes to school, to a degree, believes that no person, not even his father or mother, can be implicitly trusted; that every statement he hears has to be weighed. Never the simple reaction, "That's true," or "It isn't true." Never the simple remark, "That's interesting." Always, "Why did he say it? Why did he want me to hear it?" I believe that educated parents are slowly coming to realize that there are laws of mental activity, of social

response and responsibility, which can be put into the training of children and I believe there will be, over the years, a definite result from this program.

Perhaps more important, there is a persisting attitude, coming down from the years, of insecurity due to the despotic government of the past. There has grown up in the area a conviction that government is something to be avoided. I remember the first time I was in a village in Turkey when the census was being taken. I was surprised to see how many able men disappeared before they could be counted, because the government to them represented only taxes, military service, possibly imprisonment, and just general bedevilment, rather than specific services of public welfare and improvement. Now, across the countries of the Middle East the governments have begun to take action in the fields of social welfare and education. There have been definite approaches to the people and programs to advance them, and those people are beginning to feel that the government may do them good; that it is, after all, *their* government.

I have had a particularly close view of this problem in relation to the phenomenon of student strikes. It has been the common technique, as you know, of politics and politicians in the Near East that every time they wanted to embarrass the government they told the students to shout, and that no one would be patriotic unless he did. And the students believed that they had done their patriotic duty when they complied. It has been an interesting process, watching the students as they go through school, to see them realize that what may have been the only technique possible under a despotic government, in the past, is not a suitable technique when the government is their own government. In a democracy, a student should be interested in politics, but that interest should be worthy of his character as a student. We find that the student bodies have gradually acquired a considerable sales resistance to the politicians who wish to interrupt their education, to use them as pawns in the streets. Furthermore, there is growing up a more educated group of political leaders who are doing what they can to prevent such use of students as pawns in the game of party politics.

This is all part of the process of developing public responsibility in and through the schools. Yet there is much still to be done. I have sometimes felt as a teacher — and this is not only true in the Near East; it may be true anywhere in the world — that there is a fundamental need to awaken even more curiosity among the students. The number of statements which will be accepted simply because they are written in a book, or the teacher said so,

is still far too large. What is going to happen if we go on this way? What can be done about it in the way of a logical reform? We must have a deeper probing into the causes, for even the schools which are doing their best now are not doing enough.

A corollary to this is learning for its own sake and not just for the diploma. I suppose it is partly true everywhere, that we study for the name of it; to hold a diploma in our hand for the fleeting moment when we walk across the stage; something for a doctor or a lawyer to put on the wall. Yet there is a definite need for increased consciousness of the value of true learning — for wanting the answers because they are the answers, not simply because they may be needed in an examination. This is one of the directions in which heads of the departments of education are conscious of the need for reforms that must yet be carried out. I grant you, if I were the Minister of Education in one of those states, I should not know any better way at present than to have standardized written examinations for all students. Yet fundamentally such a system of examinations tests only the factual part of education; scholars must know not only facts, but also skills, attitudes, understanding and appreciation of values.

We must do something similarly to hold more of the competent young men in the teaching profession. Unfortunately, it has been true for a long time that teaching has been underpaid and relatively without opportunity for advance — without any of the sense of power that exists in political fields of activity. Time and again I have seen the finest young men trained to be teachers drifting into other branches of service. I don't know what the foreign services of many states would be like if they hadn't taken teachers into various administrative services of the government. We must, in some way, maintain incentive in the teaching profession so that the best men will stay in it and not be siphoned off to other purposes.

Once I had an opportunity, in talking with the Minister of Education in Syria, to remind him that two services of the government are most definitely building for the future. These are the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Public Instruction, for Syria lives by its fields and its men. Here is where the future will be built. Unfortunately, in many states, this has not been recognized and the Ministry of Education has had the small end of the bargain in the assignment of personnel. I think this should be corrected. There are many possibilities of adult education by means of radio or motion pictures which have not been realized. I made an informal count of the radio programs of one or two of the states in which I lived. I do not

believe that 5 percent of the radio time was given to anything which might be called instructional. There was news — too much of world news, creating the impression that what happened in Washington, Moscow, and Paris was of more interest than what was happening in their own village. Perhaps there are some other government systems of radio in the Middle East more alert than that one, but, if so, I haven't come across them. I call attention to this as an undeveloped possibility.

In particular, there is need to do something for the migrant and nomadic populations. I admit they are not as ignorant as some people think. There is a great difference between being unschooled and uneducated. If you know anything of the young Bedouin boys, you will know that they are some of the smartest lads on earth. When they come to a school they have no problem in holding their own or excelling over the city-bred students. But there is no system for tying together the education, whether in school or not, of the nomadic and migrant elements of the population. Provincialism has so long held the field, there has been so long a time of loyalty to one's home town or to one's home group or tribe, that there needs to be a conscious effort put not only upon national education, but upon education of the wider values all the way up through the United Nations. There needs to be a deeper sense of social solidarity.

I believe if one talks with Arab leaders carefully enough he will find that one of the fundamental problems they feel is for a basic definition even of nationalism itself. Sometime ago I was asked by an organization to recommend a young Arab as an employee. I sent them a fine lad. They called on the telephone later and said, "He looks nice, but really, is he an Arab?" I said, "If you can tell me what makes an Arab, I will tell you if he fits the description."

The basic problem of the integrated Arab is that he needs to work through the question of his social culture. The basic problems of the area are not technological. They are not even, at heart, economic but sociological — almost on the edge of what you might call spiritual. They are the problems of human inter-relationships.

In a public address a few days ago in Denver, I said that one of the basic problems of life in the Near East has been the fear of each person for his neighbor. When I met a young Arab who had been in the audience, I was a little afraid I had overstated the case and that I might have hurt his feelings. He was a student of sociology. I asked him if I had been somewhat harsh when I said that fear of one's neighbor was the basic problem. He

said, "No, it's worse than that. We're afraid of ourselves." The basic problem is one of self-respect, of coordinated thinking, of social responsibility. Now we're right back in the cycle, raising the question of whether the hen came before the egg or the egg before the hen — whether the school can teach social responsibility until in coordination with other agencies there is a growing sense of responsibility through all society. But I am convinced of this: the school can play its part. Most of the schools are playing their part, and those responsible for education are glad and eager to promote development of the total sense of public and social responsibility, which is, indeed, the major need of the Near and Middle East at the present time.

Third Session, Saturday morning, March 5th
Presiding: ROBERT F. OGDEN, Near East Section,
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PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY: ITS PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS IN ISRAEL

DON PERETZ

Author

AS AN OBSERVER of events in the Middle East I am reminded of a little parable I read in a review of Reginald Reynold's new book, *From Cairo to Cape-Town*. It seems that a certain man, coming into a room where a number of people had been sitting for some hours, remarked that the room was stuffy.

