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PERCEPTIONS
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DURING
THE
OCTOBER WAR



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
ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY DURING THE OCTOBER WAR

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This is a study of Arab views—as reflected in Arab media—of United States foreign policy during the October 1973 Middle East war.

The fourth Arab-Israeli war was a major turning point in the longstanding Middle East conflict. Militarily the outcome was different from previous Arab-Israeli wars. On the diplomatic front the Arabs achieved a large measure of unity and collectively brought the “oil weapon” into service of their political objectives, while Israel suddenly appeared to be more isolated than before. Probably the most important long range result of this war, however, was in the psychological sphere, i.e. in the attitudes of both Israelis and Arabs. Perceptions of the dispute were altered sufficiently on both sides so that a new environment emerged after the war making new developments possible. Specifically, after this war the American Secretary of State was able to mediate some important steps toward a settlement of the dispute, and to reestablish diplomatic relations with several key Arab countries.

America and American policy have loomed increasingly large in Arab perceptions of the Middle East conflict over the years. The United States as a superpower is especially thought of in times of crisis and war: President Truman's support for the establishment of Israel, President Eisenhower's rôle in the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egypt's allegation of American direct participation in the 1967 war, and growing US military aid to the area since then, are fundamental elements in US policy as seen from the Arab world. During the 1973 war, the Arabs watched American actions and listened to official American statements with interest, to see what the US would do this time.

This study compares American policy, as enunciated and explained throughout the war by American government officials, with US policy as understood by the Arabs. To what extent were Washington policy statements listened to and understood as intended? To what extent did the Arabs agree with that policy and accept its rationales? Specifically this study deals with Arab perceptions of: America's relationship with Israel and the Arab states, the credibility of the US as a mediator—a rôle which the Secretary of State developed after the war, the importance of détente, and the utility of the "oil weapon" against US policy, as well as other issues. All of these questions had been discussed in the Middle East before the war, but the crisis gave them special urgency.

This paper uses Arab mass media as one of the prime sources of information on Arab attitudes and reactions to US policy. It is true that Arab media operate under varying degrees of governmental influence—and even control—so they are not pure indicators of popular thinking. Nevertheless they do provide some evidence of underlying Arab attitudes, when taken as a whole. For this study I have closely examined daily newspapers in seven Arab countries representing a cross-section of Arab perceptions, including, for example, some Lebanese papers which tend to operate with considerable independence of governmental restrictions. I have also made a thorough search of secondary sources including records of daily radio broadcasts, and consulted knowledgeable observers of Arab opinion.* From this I have extracted generalizations about Arab opinion, with typical examples, mentioning important variations where they occur.

* Original newspapers studied were Lebanon's *al-Nahār*, Egypt's *al-Akhhār*, Kuwait's *al-Siyāsah* and *Ra'ī al-Āmm*, Saudi Arabia's *al-Madīnah*, Syria's *al-Ba'th* and Iraq's *al-Thawrah* and *Baghdad Observer*. Secondary sources were the Daily Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter referred to as FBIS), unclassified embassy reports, and interviews. Most broadcast texts were taken from FBIS sources, most newspapers from the original. Z = Greenwich Mean Time.

ARAB PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE OCTOBER WAR

General US Policy Goals

The fourth Arab-Israeli war began on October 6, 1973, when Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack on Israeli military forces, and it ended with a ceasefire on the 24th. Basic American policy during the war focused on two goals, as enunciated in the United Nations on October 8th:¹

First . . . the most appropriate means must be found for bringing the hostilities to an end . . . Second, conditions must be restored in the area that would be conducive to a settlement of longstanding differences in the Middle East.

These principles were consistent with earlier American Middle Eastern policy. The United States for at least two decades has supported the continued existence of Israel, sought good relations with Israel's Arab neighbors, and a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Washington supported a strong Israel but realized that if the Arabs were crushed there would be no lasting peace.

1. Ambassador John Scali's statement at UN Security Council October 8, 1973, in *Department of State Bulletin*, November 12, 1973.

The US has also sought to contain Soviet political gains in the area while avoiding a superpower clash over it. It was, therefore, natural that the American goals during the October War should be both a quick end to the fighting, and a settlement of longstanding issues. The choice of means was more difficult, and in fact these changed as the situation evolved during the war. Throughout the first week, Washington avoided taking specific political or military positions and sought through quiet diplomacy to find a consensus among the belligerents and other concerned parties. In the second week, the United States became more directly involved in the conflict by airlifting arms and other military equipment to Israel while at the same time denying charges that it was intervening in any other way. Then, in the third week, it deepened its involvement by joining the Soviet Union in sponsoring a ceasefire and the framework for a longterm settlement.

We will now examine that evolving policy as seen by Washington, and as seen by Arab mass media.

First Week of War: Neutrality and Quiet Diplomacy

The Syrian-Egyptian coordinated attack of October 6 surprised everyone. Reports and rumors of military activities had circulated during the week, even in Egyptian and Syrian media, but Western and Israeli military analysts discounted the probability of war.² When the American Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, learned three hours before the attack that war was likely, he immediately made "major efforts to prevent the outbreak of the war by acting as an intermediary between the parties."³ This last minute diplomatic effort failed, but the Secretary decided to keep up his

2. *Al-Ahrām*, Cairo's most influential newspaper, appeared on the morning of the 6th with the headline "Tension Envelops Fighting Fronts and Intensifies on Suez Canal Front" but also with a p. 1 photo of Egyptian Foreign Minister Zayyāt happily greeting US Secretary of State Kissinger. None of the media showed signs of an orchestrated campaign preparing for war which might have given Western and Israeli analysts a clue. Egyptian authorities must have left the press alone.

3. Kissinger statement in October 25 press conference, Department of State press release no. 390, October 25, 1973.

mediation efforts, both at the United Nations where the Israeli and several Arab foreign ministers were currently attending the General Assembly opening, and through embassy channels. His spokesman stated that the United States had tried to prevent the outbreak of fighting, and now urged "restraint, non-escalation, and an end to it."⁴ He did not elaborate further, and US official public statements throughout the week attempted to avoid controversial substantive matters.

The intention of American policymakers in adopting this very simple public posture at the outset of the war, calling for a cease-fire but saying nothing more, was to help the quiet diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities, by not raising controversial issues in an open public forum which might complicate these efforts, and make it more difficult for Washington to play a mediating rôle. The State Department even refused to comment at first on who had started the war, because the two sides disagreed on that.⁵

Washington policymakers felt compelled to call the UN Security Council into session on October 8,⁶ and once convened, they had to make a somewhat more substantial statement of US policy there. But they kept this statement as brief and general as possible in order to minimize acrimonious public debate on the issues—it merely called for a ceasefire and establishment of conditions for a long term settlement, a "return to the positions before the hostilities broke out," and adherence to a previous UN resolution. The Americans did not call for a vote in the Council because they "realized that no majority was available and we did not want sides to be chosen

4. Robert McCloskey press conference, State Department transcript, October 6, 1973.

5. At first, Arab spokesmen denied they had attacked first, and the State Department spokesman refused to "draw any judgments" October 6, but on the 7th he did refer to the UNTSO statement accusing the Arabs. The White House made no substantive comment on the war at first. McCloskey transcript, October 6, Department of State.

6. Ambassador John Scali, UN Security Council statement October 8, 1973 (fn. 1 ref.): "In such a serious situation, we felt we could not fail to exercise our responsibility, as a permanent member of the Security Council, to request a meeting of the Council . . ."

prematurely."⁷ The State Department spokesman at his daily press conferences tried to explain the low profile to persistent newsmen:⁸

What we are attempting to do is crystallize a consensus among the parties to the conflict and the other nations with interest in the area, a consensus that will bring a stop to the fighting, return a non-violent atmosphere to the area, and a means to begin a diplomatic negotiating process, looking towards a settlement of the issues . . . We are going to have to be permitted to conduct a good deal of this in the private channel.

Little Arab Attention to the US Effort

Washington's low public profile and efforts at quiet diplomacy attracted little public attention during the first days of the war in the Arab world. Arab media and public opinion concentrated almost exclusively on military reports, because it quickly became clear that this was a full scale war and Arab forces were doing better than they had in previous wars with Israel. All Arabs, from Rabat to Kuwait, identified with the Egyptian and Syrian military effort that began October 6th. But their sympathies were tempered by the assumption, prevalent especially since the 1967 war, that Israel had clear military superiority and could win any test. The Arabs were also quite aware that America had provided most of Israel's arms and was committed to backing its existence; many still believe that America had somehow intervened to help Israel in the 1967 war as Nāṣir had charged. But they were so convinced that continued Israeli occupation of territories taken in 1967 was unjust and illegal, and they were so fascinated by the sudden Egyptian-Syrian attempt to recover land by force, that their atten-

7. Explanation by Secretary Kissinger in October 25 press conference (fn. 3 ref.); on October 12 he said: "We have not gratuitously sought opportunities for confrontations in public forums which might harden dividing lines." (State Department transcript, October 17).

8. Robert McCloskey press conference, October 10, 1973, text in State Department telegram no. 201373, October 11, 1973.

tion focused strictly on battlefield events and thoughts about the American rôle receded into the background.

Egyptian President Sādāt of course knew the military situation well and probably never expected to be able to "liberate" all of Palestine or even the territory lost in 1967. Instead he hoped for enough military gains to restore Arab pride and allow him to go to the bargaining table with Israel, as became clear a week later when he announced his war aims. At the outset, however, he left these ambiguous, and the Arab public hoped for a big victory.

Arab media reflected this preoccupation with military events, and Arab pride at initial Arab achievements. Radio stations extended their broadcast hours and filled them with war reports;⁹ newspapers covered many pages with battle news under banner (8-column) headlines like these examples from October 7th papers:

We Crossed the Canal and Raised the Egyptian Flag (*al-Akhbār*, Cairo)

Liberation War Has Begun (*al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, Libya)

The Arab Liberation War Has Begun (*al-Siyāsah*, Kuwait)

War Breaks Out Suddenly and Continues (*al-Nahār*, Beirut)

War! (*al-Ra'ī al-Ām*, Kuwait)

Initial American diplomatic efforts and ceasefire appeals were given little or no space in Arab media, although they were mentioned by US spokesmen in daily press briefings and by the Secretary of State in his first press conference October 12.¹⁰ The only media to focus attention on US policy at first were those in Iraq, and, briefly, in Saudi Arabia. In the latter country, the government on the first day of the war published an exchange of telegrams between King Fayṣal and Washington concerning the US appeal for

9. Cairo and Damascus stations began 24-hour service, Beirut extended to 20 hours, Tripoli to 21:45, Baghdad and Amman to 22 daily.

10. E.g. only *al-Nahār*, October 7, devoted a banner headline to "America Calls for Cease-Fire and Britain Works for Convening Security Council," while Cairo's *al-Akhbār* buried the story under a 1-column p. 1 headline "Meetings in Washington and New York" and many others ignored the story. State, in its daily press briefings, and the White House and Pentagon in their frequent public statements, dealt often with the ongoing war.

help in preventing war. Saudi media carried a flurry of headlines and commentaries for a few days highlighting the king's response, which appealed to Washington to restrain Israel.¹¹

Iraq was a special case. The radical and strongly anti-American Iraqi régime used the occasion of the war to step up attacks on the United States starting from the first day of the war and continuing through the ceasefire 18 days later. These attacks on "American imperialism" were amplified by the well controlled Iraqi electronic and print media in news stories and editorials.¹² A favorite theme was the use of Arab oil as a political weapon, particularly since the Iraqi government nationalized American shares in an Iraqi oil company within hours of the start of the war as a way of striking back at "American and Zionist aggression." Baghdad Radio not only featured the decree, which called on "all Arab countries . . . to hit and liquidate US interests completely," but it also began carrying slogan-type announcements of this kind:¹³

The imperialist-Zionist aggression must be answered today by striking US interests in our homeland, [and]

Brother citizens:

Our battle with the Zionist enemy is a national battle that requires us to provide the means for its success by striking and liquidating the pillars of American imperialism and Zionism in the area . . .

11. October 7 Saudi papers bannered King Fayṣal's key points, e.g. "Fayṣal: The Volcano Will Erupt If America Does Not Restrain Israel" (*al-Madīnah*), while editorials followed Fayṣal's lead, condemning Israeli "aggression" and appealing to America to stop it (*al-Nadwah*, *al-Bilād*). Cairo's *al-Akhhbār* frontpaged the story "Kissinger Message to Fayṣal . . . Fayṣal Replies to Kissinger: Responsibility Rests with Israel and America."
12. Baghdad's *al-Thawrah*, October 7, ran a banner headline, "Important Decisions Confront Imperialist and Zionist Aggression," implying to readers that the Arabs were standing up to a hostile America. Another headline, "America Moves to Stop the Shooting," was under a general headline "Moves of the Enemy," and the story emphasized the "constant contacts" between Secretary Kissinger and Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, omitting Kissinger's equally frequent contacts with Arab representatives, including foreign ministers.
13. Baghdad Radio, October 7, 1973 at 0707Z and October 8, 1973 at 1748Z. The appeal to liquidate US interests was broadcast on October 7 at 0725Z, and the nationalization decree right after it.

