PEOPLE, POWER AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS:
PROSPECTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

A Summary Record

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PROGRAM

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PLENARY SESSIONS

Keynote Address: "The Islamic Dimension"
Richard H. Nolte
Executive Director, Institute of Current World Affairs

Panel Discussion:

"The Legacies of the Modern Historical Era"

Majid Khadduri, Chairman, *Distinguished Research Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University*
L. Carl Brown, *Director, Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University*
C. Ernest Dawn, *Professor of History, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

Panel Discussion:

"The Monarchies: The Record of the Traditionalist Societies"

Rodger P. Davies, Chairman, *Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*
Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia*
R. Bayly Winder, *Director, Center for Near Eastern Studies, New York University*
I. William Zartman, *Head, Department of Politics, New York University*

Panel Discussion:

"The Struggle For Elected Democracy"

Harry N. Howard, Chairman, *Adjunct Professor, American University*
Shlomo Avineri, *Chairman, Department of Political Science, Hebrew University of Jerusalem*
Michael Hudson, *Director of the Middle East Center, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University*
Osman Nur Yalman, *Director, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, University of Chicago*

October 2, 1971

Panel Discussion:

"Marxism in the Middle East: Ideology and Reality"

John C. Campbell, Chairman, *Senior Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations*

Panel A:

"Twenty Years of Soviet Ideological Impact"

Walter Laqueur, *Director, Institute of Contemporary History and Wiener Library, London*

Panel B:

"Socialist Arab Régimes of Today"

Malcolm H. Kerr, *Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles*

William B. Quandt, *Social Science Department, the RAND Corporation*

Michael H. Van Dusen, *Staff Consultant, Near East Subcommittee, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives*

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

THE ISLAMIC DIMENSION

Richard H. Nolte

Ambassador Hart's charge to me -- and challenge -- was to present in the opening address of this symposium "an historical analysis which will highlight both the positive and negative legacies of the Islamic heritage for Middle Eastern States today....How much remains of the heritage and what sort of role does it play?"

In approaching that task, I should like to make three preliminary comments. The first is that in these days of the here and now, of non-historical social sciences, of instant readout, the idea of heritage, legacy, things of value handed down is considered rather quaint. A post card came to me the other day from a vacationing friend in Europe:

> "Having seen the majesty created by Minoans, Greeks and Romans, I'm struck by how totally civilizations can fall. Like, where are they, now that we need them?"

But that's not the whole story. President Nasser was more nearly right when he said in his Philosophy of the Revolution: "There are no discontinuities in history." What would Western civilization be today without the central contributions of ancient Greece and Rome -- in drama, for example, in the idea and forms of democracy, in architecture (in this city, particularly), in law. No, we are part of all we have met, said Tennyson, and just as we in the West perceive our antecedents in Greece, Rome, medieval Christendom and the rest, so too do the contemporary peoples of the Middle East share an enduring past. For a thousand years and more, the basic fabric of their society and culture has been Islam.

My second comment is to acknowledge a certain temerity on my part in venturing to talk about Islam, not being Muslim like

some of you, and not having been steeped even as thoroughly as most of you in the day-to-day realities and subtleties of living in Muslim surroundings. It's like a bird telling fish about the sea. One may hope, perhaps, that a bird's eye view will have some value.

The third and final preliminary comment is a relativistic one. All of us, peoples, nations, societies, are willy-nilly riding the tiger of technological change. This is true perhaps most of all of the US -- the farther along the developmental track you are, it seems, the faster you go. Accelerating scientific and technological innovation has given rise to problems of change and growth that strain our capacity to understand them, let alone control them. But it seems clear that what we think we understand today, what we identify as important today, may be wrong or completely irrelevant tomorrow. In looking at the Islamic (or any) heritage, therefore, we must handle the concepts "positive" and "negative" very gingerly indeed.