The people sitting there were very annoyed at this remark. "How can you presume to judge," asked one man, "when you have only this minute come in?"

Another said, "It is always those people from outside who make this ill-informed criticism. Only those who have sat here for hours can possibly know whether the air is fresh or foul."

"It is just to keep out ignorant critics like you," said a third, "that we keep all the doors and windows shut."

So they threw the intruder out and bolted the door.

At this year's Middle East Institute Conference we have emphasized that creation of public responsibility is a paramount problem in most countries of the area. On the one hand there is the need to create government responsibility toward its obligations and toward the public for which it should feel responsible. On the other, there are monumental difficulties in developing public responsibility toward the government, its apparatus, and its tasks.

The State of Israel was in a fortunate position with respect to this question in 1948. In those trying days of the Arab-Israel war many competent observers expected the new nation to collapse before the invading armies. But they underevaluated one of Israel's prime assets — the unusually high degree of public responsibility that then existed in the Jewish community. If it were

possible to measure that asset, it would not be surprising to find that Israel had more public responsibility "per square head" than any nation in the area, and perhaps more than most nations elsewhere. Of course, there were immediate pressures which elicited a high degree of civic response. Not only the government, but each of its Jewish citizens, almost without exception, felt that they were making a last ditch stand for their very lives.

The phenomenal response to the burdensome civic demands exacted from Israelis was not the creation of the moment, although fearsome excitement probably did much to galvanize all latent potential toward effective action. There were underlying social and historic reasons why Israel's government and its Jewish population reacted the way they did.

Within the country's Jewish community the concept of public responsibility was by no means novel. It had a long and established standing. It began at the end of the 19th century when the original Zionist settlers came to Palestine. They brought with them from Europe a tradition of public spirit moulded in a cast of Socialist idealism and 19th-century liberal enlightenment. This tradition was manifest in the early agricultural colonies these Jewish settlers founded.

As the Palestine Jewish community — or in Hebrew, the Yishuv — became more firmly established, its desire for self-government grew. Simultaneously there was a growing consciousness about, and a feeling of responsibility toward, the Yishuv on the part of Zionists outside Palestine. Pursuant to the establishment of the British mandate, the already developed spirit of public responsibility, the growing desire for self-government, and the interest of world Jewry, amalgamated to form a set of Palestine Jewish national institutions, or as Professor J. C. Hurewitz calls them, a quasi-government.

PRE-ISRAEL INSTITUTIONS

The quasi-government had three principal pillars: the Kneset Israel, represented by the National Council; the World Zionist Organization; and the Jewish Agency for Palestine. These organizations conducted a variety of functions for the Yishuv. They provided health, educational, and welfare services. They managed its religious affairs. They arranged for the purchase and settlement of land, and carried on negotiations with the mandatory power, foreign governments, and international organizations.

The strongest of the quasi-government's three pillars was the Jewish Agency. It was designated by the League of Nations to cooperate with the mandatory power in developing the Jewish national home.

Herzl defined Zionism as "the Jewish people on the way." The Jewish Agency for Palestine might have been defined as "the Jewish State on the way." In many respects it grew into a functional body parallel with the British administration in Palestine. Its numerous departments corresponded to those of the Palestine government, and supplemented its work in the Jewish community. The Agency established agricultural experiment stations and technical schools. It appointed immigration officers in all European countries with large Jewish populations. And together with the National Council it did much to develop representative communal organizations which fulfilled many activities of a welfare state.

Thus within the institutions and agencies of the quasi-government, as well as within the government itself, a corps of administrators and officials was trained and received experience of wide scope in public responsibility before the State of Israel was formed.

Palestine's Jewish population responded most favorably to their Jewish quasi-government. Although membership in Kneset Israel was voluntary, only a tiny minority of Jews chose to opt out. Most of them recognized the need for and the benefits from the quasi-government, and they offered it full cooperation, free of any government enforcement laws. This was part of the local social norm. The National Council, for example, collected dues from all members of the Yishuv. Together with the Jewish Agency, the Council also recruited large numbers of Jewish volunteers for training in the Hagana, or self-defense organization of the community.

The quasi-government owed part of its success to the moulding of the younger generation. The Royal Commission of inquiry into the 1936-37 disturbances pointed out that from the schools of the National Council there "emerged a national self-consciousness of unusual intensity."

Indeed, the quasi-government was so successful in its indoctrination that it commanded far greater respect and loyalty from most of the Jewish population than did the official government of Palestine. For at the time the feeling among most of the Jewish residents of the country was one of hostile suspicion to the British mandatory official, whereas cooperation with the Jewish Agency or the National Council representative was not merely countenanced, but freely offered. As political tensions between the Yishuv and the mandatory power became intensified, and the Jewish community became convinced that the British were discriminating against it, there was a complete breakdown of rapport between the Yishuv and the official government. By the end of the mandate, even before the establishment of Israel,

the quasi-government had for all practical purposes become the functional government of the Yishuv. This was true not only because of the growing lack of confidence in the mandatory government, but because that government abandoned its authority in whole geographic areas. In these instances the quasi-government filled the vacuum, providing such services as police. It even established a Jewish postal service before termination of the mandate.

To complete this background picture, a word should be said about another powerful pillar of the Yishuv, although it was not directly part of the structure of the quasi-government. For the Histadrut, or General Confederation of Labor, also contributed significantly to the tradition of public responsibility existing in Israel when the state was founded. Beginning immediately after World War I with a number of small trade unions, it grew into a comprehensive federation comprising the vast majority of Jewish laborers and white-collar workers. It developed systems of health service and social insurance for its members. In the cooperative and collective agricultural settlements it promoted a way of life which was fundamentally democratic and it did much to encourage acceptance of civic responsibility.

IMPACT OF THE PALESTINE WAR

We have seen that institutions, concepts, and a state of mind conducive to practice and development of public responsibility were parts of the foundation of the State of Israel — indeed, they contributed substantially to its creation. But the great élan of the Yishuv, which reached its peak during the Israel-Arab war, was followed by a psychological depression common in most nations which have passed through a war experience. The drab post-war tasks of reconstruction and — in Israel — absorption of the immigration influx, were not as stimulating or challenging as was the fight for liberation. The task of erecting thousands of tents for newcomers did not hold a candle to midnight escapades behind enemy lines.

Accompanying the psychological depression there were lawless attitudes which had developed in Palestine toward the mandatory power, and in Europe as a result of Nazi persecution. Now these were often turned upon the new Jewish government. They could be found all along the line — from reaction to government attempts to apprehend the assassins of Count Bernadotte, to widespread tax evasion and black-market activity.