The Iraqi régime used these broadcasts in an attempt to put pressure on other Arab régimes, especially oil states like Kuwayt and Saudi Arabia, by exhorting "Arab masses . . . to confront firmly anyone who provides the imperialist American enemy with a capacity for aggression and means of survival." Newspapers also reiterated this theme in editorials and newsplay.¹⁴

Reaction to Security Council Moves

The American appeal to the Security Council and October 8th statement there drew some Arab comment, all negative, revealing latent skepticism about American motives. Editorials said the American appeal to the UN was a "trick" to "ensure Israeli aggression in perpetuity";¹⁵ and they said "American imperialism" would "use the Security Council's great influence this time to serve the goals of its Zionist protégé" or would block any Council action helpful to the Arabs.¹⁶ The Arabs saw Israel as the aggressor because it still occupied Arab territory taken in the 1967 war. And since Arab armies had just retaken some of this territory, they regarded the appeal for a ceasefire as a pro-Israeli attempt to halt their legitimate liberation efforts. One Arab commentator said that America should take "serious, urgent and decisive" action to persuade Israel to withdraw from these lands, instead of simply calling for peace in the United Nations.¹⁷ The following was typical of commentaries and public attitudes throughout the Arab world:¹⁸

14. Newspapers on October 8 carried identical banner headlines "American Oil Interests Nationalized," and supported the decree with editorials and with features explaining how the "masses" welcomed it (e.g. *Baghdad Observer*, p. 8); *al-Thawrah* main editorial, p. 1, "Nationalization of American Shares and Liquidation of American Interests" and p. 8 editorial by Saḥīb al-Samāwī, "The Oil Weapon."
15. *Kuwait Times* editorial on October 8; Cairo's *al-Jumhūriyyah* on October 9 echoed the same idea.
16. Morocco's *L'Opinion* of October 8, and Baghdad Radio, October 10, at 1610Z, respectively.
17. Saudi Arabia's *al-Madīnah*, October 9.
18. Saudi Arabia's *al-Ukāz*, October 11; similar editorials appeared in *al-Nadwah*, October 8, which ridiculed the US call for peace "based on occupation," and in *al-Madīnah*, October 9, which said: "American sentiments seeking to utilize the

America expressed the strangest logic after the outbreak of the fighting between Arabs and the occupiers of their land. America wishes the Arabs to stop trying to liberate their land and to retreat to the borders which resulted in the Israeli aggression of 1967. This . . . means that America supports only the enemy and stands in the face of the legitimate struggles which the Arabs are now undertaking.

False Intervention Stories

By the fourth day of the war, Tuesday October 9, Israel had had time to mobilize fully and to launch a strong counterattack on both fronts, but it was already becoming clear that Israel would not achieve a quick or low cost victory as in 1967. Syrian forces put up stiff resistance in holding the Golan Heights territory they had retaken, and Egyptian air defenses at the Suez Canal were taking a heavy toll of Israeli aircraft. Iraq announced on the 9th it was sending 13,000 troops to the front, and several other Arab countries simultaneously pledged material support for the Arab side.¹⁹ Arab media trumpeted these military advances, and some implied that the war would go eventually in the Arabs' favor.²⁰ At this point, and primarily because of these military successes, the Arabs began

Security Council . . . should be translated into serious urgent and decisive American action—not mere promises—by asking Israel to pull her forces out of occupied lands." Morocco's *L'Opinion*, October 8, said the Arabs could expect nothing from the Security Council because "US imperialism" would block a "just decision." Sudan's *al-Ayyām*, October 10, said "The US persists in its Zionist policy calling for the Arab forces' withdrawal from their legitimate territory which was forceably seized." Baghdad radio on October 10 at 1610Z said "The US is trying to use the Security Council's great influence this time to serve the goals of the Zionist protégé," and *Baghdad Observer*, October 9, p. 2 editorial, said the same, as did Cairo's *Iḥsān 'Abd al-Quddūs* in *al-Akhbār*, October 8.

19. Kuwait announced that its army and airforce were at the disposal of Egypt and Syria, Tunisia and Sudan announced they would send troops, and on the 10th Morocco announced it had sent troops to the Egyptian front.
20. There were, however, signs that Arab editors, particularly in Egypt, were taking special care to maintain credibility, which was damaged in the 1967 war.

to think about the possibility of American intervention to assist Israel against them.

Arab editors therefore began to pick up news stories carried by the wire services which seemed to confirm these suspicions. The first was the departure of the American aircraft carrier *USS Independence* from Athens for a position near Crete. Pentagon officials said the move was "normal" in such a crisis, and indicated it was related to safety precautions for American citizens in the war zone. But several articles appeared in the Arab press like the one in Algeria's leading daily which was headlined "Threat of Sixth Fleet." It said that with the tide of battle going "against Israel," Arabs should focus attention on Sixth Fleet units now "massing" just outside the combat zone. The article alleged that the "Pentagon, according to its own declarations (sic), has taken all necessary measures for possible intervention in the Middle East."²¹

Other Arab newspapers carried rumors picked up at the UN that Washington was planning arms deliveries to Israel, or printed wire service reports from West Germany that American troops stationed there had been given orders to prepare to move to the Middle East. There were other,²² equally speculative and unverified, news stories which Arab editors gave credence to because of their expectations about the United States, and because the sources seemed to be good ones.

Editorials began appearing warning that "the Arabs will not brook any interference by the United States,"²³ as rumors began to run

21. Algeria's *El Moudjahid*, October 9; editorials in the Sudanese papers *al-Ayyām* and *al-Sahāfah*, October 9, referred to "suspicious movements of the 6th fleet" and said "the US is trying to stop the war in order to stop the defeat of Israel." Kuwait's *al-Siyāsah*, October 9, carried a 4-column p. 1 headline, "American Fleet Moves Toward Area Under Pretext of [bi ḥujjah] Precautionary Movement." Iraq's *al-Thawrah*, under the headline "Readiness of the American Fleet," misquoted the Pentagon.

22. Jiddah's *al-Madīnah*, October 10, printed a wholly speculative story based on unnamed "sources close to the Pentagon," under a banner headline "Will America Compensate the Losses of the Enemy?". The UN rumor was printed by Beirut's *al-Anwar* on October 9. Kuwait's *Ra'i al-Āmm*, October 9, p. 9, printed the story from Germany under the headline "Rumors of Movement of American Forces Toward the Mideast," sourced to AFP Heidelberg.

23. Kuwait's *Ra'i al-Āmm* and *Daily News*, October 9.

through major Arab cities that America was on the verge of supplying Israel with new weapons.

During the next few days, October 11-14, a spate of stories circulated in the Middle East which were probably all untrue but which fed speculation that the United States was participating in the war:²⁴

1. The prestigious independent Lebanese newspaper *al-Nahār* quoted an unnamed Arab military source that six ships enroute to Israel could be military transports from America;
2. Nicosia Radio reported that 57 American Phantom planes had landed at a British military base at Akrotiri, Cyprus, presumably headed for Israel;
3. Cairo's Middle East News Agency reported that US Phantoms based on a US carrier had joined Israeli planes in raids on Egypt;
4. A Lebanese newspaper published an "exclusive," with photographs of some wreckage, claiming that a US Navy aircraft from a US carrier had been shot down after attacking Syria, and
5. Reuters quoted the Syrian Embassy in Paris as saying that a US Air Force Phantom carrying no Israeli markings and piloted by an American Vietnam veteran was shot down over Damascus.

All of these stories were false. The first was simply incorrect speculation, the British denied the second²⁵ and the State Department spokesman specifically denied the other three in brief statements on October 11 and 13. Remembering that Egypt's false accusation of American participation in the 1967 war had led seven Arab countries to break diplomatic relations with the United States, he denounced these new stories as "outrageous," "mischievous and

24. (1) *Al-Nahār*, October 11, p. 1, under a headline "Sixth Fleet in Israeli Waters" said "Six large naval units entered Israeli territorial waters at 11:30 p.m. coming from Cyprus. He . . . did not deny that they belonged to the American 6th fleet and could be military transport ships." (2) Nicosia Radio, October 11, FBIS 100, October 11. (3) MENA ran it only 2125 to 2207Z; (4) *al-Yawm*, October 13; the photos showed US Navy markings on a fuel tank which the caption said "leave no room for doubt that the Phantom had taken off from one of the US carriers." (5) Reuters, Paris, October 13.

25. Nicosia Radio, October 12, 1126Z.

groundless," and repeated that there was "no American involvement in the fighting by US military forces or personnel."²⁶

Throughout the Arab world, however, media gave these stories very prominent play because they fit perfectly with the Arab perception of America as willing to do anything to help Israel. American denials were either not believed or they failed to catch up with the original stories or they were buried in the more interesting and sensational report of the accusation.

The situation was complicated by the emergence at the same time of two other stories—about volunteers and bomb shipments—which may have had some truth to them but which were blown out of proportion and distorted by some Arab media. First, a Norfolk *Ledger-Star* newspaper reporter discovered that an Israeli El Al cargo plane with its insignia inadequately concealed had loaded missiles and bombs from a US Naval Air Station in Virginia, and the Associated Press picked up this story on October 10th for worldwide distribution.²⁷ The report was apparently true, but it did not mean, as the Arabs immediately assumed, that the United States had decided to launch a major resupply effort for Israel. This small shipment was part of a phased delivery from an arms sale arranged long before the war. American newspapers quoted unnamed US officials that ammunition and missiles were being supplied but no large scale resupply program had been decided. Nevertheless when the Norfolk story got out, Cairo Radio broadcast an Egyptian government statement that it was a "clear provocation of the Arab nation's feelings at this critical stage."²⁸

The second story concerned American volunteers. On October 11th, Reuters reported from London that "several hundred men" from the United States had transited Heathrow airport. The next day, an influential Spanish newspaper reported that 150 American veterans of Vietnam, including Phantom pilots, had transited

26. Robert McCloskey statements of October 11 replying to allegation no. 3, and October 13 replying to nos. 4 and 5 (State Department cables 202319 and 203431, October 11 and 13).

27. Associated Press no. 79, Virginia Beach, October 10.

28. Cairo Radio, October 12, 1230Z, quoting Ahmad Anis; John Finney article, *New York Times*, October 12, p. 1.

Madrid enroute to Israel.²⁹ In both cases, if there were any truth to the stories, the men would have been private citizens going to volunteer. The State Department spokesman specifically denied that the US government or its personnel were involved in the fighting, and American officials reminded newsmen that the US government tries to discourage, but cannot legally prevent, private Americans from participating in a foreign war.³⁰

These two somewhat mysterious stories, of bomb shipments and Americans enroute to Israel, were added to the false ones in reinforcing the growing Arab conviction that the United States was intervening in the war. From this emerged unfounded news reports throughout the Arab world, which carried such headlines as:³¹

News of Entry by US Sixth Fleet to Supply Israel (*al-Madinah*, Saudi Arabia);

48 Phantoms and Other American Equipment to Replace Israel's Serious Losses; American Volunteers Pour Into Israel; Supply Israel With 350 Tanks to Replace its Losses in the Fighting (*al-Akhhbār*, Egypt);

Washington Supplies the Enemy With New Weapons and Men in the Face of Mounting Losses, American Pilots Participate in the Fighting (*al-Balagh*, Libya);

Arab Moves to Confront American Participation in the War (*al-Ra'i al-'Āmm*, Kuwait);

29. Reuters, October 11; Reuters 108, October 12 (State Department cable 203431, October 13).

30. Robert McCloskey statement of October 13 (State Department cable 203641, October 14); US official's statement (State Department cable 203633, October 13).

31. *Al-Madinah*, October 12, combined the *Nahār* and Cyprus reports; *al-Akhhbār's* October 12 text had nothing to support its headline except speculation by AP and "the White House spokesman refused to reply to any question about the supply of arms to Israel" and a report to Congress over defense appropriations. *Al-Balagh*, October 12, said "The US is now becoming entangled in intervention (*dukhul*) as a participant (*taraf*) in the battle as its assistance to the Zionist enemy has begun taking an obvious form." Second *Balagh* headline, and headlines from *Ra'i al-'Āmm* and *Muḥarrir*, from October 14 papers. Most of the Moroccan papers spread the allegations all over their front pages; *L'Opinion*, October 11, and *al-'Alam* and *al-Anbā'*, October 12 bannered the Norfolk story.

Arab People Preparing to Strike American Interests Following Intervention Against the Arabs (*al-Muḥarrir*, Lebanon).

There were a few embellishments and distortions of these stories,³² but most Arab media simply played these several news items straight, and let their cumulative effect imply American intervention. The few American denials were used to some extent,³³ but editors generally did not take care to repeat them when new allegations surfaced. Commentators used the stories as a basis for warning the United States; one, for example, tied together a 1967 myth with the new false charges to express a widely-held view:³⁴

Since the creation of the Israeli state, the US has not refrained from carrying out sabotage through the Zionist tool or indirectly by exploiting the Arab people's resources . . . During the Six-Day War [of 1967] . . . the Sixth Fleet provided Israel with an air umbrella to protect the Israeli forces . . . [Now] a number of aircraft from the American Sixth Fleet have actually landed in Israel . . . The United States is bound to come out of this shameful game a loser.