In a recent essay about the promise and peril of the new genetics and the new tools of microbiological engineering, scientists sound a warning about genetic manipulation and the possibility of eliminating defective genes from human heredity

> ...because as man's environment changes and as man changes his environment, it is important to maintain flexibility....A gene that is considered "bad" now might become necessary for survival in the event of drastic environmental change. It is foolhardy to eliminate genetic variability. That is our evolutionary bankroll, and we dare not squander it. Species that ran out of variability ran out of life.

In much the same way, I see the Islamic heritage as a sort of cultural gene pool, part of our evolutionary bankroll, a potential for variability in an unpredictable future. Judgments as to what is positive and negative about it must at most be tentative.

It will be clear that in speaking of the Islamic heritage as a cultural gene pool or evolutionary bankroll, I am speaking of its potential importance not only for the survival and health of Middle Eastern societies, but, in this shrinking world, for all societies, all of us, altogether.

This being said, let me now turn to Islam and its legacy, plus and minus, to the contemporary Middle East. First of all, what *is* Islam? Wilfred Cantwell Smith has said "the distinctive thing about Islam is that it is Muslim." Well, he's got a point. A time-honored Muslim answer is, *Islam din wa dawla*: Islam is religion and state.

Religion, in this formulation, boils down to a core of doctrine and ritual common to all Muslim peoples; and it is not unfamiliar, for Muslim dogma incorporates many ideas found in early Judaism and Christianity and, in fact, regards itself as a perfected restatement of the same truth approximated in Jewish and in Christian doctrine. The God of Islam is absolutely powerful, eternal, self-sufficient, the source of good and evil, the uncreated originator of all the universe which He maintains in existence by the constant act of creating. Uncompromising monotheism is fundamental in Muslim doctrine and *shirk*, the association of anyone or anything with God as an object of worship, is the great unforgivable sin. The Christian idea of the Trinity is excoriated.

Unlimited by law or principle, God's will is done beyond the power of man to check or comprehend. Unquestioning resignation to the commands of God -- and this is the technical meaning of the word *Islam* -- is thus the duty of man. This doctrine fosters the fatalistic cast of mind thought to be typical of the Muslims, and helps to explain their traditional scepticism about the ability of mere men to carry out human plans. To every phrase announcing hope or intent, Muslims add the universal postscript, *insha'allah*, 'if God wills.' God's angels record the earthly actions of men and will bear witness for or against each soul on the Day of Judgment when it rises from the grave to stand before God. Paradise with its gardens and dark-eyed virgins will be the eternal portion of him who has avoided the temptations set for him by God's devils, the *jinn*, and has led a virtuous life; for the virtuous woman, the rewards, when she gets to Paradise, are less specific. Hell, with its fires 69 times as hot as earthly fire, lies in wait for the wicked.

If extended to a logical conclusion, the doctrine of submission to the ungovernable will of God would suggest that man's ultimate fate is out of his own hands, beyond his control to alter for better or for worse, and that complete irresponsibility would be the result. Any deed, however evil, could be shrugged off as being ordained by God. But such is not the case. In Muslim doctrine, man is allowed a margin of free will, so to speak, in which he can choose by his actions to save or damn himself. He is himself responsible for what he does. And he knows what he ought and ought not to do. God has repeatedly revealed sufficient of His will to show the way to salvation. A long succession of apostles or prophets, including Adam, Noah, Moses and Jesus, were inspired to preach the unity of God, to show the path of righteousness and warn of Judgment Day. But men continued to disregard or corrupt the message, with awful consequences to themselves. At length, early in 7th-century Arabia, Muhammad was appointed to be the final, the 'Seal' of the prophets. To him was revealed the Qur'an, the Muslim holy book, which for Muslims is the

perfected and eternal embodiment of truth for the guidance of men, the literal last word of God.

These are the bare essentials of Muslim dogma. But for the great majority of Muslims the ritual duties which must be rendered to God are an essential part of belief -- to the point that even imperfect performance of them is a guarantee of faith. Muslim is as Muslim does, so to speak.