The process of forming the state produced revolutionary changes in its social and economic structure, and marked it with a number of bizarre characteristics. In some instances they derived from the Yishuv's history

under the mandate. Others were new phenomena created by new historic and social forces. Let us examine some of those which are unique, not only in the history of the Middle East, but in the world at large.

During the first three years following the establishment of Israel, new immigrants more than doubled its population. More than 40 percent of the newcomers came from Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Notwithstanding this large influx, national leadership has remained in the hands of the early idealistic Zionists.

I do not mean to imply that Israel is run by an oligarchy or by an entrenched clique of politicians. That is not the case. If there is any Middle East nation where the government heeds public criticism and pressure, it is Israel. Its press certainly voices the criticism of as many political factions as are found in any nation. My point here is that public responsibility did not become diffused among the mass of new immigrants. What, then, have been the reasons for this lag?

Naturally Israel's population could not be doubled in three or four years without cataclysmic social effects. No matter how one defines absorption, a large proportion of the new population has not yet been absorbed economically or socially. Neither the economic nor social means were available to digest such a large influx in so short a time. There are especially shortages of trained leadership and professional people. There are not even sufficient schools, or books, or techniques to swiftly train new immigrants to become integrated and useful citizens.

There is also a great difference in quality between the immigrants who came after 1947 and those who came early in the century. Most of the recent arrivals came for a variety of reasons having little to do with idealism. Few were mentally conditioned to the rigors awaiting them in Israel, despite the fact that such conditions were luxurious compared to those found by the early settlers of the Yishuv. Only a few new immigrants had skills of any value to the nation. Those who came from Near and Middle Eastern countries were culturally unprepared for life in a dynamic Western state, and for not only the extraordinary, but even the very ordinary, demands which such a state makes upon its citizens. Because their social organization was Eastern, their concepts of loyalty and responsibility frequently did not extend beyond their own family groupings. Most of the Near and Middle Easterners were imbued with oriental cultural inhibitions toward government and its paraphernalia. Psychologically they were fully prepared to resist such things as taxes, rationing, and the like. More often than not, they became a public responsibility rather than a responsible public.

A similar situation exists with regard to Israel's 180,000 Arabs. Besides their underdeveloped social and cultural status, they present a serious political problem, for they have passed through a national traumatic experience from which their community has not yet, and from which it may never, recover. The country's Arab citizens are but the remnant of a community, most of whose leadership and membership fled the country during the Arab-Israel war. Most Israel-Arabs have relatives in surrounding Arab countries. So long as the security situation between Israel and these countries remains so unstable, Jewish security authorities will no doubt look upon this minority with suspicion, or at any rate with circumspection. Therefore it is not likely that the Arab minority will develop a sense of responsibility to their government while this situation persists.

Another unique characteristic of Israel is the extent to which its economy is not indigenous, but dependent upon other than its own resources. In the first six years of Israel's existence, between 50 and 60 percent of the national income came from abroad. In the case of other nations which have been receiving similar assistance, the average was considerably lower. The main sources of Israel's income were the Jewish community in America and the United States government. The concept of relying on a high proportion of foreign assistance was not new. Under the mandate, much of the Yishuv's economy was financed by foreign, especially American, philanthropy. Zionist leaders had always assumed that building the national home and absorbing large numbers of Jews without capital was a responsibility, not only of Jews in Palestine, but of their brethren everywhere. Consequently, as we have seen, a large part of the responsibility for the Jewish quasi-government that existed under the mandate rested with reorganized Zionists in the diaspora. They exercised their responsibility largely through the Jewish Agency in the various fields mentioned before.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL ADJUSTMENT

With the creation of the state, many organs of the quasi-government became an integral part of the Israel government. For example, the military and many immigration duties of the Jewish Agency were taken over by the Ministries of Defense and Immigration respectively. However, a large part of the former quasi-government remained outside the new official government. The Jewish Agency retained many of its functions in the areas of immigration, land settlement, and refugee absorption. Through their role in the Agency, non-Israeli Zionists in America, in England, and in other

countries, play an important part in the economic and social institutions of Israel, although most of them will never settle there or owe the Jewish state any allegiance in a legal sense. But their responsibilities in Israel for functions which are generally those of a government are much greater than those of non-Zionists.

Some Israelis who are concerned about their country's economic system believe that the great diffusion of economic support among world Jewry — resulting in a foreign rather than a self-sustaining economy — has had untoward effects on local public responsibility.

Some of the ordinary economic pressures that usually are exerted on labor to fulfill its responsibilities to produce, are only beginning to be felt in Israel. Although average wages and salaries in 1954 compared favorably with those of many Western European countries, Israel's labor productivity was far below that of these same countries. In other words, Israel's relatively high standard of living and numerous government services, which make it one of the most progressive countries in the Middle East, are not mainly supported by the indigenous economy, but by the influx of foreign assistance, philanthropy and German reparations — by Israel's foreign economy.

Tendencies toward overreliance on the foreign economy have also affected some of the nation's more socially responsible institutions. The kibbutzim, or collective settlements, have always been considered the most socially aware groups in the country. But after 1948 many of them developed attitudes and carried out actions which disregarded Israel's economic plight. For example, in many settlements there is a dangerous trend toward overcapitalization. In last Autumn's *Middle East Journal*, Jenny Nasmyth tells of visiting a kibbutz of 150 members who were farming a little over 1,000 acres, of which 300 were irrigated. There she found about a quarter of a million dollars worth of machinery purchased with public loans and philanthropy dollars, instead of with the community's own resources or credit. She claims that it occurred to none of the members that this was an extravagant way to farm.¹

An attachment to many traditional forms of organization in the country fortifies resistance against adjustment to the new economic realities. Intensive, small-scale, high-cost farming has been the pattern of agricultural settlement in the Yishuv. This pattern was ideally suited to the garden and dairy type farming of mandatory times. However, in the past few years this system has glutted the market with vegetables. Late in 1953, shortly before I left Israel, a great scandal was created because tomato producers found it neces-

¹ *Middle East Journal*, vol. 8 (Autumn 1954), p. 397.

sary to destroy several tons of surplus in order to maintain prevailing prices. Thus an inflexible tie to the traditional form of Zionist agriculture has prevented the Yishuv's farmers from turning to cultivation of crops like cattle fodder, sugar beets, or wheat which would contribute to the country's balance of payments.

The same conservative attachment to the old ideologies and forms of communal organization blocked absorption of many new immigrants who are still living in tin or wood shacks located in huge muddy camps outside many of the country's urban centers. Government officials pleaded with kibbutzim to hire about 25,000 of these unemployed newcomers. After long internal disputes about compromising their socialist ideals, most settlements rejected proposals to hire labor, and left the problem for others to solve.