The Soviet Airlift

The Soviet Union began an airlift of military supplies and equipment to Egypt and Syria on October 10, a fact which US govern-

32. E.g. Cairo's *al-Akḥbār* and *Jumhūriyyah* of October 13 added to the Madrid story: "150 American pilots have arrived in Spain enroute to Israel with Phantoms," then the Palestine News Agency altered it to say the 150 Americans had transited "Torrejon Base, which is one of the US bases in Spain" rather than the commercial airport as Reuters had said (Iraq News Agency, October 13 1100Z). *Al-Akḥbār*, October 14, said of the Syrian story, "It is certain that this plane came from one of the American aircraft carriers." *Al-Balagh*, October 14, ran a photo of a serial number from a Phantom with US Navy markings over a caption, "This is evidence of the crime, America."
33. Beirut's *al-Nahār* and *Orient-Le Jour*, October 14, printed the McCloskey denial and were generally most scrupulous about balance, but the Madrid story was used October 13 without US denials by *el-Moudjahid*, Radio Algiers, *Ra'ī al-Āmm*, etc.
34. Morocco's *L'Opinion*, October 12. Similar editorials appeared the same day in Morocco's *al-Ālam*, Cairo's *al-Akḥbār* (headline: "America Will Pay the Price"), and *al-Ahrām*, in which Chief Editor Muḥammad Haykal said "some aid has actually begun reaching Israel" including "3 or 4 squadrons of Phantom planes."

ment officials announced the same day.³⁵ Neither the Soviet government nor the two recipient governments made any information on this airlift public at any time, but Washington did immediately in order to signal Moscow that it was watching closely. It is long-standing US policy to help maintain a Middle East military balance. The State Department spokesman said,³⁶ on the 10th: "If this turns out to be a massive airlift it would tend to put a new face on the situation," and on the 13th: "The airlift is continuing at what would appear to be a fairly substantial rate. If that persists, it would have the effect of creating serious difficulties."

At the same time, the Secretary of State warned at his press conference against a nuclear power conflict developing out of the Middle East war, and then in connection with the Soviet airlift said:³⁷ "We are having discussions with Israel about the special situation created by recent events."

Although these warnings were directed primarily at Moscow, they were also listened to intently in the Arab world. The Secretary's press conference received moderate attention in Arab media, which emphasized his comments on the Soviet Union. But since the Soviet-Arab airlift was not being discussed publicly by any government except the American, many Arabs thought the American repetition of the allegation was a deliberate ruse, as for example in the Kuwait newspaper story that was headlined, "America Spreads Rumors of Soviet Arms to Excuse Providing Israel with Planes." It said:³⁸

The American president is heading toward the provision of all the arms Israel asks after spreading rumors about the establishment

35. This date was given by Secretary Kissinger in his October 25 press conference, State Department press release 390, October 25; the announcement was made by the Pentagon and confirmed by the State Department spokesman.
36. Robert McCloskey statements, October 10 (State Department cable 201373, October 11, 1973) and October 13 (State Department cable 203633, October 13).
37. Secretary Kissinger press conference of October 12, State Department press release 380. This press conference received moderate attention in Arab media, most of it focusing on his remarks about the USSR.
38. *Al Ra'i al-'Amm*, October 12, p. 10, which also ran a story on p. 9 headlined "Are Sixth Fleet Planes Participating in the Fighting?" Also in commentaries in *al Muḥarrir*, October 11, and Algiers Radio at 2200Z on October 11.

of an air bridge between Moscow and the Arab states . . . American officials said the Soviet Union was airshipping military equipment to Egypt and Syria. Those officials were unable to describe the Russian equipment. . .

This charge was even made in Egypt while the Soviet airlift was operating into that country. On October 12, one of Cairo's leading dailies said editorially that the United States was "trying to fabricate excuses" to compensate Israel for its battlefield losses,³⁹ while another leading daily included this in a front page news story:⁴⁰

American propaganda machinery tried to call for American arms to Israel and volunteers, raising a cry about Soviet arms being sent to the Arab countries.

Then the official Egyptian government spokesman warned America against supplying Israel with arms used to attack Arab civilians, and said the US government had "intentionally circulated statements that the Soviet Union is supplying Egypt and Syria with military equipment by air." He did not specifically deny the statements, but left the implication of a denial which was given top Egyptian media treatment October 13th, both in headlines and in commentaries.⁴¹ All of this Arab reaction came before the United States had made the decision to begin the major resupply of Israel.

39. 'Alī Ḥamdī al-Jamāl editorial, *al-Ahrām*, October 12; Chief Editor Haykal wrote in the same paper that the US was already helping Israel and planning ways to increase that help (editorial "A Question").

40. Cairo's *al-Akhbār*, October 12, p. 1.

41. For details see Cairo Press Review, October 13, p. 16, 30; *al-Ahrām's* lead editorial of October 13 said, "The uproar the US is raising about Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt and Syria is a vicious ruse with which the US is trying to justify making up for Israeli losses at an unforeseen rate with the most sophisticated weapons." Cairo Radio commentary by Ṣabrī Subayha, October 13, 1800Z, said: "American government officials deliberately made statements that the USSR is supplying Egypt and Syria with military equipment . . . Such statements are provocative to the Arab nation." Cairo's Voice of the Arabs, October 13 at 1530Z, said: "The US is indulging in a baseless uproar about an alleged Soviet supply of many weapons to Egypt and Syria in the course of the battle. It is a malicious trick designed to justify the US arms supplies to Israel . . ."

American Resupply Decision

After one week of war, on October 13, the United States decided that its attempt to reach a ceasefire through quiet diplomacy with the combatants and the Soviet Union had failed, and that because the Soviet airlift was in its fourth day and had become massive, an American resupply effort to Israel did have to be launched.⁴² Israeli forces had pushed back the Syrian thrust by concentrating on that front, but Egyptian forces were well placed in the Sinai Peninsula, and Israel had already lost nearly as many men and more equipment than in the 1967 war.⁴³ The US government intended to announce this decision publicly on Monday, October 15th, when it actually began.⁴⁴ According to some observers, American officials wanted to delay publicizing the resupply effort as long as possible and then reveal the minimum necessary details, not only because of its usual no-comment policy on arms deals but also because of a concern for adverse Arab reaction.⁴⁵

Despite these efforts, however, the decision leaked out immediately, apparently from the Defense Department. The wire services on the afternoon of October 13 began quoting unnamed "US government sources in Washington" that the decision had been

42. Kissinger press conference, October 25, State Department press release no. 390, October 25.

43. Israel had lost nearly 100 aircraft, over 500 tanks, and over 3,000 men killed or wounded, *The October War*, Riad Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, eds., (Beirut: al-Nahar Press, 1973), pp. 21 and 41.

44. Kissinger in his October 25 press conference (cited) said the President decided on October 13th, and Jerusalem Radio, October 16, at 1908Z said the first of the planes landed that day. Marvin and Bernard Kalb, in *Kissinger* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974, pp. 472, 478), say the President decided on the airlift October 12 and it began the 13th, but the Kalbs' version appears to be incorrect.

45. The Kalbs, *op. cit.*, p. 474, quote Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's concern for Arab reaction, and Kissinger, in his October 12 press conference, after mentioning the airlift and US friendship with Israel, implied that he was concerned about this too, when he said "We have made a very serious effort in this crisis to take seriously into account Arab concerns and Arab views. On the other hand, we have to pursue what we consider to be the right course; we will take the consequences."

made,⁴⁶ and Arab media gave these news reports top billing.⁴⁷ Arab commentators assumed that the Washington leaks constituted the official announcement for a deliberate purpose; as one said:⁴⁸

American imperialism, alarmed at the turn taken by the battle, has been escalating its supplies to the Zionists and has pointedly made that public (sic), obviously with the purpose of intimidation of the Arab masses.

The misperception about the leak was due partly to Arab expectations of what America would do for Israel, but also to differences in the rôle of the press in the countries involved. When the US resupply decision was made in Washington on the 13th, it immediately became known in the Arab world then, two days before the official announcement, because the United States is such an open society and the press and wire services are so free and aggressive. By

46. Associated Press said that, although the Pentagon officially refused to discuss the matter, "Nixon administration sources said that the basic decision has been made and that movements of major US military gear to Israel would begin soon." (Fred S. Hoffman byliner, 2:55 pm, October 13). The UPI version was: "U.S. Government sources in Washington said the Nixon administration will start replacing some Israeli planes, tanks and other military equipment in a few days." (UPI Middle East Roundup, no. 96, 6:50 pm, October 13). See, for example, *New York Times*, October 14, p. 1.

47. E.g. October 14 papers: *al-Balagh*, Libya, p. 1, under headline "America Replaces Everything for the Enemy That it Lost" quoted "informed circles in the American Government" that the decision had been made; *Baghdad Observer*, p. 5, under headline "US Planning Adventure" warned against "a dangerous preparation for a military venture to intervene in the Mideast in favor of the Zionist enemy;" and *al-Siyāsah*, Kuwait, p. 7.

48. *Al-Jumhūriyyah*, Baghdad, October 14, lead editorial, "Struggle Until Victory," which added: "As a matter of fact, American imperialists are reported to have been taking active part in the Zionist aggression." The same view was expressed in *Cairo's Voice of the Arabs*, October 15, which said: "Despite extreme secrecy, news has leaked pertaining to US measures to succor the Zionists enemy with a flood of military hardware . . . The new US attempt, or plot, follows the failure of US policy . . . US colonialists have now announced (sic) the commencement of the supply to the Zionist colonizing entity of further military hardware." ('Alī Mūsā commentary, 1415Z). Other similar Cairo examples were Brāhīm Mīsaḥ *Voice of the Arabs* commentary October 15, 1130Z, *Cairo Radio* 1240Z and *Voice of Palestine Cairo* 1730Z.

contrast, the Soviet Union was able to carry out its resupply effort without any information about it ever leaking out of Moscow, Cairo or Damascus. Soviet media carried reports of the US resupply effort, but totally ignored the Soviet airlift for an entire week. Only on the 17th, and then in a very indirect and ambiguous way, did Soviet media refer at all to Soviet aid to the Arabs.⁴⁹ Egyptian and Syrian media apparently avoided the Soviet aid story because Moscow did and because they were not anxious to give the Russians credit for their military successes. The information on Moscow's airlift came therefore from Washington, which had gathered correct intelligence and made it public as a signal to Moscow—but that signal was seen by many Arabs as a deliberate lie, just as many of them saw the leaks of the 13th as deliberate propaganda directed against them. Suspicious and skeptical about governmental control over media from their own experience, they incorrectly assumed Washington was practicing it too.

Resupply Announcement

The State Department's announcement of the resupply decision, when it did come on October 15, was terse:⁵⁰

We watched and waited over this situation for several days, pursuing the objective of achieving a diplomatic arrangement that would bring an end to the fighting. We have begun some resupply of Israel . . . to prevent this massive airlift by the Soviets from unsettling the military balance in the area.

Coincidentally, the announcement came on the same day as some informal remarks which President Nixon made during a White House ceremony honoring a group of Vietnam war veterans. American policy, the President said,⁵¹

49. Moscow Radio finally gave in to criticism from Peking which had been belittling Soviet aid to the Arabs; Moscow Radio on October 17 commented that the "Arab public links Syrian and Egyptian efficiency to Soviet military aid which is rendered by the Soviet Union." No specifics were given.

50. Robert McCloskey statement, State Department transcript, October 15.

51. President Nixon statement, October 15, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, USGPO, October 22, 1973.

is like the policy that we followed in 1958 when Lebanon was involved, it is like the policy we followed in 1970 when Jordan was involved . . . We stand for the right of every nation in the Middle East to maintain its independence and security. We want the fighting to end.

The President's reference to 1958, when American marines landed in Lebanon at the country's request, and to 1970, when US forces were alerted during the Jordanian crisis, was widely interpreted as a threat of possible US military intervention, although it was not intended as such. The White House spokesman, commenting on these remarks, emphasized that US policy "is not one of aggression, it is not one to dominate any other country"; and the State Department spokesman also tried to dispel the impression that a threat was intended:⁵²

It needs to be emphasized that the president was speaking about a broad policy objective . . . and not about a specific tactic in the area, such as might have been illustrated by one of the situations to which he referred.

The Arabs, however, universally discounted these explanations and interpreted President Nixon's casual remarks as a deliberate threat to intervene. This multiplied the impact of the resupply announcement. Arab listeners heard a threat because they believed American intervention was quite possible in such a situation as then existed, and because the international wire services said the President seemed to be hinting at intervention. Media throughout the Arab world gave both the President's remarks and the resupply announcement top billing on October 16th. Some of them included the White House and State Department explanations,⁵³ but many ig-

52. State Department spokesman McCloskey press conference, Department of State transcript, October 15; White House spokesman Gerald Warren statement October 15, *Washington Post*, October 16. Reference to those two countries might, however, reinforce Arab suspicion that a reactionary move was afoot.

53. The most balanced reporting on the October 15 statements was in Beirut's *al-Nahār*, October 16, in a p. 12 article by Bāsīm Mu'allam, datelined Washington and carrying a p. 1 headline. It said that unnamed "observers explained Nixon's speech as a hint of intervention," but added: "Some observers quoting

nored these. Most typically, they wrapped the two stories together under big headlines like: "America Announces Officially It is Rearming Israel; Nixon Threatens Armed Intervention";⁵⁴ some emphasized only the President's remarks as the more significant (e.g. "Nixon Threatens Military Landing"), and a few said simply, "America Supports the Enemy."⁵⁵

A spate of commentaries appeared in Arab media on October 16th reacting to the two statements. This was a new high point in anti-American feeling; commentators tied the two together into interpretations like this one:⁵⁶

By its provision of new arms, the United States has dropped all pretense, and, faced with the defeat of its protégé on the battlefield, the head of the US administration did not hesitate to threaten to return to the darkest times of brinkmanship policy, to land the marines if the fate and security of Israel were in question.