The most important of the prescribed duties are the five so-called 'Pillars of Islam.' The Muslim first of all is required to profess the Muslim creed with its fundamental doctrine about the unity of God and the mission of Muhammad: la illha illa'llah wa Muhammad rasulu 'llah, 'There is no god but God, Muhammad is the Prophet of God.' This is perhaps the decisive pillar of the faith. No one may call himself a Muslim without professing the creed; and conversely, the belief of a man who does cannot be questioned. Muslims are supposed to pray at five set times each 24 hours, in company (preferably) or alone, and in a state of ritual purity which is achieved before each prayer by ablution. Almsgiving to the poor, the traveller, and other worthy objects is the third duty. Alms so given are regarded as a loan to God, who will repay many-fold. Fasting is required of Muslims from dawn to dark during Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim lunar year, and is recommended at other times. Performance of the Pilgrimage at least once during his lifetime, if at all possible, is the fifth duty urged on the Muslim. The Pilgrimage with all its traditional ceremonies takes place during the twelfth month of the Muslim year, at which time the faithful from all over the Muslim world converge on Mecca and its sacred mosque to do their duty to God.

To the five duties is sometimes appended a sixth: the jihad, or holy war against the infidel. All Muslims are required to "strive in the way of God." In the days of Muslim empire, when the Caliph was at once a religious and political leader, holy war and war of state could be synonymous. But after the Caliph lost his battalions the holy war came more and more to be interpreted in personal ethical terms. In recent times there have been attempts to revive the early military meaning of jihad. But so far these attempts have not had much success.

Understandably, only the truly pious feel it necessary to perform all the primary and the host of lesser duties in their burdensome daily detail, and the general level of observance varies from area to area. But all Muslims profess the creed, and the great majority observe the strict abstinence of Ramadan and attend at least the congregational prayer at noon on Friday. Performance of the ritual duties, after all, is in the last analysis a matter between the individual and God -- there is no intervening church organization or constituted clergy in Islam. Whether prescribed or gratuitous, a prayer

properly executed, a fast faithfully observed, alms given, a pilgrimage completed -- each acts as a deposit of virtue, so to speak, in the Muslim's celestial account, to be weighed against the debit of his sins.

This, in barest outline, is the essence of the Islamic religion, properly speaking. But for Muslims Islam has had a far wider meaning than Christianity does for us. More than belief and worship, Islam also embraces the whole range of man's relations with his fellow men. In its fuller meaning, therefore, Islam is nothing less than an entire way of life.

The basic framework of Islam and the backbone of Muslim society is the Sacred Law, the Shariʿa. It is the product of many generations of medieval thinkers who sought to elaborate the will of God as revealed in the Qurʾan and in the divinely guided actions of the Prophet into a comprehensive system of recommendations and commands for the guidance of men. In Islamic theory, the Shariʿa claims to regulate all human actions public and private, social and individual. In theory, it makes no concession to Caesar, and asserts its authority over political man in his acts of government as well as commercial man in the marketplace and private man in his prayers.

It tells him how to worship, what and what not to eat, to wear, how to honor his parents. It goes on to lay down rules for marriage, divorce, inheritance and other family matters. It includes areas which in the West have no connection with religion such as commercial transactions and crime, and even extends into what we would call constitutional law and government. The Shariʿa is thus law in a far wider sense than we are accustomed to. It is also more complicated in its judgments. With us, an act is either lawful or not lawful. Whether it is also decent, good, pious, ethical, moral or in good taste is beside the point. Not so in Muslim law. Depending on circumstances an act is mandatory, commendable or recommended, permissible, reprehensible, or absolutely forbidden.

This highly normative standard-setting quality of Muslim Law is not accidental; it is a product of the process by which it came into being. With the death of the Prophet in 632 AD, the Arabs exploded out of their barren peninsula and in less than a century of sweeping conquest had established dominion westward through North Africa to the Pyrenees, and eastward through Persia deep into central Asia. By and large, the Arab rulers of the first century were empirical in their administration of the sprawling new empire, drawing on bedouin precedents, prophetic innovation, Byzantine and Sassanid institutions and concepts, Talmudic and Eastern Christian canon law, and no doubt there was a good deal of improvisation.