Another characteristic of Israel's new economic and social structure is the great overburden of nonproductive labor. Last June more than 20 percent of employed Israelis worked in administrative services of the government and public and private bodies. More than 10 percent worked in health, education, and social welfare. This burden of officials and government services is not supported by the productive efforts of Israelis, but mainly by the foreign economy. Mapai Kneset member Eliezer Livneh has warned that it may lead to the country's decline through what he calls Levantinization.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL LIFE

Most of the comments I have so far made indicate that too often effects of the tremendous changes produced in the economic and social structure of the Yishuv as it emerged into the Jewish state were deleterious. However, a large residue of the more salutary characteristics of the pre-Israel Yishuv continue to give it distinctive coloration, particularly in its Middle East setting.

The one which to my mind is fundamental, particularly as it effects development and practice of public responsibility, is lack of a gaping chasm between the lower and uppermost classes of society. Few if any other nations have obtained so even a distribution of national wealth. This was not a conscious aspiration of the Yishuv. It resulted more from the nature of the Jewish immigrant to the country, from the poverty of resources which could be exploited, and from the social philosophy of the leadership in government and in the national institutions. Before 1948 no rich mineral deposits were discovered, neither was land wealth available to individual Jews. Development of trade, commerce, and industry in the Jewish community had not

progressed to a point where individual fortunes could be reaped from them. Since establishment of the state, the government has legislated out of existence the possibility of acquiring personal wealth from subsoil rights. New lands acquired by Zionists are either under government control or under the aegis of some national institution, and a system of taxation in Israel which is more severe than that of contemporary Great Britain has prevented accumulation of huge personal fortunes in trade, commerce, or industry.

The resulting social structure is one in which position is neither determined nor acquired by wealth, but by achievement. And possibilities of achievement are open to nearly any Jew who accepts the mores and attitudes of the country.

The result is a broad base of public participation in the processes of government, perhaps most manifest in the high percentage of voters. Suffrage is universal — a characteristic not common in the area — and representative of all sectors of the population. The proportion of eligible voters who cast ballots in the first election in 1949 was 87 percent. In the last election it was 78 percent.

Not only is there a broad base of participation in the electoral process, but despite the large influx of indifferent or inarticulate immigrants, a relatively large number of Israelis take part in the nation's communal activities. Community centers, party offices, and labor union headquarters can be found in nearly every settlement, Jewish as well as Arab. Not only do they exist, but they are vital centers of communal life and play an important role in creating public consciousness.

The Israel government is doing much to encourage public participation in national life. Its well developed school system has increased the number of existing institutions by nearly 180 percent since 1948, and approximately the same percentage of increase applies for the Arab as for the Jewish population.

Growth of the country's health services has more than kept pace with the population increase. Although the rate of infant mortality in the pre-Israel Yishuv was relatively low, it shot up in 1949 after the first wave of mass immigration. Last year the ratio dropped almost to its pre-war level of just under 35 per 1,000 births.

One thing I have learned from my trips back and forth to the Middle East is never to make prophecies. It is not that my average has been so low, but that the variables there are so great. Therefore I recognize that one must hesitate to speculate about the future in discussion of prospects for public responsibility. There are various possibilities. Modern Israel may absorb its

new immigrants. They may become Westernized and accept the responsibilities that a modern state demands of its citizens if it is to function successfully; or the new population may eventually swamp the government and Orientalize it to such a degree that it will not be recognizable as a Western government. A third possibility is a two-class society — one, a governing Western class, the other, a mass of Orientals who are the governed. The answer to this dilemma will be determined by the degree of Zionist success in homogenizing the country's population.

Speculation about the prospects of public responsibility in Israel cannot bypass these fundamental social and economic difficulties. Will costs of production be lowered? Will productivity of labor be raised? Will the country be able to free itself from such great dependence on foreign assistance and base its economy on productivity rather than on philanthropy? I am sure that the answer to most of these questions is positive. That seems to be the trend today. However, the fundamental question is: Will the positive answers be conclusive soon enough to preserve Israel's high level of civilization? If this final question is answered affirmatively, then the prospects for public responsibility in Israel are indeed bright.

Third Session, Saturday morning, March 5th
Presiding: ROBERT F. OGDEN, Near East Section,
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PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY: ITS PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS IN TURKEY

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OUR GENERAL SUBJECT is public responsibility. This has many aspects, but I shall take only one of them. I believe the greatest public responsibility is defense; national defense and defense as a member of a community of nations. My subject, therefore, will be "Turkey's Place in the Defense of the Free World." I leave the military aspect of defense to specialists and shall take up only the political aspects.

First, something about the setting of the problem. The free world must defend itself, and this defense must be taken as a whole. It must be taken as the defense of a large frontier that stretches from the tip of Norway through Europe, the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Far East to the tip of Japan and Korea. The defense of this extensive front must be organized.

The first step in organizing this front has been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. With NATO a new concept came into being. Not only the countries immediately adjoining the common danger have come together in a defense effort, but a community of nations on both sides of the Atlantic. European countries as well as the United States and Canada have joined forces.

The part of Europe that lies next to immediate danger is weak. It has been weakened by two world wars and is divided against itself; hence its defense potential is greatly reduced. In Europe, two countries have immediate frontiers with Russia: Norway and Turkey. When the Atlantic Treaty Organization was being organized, Turkey applied for membership. There was some hesitation. The theory then was that Turkey should lead the Middle East Defense Organization rather than be a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as it was more Middle Eastern than European. To this Turkey strongly objected, pointing out that it was essentially a European country, as it was not the territory of a country alone that determined whether it was European or not. The Turkish thesis prevailed in the end,

and in 1952 Turkey was admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization along with Greece.

The eastern end of the free world frontier is being organized as the South East Asiatic Treaty Organization. Between NATO and SEATO the gap is slowly being filled. In filling this gap, the first step has been the Balkan Alliance. The attempt to bring together the nations of the Balkan peninsula, fertile in trouble and a source of many wars, is not new. The first attempt at organizing peace in the Balkans was made between the two world wars. Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania then concluded a pact that lasted until World War II. In the period following World War II, after Yugoslavia left, or rather was expelled from, the Cominform, Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia joined in a new Balkan Pact. The present pact is of particular importance because Yugoslavia is geographically very important and has a considerable army. Through the Balkan Alliance, Yugoslavia is now linked to the Western system of defense.

The Balkan Alliance is, first of all, a political organization. It has its permanent Secretariat and permanent Council, and is soon to have its Consultative Assembly. It is also a military set up, with common defense plans. But there are certain difficulties. As Yugoslavia is not a member of NATO while Turkey and Greece are, exchange of military information and plans is not always possible. Strained relations between Yugoslavia and Italy, though very much eased after the solution of the Trieste question, still present problems.