Similar comments in other Arab countries used words like "American imperialism," "gunboat diplomacy" and "self-appointed policeman."⁵⁷ Many editorials simply refuted the American rationale that

sources in the White House denied in his speech that Nixon intended any direct military intervention in the area. They said the President was speaking in general terms." The headline was "Nixon Hints at Intervention to 'Establish Peace'," however.

54. Papers which emphasized both stories were Libya's *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, Jordan's *al-Ra'ī* ("Air Bridge Between Washington and Tel Aviv; Washington Officials: We Will Use Force to Ensure the Security of Israel"), Beirut's *al-Sha'b*, Kuwait's *Ra'ī al-Āmm*, all October 16. The one quoted in the text is Cairo's *al-Akhbār*.
55. *Al-Muḥarrir*, Beirut, and *al-Thawrah*, Baghdad, respectively. Other papers emphasizing the "threat" were Morocco's *al-'Alam* and *L'Opinion* and Maghreb Information, Cairo's *al-Ahrām*, Jordan's *al-Dustūr*, Kuwait's *al-Siyāsah*, and Tripoli Radio, Libya, 2100Z; *Kuwait Times* headlined simply "The Great American Betrayal" and Morocco's *Le Martin* "Nixon Reaffirms Total Support for Israel"—all October 16.
56. Unattributed commentary, Algiers Radio, October 16, 200Z, which was essentially the same as an editorial in *El Moudjahid*, October 16.
57. Beirut's *al-Nidā*, October 17, Cairo's *al-Akhbār*, October 16, and Damascus Radio at 1915Z, October 16, respectively. Commentaries on Algiers Radio at 2000Z, October 15 and Baghdad's *Voice of Palestine* at 2235Z, October 15, were similar.

a Middle East arms balance was necessary for peace, as this typical one expressed.⁵⁸

At a time when all peace-loving peoples are looking to America to . . . bring about an end to the tragedy . . . Washington's present aid to Israel and its direct or indirect participation in the conflict can only, on the contrary, encourage the Zionist state to continue its policy of expansion and bellicose schemes.

In addition, the Arabs simply believed that justice was on their side, that they had only retaken a small part of the land taken from them in 1967, and that America was now openly supporting continued Israeli occupation. Thus Arab media writers stressed that Arab forces were merely fighting for their "legitimate rights," as supported by all "the Arab peoples," whose will to resist would eventually prevail.⁵⁹ Many editorials also found in the "threat" of the President convincing proof of "the failure of Zionist armies in the field" because the United States had to "rescue" its ally from "devastating defeat."⁶⁰ Some went on to say that the announcement of American help for a "faltering" Israel "confirms the Arabs' continuing view that Israel is a protectorate without roots in the region."⁶¹

Another common theme, based on the widespread belief that had

58. Tunis, *L'Action*, October 16. This was similar to an editorial in *al-Amal*, Tunis, October 16, and to an editorial in the October 16 *al-Akhhbār*, quoted by Voice of the Arabs at 0525Z same day, and another in the same Cairo paper, p. 1, "What Does America Want?" The following day, that paper showed its bias in a news headline over a report from Oslo which it printed on p. 2: "Nobel Prize Awarded to Kissinger While US Intervenes Militarily to Kill Peace."
59. Algerian Press Service commentary, evening October 15 (Reuter RNR 01,0118, October 16) *al-Akhhbār*, October 16, Cairo; and Omdurman Radio, Sudan, at 1315Z, October 16, respectively. Similar comments were made by *al-Akhhbār*, Cairo, October 16, and *al-Ahrām*, Cairo, October 18 ("Two Diametrically Opposed Positions," *Ahrām* editorial broadcast also by Cairo Radio, October 18 at 0630Z.)
60. Commentaries broadcast by Algiers Radio at 2000Z, October 15, and Cairo's Voice of Palestine at 1918Z, October 16, respectively.
61. Beirut's *al-Nahār*, October 16; *Nahār*'s sister paper, *Orient-Le Jour*, also ran a similar editorial that day.

developed during the previous week, was expressed by one writer this way:⁶²

If the United States says it has started recently to send arms to Israel, this is a false assertion, because American weapons have been pouring into Israel since the first day of the fighting.

Some editorials went further, saying that Washington not only lied but was conducting a deliberate propaganda campaign against the Arabs.⁶³

The United States has assumed the task of continuing this psychological warfare [begun by Israel] using the weapons of threats to interfere in the Middle East and of stepping up the shipment of destructive weapons to Israel . . . to frighten the Arab fighters on the battlefields and weaken their will to fight.

A newspaper columnist in an oil producing country added his own twist to the theory:⁶⁴

Nixon's threat is probably aimed at cutting the ground from under the Arab oil producing countries which will be meeting here [Kuwayt] tomorrow to discuss possible steps in connection with cutting the flow of oil.

Finally, these American statements on October 15th led com-

62. Cairo's *al-Akhabār*, October 16, p. 1, "What Does America Want?" Similar editorials appeared on Algiers Radio at 2000Z on October 15 and 2000Z October 16 (the latter was essentially the same as an *El-Moudjahid* editorial that day); on Baghdad's Voice of Palestine at 2235Z October 15, and Cairo's Voice of Palestine at 1918Z, October 16. Baghdad's *al-Thawrah* newspaper printed a p. 1 news story, headlined "America Announces 'Officially' the Supply of Arms to Israel" which sounded like an editorial; it said: "It is known that this is the 'official' announcement on US arms which Washington began to supply to the enemy from the first day of the battles on October 6th."

63. Damascus Radio, 1215Z, October 17, which also said: "The news agencies attached to the ruling circles in the United States have been resorting to all sorts of ways to describe in thrilling detail how arms are being shipped to Israel." Algiers Radio at 2000Z, October 15, said the President's statement might be "only a maneuver to intimidate the Arab countries," while *Al-Ahrām*, Cairo, October 18, called it "psychological warfare manifest in threats or intimidation."

64. Kuwayt's *Ra'ī al-Āmm*, October 16.

mentators throughout the Arab world to call for actions to harm American interests in the area. Prior to the war, voices had been raised from time to time suggesting that Arabs should act against American interests because of American policy on Israel. But during the first week of the war, only media in Iraq, which had immediately nationalized American oil company shares, took that line. Then, at the end of the first week, as stories of American participation in the war circulated, columnists in other Arab countries began to revive the idea,⁶⁵ and it became quite widespread after the 15th. Some demanded use of the Arab "oil weapon" (embargoes, nationalization, etc.),⁶⁶ while others went further and demanded severance of all economic, political and military ties with the United States.⁶⁷ These latter demands were reminiscent of June 1967 when six Arab states suddenly broke diplomatic relations with Washington following President Nāṣir's accusation of American participation in that war. The situation was different from 1967, however. The Arabs knew that the breaking of diplomatic relations—which remained in

65. Cairo's *Voice of the Arabs* at 1530Z, October 13, said: "Arab oil must enter the battle now as the most important weapon against American partiality to Israel . . . The interests of the United States on Arab territory must be placed in peril." Morocco's *L'Opinion* printed editorials October 13 and 14 entitled "Black Gold and the Arab Cause" and "US Go Home," which said the US had "committed crimes" and should be punished with the oil weapon, adding: "You have conceived its [Israel's] creation as a means to penetrate the Arab world. You have supported it frenetically every time the Arab peoples wanted to recover what is rightfully theirs." Cairo's *Voice of the Arabs* at 1715Z on October 15 called for use of the oil weapon.

66. Beirut's *al-Jarīdah*, October 16. Cairo's *al-Jumhūriyyah*, October 16, in an editorial "Oil and Liberation" on p. 6 called for the oil weapon, and *al-Ahrām* on October 17 published the appeal by a former Iraqi oil minister for nationalization of American-owned petroleum. Algiers *Voice of Palestine* at 1830Z, October 16, appealed to Arab workers to "stop pumping oil immediately to the US. Destroy the oil pipelines. Stop loading US ships—burn them if you can!"

67. Beirut's *al-Nidā*, October 16, Morocco's *al-Bayān*, October 16, called for the evacuation of American military personnel from Morocco, and Iraq's news agency INA, October 17, reported that "progressive and nationalist forces in Lebanon" wanted to boycott US trade, remove Arab funds from US banks, and use the oil weapon. (INA, October 17 0944Z). Other commentaries called for action against US interests without being specific: Cairo's *al-Ahrām*, p. 1, October 16, *Voice of the Arabs*, at 0525Z, October 16, and *al-Akhbār*, October 16; and Beirut's *al-Muḥarrir*, October 16.

effect for several countries—had not had the desired effect on US Middle East policy. More important, it looked to them as if the military situation was running in their favor, unlike 1967, when they thought they had lost because of US intervention. Now, Arab anger and indignation over American moves in the October War slowly developed into a critical juncture for the United States during the second week of war, and finally to a deliberate embargo of Arab oil. This time, with the experience of 1967 behind them, and newly found confidence in their ability to control the oil market, the Arabs resolved to use this selective economic weapon.

Critical Period: October 16–22

The resupply announcement and President Nixon's remarks of October 15 focused Arab attention firmly on Washington. The US was kept firmly in view by a series of political events which dominated Arab media during the following week: President Sādāt of Egypt made his first wartime speech and appealed directly to the United States; President Nixon met with Arab representatives and later asked Congress for more aid for Israel; Arab oil ministers worked out new oil policies, and the United States joined the Soviet Union in sponsoring a UN ceasefire resolution. These events had quite different effects on the Arab view of America, which fluctuated considerably during the week.

Moderating Factors

The American statements of October 15th had evoked anger all over the Arab world, but 24 hours later, this negative reaction was muted and editorial calls for action against the US fell off sharply. To some extent, this was due to the belated arrival of news reports that Secretary Kissinger, on the night of the 15th, in response to newsmen's questions about President Nixon's remarks, had said that the United States was not in fact planning to intervene militarily in the Middle East.⁶⁸ It was due to the fact that Arab forces on the

68. He made the remarks late Monday evening at a White House dinner for former Secretary Rogers, but they missed Tuesday morning papers in the Middle East. The story was carried by the Wednesday papers, e.g. Kuwait's

battlefield were still doing relatively well, it seemed, given the Arab assumption of military inferiority and the wartime media tendency to stress positive aspects of the conflict in order to boost morale.

But the most important reason for the cooling of Arab anger over the resupply announcement was the non-inflammatory, restrained, moderate tone of President Sādāt's October 16th speech. Syrian President Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad had made a speech on the 15th which also sounded moderate to Arab listeners—his only reference to the United States was a mild warning to (unnamed) parties “who support Israeli aggression” that their “numerous interests in the Arab world” would be endangered.⁶⁹ But President Sādāt's speech had a far greater impact on the Arab world, and attracted much more attention throughout the area because Egypt clearly retained political and psychological leadership in the Arab world even though Egypt and Syria had launched the war together. Asad's speech received only minor coverage in media outside Syria, but Sādāt's speech was given top frontpage headlines throughout the Arab world on October 17.⁷⁰

In a low keyed and measured way, Sādāt specifically assured the Israelis “we are not advocates of genocide” and have not “fought to commit aggression against the territory of others,” but for “peace and justice” based on UN-endorsed restoration of the 1967 territories and legitimate Palestinian rights. Then he appealed directly to the United States, saying it was “a pity and regrettable” that America failed to understand that the real “aggressor” was Israel for occupying the 1967 territories, and that the American resupply

al-Siyāsah, p. 10 and *Ra'ī al-Āmm*, p. 11, by most of the Lebanese and Jordanian papers, etc. *Al-Nahār* gave the story a p. 11 headline, “Kissinger Denial: We Do Not Intend to Send American Forces To the Mideast,” but *al-Siyāsah* gave it a different slant: “Kissinger: We Will Intervene (*sanatudkhul*) After the Soviet Union Intervenes Militarily In The Mideast.”

69. Full text of Asad speech in *al-Ba'th*, Damascus, October 16, pp. 1–2, English translation in Rayyes and Nahas, *op. cit.*, pp. 280–85. The speech was clearly intended to be moderate, but Syrian media emphasized the one hawkish line Asad uttered.

70. Beirut's *al-Nahār* and *Orient-Le Jour* gave it banners, while Beirut's *Muḥarrir*, Jiddah's *al-Madīnah*, and Kuwait's *Ra'ī al-Āmm* and *Siyāsah* made it their leading story, for example.

effort was rewarding the aggressor. In an "open letter" to President Nixon, Sādāt offered to accept a ceasefire immediately, reopen the Suez Canal, and even attend a peace conference with Israel which he had not previously agreed to do.⁷¹ To Arab ears, this was clearly a moderate and generous offer, coming in the middle of a war which Egypt had not lost, and the day after the American resupply announcement. Cairo Radio said the speech was a direct reply to that announcement,⁷² and its measured and restrained tone did help considerably to dampen Arab anger.