In a natural delegation of authority, Arab governors began early to put the business of deciding disputes and assigning penalties

into the hands of secretaries for legal affairs, or qadis. The jurisprudence or practice of these early qadis contributed much to the formation of a recognized body of administrative and legal habit by the end of the first century of Arab rule.

During this period of Ummayyad rule from Damascus, it is possible to identify two main tendencies. The one, just referred to, involved the organization and administration of the new Arab empire. The other was an Islamic one, which gradually became dominant. Using the precepts of the new religion, scholars in various cities of the empire began to criticize popular custom and Ummayyad administrative practice in a piecemeal way with the objective of reform, and went on to elaborate in more and more detail a system of things as they ought to be. In this way, Muslim law acquired its decisively normative character. From criticism, scholars progressed to systematization and logical elaboration, and gradually the main outlines of the Shariʿa took form. As it gained in definition and prestige, it began to have an influence on the practice of the governors and their qadis. But the decisive step in this direction remained to be taken by the Abbasids.

In 750 AD, a little more than a century after the beginning of the Arab conquests, the Persian-based Abbasid dynasty, promising to establish the reign of God upon earth and, riding the egalitarian appeal of Islam to the non-Arab masses of the empire, overthrew the Arab hegemony of the Ummayyads. Under the Abbasids Muslim law came as close as it was ever to come, except for a time many centuries later under the Ottoman Turks, to establishing itself in fact as well as in theory over administrative and legal practice. The great innovation of the Abbasids was to centralize the appointment of the qadis, and to select them from the ranks of the pious legal scholars. Except insofar as the qadis had hitherto applied in practice certain Quranic rules about inheritance, divorce, and the like, this departure established for the first time a direct nexus between the Sacred Law and everyday practice: a substantial part of the practice was put into the hands of specialists who were required to make decisions in accordance with the Shariʿa.

On the face of it, the Shariʿa had captured, so to speak, the chief legal officers of the empire. A bridge had been thrown across the growing gulf between theory and fact, and a foothold secured in administrative practice. But to complete its victory, the Shariʿa would have had to go on to establish its practical authority over the other administrative officers of the empire including the ruler himself. This, in spite of the theory and in spite of continuing efforts, it has not been able to accomplish. Although comparatively complete in matters of worship, family law, and even commercial transactions and private affairs in general, the Shariʿa was sketchy indeed when it came to public law; and this very fact is a measure of its failure to bring conduct of state

under its sway. The Shariʿa did supply some guidance in matters relating to the holy war, and to the collection and disbursement of certain taxes. It specified punishments for certain crimes, and it set out in general terms the public duties incumbent on the ruling authority, such as defense of the frontiers and maintenance of the religion. But for the men who had to administer the Muslim empire, the Shariʿa could not in its incompleteness and rigidity establish itself in practice as an all-sufficient law.

The wide gaps it left in its attempt to regulate the conduct of state continued to be filled by the administrative initiative of Muslim rulers and their lieutenants who were faced with the day-to-day necessities of government. A large and developing body of secular administrative practice thus remained outside the precincts of the Sacred Law and often in direct contradiction to it; and it was a practice which included, in fact if not in theory, all the functions of government -- legislative, judicial and executive.

Well aware of all this, Islamic legal theory sought to maintain the Shariʿa claim to omnicompetence by bringing the ruler's administrative practice into the fold of Islam. But to do so, it had to make all the concessions. It was forced to recognize the wide discretionary authority the ruler already had, and to regularize it in the name of "common sense," or "consideration of the public good," or simply "necessity." In return, the ruler was exhorted to keep his administrative practice "sound," "religious," and "just" -- within the bounds of the Law.

If the Shariʿa failed to "capture" the ruler and his other administrative officials and was forced to recognize their practical autonomy, even its new monopoly over the qadis was an incomplete one. For although the law they were thenceforth supposed to apply was the Shariʿa which was held to be divinely established, eternal, and independent of the ruler's control and which was vested in legal handbooks and interpreted by a corps of jurists and jurisconsults (muftis) equally beyond the ruler's control, the qadis continued to rely upon the ruler for execution of their judgments. Moreover, the qadis themselves continued to be appointed, paid, and dismissed by the ruler; and the latter retained his power to limit the competence of the qadis' jurisdiction in time, place, and subject matter. Despite their Islamic propaganda, the Abbasid rulers were not long content to suffer the existence of so important an institution independent of their authority; and they used the various powers confirmed to them by the Shariʿa to cut down the role of the qadis. If they could not control the Law, they could at least fence in its judges.