A very unfortunate trouble in the Balkan Alliance is the question of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. This is a useless and unwarranted problem that mars the friendly relations between the two countries from time to time. We believe that good neighborliness and close ties between Turkey and Greece are essential, not only for these two countries but for the peace of that region and for the defense of the free world. It is important that a satisfactory solution should be found soon.

The next attempt at filling the gap in the defense system of the free world has been the treaty between Turkey and Pakistan. Unlike India, Pakistan is not neutralist. It has military potentialities of importance. Indeed, the cream of the British Indian army came mainly from this part of the sub-continent. The Turkish-Pakistani Pact started as a political instrument and later developed into a military alliance. Pakistan is receiving American aid. Its army is being equipped and trained by Americans, and it is becoming useful and important in the defense of the free world. Through its eastern

part, Pakistan stretches into SEATO. That link is being strengthened, and as a counterpart to Indian neutralism Pakistan's inclusion in the defense system is proving very useful.

The latest attempt at filling the gap has been the organization of Middle Eastern defense. Here also there was a previous attempt way back in the early thirties. A treaty was then signed between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Sa'dabad Pact, as this was called, was not a military alliance, but the beginning of a rapprochement among these countries, a very far sighted move, the importance of which is now being realized.

Then in 1946 a treaty between Turkey and Iraq was signed mainly to regularize economic problems and certain public works that are needed to control the floods of Mesopotamia. Another attempt to establish a basis for regional defense was made in 1951, when the United States, France, Britain, and Turkey approached Egypt with a view to organizing some kind of a Middle Eastern defense pact. Egypt immediately refused, saying that as long as foreign troops were stationed in Suez, it could not enter into any kind of agreement with the Western world. Egypt has no such claim now. The Suez Canal zone has been evacuated, but still there is a great deal of reticence on the part of Cairo.

The latest idea in Middle Eastern defense is what we now call the northern tier concept. It is to include mainly Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, but the door will be open to all the other Arab countries; the United States and Great Britain will be associate members. This whole move is considered to be a very important one in filling the last gap that exists. The treaty between Turkey and Iraq has been signed. It is a very important forward step and we believe and hope that more will come. The next step very probably will be Iran. Iran is extremely important geographically, and I do hope that political conditions in Iran will permit — and they are improving — its entry into the defense system. Militarily, Iran and Iraq are not as yet up to standard, but with American aid, training, and equipment, their military importance will match their geographical importance.

In organizing the Middle Eastern defense organization, there are certain difficulties. The first difficulty is the conflict, or seeming conflict, between this attempt and the distraction of certain rivalries. Egypt wants to be the leader of the Arab League. But the ideal of the Fertile Crescent, of uniting Iraq with Syria and possibly Jordan, seems to menace its leadership in the Arab world. Then there are dynastic difficulties. The Hashemites are ruling in Jordan and Iraq. The Saudis have become masters of Saudi Arabia and

are suspicious of any move on the part of the Hashemite-ruled countries. The Arab League countries have thought of an Arab security pact that would take care of their security needs. But as it was late in coming and did not seem to secure the region, Iraq took the first initiative and decided to incorporate itself in the Western defense system.

The rest is current news. Every day you hear of attempts at furthering or retarding the final conclusion of the Middle Eastern defense organization. Egypt has called a meeting of the Arab League in Cairo, trying to prevent it, but this has not given any results. Hopes now are that some kind of an agreement will be reached between Egypt and the other Arab countries that will permit their inclusion in the Middle Eastern defense organization.

Another very important difficulty in this region is, naturally, the Israeli-Arab conflict. It is a real and very important difficulty. The uncompromising attitude of the Arab countries toward Israel, and of Israel toward the Arab countries, is the basis of the trouble. I think we must concede that Israel is a reality, and all countries of that region must realize that the real danger is not there but from the north. And they must also realize that organization against the danger from the north is and must be the main preoccupation.

Now, Turkey occupies a very interesting and peculiar position in this respect. Turkey is extremely friendly to the Arab nations. Turkey has lived in the same community of nations with the Arab countries for centuries. Perhaps as a senior partner, as a bigger brother, but certainly as a brother. History and common traditions, common religion, are there to bind them, and Turkey has the best of intentions toward all those countries. We only wish them to be independent, prosperous, and progressive. Turkey has absolutely no irredentist or imperialistic ideas in those regions. Turkey has gone through that experience and has sincerely decided that the best way is to let the Arab countries rule their own lands. With Israel also, Turkey has very good relations. Turkey was one of the first to recognize Israel, and now entertains cordial diplomatic and important economic relations with that country. There is absolutely no anti-Semitism in Turkey. Turkey traditionally is a very tolerant country. The Jews who were expelled from Spain in the 16th century found an open haven in Turkey. About two weeks ago there was an exhibition of Hebrew manuscripts in the New York Public Library. As I was going through it I found one on which was written: "Begun in Spain, finished in Istanbul."

For all these reasons I think Turkey can be a link, a country that can find some kind of a solution to this extremely unfortunate antagonism between the group of Arab countries and Israel. Certain important problems

have to be solved. There is the refugee problem. It's a cause of human misery that must come to an end, yet cannot be solved within the means of the Middle East. The Western world, especially America, must come in with material and moral help. I think Israel's anxiety about the organization of the Middle East defense system is unfounded. Its fear that this organization is pulling Turkey away from Israel and into the Arab arena is unfounded. Turkey is trying to do good to both sides; trying to do its share in organizing the defense of that part of the world.

Turkey's importance in the defense of the Free World comes first from its geographic position; secondly, from its attitude toward Communism; and thirdly, from its military strength. Turkey's geographic position makes it a bulwark against the main Communist force. It controls the only seaway that leads to southern Russia. Turkey is like a huge aircraft carrier anchored under the soft belly of the big monster on the north.

Turkey's attitude toward Communism is a most important factor in organizing the defense of the free world. Turkey is decided to defend itself against Communism whether others will or not. Turkey has seen times when it has been alone in this. Remember 1945, the years toward the end of World War II, and the first postwar years, when being pro-Russian was fashionable even in America. America believed in those years that Russia was a grand ally; that we could sit at a peace conference and arrange the affairs of the world in conjunction with our big brothers up north. Turkey never believed this was possible and tried to caution everybody. Turkey has been in close contact with Russia for the last two or three hundred years, and knows very well what that means. In those years when Turkey stood alone, Russia delivered a note demanding three strategically important Turkish provinces, and also asking for "participation," if you please, in the defense of the Dardanelles. That was a tremendously serious moment for Turkey. It stood alone and knew that if attacked by Russia, no one would come to its aid. The decision was an extremely difficult one, but did not cause any hesitation at all. It is not the habit of Turkey to hesitate in matters like that, contrary to certain countries we know.