Egyptian media underlined Sādāt's appeal to a sense of justice which he made from a position of increased military credibility. They said "even the United States" should see that sending Arab forces into Israeli-held Sinai was not "aggression." This theme had been mentioned by a few columnists earlier in the war,⁷³ but now it became common as writers in other Arab countries picked up Sādāt's lead. One put it this way:⁷⁴

[Sādāt's] peace plan puts the United States and Israel face to face with justice . . . The Arabs are determined to struggle to the end [but] they are now extending their hands to peace.

Because Sādāt's approach in the context of the circumstances deliberately seemed to be moderate, the more radical Arab editors refrained from speaking out, although their headlines highlighted

71. Full text in *al-Ahrām*, October 17, p. 1, English translation in Rayyes and Nahas, *op. cit.*, pp. 267-79.

72. Cairo Radio at 0600Z, October 17.

73. *Al-Ahrām* editorial, quoted also by Middle East News Agency, October 17, FBIS, October 18, G-8. This theme had been mentioned by a few earlier, e.g. *al-Akhbār*, October 16, mentioned "legitimate rights" editorially, and an Algerian Press Service commentary running Monday evening stressed "legitimate national rights," Reuter RNR 01, 0118Z, October 16.

74. Jordan's *al-Urdun*, October 17; similar editorials appeared in Lebanese papers October 17 (*al-Nahār*, *Orient-Le Jour*, *al-Safa*) and 18 (*al-Nahār*, *al-Hayāt*); *al-Amal*, Beirut, October 18, said: "American policy in the region appears today more than at any other time as in immoral policy based on the violation of human rights for the sake of military domination."

Sādāt's harsher words about America rather than his peace overture to Washington.⁷⁵

Another event which helped the American image in Arab eyes was President Nixon's meeting on October 17 with four Arab foreign ministers, after which he said:⁷⁶

Whatever differences we have are with regard to the means . . . but the goal of a fair and just and equitable peace we are all dedicated to.

Like the Sādāt speech the day before, this gesture helped focus attention on American policy. Its positive effect on Arab opinion, as reflected in Arab media, was that the United States seemed to be making an effort to listen to Arab views and to participate in working on the problem of peace. It was especially helpful in countries whose foreign ministers participated; their media gave the story prominent publicity with considerable sympathetic treatment of the President's effort.⁷⁷ Media elsewhere, too, reflected Arab satisfaction with the event. Some newspapers ran headlines like "Nixon Announces Support for a Just Solution," while editorials expressed this common thought about his remarks:⁷⁸

75. E.g. *al-Muḥarrir*, Beirut, top headline, October 17: "Sadat: American Support Does Not Frighten Us, All Its Interests Are In Our Lands, Not Israel;" Baghdad's *al-Thawrah*, October 17, p. 1: "President Sadat Criticizes American Support For The Enemy; Beirut's *al-Yawm*: "We Will Continue to Fight Until Liberation."

76. Remarks on October 17, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, USGPO, October 22, 1973.

77. E.g. Kuwait's *al-Siyāsah*, October 18, frontpaged a 3-column photo of President Nixon with the four foreign ministers, and banner headlined President Nixon's statement on p. 8; Jiddah's *al-Madinah* ran it as the second biggest story October 18 under a headline "Nixon Assures Arab Ministers the Settlement Must Be Peaceful, Just and Honorable," and included the full text of the President's remarks plus Saudi Minister Saqqāf's tribute to Secretary Kissinger who had settled the Vietnam war and "probably can play a rôle in the settlement of the Mideast problem." Moroccan media reflected public satisfaction with the visit by suspending editorials critical of US policy, temporarily.

78. Headline from *al-Nahār*, Beirut, October 18, editorial from Tunisia's *al-Amal*, October 18. Similar headlines and news coverage appeared elsewhere, e.g.

We welcome this healthy attitude shown by the US president, hoping it will be followed as soon as possible by effective action for putting an end to the Israeli aggression.

Thus, although the United States had, since the beginning of the war, made a major effort through quiet diplomatic channels to "crystallize a consensus" and bring about a ceasefire, this effort was just beginning to be noticed by the Arabs. It was ignored partly because the initial US ceasefire appeal asked a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, which later gave way to a ceasefire in place that was more to the Arabs' liking. It was also because the US diplomatic effort, unlike the military, was not visible. This began to change when President Nixon met with Arab representatives. Most important was the emergence at this time of an idea stressed by President Sādāt and reinforced by the White House meeting; as one headline put it: "Responsibility for Peace Placed on Nixon."⁷⁹ This thought developed even more widespread credence in later weeks and months in the Arab world as Secretary Kissinger proved the sincerity of the American interest in helping settlement efforts as a mediator. On October 18th it was just beginning to be discussed, so not only the more radical Arab papers but even some Cairo ones downplayed the significance of the White House meeting.⁸⁰

By that date, Arab media were becoming preoccupied with two other aspects of American policy—arms and oil—which carried

al-Ahrām, Cairo and *al-Dustūr*, Jordan, October 18. *Al-Nahār* carried a special Washington byliner on p. 11 by Samir 'Aṭallāh and Bāsim Mu'allam, and a 4-column photo on p. 1.

79. Beirut's *al-Jarīdah*, October 18. The Tunisian paper *L'Action* October 18 commented: "The role the US should play to bring Israel back to reason is of foremost importance . . . The US president can, if he wants to, hasten the hour of such a settlement using the considerable influence of his country."

80. The Middle East News Agency reported on October 19 that the meeting had been a failure (MENA Damascus 1314Z); even Cairo's *al-Akhbār* and *al-Jumhūriyyah* gave the story only brief 1-column treatment, p. 1, on October 18, and the *Akhbār* headline stressed the only negative aspect: "Nixon Announces After Meeting Arab Ministers, We Differ On Means To Reach A Settlement;" Libyan media ignored the meeting entirely, and Iraqi media used the occasion to discredit Saudi Arabia.

negative implications: events and news stories in these two areas fed Arab media with evidence of a growing Arab-American confrontation, overshadowing the moderating factors noted above.

Resupply Stories

Starting from the fourth day of the war, October 9th, Arab media had featured reports—most of them false—of US military support for Israel. Then, starting on the 18th, after the American resupply airlift to Israel had in fact begun, these stories increased. Although State Department spokesmen as usual refused to comment on details of arms arrangements, information did come out of the Pentagon, officially and unofficially, on the nature and magnitude of the American airlift. Official statements were rather terse,⁸¹ and the bulk of the information was obtained by a resourceful Washington press corps from bureaucrats who probably thought publicity for the efficient American airlift to Israel might help ease the Pentagon's budget through Congress. But Arab editors knew nothing about these domestic political factors, and as before, they tended to believe, probably quite incorrectly, that the steady flow of information about the airlift was a deliberate leak by the government and aimed at the Arab world. As Cairo Radio said on the 19th, both the United States and Israel had made a "deliberate effort during the past two days to talk a lot about the quality and quantity of weapons" going to Israel in order to "frighten" Egypt and Syria. It added:⁸²

The Egyptian and Syrian peoples have become completely immune to the psychological warfare manifested in threatening or intimidating them with US weapons.

The reports coming out of Washington had high credibility and Arab media featured them, often omitting the American rationale of

81. E.g. statements by Defense Secretary Schlesinger, October 18 and 26 (DOD News Release October 18, 1973, State Department Press Release, November 19, 1973).

82. Cairo Radio commentary, at 1630Z, October 19; Voice of the Arabs broadcast same day, 1530Z, criticized VOA and BBC "lies" about the situation.

the necessity to maintain the arms balance.⁸³ There were a few editorials from radical commentators attacking US arms policy, such as the one which said:⁸⁴

Now that America is pouring huge quantities of military supplies into Israel, an altogether new situation arises of which we must take full notice . . . When we give battle to Israel, we give battle to America as well, and we will confront, if not American regular forces, then American arms, rockets, aircraft and volunteers.

But most of the impact on Arab opinion was through news reports alone, and it was for this reason that Arab editors and governments friendlier to the United States tended to downplay such news stories as much as possible.⁸⁵

The especially sensitive question of American personnel helping the Israelis came up again, and it was here that some radical editors distorted news items to make them appear worse than they were. Washington news reports that American non-combat technicians were accompanying the airlift to help with deliveries became, in some Arab media, deployment of "intelligence specialists," "pilots and radio jamming experts," or simply "non-volunteer forces,"⁸⁶ and Washington's explanations were ignored.

83. Baghdad's *al-Jumhūriyyah*, October 19, said editorially American "imperialists" were deliberately advertising their arms deliveries for psychological warfare. *Baghdad Observer*, October 18 and *Voice of the Arabs* same day, had similar commentaries. (*Voice of Arabs* at 1530Z.) News stories carried as many details as were available, plus speculation; e.g. Cairo's *al-Ahrām*, October 18, p. 1., *al-Akhbār*, October 19, p. 1; Kuwait's *Ra'ī al-ʿĀmm*, p. 11; Beirut's *al-Nahār*, October 18 top story, p. 1; Cairo Radio, October 17, 1800Z and *Voice of Palestine*, October 19, 0640Z.
84. *al-Jumhūriyyah*, Baghdad, October 19. Similar editorials appeared in Baghdad's *al-Thawrah*, October 18, Beirut's *al-Sha'b*, October 18, and on Tripoli Radio at 0030Z, October 20, and *Voice of Palestine* at 0640Z on October 19.
85. Saudi Arabian media totally ignored the resupply stories through October 22, and Jordanian media downplayed them, in both cases apparently on government request.
86. *El-Moudjahid*, Algiers, October 18; *al-Liwa*, Beirut, October 18; and *Voice of Palestine*, Algiers, at 1830Z, October 19, respectively. Even Egyptian papers, normally restrained, carried errors when the source was a Western news agency, e.g. *al-Akhbār*, October 18, p. 1 story quoting AFP.

Even Egyptian newspapers, which had been restrained during the war, carried such distortions when the source was a Western news agency. Then on October 19, when the Egyptian government declared that "foreign volunteers in the enemy ranks" would be treated as mercenaries and "treated accordingly," a Cairo paper explained that this warning was directed at the United States.⁸⁷

The Oil Weapon

The actual use of Arab oil as a political weapon was the other big story which helped Arab media focus negative attention on the United States starting October 18th. Public demands for action against American interests grew to such an extent during the October 13-16 period that on Wednesday, the 17th, representatives of Arab oil producing states met in Kuwait and agreed on oil production cuts that were directed primarily at the United States. President Sādāt's relatively moderate speech of the 16th did not prevent this action, nor had it intended to. Compared to what radicals such as Iraq were calling for, the decision was a moderate one. This meeting of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) declared:⁸⁸

The war resulting from Israel's defiance of our legitimate rights, with the backing and support of the United States . . . prompts the Arabs [to reduce production by at least 5% monthly to] compel Israel to withdraw from our occupied lands and make the United States aware of the exorbitant price . . . of its blind and unlimited support for Israel.

This announcement, and resulting actions taken by individual member states, provided material for major headlines and anti-American commentaries throughout the Arab world. A typical front page headline on October 18th was: "Oil Weapon Enters the Battle,"

87. The consequence is that they would not be taken prisoner. All Cairo media on October 20 carried the official statement by Aḥmad Anīs, government spokesman, and *al-Ahrām* printed the interpretation.

88. OAPEC Ministerial Council statement, October 17, broadcast on Kuwait Radio at 2000Z.

over a news story emphasizing that the decision was aimed at Washington, "in answer to the United States arming Israel."⁸⁹ Saudi Arabia, whose American-owned ARAMCO was the biggest Arab oil producer and the biggest supplier of Arab oil to the US, announced on the 18th it would cut production by ten per cent as a warning to Washington for helping Israel, and if this failed it would completely stop oil exports to the United States. Saudi media amplified this announcement in their news coverage,⁹⁰ and stressed in their commentaries that this policy proved the kingdom would "meet its commitments" and "devote all its resources" to the Arab struggle.⁹¹

Other OAPEC states cut oil production five or ten per cent, and two—Libya and Abu Dhabi—announced on the 19th that they would ban all oil exports to America because production cuts were not enough.⁹² Iraqi media of course agreed,⁹³ and a few radical

89. Cairo's *al-Akhbār*, byliner by Junaydī Khalaf-Allah, p. 1. Cairo's *al-Jumhūriyyah*, Amman's *al-Raī*, Beirut's *al-Nahār* and *al-Anwar*, all had similar stories the same day.
90. Saudi newspapers, October 19, gave their banner headlines exclusively to the decision, e.g. *al-Madīnah*'s top headline: "The Kingdom Uses Its Efforts To Straighten Out America's Current Position And Its Military Assistance to Israel; The Kingdom Will Stop Exports of Oil To America If The Efforts Do Not Lead To Tangible Results." Saudi production in August 1973 was 8.3 million B/D, and exports to the US 0.6 m B/D.
91. E.g. Riyadh Radio commentary of October 19 said the US would receive less oil because Israel was becoming "very obstinate, barbaric and arrogant because of all the support it is getting." *Al-Bilād* editorial said "the decision . . . emphasizes that the kingdom always means what it says" and that the US should have heeded Fayṣal's warning in his September *Newsweek* interview.
92. Tripoli Radio commentary at 0030Z, October 20, called the Kuwait Conference decisions "weak and disappointing" and the ministers "collectively failed to perform a duty dictated by the pan-Arabism of the battle," so Libya "acted on its own" and banned exports to America. Only Iraq took this hard line with Libya. Abu Dhabi Radio at 1230Z, October 19, announced the ban "until the US changes its hostile attitude toward the Arab nation."
93. Baghdad Radio, October 19, Ḥafīz al-Qabbānī feature at 1920Z; *al-Jumhūriyyah* editorial, October 19, said the decision was a result of "Arab reactionary policy," and Tāriq al-Sha'b on October 19 said it was "disgraceful."

commentators said the OAPEC decision had not gone far enough, pointedly blaming Saudi Arabia in editorials like this:⁹⁴

The oil kings have disappointed all hopes . . . [by] this feeble decision . . . Before American policy can be liberated from Israel, Saudi policy must be liberated from being a pawn of American interests.