The restrictions imposed upon the Shariʿa in action, however, were not solely due to the despotic tendencies of the Abbasid rulers or of their successors since then. In some ways, the Shariʿa was

self-limiting. It bound the *qadi* in terms of procedure as well as of law, with the result that *qadi* justice became more cumbersome and was deprived of all initiative. One quick result of the latter fact was that competence in matters of crime was mostly taken away from the *qadi* and given to the police, another arm of the administration. Similarly, utilizing the earlier Sassanid institution, the Abbasid caliphs re-established administrative tribunals to hear complaints about miscarriages of *qadi* justice and the oppressions of powerful men. Very soon, this "King's justice" was competing with the *qadi* courts, notably in matters of property right; and they thus constituted a further limitation of the *qadi's* function.

Nevertheless, it remains true that the *qadi* institution is one of the most vigorous ever developed by Muslim society. Although in most Muslim countries the *qadi's* jurisdiction and power have progressively been narrowed to the point that only matters of family law remain in his hands, the *qadi* courts are still an important part of their legal systems. In Saudi Arabia, the *Shariʿa* is still the only official law and the *qadi* courts are still the only official courts, although it is interesting to note the recent formation in that country of a board of complaints reminiscent of the Abbasid prototype. In Turkey on the other hand, and more recently in Egypt, the *qadi* courts have been abolished.

By the end of the second century of Islam, about the time of Harun al-Rashid and Charlemagne, the *Shariʿa* had been developed in general outline and fixed in a body of jurisprudence, and it had, so to speak, become selfconscious. It had begun to seek an explanation of itself. The formal theory of the origins of the *Shariʿa*, developed during the 3rd century of Islam, was essentially a *post factum* attempt to find a solid Islamic basis and explanation for the body of sacred law already in existence. According to the classical theory, the four sources of Law are the *Qurʾan*, the *sunna* or practice of the Prophet, *ijmaʿ* or consensus of the scholar on points of law and *qiyas*, or analogy, a logical method of extrapolating known rules to new situations. Of these, the *Qurʾan* and the prophetic example are material sources, but consensus was more a principle of selection and ratification than a material source. But it was decisive, because *Qurʾan* and *sunna*, legal principles and rules and analogical extensions -- all depend for their meaning upon what scholars agreed was their meaning. The principle of consensus might have provided Muslim law -- as indeed it did for a time -- with a powerful means of growth and adaptation to changing circumstance. Instead, it became the great obstacle to adaptation and change, a principle of rigidity. A consensus once reached on a given point was considered to be forever binding beyond any chance of reconsideration -- a sort of canonical *stare decisis*. Muslim scholars of a later day did not have the power to reopen questions answered by their predecessors; and instead of a flexible instrument of progress, *ijmaʿ* became the might anchor of the status quo, the status quo of the 10th century AD.

The definition of sources and the irrevocability of consensus gradually deprived the body of "positive" Islamic law of the possibility of further growth. For as the scholars progressed in their elaboration of the Law, the fact that they could not recognize new sources or turn back to reconsider points already agreed upon meant that before very long the logical possibilities of the legal system were exhausted, and it developed to extremes every bit as absurd and empty as those reached by the scholastics of medieval Europe. But before losing themselves in sterile detail, the scholars had constructed an imposing edifice of law, and one that has stood the test of time. The Shariʿa has endured essentially unchanged for a thousand years.