I happened to be in the Government in those years, and I remember the evening when that decision was to be taken. The atmosphere was very tense. But it did not take long for the Cabinet to arrive at the inevitable decision, which was a definite no, without even accepting to negotiate on the point. It worked perfectly. Nothing happened. The last we heard of it was last autumn when the great peace offensive on the part of Russia was launched.

Turkey was not spared, and Malenkov sent a note saying that the note of 1945 was withdrawn.

The third major factor that makes Turkey important in the defense of the Free World is its military power. Turkey has a large military establishment, over one division for every million of its 22 million population — one of the largest proportions in the world. Turkey has today the largest army in Europe this side of the Iron Curtain. The army is being equipped and trained, thanks to our American friends, as is the air force. The Turkish army is on the way to becoming one of the most modern and efficient striking forces in the Free World. It is not only big and well equipped, but also capable, ready, and willing to fight. All history is a witness to this, and in recent times Turkish soldiers in Korea have proved it once more when they fought shoulder to shoulder with their comrades in arms.

This great defense machinery is naturally a very heavy burden on the Turkish economy. Not only are the best and youngest hands withdrawn from production, but they become consumers. We have to support some 25 divisions, and production is lessened proportionately. Over 40 percent of the Turkish budget is spent on defense. American aid in this respect is a very great help. Way back in 1947 this help started, totalling up to last year about \$1 billion. All Turkey is thankful and appreciative — in this, the opposition joins hand with the party in power.

Turkish and American relations have been very cordial all along. There are historic reasons for this: America has never taken part in imperialistic designs in Turkey. When, during the last years of the Turkish Empire, Turkey was called the Sick Man of Europe, when all the imperialistic powers were drawing up secret treaties to divide Turkey, America stood aloof; and when, at the end of World War I, the Sick Man of Europe was declared dead and signatories to the secret treaties came to claim their heritage from the dead, America stood aloof. America was in those years one of the few lights that Turkey had; recent events have strengthened this friendship, and today the two countries are really on very good terms. There is no anti-American feeling in Turkey, in contrast to many other countries where American help has been far bigger than in Turkey.

Turkey is also important to the defense of the Free World — in addition to its geographic position, its uncompromising attitude toward Communism, and its strong army — because Turkey is politically stable. It's stable because in Turkey, freedom and democracy have been established. Now, in the framework of public responsibility, democracy is a very important theme to dwell upon. The evolution of Turkey from a one-party system to a demo-

cracy is unique in history. One party, strongly entrenched, forced by nobody, inside or outside, deliberately brought it about because it believed it was to the good of the country, because it believed the time had come that this evolution should take place as part of the series of great reforms that Turkey had been undergoing through the last quarter of a century. The one party then in power conducted absolutely free elections — the proof of its honesty was that it lost the elections. This, I think, is a unique achievement unparalleled in history and should be an example to many other countries.

The transition from a one-party system to a democracy has naturally had its birth pains, its growing pains, its setbacks. In Turkey, of late, there have been certain restrictive measures taken on the press and on justice, but democracy is new, and these are growing pains, a passing phase. We, as the opposition, are doing everything we can to see to it that they are passing, growing pains. Democracy in Turkey is established; no one can uproot it and Turkey will never go back.

As economics is the basis of defense, the economic development of Turkey is an important subject in our general framework of public responsibility. This development has been remarkable. Indeed, along with its political and social development, the economic development of Turkey is one of the important phenomena of the last 30 years. One can say that Turkey today is one of the fastest growing countries in the world. It is like the America of the 1870's. You can see boom towns in many regions. Fortunately, this expanding economy has space. In this respect, Turkey is a pilot case, in showing to the world — especially to the economically as yet underdeveloped countries — that the gap between the standard of living of the underdeveloped and the highly developed countries can be filled, and can be filled without Communism, through freedom and democracy. Turkey's example is particularly important from this point of view, because we must realize that the Communist propagandists find the backward countries willing in many instances when they come in and say, "Look at your misery! Join the Communists and your lot will be better. What have you got to lose but your misery and hunger?" Then you can point to Turkey and say, "Here's a country that has raised its standard of living without resorting to Communism. Here's a country that has made tremendous advances in its economy, and has remained free and democratic."

In this field also there are difficulties in Turkey; in recent times, real, grave difficulties. There is a certain amount of inflation and rising prices, with their consequent social effects. These are caused mainly by an ambitious attempt to raise the standard of living very quickly; to industrialize beyond

the means of the country. There has also been a certain amount of politics in economics, but in this Turkey is not alone. We know many other examples; when I make speeches as one of the leaders of the opposition I even say a certain amount of politics in economics is inevitable; we know richer countries which have it, but we cannot afford more than they.

American economic aid has also been of great importance to Turkey. Beginning in 1948, when the Republican Peoples' Party was still in power, it had attained by 1954 the order of \$500 million. For this also Turkey is appreciative and grateful; the opposition again joins hands with the party in power in expressing thanks. We also join hands with the party in power in expressing that the economic aid has been most insufficient. Compared to Europe, Turkey has received less aid than any other country with the exception of Iceland. And we believe we deserve more.

Public responsibility must not be limited to nations alone. There is an international public responsibility that we must dwell upon: the public responsibility of nations toward one another. We cannot, unfortunately, at present speak of one world in terms of the whole world. Let us just dwell upon one Free World, and international public responsibility within the framework of the Free World. In organizing the defense of the Free World, economic development of the different members must be taken care of as well as defense. If, within the framework of the Free World, there are countries with very low standards of living and others with very high standards of living, you cannot have stability, and defense is correspondingly weakened. The great responsibility of the economically developed countries is to help the economically undeveloped countries to raise their standards, to develop their industries. In this, I think Turkey is showing the way, but a great responsibility rests on the shoulders of America. This must be realized and I am very glad to be able to say that it is. It is five years since I was last in this country. One of the changes I see is a greater realization of this responsibility, a greater interest in what is going on in other parts of the world. I feel confident that this responsibility will increase and show results.

Third Session, Saturday morning, March 5th
Presiding: ROBERT F. OGDEN, Near East Section,
Library of Congress

SUMMATION

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THE AREA OF our discussion has reached all the way from Morocco to India, with the focus on the Near East, the Arab world, Israel, Turkey, and Iran. With regard to political stability, it is to be remembered that most of the states of this area are successor states to some empire, the empires being in process of retiring, if they have not already done so. Even Turkey, as a republic, is a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. The Arab states are likewise successor states to the Ottoman Empire; India and Pakistan to the British Empire. Afghanistan and Iran have been relatively independent all these years, but with ups and downs. As a result, there has been much political instability in the area as the peoples of these states endeavored to organize themselves and get experience in political life. Israel I did not mention because I do not know to what Israel is a successor in the area, except that in a sense it is a successor to a problem imported mainly from Europe.