Most Arabs, particularly in oil producing countries, seemed to believe, however, that the production cut was indeed a serious step. Media throughout the area gave it considerable newsplay,⁹⁵ and commentators welcomed it because, as one put it:⁹⁶

[The actions] embody the will of the Arab nation . . . This decision is a warning to the United States to abandon its pro-Israeli policy that opposes the just struggle of the Arabs to liberate Arab territory.

Arab leaders in the 1967 war had broken diplomatic relations with the United States in retaliation for alleged US participation in the war. That move had not achieved the desired result, and now that Arab oil states were more self confident about dealing with the West, they decided to try a new tactic aimed more directly at American economic interests. Nobody would definitely predict it would

94. *Al-Muḥarrir*, Beirut, October 19. A second editorial in the paper said, "Arab oil ministers decided that Arab blood is cheaper than Arab oil." Cairo Radio at 0615Z on October 19 broadcast an *al-Jumhūriyyah* editorial suggesting other ways to harm US interests, as did *al-Fajr al-Jadīd* and *al-Bayraq* in Libya, October 18, and Beirut's *al-Sha'b*, October 18.

95. E.g. on October 18 Kuwait's *al-Siyāṣah* and Libya's *al-Balagh* gave the story top banner headlines; October 19 it was the no. 2 story in *al-Balagh* and Beirut's *al-Nahār*, and was p. 1 news in Tunisia's *al-Amal*, Jordan's *al-Raī*.

96. Voice of the Arabs commentary by Ṣabrī Subayha at 1800Z on October 19 similar to *Jumhūriyyah* editorial of October 19 and *Ahrām* editorial of October 18 by Ṣalāḥ Muntaṣir. Tunisia's *La Presse* editorial predicted oil pressure would force the US to "change its attitude." Even cartoons carried the message of oil being used to fight America, e.g. Kuwait's *al-Siyāṣah*, October 18, and Beirut's *al-Nahār*, p. 12, October 19.

work, and there was pressure from radical quarters to go further, but they took the step and watched for results.

The \$2.2 Billion Request for Israel

On Friday, October 19th, as the Arabs were still debating whether oil production cuts were sufficient to affect US policy, President Nixon asked Congress to "authorize emergency security assistance of \$2.2 billion for Israel." This request was larger than any previous one, and the President said it was to be mostly in the form of more attractive grant aid rather than the usual sales, and that \$825 million had already been spent during the war for Israeli arms. The President explained that the request resulted from the Soviet airlift threatening to upset the Middle East arms balance, and that not all of the \$2.2 billion would be spent if the war ended soon.⁹⁷ He did not mention the oil embargo at all; in fact, US officials had treated the oil question in very low key all along, so as not to heat up the issue with unnecessary rhetoric,⁹⁸ and it did not seem appropriate to bring up the embargo at this point.

To the Arabs, however, the \$2.2 billion request looked like open defiance of the OAPEC warning. As in the case of the resupply announcement at the beginning of the week, they did not accept the American explanation of a need for "balancing" the Soviet effort, or bolstering Israeli military strength, since Israel seemed able to defend itself very well anyway. Arabs reacted angrily to the President's announcement, and even moderates felt compelled to act. Within 24 hours, Riyadh Radio was carrying a royal decree announcing that:⁹⁹

97. President Nixon's message to Congress, October 19, 1973, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, October 22, 1973, USGPO.

98. US spokesmen said several times, in response to newsmen's questions, that Arab oil producers had not officially threatened to cut off oil supplies. Robert McCloskey statements, October 11, 13 and 16 (State Department cables 201854, 203633, and 204920, October 11, 13 and 16). When the production cuts did come, he said they were "a matter of some regret" but that the US could handle the emergency (State Department transcript, October 18, McCloskey briefing).

99. Riyadh Radio at 2005Z, October 20.

In view of the increasing US military support for Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has decided to stop exporting oil to the United States because the latter has adopted this attitude.

Five other Arab states followed the Saudi example the next day, ending all significant Arab oil shipments to the United States in response to the \$2.2 billion arms request.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, Bahrayn announced cancellation of its naval facilities agreement with the United States "as a result of the current American hostile stand against the Arab nation."¹⁰¹

These actions were given top news space in media throughout the Arab world, and they revived some earlier editorial themes. Several commentators echoed Cairo's prestigious Voice of the Arabs, which said:¹⁰²

. . . pouring arms free of charge into Israel makes the United States the number one enemy of the Arabs. Israel is only a tool in its hands . . . The direct US rôle in it [the war] necessitates the use of all weapons, including military, political and economic. American interests lie in the Arab homeland and not in Israel.

Columnists again accused America of injustice, saying that by providing Israel with massive arms, "America has refused to submit to the voice of righteousness, justice and peace."¹⁰³ The warnings to America had been clear, they said, but:¹⁰⁴

100. Abu Dhabi and Libya had been first and second on October 19, Saudi Arabia was third, followed on October 21 by Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrayn and Dubai; Oman became no. 9 to embargo on October 25. They gave the US \$2.2 billion arms requests as the reason.

101. Press release issued by Bahrayn Council of Ministers, quoted by Riyadh Radio at 1900Z, October 20, The US was given one year's notice.

102. Şalâh Suwayfî commentary at 1130Z, October 20. An editorial in *al-Bilâd*, Jiddah, said the embargo was because of a "hostile attitude against our rights." Jiddah's *al-Nadwah*, October 20, attacked the US without mentioning it directly, in an editorial "The Enemies Of The Arabs."

103. 'Ukâz, Jiddah, October 21. A similar editorial was published in *al-Nahâr*, Beirut, October 20.

104. Hilmî al-Buluk on Voice of the Arabs, Cairo at 1130Z, October 21. Similar commentaries were carried in Amman's *al-Dustûr*, October 21 and Jiddah's *al-Madînah*, October 21. Beirut's *Orient-Le Jour*, October 20 and 'Abd al-Fattâh Hilâl on Cairo Radio same day said the US was defeating its own interests in the Middle East with the \$2.2 billion request.

. . . the United States believed or imagined that the Arab states were not serious in using oil in the battle . . . [and] did not see the true significance of this [OAPEC] decision, believing it was a mere threat . . . This must explain President Nixon's request, . . . after the decision of the Arab states to reduce oil production, to allocate \$2.2 billion to assist Israel militarily. . . . The US should know that the Arab states are capable of taking even greater measures against US interests . . . We are prepared to go all the way in opposing the US challenge.

Iraq now announced that it had not even signed the OAPEC agreement because it did not go far enough, and Iraqi media (together with Libyan) continued to call for the total liquidation of American interests in the Arab world.¹⁰⁵ Most Arabs, however, felt that the embargo on oil was sufficient, and they expressed satisfaction that oil had finally been used as a political weapon.¹⁰⁶ Although many Arabs were nervous about a confrontation with the United States, editorials expressed confidence that the embargo would work, for example:¹⁰⁷

The American citizen who is going to suffer from a shortage of oil for his car and household facilities will soon ask what he has to gain by supporting the Israelis in their war against the Arabs and in their refusal to implement UN resolutions.

This optimism about the effectiveness of the oil "weapon" would grow in the following weeks and months. But during the next few

105. *Al-Thawrah* and *Baghdad Observer*, October 21, and Baghdad Radio at 1818Z, October 21. Iraq's official news agency INA said Iraqis called for "total liquidation of American economic interests" (Reuters RNR 12, October 22). Libya's *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, October 20, in an article by Kāmil Badr, "Oil, Money and The Total Confrontation With the Enemy," took a similar line.

106. E.g. commentaries by Algiers Radio at 2000Z, October 20 and Tunisia's *al-Sabāh*, October 22.

107. Jiddah's *al-Madīnah*, October 21. *Al-Anwār*, Beirut, October 21, put it differently: "America's fingers are now between Arab teeth which are biting down gradually and unhurriedly." Cairo's *al-Akhbār*, October 19, said the embargo was a "slap in the face for the US," while *al-Ahrām* and *al-Akhbār* on October 21 ran news stories implying the embargo would work.

days, American and Soviet diplomatic and military moves captured the headlines and the thoughts of the Arab public.

Superpower Ceasefire Effort, October 20–25

On Saturday, October 20, Secretary Kissinger suddenly flew to Moscow, and the next day worked out with the Soviet Union a joint ceasefire agreement which American Ambassador John Scali presented immediately to the UN Security Council. Ambassador Scali declared that both superpowers would lend their good offices to facilitate a negotiated settlement.¹⁰⁸ Arab media had, up to that point, paid very little attention to the statements that US officials had been making since the beginning of the war about American efforts at quiet diplomacy with all relevant parties including the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁹ But the Kissinger trip and agreement threw a spotlight on US mediation efforts, and Arab media gave this new development top billing.¹¹⁰

Arab reaction to it was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Arabs were becoming aware from battle reports that Israel was starting to gain the upper hand, even though there was some over-

108. Ambassador John Scali statement, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 12, 1973.

109. News reports of Secretary Kissinger's October 12 press conference, and the daily press briefings of his spokesman did in some media mention this, but not prominently, and there were no commentaries on these remarks. Nor did they highlight President Nixon's comment that the US "is trying to play a mediating rôle" and "has been actively engaged in efforts to contribute to a settlement" (October 10 and 19 statements, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, USGPO, October 15 and 22, 1973). Finally, on October 19, a few commentators focused on the subject: *al-Ahrām* chief editor Muḥammad Haykal, for whom US-Soviet relations is of special interest, talked about the "hot line" in his column and frontpaged an "exclusive" report on US-Soviet contacts; Cairo's *al-Akhbār* mentioned briefly that Premier Kosygin had been in Cairo; Beirut's *al-Nahār* editorialized that superpower agreements were still difficult; and Tunisia's *L'Action* said the superpowers' attitude was "ambiguous" so far (article by "A.B.," "The Only Road to Peace.")

110. E.g. Jiddah's *al-Madīnah*, October 21 and October 22, made the Moscow talks its no. 2 story and on October 23 all Saudi papers bannered the ceasefire in extra large type. Beirut's *al-Nahār* followed the same pattern. Jordanian papers gave the story third place, under oil embargo news, until October 23 when they bannered it.

optimism in Arab media accounts, and they could see some advantages to a ceasefire at that point. Egypt's quick acceptance of the UN resolution strongly reinforced that idea, since Egypt had been leading the Arab war strategy. Also, many Arabs had for years been calling for direct American participation in settlement efforts since America was Israel's only major arms supplier. They also were encouraged by the participation of the Soviet Union which professed to look out for Arab interests. Finally, the US was now backing a ceasefire in place, which the Arabs saw as a gain, rather than a return to the 1967 lines, which they had regarded as a setback. On the other hand, however, there were latent suspicions in the Arab world that a solution coming from "outside" would be against their interests. Recent events had reinforced the Arab conviction that America was so completely partial to Israel that it could not be helpful in finding a just settlement.

Therefore, Arab reaction to the October 22nd ceasefire resolution and the American rôle in it was hesitant and confused, a mixture of hope, suspicion and doubt. Arab opinion and media commentary, fairly unified in war, was beginning to diversify more over how to make peace. Egyptian media, following the Egyptian government's lead out of loyalty to the national interest and probably on direct instructions from the régime, generally supported the ceasefire agreement as soon as Egypt accepted it.¹¹¹ They showed, through news selection and commentaries, how the agreement was in harmony with President Sādāt's war aims and Egyptian interests.¹¹² And they stressed that US-Soviet sponsor-

111. *Al-Ahrām* frontpaged a report on the trip October 21, saying "observers" consider contacts a "prelude to a joint initiative," but giving no hint of support for that. *Al-Akhbār* on October 20 reported under a p. 1 headline "America Refuses A Settlement Until Israel Readies Its Forces" and chief editor Ihsān 'Abd al-Quddūs wrote that Moscow wanted an explicit agreement but Washington and Israel favored dangerously vague terms. *Akhbār*, October 22, first edition, carried an editorial criticizing US active "participation" in the war, but the third edition, printed at dawn after the ceasefire agreement had been announced, gave it four banner headlines and dropped the anti-US editorial for one praising the accomplishments of the Egyptian army.

112. All Cairo papers, October 23, gave the ceasefire most of p. 1 and downplayed the continuing news of US arms deliveries to Israel. *Al-Ahrām* also added a

ship meant a superpower commitment to help carry it out; as one Cairo daily put it:¹¹³

The undertaking by the two superpowers of a special commitment regarding yesterday's Security Council resolution . . . is a position that neither the US nor Israel has ever before accepted.