A shift is going on in the whole position of these countries with regard to their economic development. Whereas, before, they used to be areas producing raw materials for the empires, now they have become more concerned with production for their own sakes and are trying to develop self-sufficiency. That in itself has brought forth many difficulties. They are, as well, trying to meet the problems of rapid population growth, because one thing that the empires have conferred upon these states is increased population. Death rates have gone down, birth rates have been maintained, and numbers have multiplied. I suppose it is something to be thankful for if some of these states are twice as big as they were 25 or 30 years ago. They are, therefore, seeking new sources of wealth to meet their needs, and trying to find out how to use them properly. They are also seeking foreign capital, and trying to relate it in some safe way to their own desired development.

In social affairs, there has been an upsurge of the masses, as we have observed. As a result of the increase in communication facilities throughout the world and the development of ways of reaching the masses, we find the

common people, although many of them are illiterate, becoming more and more conscious of things of which they have been deprived for many years. And consequently they are anxious, now, to catch up with the upper classes.

Mention has been made of experiments in villages, of the rapidity of their development, and of the awakening of the peoples in the villages to ask for something better. Some political consciousness is also developing in rural society. Illustrations have been given as to the way villagers shun their own political leaders. I heard, some years ago, a governor of a province in Egypt say, "I wish you would tell me how to win the confidence of the fellahin. If I send an official, no matter what his purpose — it may be the most benevolent — to a village, the people say, 'Who is this fellow? What is he doing here? Has he come to draft some of our sons, or has he come to collect some taxes, or has he come to expropriate our land?' And they all hide and I can't get anywhere near them." Today the people are more and more coming out to demand their own place.

It is noted, too, that educational factors are very prominent as education has increased so very rapidly in some of these countries. Indeed, the demand for education is far ahead of the facilities of the countries to provide it. School buildings are lacking; teachers are not trained; there is not enough equipment; there are few textbooks; and the community is not well enough organized to deal with it adequately. But the masses are demanding education and are going to get it.

On the international level, as we have been hearing this morning and yesterday afternoon, there is a great deal of consciousness developing about the importance of international relations. National security is really very much to the fore, but how to obtain it is what puzzles the peoples of the Middle East. They fear subversion as various types of political thinking infiltrate the country. And they fear, also, external aggression. The positive threat from the north, seeking not only to dominate, perhaps, the peoples of the area, but also to control its resources, has been mentioned many times. If 60 percent of the proved oil reserves of the world are in the Persian Gulf area, and all that could be denied to Europe, what would happen to the machinery of Western Europe, not to mention the Near East itself?

Then the question came up about mixed factors. It has emerged very clearly that there are social, economic, psychological factors all mixed together bearing at times on certain questions and making solutions difficult. It has been suggested, for example, that when foreign nationals go into the Middle East, either officially or as private individuals, through the investment of foreign capital, and are not sure their contracts will still be honored

25 years from now, it might be a good idea always to think of winning the support of the masses of the people, to do something to make the people feel that this is an activity which will be beneficial to them all, for governments pretty generally follow the sense of the people.

I'd like to comment about some matters that I did not hear mentioned. And that is with regard to the hopeful signs for social and public responsibility in the area. The Arab states have taken this whole matter very seriously, yet little publicity has been given to the hard work of the Social Affairs Committee of the Arab League or its Cultural Committee. Four separate times there have been area social welfare seminars — in Beirut, in Cairo, in Damascus, and last March in Baghdad. Delegates came together from all the Arab states and for two weeks sat down in committees and in plenary session to consider many of the social problems that these states have, and to see what can be done about them. The fifth seminar is projected for next January at the invitation of King Sa'ud, to be held at Jiddah.

Now, these facts are something to be borne in mind when you think of the people actually working to solve their own problems in ways that do not always appear in the political headlines.

There are also ethical factors which have been hinted at, because it is known that no matter how many devices one invents, whether they are mechanical or social, they will not succeed if there is not the will behind them. A hammer can be used to build a house or to kill a person. It depends upon the motive. We need to keep in mind, I think, the necessity for a certain type of high ethical consciousness — let us say conscience — that needs to be developed in the area.

The schools — as has been intimated this morning — are definitely trying to do this; trying to build a social conscience in the children. The social welfare seminars are trying to get it into the government officials and into the social workers through the development of schools of social work for training in the area. All of these factors we need to keep in mind. Furthermore, some references have been made to the value of technical assistance. Personally, last year, I witnessed a very interesting technical assistance program under UNESCO at a village in Egypt called Sirs al-Layan, where a project is in operation now for training young people from the Arab states for rural welfare. At this village people come from all the Arab states, young men and women, to take courses under the direction of technical experts in rural development sent by the United Nations.

It is encouraging to know that the nations of the Middle East are going forward in spite of many difficulties.

Luncheon Session, Saturday noon, March 5th
Presiding: GEORGE CAMP KEISER, The Middle
East Institute

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT

HON. JEFFERSON CAFFERY
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WHEN I ARRIVED here I thought that people I would meet would be interested — very interested — in the political and economic questions of the Near East. I suppose they were. But whenever I met people they would say, "Tell me about the solar boat." So, I'll tell you first about the solar boat.

I've forgotten exactly when it was — some months ago — that in clearing away the debris back of Khufu's pyramid, the people who were doing it ran into lines of stone, and it was quite clear that there was something under them. They cleared away more debris and finally bored a hole in one of these stones. We looked through and we saw a boat. A lot of things have been said about this boat, some of them a little exaggerated.

The stones on top of one boat were cleared away so that we could see it. Now, that boat is sometimes called a "solar boat"; perhaps it is. But it was surely one of the boats in the funeral procession of a Pharaoh, and I think most certainly of the great Pharaoh Khufu, of the Fourth Dynasty. The dead Pharaohs were carried to their pyramids when the Nile was high; this was the reason they came in boats. The body was brought on one boat while other boats — how many I don't know — were in the procession. They then buried the boats.

The boat, as we see it now, is disassembled. When we looked through the hole, at first we thought the boat was all there. It's in pieces. The planks which look like the deck are sitting on a lot of stuff kicked all around — why, I don't know. I've been out there often with my Egyptian archeologist friends, but we have been unable to decide. There are some poles and, of course, there are oars; also, hundreds and hundreds of feet of rope.

The wood appears to be intact. Some pieces are of local Egyptian wood, but most of it is cedar from Lebanon. Nothing further has been done because you can't get down unless you step on the boat. Although it looks all right, you can't run the risk of having anyone step on it. For the time being they have been letting a man down on a pulley.