Elsewhere in the Arab world, commentators were not quite so sure about the agreement. A few welcomed it, but even pro-Egyptian and pro-Soviet writers would only go so far as to say that President Sādāt must know what he was doing.¹¹⁴ Strong criticism of the American rôle came from Iraqi and Libyan writers. Libyan commentators called it a "plot hatched in the dark by the major powers against the desire of the Arab masses."¹¹⁵ In Iraq, which had close ties with the Soviet Union, the media downplayed the ceasefire agreement while continuing to call for the elimination of US interests in the Middle East.¹¹⁶ A few other radical editorials

special report by its Political and Strategic Center saying the agreement embodied the principles of President Sādāt's October 16 speech and this was the best time for a ceasefire. *Akhbār's* Mūsā Šabrī praised Arab military heroes who had "saved the UN charter" from "Israel's aggressive inclination and US support."

113. *Al-Ahrām* editorial of October 23, and Maḥmūd Sharaf commentary on Cairo Radio at 1230Z on October 23.
114. E.g. Beirut's *al-Anwar* and *al-Sha'b*, October 23, exemplified the latter category. Positive editorials appeared in Beirut's *al-Nahār* and Tunisia's *La Presse* on October 23, and in *al-Dustūr*, October 22, which said the oil embargo and Watergate must have helped bring about the ceasefire.
115. Tripoli Radio at 0100Z, 1230Z and 2130Z, October 22. The press downplayed the news, e.g. *al-Balagh*, October 21 gave it only 1 column on p. 1, October 22 ignored it, October 23 finally gave it top space, and October 24 banner on p. 2 said "Arab Masses Denounce Decision on Cease-Fire" referring to a popular rally in Baida; another headline, "Any Agreement Between America and Russia Will Not Be In Our Interests" appeared to be over a news story but was really an unsigned editorial.
116. Headlines in the *Baghdad Observer* and *al-Thawrah*, October 23, stressed the rejection of the ceasefire by Palestinian leaders, but "Egypt And The Enemy Agree." Baghdad Radio, October 21, at 1818Z attacked ceasefire plans. A typical *al-Thawrah* banner headline on the 24th was: "Arab Popular Denunciation of Security Council Decision," and the official news agency INA ran a story October 24 quoting "informed sources" in Beirut that the CIA was defending the ceasefire resolution.

were openly negative, expressing the "disappointment of the Arab public" which had "wanted to continue fighting whatever its results."¹¹⁷ But many of the radical writers were silent, caught in a period of uncertainty because not just the US and Israel but also Egypt and the Soviet Union were involved in the ceasefire effort.¹¹⁸

The most common reaction in the Arab world, as expressed in the media, was a skeptical wait and see attitude. Editorials expressed doubt about the good intentions of both Washington and Moscow, and their ability to reconcile the widely divergent Arab and Israeli views. They also suspected that the ceasefire might turn out to be just a "breathing space" for Israel to prepare for a new military thrust.¹¹⁹ One put the widespread concern this way:¹²⁰

Is the Security Council resolution a trap for the Arab cause? . . .
Have the Arab states been given sufficient guarantees from the two superpowers that they will force Israel to withdraw?

Diversities in Arab views of the situation then intensified as events rapidly unfolded, from October 22 to 25. First, fighting continued past the ceasefire deadline of the 22nd set by the UN resolution. It is not clear who violated the ceasefire first, and each

117. Beirut's *al-Bayraq* October 23 editorial. INA reported from Beirut on October 23 that demonstrators marched in the streets there against the agreement, a fact most Beirut papers thought too unimportant to print. Beirut's pro-communist *al-Nidā* on October 24 printed a Ḥannā Ṣālīḥ editorial calling for attacks on US interests.
118. E.g. *al-Muḥarrir*, Beirut, which is close to the *fidā'iyyīn* and usually vocal on such subjects, was silent October 23, editorially.
119. Kuwait's *al-Siyāsah*, Jordan's *al-Dustūr* and *al-Ra'ī*, October 23, expressed fears about a breathing space; *El-Moudjahid*, Algiers, October 22, expressed doubt about superpower mediating abilities; and doubt about superpower intentions was articulated by Beirut's *al-Safa* and *Orient-Le Jour*, Kuwait's *Daily News* and *Kuwait Times*, and Tunisia's *al-Sabāḥ*, October 23. Beirut's *al-Hayāt*, October 23, opined that Syrian hesitation to accept the ceasefire was due to mistrust of Russia, while Algiers' *Voice of Palestine* at 1830Z on October 22 said US imperialism has concocted an anti-Arab agreement.
120. Morocco's *al-'Alam*, October 23. The other Moroccan pro-Istiqlāl paper, *L'Opinion*, on the same day printed a similar editorial, "Arrangements Which Arrange Nothing."

side accused the other,¹²¹ but it was clear that Israel made the greatest gains, cutting off Suez City and the Egyptian Third Army. That fact reinforced Arab suspicion about the ceasefire itself. Israeli forces had been gaining momentum and probably would have achieved as much had there been no ceasefire. But the Arabs tended to believe, as one editorial put it, that Israel gained "with maneuvers and treachery what it had not been able to achieve with direct fighting."¹²² And because the United States, Israel's major ally, had sponsored the ceasefire, several commentators concluded that these Israeli gains had been made with specific American collusion.

One version of this accusation, advanced by Egypt's most prominent editor, was that American reconnaissance aircraft had gathered intelligence for Israel to help it violate the ceasefire.¹²³ Whether or not the collusion allegation was believed, most Arabs thought that the United States as a cosponsor of the UN resolution had some responsibility for maintaining the ceasefire and should not have allowed Israel to gain ground after the deadline. American officials did call for adherence to the ceasefire line—in effect asking Israel to withdraw to it—and declared that the US government had been "in active and serious consultation with Israel to impress upon it the urgency of absolute adherence to the Security Council's ceasefire resolution . . . We have done our part to carry out our part of the agreement . . . but it cannot be done by

121. Bernard and Marvin Kalb, *op.cit.*, p. 487, say Israel reacted to the Egyptian violation, but US officials refused to take sides in that argument. Maps of the area are available in Rayyes and Nahas, *op.cit.*, appendix; the text of UNSC Res. 338, which called for a ceasefire in 12 hours, i.e. at 1652Z, is in the same book, p. 97.
122. Amman's *al-Dustūr*, October 25, quoted by Amman Radio at 0720Z the same day.
123. Exceptional article in *al-Ahrām*, October 28, by chief editor Muḥammad Haykal; the idea also appeared on the inside pages of the Amman press October 27. Beirut's *al-Nahār* published on p. 11, October 24, a report by Bāsīm Mu'allam which implies US-Israeli collusion, and Beirut's pro-Cairo daily *al-Yawm* the next day charged US-Israeli collusion on this matter. Tunisia's *al-Sabāh*, October 25, said Israel's moves were all "dependent on the US flow of arms" and that the Israeli plan had been "supported and approved by the US."

snapping our fingers."¹²⁴ The Arabs, however, were not convinced that Washington had tried hard enough to restrain Israel. They assumed that Israel was so beholden to Washington for military support that it would have to follow any US orders. As one commentator typical of many put it:¹²⁵

America is responsible from first to last for Israel's actions, which are trying to push the situation to a terrible explosion. Washington now has two options: either it hastens the explosion or it hastens the return of Israel to its own house.

The issue of the ceasefire violation was a particularly delicate one in Egypt and Syria, the main belligerents, who had, by October 23rd, accepted the ceasefire resolution. Egyptian media reflected the same concerns as elsewhere in the Arab world, although the tone of news and commentaries was clearly more optimistic. Syria, whose régime was supposedly more radical, was clearly in a quandary, and Syrian media reflected this by printing battle news and refraining from all editorials on the ceasefire.¹²⁶

In Iraq and Libya, where the governments openly opposed the ceasefire, media continued to attack it strongly.¹²⁷ Radical writers

124. US Ambassador John Scali, speaking to the UN Security Council October 24, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 12, 1973.

125. Beirut's *al-Anwar*, October 25. Other editorials expressing deep skepticism appeared, for example: in Cairo's *al-Akhhbār*, October 24, *al-Ahrām*, October 28 (Muḥammad Zakī 'Abd al-Qādir and Anīs Manṣūr articles), Tunisia's *L'Action* and *al-Sabāh*, October 25, Beirut's *al-Nahār* and *al-Anwar*, October 25, Amman's *al-Dustūr*, and Beirut's *al-Hayāt* and *Orient-Le Jour* emphasized US responsibility for making the ceasefire work. Tunisia's *al-Sabāh*, October 24, said the agreement was too ambiguous to be effective.

126. MENA Damascus report, October 25, 0820Z.

127. Baghdad Radio at 0520Z on October 25 broadcast an *al-Thawrah* editorial "Not Like This Brothers and Friends" blaming Moscow for lack of consultation. *Al-Thawrah*, October 26, published a p. 2 article by Ḥasan al-Khāshif, "Did The Arabs Use All Of Their Forces?" saying victory had been possible so a ceasefire was premature. Tripoli Radio in a commentary at 1230Z on October 28 called the ceasefire "another trick" of advantage to Israel. *Al-Balagh*, October 25, gave a red banner headline to "American Plot Emerges Clearly" which attacked the "Washington-Moscow conspiracy," and Tripoli Radio the same day at 2100Z attacked the "new chapter in the US-Soviet plot" against the Arabs.

elsewhere, confused by Soviet sponsorship of an arrangement that was turning out badly, did not attack the ceasefire directly but restricted themselves to general attacks on United States policy.¹²⁸ Clearly there was a malaise and unhappiness with developments throughout the Arab world.

Climax of the Crisis

The UN Security Council passed a new US-Soviet ceasefire resolution on October 24, but since the Egyptian Third Army was still cut off and the battlefield situation shaky, President Sādāt asked the two superpowers to send forces to police it. The United States quickly rejected this suggestion, saying the dispatch of American and Soviet forces to the Middle East would not be "helpful in creating conditions of peace."¹²⁹ Then in the early hours of the 25th, Washington suddenly called a global alert of US military forces. Secretary Kissinger in a press conference that day made it clear that the alert was a warning to Moscow, which seemed to be preparing a unilateral move into the Middle East that the United States strongly opposed.¹³⁰

The Arabs recognized the American alert as a very serious step possibly affecting them; it evoked awe and some fear throughout the Arab world. Arab media generally showed their concern by giving the alert their biggest headlines October 26th and printing the story in full, giving extensive quotes from Kissinger's press conference.¹³¹ This straight and complete news coverage implied ac-

128. Beirut's *al-Muḥarrir*, October 24, in an editorial "American Illusion" and the war was against America, not Israel, and called for further "struggles" against the US. Beirut's pro-Communist *al-Nidā*, October 24, is another example. On October 25 *al-Muḥarrir* bannered "Arab Nation Wants to Fight" but did not openly reject the ceasefire, only called for action against the US, as did the pro-Moscow *al-Sha'b*. Algiers Voice of Palestine, however, on October 30 editorially opposed the US "peace plan" in an 1830Z broadcast.

129. Ambassador John Scali statement at UN Security Council, October 24, *Department of State Bulletin*, November 12, 1973.

130. Kissinger press conference, October 25, State Department Press Release No. 390, October 25.

131. E.g. Beirut's *al-Hayāt* top banner headline, *al-Nahār* no. 1 story, Cairo's *al-Ahrām* and *al-Jumhūriyyah* banner headlines. Amman's *al-Dustūr* editorial on October 26 emphasized the world danger involved, Algiers Radio at 2000Z,

ceptance, generally, of the American explanation. Only a few columnists expressed doubt, saying that President Nixon had called the alert only to distract attention from his Watergate problems,¹³² and only Egyptian media questioned the American claim that there were signs of a possible Soviet military move into the Middle East, saying the US alert was "no more than a pretext used by the US Government for staging a full-scale show of military support for Israel's war against the Arab states."¹³³

The more common public reaction was a sense of awe that, as one banner headline said, "World Nuclear Confrontation Caused by Mideast War."¹³⁴ The Arabs recognized this as a major turning point. They saw that their "local" conflict finally had threatened to involve the superpowers directly in a world conflict, and a few hours after the American alert they saw that the superpowers had come together again to sponsor one more UN ceasefire resolution. This resolution did end the war. President Sādāt explained that he accepted it because he could not fight the United States, which was helping Israel with a massive resupply, but Egypt's leading columnist indicated there was also concern about the international aspects of the conflict too. Egypt, he said, was "facing a coordinated move by the two superpowers . . . making their first move in an age of détente."¹³⁵

October 25, reported great "anxiety" in connection with US forces being put on alert.

132. Editorials on October 26 in Tunisia's *La Presse* and Beirut's *al-Anwar* attributed the alert to Watergate problems, as did Tripoli Radio at 0030Z and 1530Z October 26 and 1230Z October 28.
133. *Al-Akhbār*, Cairo, October 26. Similar editorials appeared in Cairo's *al-Ahrām*, October 26, "Playing With Fire," and Tunisia's *al-Sabāh*, October 31, and in an editorial by Egyptian chief editor Ihsān 'Abd al-Quddūs in *Akhbār al-Yawm*, October 27. Cairo's *al-Jumhūriyyah*, October 27, said the alert was "to give Israel another opportunity to achieve more gains on the battlefield," and on October 28 it gave a banner headline to the Moscow claim that "US Presented Outlandish Justification For Alert." The US claim was made by Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger, October 13 and 26 press conferences.
134. *Al-Ahrām*, Cairo, banner headline, October 26.
135. Muḥammad Haykal editorial in *al-Ahrām*, October 26. President Sādāt's explanation was given top billing in Cairo media November 1. UN Security Council resolution 340 passed quickly on October 25, establishing a ceasefire and a UN Emergency Force, excluding permanent members of the Council.