The solar boat has helped in a lot of ways. Among other things, it brings a lot of tourists. It is like a cycle: the more they talk about Dedefré, the more tourists; the more tourists, the more they talk about Dedefré. The name Dedefré appears eleven times in hieroglyphics on the covering stones. Dedefré was the second son of the great Khufu but he was killed by the mother of Khufu's third son, Khafré, after a reign of only a few years. The history books said three but there are signs on one of the stones which say "seventh month of the fourth year of the reign of Dedefré."

The Egyptians were a very absorbing race: they absorbed Assyrians, Syrians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, and Arabs — invaders all. The Egyptians of today look just like the Egyptians on the walls of the temples and tombs. There is a famous wooden statue in the Cairo museum which looks like the people in the villages now.

The Arabs, of course, came in the 7th century. Some Arabs stayed behind, but not very many. The race is just plain Egyptian. There is some admixture, but I'd like to make the point: the Egyptians are a very distinctive race. It's very marked, how many things you read of from thousands of years ago that have some bearing on what goes on in Egypt today.

In Egypt, I think I can safely say that the present regime above all is dedicated to doing something for the masses. Perhaps that is the greatest strength of the regime. The masses believe that the government wants to do something for them. In most of their past history that wasn't true. The masses did not always have an easy time. I think there is some exaggeration sometimes in the pictures of the pyramids showing workers being driven like slaves. I don't think that is true. As a matter of fact, in the ancient Egyptian religion, everything came through the Pharaoh. There was no place in the temple for what we would call congregational worship. The Pharaoh went to the temple, and he was a god, and he communed with the gods. If any good came to Egyptians, it came by way of the Pharaoh, not through any prayers of theirs.

So it is very possible that in many cases the workers on the pyramids and temples worked with enthusiasm. They weren't driven to it like slaves. Papyrus accounts have been found of the food the overseers gave them, and it seemed ample. Houses were built for them to live in, if not in luxury. The Pharaoh owned the land and he owned the people, but probably he did not always treat them too badly.

As a matter of fact, the present government is so dedicated to the principle of service to the people that they themselves believe, as I believe, that they will be successful only if they are able to follow through. It is a problem.

There are 22 million people living on less than 6 million acres of cultivable land. Not much can be done under those circumstances to raise standards of living. There is really only one solution: more land, which means more water. When the Nile is low, its two branches are blocked off and not a drop of water goes into the Mediterranean; for some months every drop is used. In high water, it's just the contrary — water flows into the Mediterranean. So if prosperity comes to Egypt, there must be a new dam.

There is considerable discussion, as you well know, about a site due south of the Aswan Dam. I am told by the experts that technically a dam there is feasible. Just at present, they are looking into the economic aspects. Water from that dam would allow Egyptians to cultivate 2 million more feddans — a feddan is about an acre — which would help considerably. So actually, that is just about the most important thing before Egypt now — construction of that dam.

Egypt has approached the International Bank, which is sympathetically studying the scheme. Of course, it is not a thing that is going to be done in a day or so. It's a very large dam. As a matter of fact, if it is built according to present plans, it will have more water in the reservoir than any dam in the United States, and you know we have some pretty big dams.

We know how politics are very much affected by economics. It is true all over the world, and it is certainly very true in the Near East. We talk about the Iron Curtain, but the only way to cure basic ills in the Near East is by raising the standards of living.

In the time of the Ptolemies, when Egypt was at its height economically, there were tremendous cultivated areas south and west of Alexandria. Horace, I think, wrote a poem about it. That is all long since gone, but the area can be cultivated again. The Ptolemies ran Egypt efficiently and it probably was the most successful example of a state-run country the world has ever seen. Everything was state-run. Even a shoemaker couldn't make shoes unless he got his license. All worked for the king. But in any event, the country was prosperous, even if it was well milked by the kings.

In the declining days, when Mohamed Ali came to Egypt, the population had been sadly reduced. It was about 2.5 million while it had been 7 or 8 million in Ptolemaic times. Since the advent of Mohamed Ali it has increased almost ten times. And modern Egyptians have a high birth rate. The country is basically agricultural — there is some industry — but Egypt frankly lacks raw materials of various kinds. There is some petroleum — not enough. Recently, American companies have been going into the western

desert, and we hope they find petroleum. That would cure other basic economic ills too.

Along economic lines, it is well known that there have been technical assistance agreements. The sums have not been large. In 1951, \$150,000; in 1952, \$634,000. The year 1953 was the only large one, with \$13 million. Last year, \$3,200,000; this year, roughly \$3,200,000.

We also made a special assistance agreement making \$40 million available. Of that, \$10 million has been committed for highways, which are very badly needed, and a little over \$7 million for drinking water in the villages, which is a sound proposition because the greatest health hazard in Egypt is the dreadful bilharzia which comes from drinking water in the canals. Bilharzia comes from a snail that lives in slow moving water. Before irrigation ditches, they didn't have bilharzia because the snails cannot live in rapidly moving water.

There is also a little over \$1 million for machine tools. It is highly in our interest, in our genuine interest, to create stability, and stability is based on prosperity. These aids of ours, I can confidently say, are sound indeed. Roads and water and machine shops are practical things.

In other words, to my mind, the only aid that is justified anyhow, anywhere, is that which is in our eventual interest. We help other countries to help ourselves, in the long-run.

I mentioned the Iron Curtain a few minutes ago, and said that the only real defense against the Iron Curtain in these crowded countries is better standards of living. At the same time, however, the Egyptian authorities have been doing other things which have to be done; that is, arrest Communists and fight the Communist party. The government is definitely opposed to Communism.

Without any doubt, the two agreements on the Sudan and Suez have meant a great deal for stability and everything we want in the Near East. The quarrel about the Suez has been going on for 72 years; on the Sudan not quite that long, but almost. These settlements have brought about a really fantastic change of atmosphere in regard to the British. None of us thought that the climate would change so quickly, so rapidly, and least of all the British thought so. We're all delighted with this. Of course, everything is not perfect, because it's an imperfect world. But all in all, the progress toward stability and good relations has surprised all of us.

I have sometimes been asked what I think about the present government in Egypt. I have said this: I think they are on the right road and headed in

the right direction, but they have a considerable distance to go. They know that. But I can say unreservedly that the regime means well. They make mistakes, but if they are on the right road, heading in the right direction, even if they have quite a distance to go, that is good. They will have ups and downs, but I can confidently say that the over-all situation has certainly improved very much indeed over the last two years. There will be more trouble, of course, but the situation has improved, and I'm confident that it will continue to improve. With the basic good will that this regime has in Egypt, I am sure that you can look for better things to come.