Signs of Change?

Most significantly, the Arabs saw what some regarded as the beginning of a change for the better in US Middle East policy. Secretary Kissinger in his October 25th press conference had not only warned the Russians, he also said that,¹³⁶

from many points of view, the chances for peace are quite promising . . . we have always stated that it must be peace with justice. [He repeated that the US sought to] make a major contribution to removing the conditions that have produced four wars between Arabs and Israelis in the last 25 years . . . Our position is . . . that conditions that produced this war were clearly intolerable to the Arab nations.

And President Nixon declared the next day:¹³⁷

The outlook for peace is the best it has been in twenty years [and] we will use our influence with the nations in the area to expedite a settlement.

The new element, added to statements that US officials had been repeating throughout the war, was the official optimism about the "chances for peace." Because of this optimism, following on the heels of a superpower confrontation and three weeks of war, the statements attracted a great deal of Arab attention. They were given unusually good newsplay in Arab media,¹³⁸ and evoked positive comment from Arab editors, helping to dispel the initial negative impact of the ceasefire attempts and the worldwide alert. Commentators in several Arab countries said they saw signs of a change

136. Kissinger press conference, October 25, State Department Press Release No. 390, October 25.

137. President Nixon press conference, October 26, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, USGPO, October 29, 1973.

138. E.g. *al-Ahrām*, Cairo, October 27, carried a full quote of President Nixon on the Middle East and the feature page exceptionally included the full text of Kissinger's Thursday press conference. *Al-Akhbār*, Cairo, October 28, printed the full text of Nixon's press conference, and the Middle East portions of that were printed October 29 by *al-Nahār*, *al-Jarīdah* and the *Daily Star* in Beirut, where nearly all papers gave it good p. 1 coverage.

in American policy; one Egyptian paper, for example, which had over the years been especially critical of Washington, said the Kissinger press conference:¹³⁹

. . . includes a new tune with regard to the current US attitude to the Mideast crisis. This tune is different from all US statements of the past six years.

This was just the beginning of an Arab hope that the United States was going to play a rôle in the political process after the war which the Arabs would find helpful in restoring their "rights." It would develop, a few days later, into a bigger story as Arab media began to quote Israeli comments about US "pressure" on them— which the Arabs had been asking for all along. The Israeli newspaper *Maariv* on October 29th said "The United States is exerting strong pressure on Israel so that it will return to the October 22 lines," and quoted Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar as saying "Tel Aviv has started to pay for US military, diplomatic and political support . . . The United States is exerting pressure against Israel." This report was replayed in media throughout the Arab world, and welcomed as an indication that the US was becoming involved diplomatically and politically in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as militarily.¹⁴⁰

139. *Al-Jumhūriyyah*, October 28. The same paper a day earlier said the Kissinger statement that circumstances leading up to the October War should not continue marks a change in the US perspective. Amman's *al-Dustūr* and *al-Raī*, October 29, were editorially hopeful because of President Nixon's words. Jordan's *al-Sabāh*, October 26 editorial, emphasized Kissinger's readiness to use political influence to get the negotiations started.

140. Cairo's *al-Akhbār* on October 30 quoted, on its foreign page, Israeli daily *Maariv*'s report that Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar had said: "Tel Aviv has started to pay for US military, diplomatic and political support," and "US exerts pressure on Israel" and that the "pressure provokes concern about our future." *Al-Akhbār* added that *Maariv* had commented "The US exerts strong pressure on Israel so that it will return to the October 22 lines." Beirut's *al-Amal*, October 30, headlined "Strong American Pressure On Israel to make It Withdraw To The October 22 Lines," and *al-Nahār*, October 24, in a column by Bāsīm Mu'allam said there were signs in Washington that the US was going to exert pressure on Israel. All Cairo papers, October 30, frontpaged similar reports. Possibly to balance this "good news" about Washington, Egyptian media began on October 30 to show the first signs of gratitude for Soviet help. Until then, they had totally ignored the presence of Soviet military advisors

The Arabs generally gave credit for any "change" in American policy to their achievements on the battlefield, and their use of the oil embargo against the United States; as one commentator said:¹⁴¹

The statements made by Mr. Nixon and especially Mr. Kissinger are, on the whole, convincing . . . Something has apparently changed in Washington. This is due . . . to the energy crisis.

Arab media, however, did not reflect that the Arabs had completely given up their suspicions about US policy. They continued to report what Arabs saw as negative aspects of that policy, such as detailed stories about arms supplies, and some radical commentators continued to call for more anti-American actions.¹⁴² But the dominant mood, after the ceasefire, was hopeful:¹⁴³

America, which was and still is fighting for its vital interests in the Middle East because of its past and current hostile attitude towards the Arab peoples has discovered the right path.

Secretary Kissinger's trip through the Arab world, which took place at the beginning of November, gave the Arabs additional encouragement that America was indeed committed to playing a helpful rôle in the area; his later "shuttle diplomacy" further rein-

and instructors in Egypt and made little mention of the Soviet airlift; editorials did not give the USSR any thanks for all this help until *al-Ahrâm* did so on October 30.

141. Beirut's *al-Safa*, October 30, which added, "It has been some time since we have had before us such a clear, subtle and balanced presentation of American policy."
142. E.g. in Cairo, *al-Akhbâr*, October 28, frontpaged a report that 250 resupply planes had landed Saturday and *al-Ahrâm* criticized the arms shipments editorially; on the 24th *al-Akhbâr* criticized the arms shipments and on the 26th the Cairo press featured Egyptian spokesman Ashraf Ghorbal accusing the US of shipping arms directly into the Sinai Peninsula, part of occupied Egypt. Cairo Radio at 1500Z, October 27, and Voice of the Arabs at 1800Z, October 30, said European differences with Washington "strengthened the grip of isolation around Israel and the US." 'Alî Hamdî al-Jammâl in *al-Ahrâm*, October 28, said the same thing. Appeals for actions against US interests continued to come from Iraq, e.g. Baghdad Radio at 1130Z, October 30 and from pro-*fidâ'iyyîn* papers, like *al-Muharrir*, October 26.
143. Tunisia's *al-Sabâh*, November 1, 1973.

forced that idea. The dramatic conclusion to the fourth Arab-Israeli war, which brought in the United States as a leading diplomatic participant, was therefore the beginning of a change in the American image among Arabs.

Conclusions

What were Arab perceptions of American policy during the October 1973 war? Insofar as we can generalize, several aspects of "the Arab view" manifested themselves during the war, and could be seen reflected in Arab mass media.

1. The Arabs saw the United States as having a strong pro-Israeli bias that overrode other considerations, such as justice and good relations with the Arabs. For example, at the start of the war, Washington called for a ceasefire, withdrawal to the prewar lines, and urgent debate by the Security Council, because the US believed this course would be fair and just to both sides. But the Arabs saw these moves as biased in favor of Israel, because they came at a time when Arab forces had just recovered some of the territory Israel had occupied in the 1967 war, so that ceasefire and return meant abandonment of what they considered "legitimate" liberation of "unjustly" held lands. The Arabs saw Israel and its friends, not themselves, as the real aggressors, and they agreed with President Sādāt that the United States was opposing a just cause to protect Israel.

2. During the war, the Arabs frequently showed their deep suspicion that the United States was trying to lie to, deceive, or connive against them. The American appeal for a ceasefire, the call for Security Council action, and the announcement that Moscow had begun an airlift, for example, were all seen by the Arabs as tricks and maneuvers that somehow would help Israel. Similarly, the false stories of US intervention with arms and men against the Arabs were widely believed, and US denials were discounted, although not with the vehemence of 1967 because of the military situation. After the US began its resupply, the details that leaked out of Washington (because of mostly domestic American reasons) were seen as part of a psychological warfare campaign deliberately aimed at the Arabs.

When the first ceasefire of October 22nd was agreed to and then broken, they suspected that Washington had contrived it as a way to help Israel gain more Arab territory by deception. These interpretations derived from the assumption that America has more control over events, over the media, and over Israel, than it really does, and derived from a deep-seated suspicion that there is more to events than meets the eye, and from a skepticism about what governments say.

3. During the war, the Arabs tended to underestimate the importance to Americans of the US-Soviet relationship and détente, which were of primary consideration in Washington's eyes. Public statements by US officials, including the Secretary of State, clearly indicated American concern that, for the good of everyone, the superpowers should stay out of the war. The US government warned the USSR against continuing its airlift, and then partly in order to maintain the balance of power and the resulting international stability, the United States began its own major resupply effort and asked Congress for \$2.2 billion for Israel. Later it rejected President Sādāt's request for troops in order to avoid a superpower confrontation dangerous to the world, and it called an alert to signal its intentions clearly and prevent a superpower clash. But the Arabs, concerned parochially with their immediate local problem of dealing with Israel, saw all of these American moves as calculated only to help their Israeli enemy, not as part of the American global strategy focused primarily on the USSR and intended to prevent World War III.

4. From the start, the US talked about its diplomatic rôle, but the Arabs generally ignored American mediation efforts until they became quite visible and dramatic, apparently because the Arabs did not expect that the United States would mediate. Secretary of State Kissinger became directly and personally involved from the first day of the war in diplomatic attempts to reach a ceasefire and create conditions for a settlement, and US officials said so repeatedly. But the Arabs paid far more attention to the battlefield, where military forces were "creating facts." President Nixon's meeting with four Arab foreign ministers on the day after President Sādāt's personal appeal to him, plus Dr. Kissinger's sudden trip to

Moscow resulting in a ceasefire agreement, and then finally the American alert and a new superpower agreement, all helped convince the Arabs that American mediation was possible. Thus the Nixon and Kissinger statements of October 25 and 26 concerning a longterm settlement were listened to more intently than previous ones because the United States seemed to be going beyond the rôle of arms supplier and military protector and becoming politically involved. But this was just the germ of a new idea, which later developed as it stood the test and Dr. Kissinger demonstrated by his postwar personal diplomacy that the US intended to remain directly involved. The Arabs later attributed the change largely to their improved performance on the battlefield and to their use of the "oil weapon," but at the end of the war they were not yet confident these would work.

5. During the war, the Arab view of American policy tended to fluctuate considerably with events, and included a changing mix of positive and negative elements. There were many cross currents, but the general trend was constantly up and down. The Arabs were preoccupied with "winning" the war and ignored America during the first few days of the conflict, then as stories of alleged US intervention started circulating they became critical but not violently hostile because the war was still going well. The US resupply announcement and what seemed to be President Nixon's threat to intervene made them angry, but President Sādāt's moderate response, the White House meeting with foreign ministers and the OAPEC oil decision cooled this anger into a more calculated and controlled channel because they felt they were doing something that might still work. But the flood of details about the US resupply, and the news of the \$2.2 billion request, made them very angry that America had ignored the OAPEC warning, and they supported an oil embargo. The sudden superpower agreement and alert, and the realization that their armies were really being pushed back, frightened and awed them, preparing most of them to accept the ceasefire when it came.


6. Egypt's strong leadership was quite evident during the war, and it was Egypt's attitude toward the US more than anything else

that set the tone for most of the Arabs. President Sādāt's speech, not President Asad's, attracted area-wide attention and helped moderate anti-American passions among the Arabs. President Sādāt's acceptance of the American ceasefire was the essential political and psychological condition for it to work, and this helped dampen criticism of Washington and throw the radicals off balance. His focus of attention on American responsibility for promoting a longterm settlement helped pave the way for the subsequent American mediation effort. The public face of Arab unity, strong behind Sādāt during the war, began to crack in the debates over use of the "oil weapon" and over ceasefire attempts, and this threatened to undermine Sādāt's policy of appealing for American diplomatic assistance. But in the later postwar months, his gamble paid off, and most of the Arabs supported his efforts to involve the United States in a longterm settlement.

President Sādāt was able to assert psychological leadership during the war partly because Egypt had for years occupied this rôle, but also because he was perceived to be the author of the surprise attack and ceasefire which brought the Arabs some military gains. This leadership rôle was enhanced to some extent by Egypt's powerful radio station, news service and widely-read newspapers. It was clearly reflected in the way most of the Arab media handled the events of the war.

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Dr. William A. Rugh's educational background includes undergraduate study at Oberlin College, where he received his B.A. degree in 1958; he holds graduate degrees from The Johns Hopkins University, M.A., 1961, and Columbia University, Ph.D., 1967. In 1964 he joined the United States Information Agency as Public Affairs Trainee, and in that same year was detailed to Beirut for Arabic language training. He was posted to Cairo in 1965, and subsequently to Jiddah, where he served in several capacities, including that of Assistant Public Affairs Officer, 1967 and 1968 and Public Affairs Officer, 1969-1970. In the latter year he returned to USIA in Washington, where he stayed until 1976. He left Washington as Deputy Assistant Director for Near East and North Africa for Cairo, where he became Public Affairs Officer.



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