Its gradual crystallization found a later formulation in the phrase, "the closing of the gate of ijtihad." Ijtihad means the exercise of independent mental effort in the search for truth. But as the law became fixed, there was no more room for ijtihad and it was gradually replaced by taqlid, the duty to accept without question the conclusions worked out in the past and ratified by the slow movement of consensus. And so during the 4th Muslim century, the "gate" closed. Henceforth the work of the scholars was limited to explanation, interpretation and application.*

Since then, Islam and its central institution have endured essentially unchanged right down to modern times, until confronted by the celebrated "Impact of the West." The term has become a painful cliché, but it is an accurate description of the mounting tide of goods, tools, techniques, social institutions, ideas and values from outside that have inundated the Middle East along with other areas of the world.

Middle Eastern society was quick to seize on the seemingly superior attributes of the West, and the result has been the profound and still accelerating social transformation we are all aware of. Nowhere have the changes been more drastic, it seems, than in the field of law. The Shari'a and Islam in general have been thrust far into the background, fading away, like Alice's Cheshire cat, leaving behind only the smile. Modern nation states have risen from the remains of the Ottoman Empire. National sovereignties have replaced the multi-national religious doctrine of the Caliphate. Western-type codes, courts and legislatures have dispossessed the qadi courts in Turkey and Egypt, with the same process going on elsewhere. In essence, Islam has been confronted for the first time by a rival system, and on the face of it, has been all but overwhelmed.

Nevertheless, if we view the Islamic creation, the Islamic experience, as part of the human gene pool, part of society's evolutionary bankroll, that is surely not the whole story; and this brings us

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*See Nolte, Richard H., "The Rule of Law in the Arab Middle East," The Muslim World, October 1958.

face to face with Ambassador Hart's question: What are the pluses and minuses of the Islamic legacy so far as one can now perceive them?

We take for granted that a good deal of the useful rules and assumptions of Islam have already found their way into the positive law of Middle Eastern states. A lot of the old wine is in the new bottles of modern codes, legislative procedures, and the rest. That is not really what I want to talk about. I want to talk about what I think of as five main consequences of Islam for contemporary Middle Eastern society and, indeed, for all of us. Two of them seem negative on the whole, and three of them positive.

First, I think, has been the legacy, unfortunate on the whole, of taqlid. Taqlid, you will recall, meant the slavish imitation of what had gone on before. In practical terms it meant that scholarship could not proceed until a person had mastered all the handbooks of the past, absorbed the lessons, embraced the ideas and values to the point that his future lay only in continuing them. Innovation was to be avoided, and the wide variability implicit in the "evolutionary bankroll" was closed out. The result in Islamic society is an undue emphasis on rote-learning instead of the free-minded inquiry which we think is vital. The legacy of taqlid implies that all wisdom lies in the printed word to the exclusion of practical experience and common sense. It has meant above all a great loss of flexibility, a deprivation of the openness that a social system and its institutions need to evolve and change with time.

Nevertheless, the picture is not entirely negative. It seems to me that the very shock of the western influx of goods and ideas has in a sense shaken open, or broken open, that crust of custom. President Nasser, you may recall, in his Philosophy, speaks about Arab society being penned up for generations, stifled in a closed room -- sick -- and then suddenly the windows are broken by a blast of cold air coming in from outside. The patient is immediately invigorated. Of course he gets a cold right away, but nevertheless the wind from outside comes as a liberating shock. Perhaps for current generations of students going out from the Middle East to school in the west or who attend western inspired colleges and universitites in the Middle East, a new attitude is now possible. One would add in these days of mass communication that television programs and films, so much of them of Western provenance, may well serve as a subtle but constant erosion of the old rigidity for Muslim society as a whole, a final solvent for the ancient principle of taqlid.

Even among scholars of the law, one sees this tendency. I recall talking with the Vice-Rector of Al-Azhar twenty-odd years ago, on precisely this subject: the need to reopen the gate of ijtihad, as far as Muslim law is concerned, if it were to reestablish itself as the monitor and model for Arab society. He agreed that this is precisely what

modern Muslim theologians were concerned with and engaged in. And, in time perhaps, they may succeed. For really, if we follow my former tutor, the late Dr. Schacht of Columbia, the period that Middle Eastern society is now going through is in many ways parallel to that first century of Islam. Then, as now, a traditional social system was suddenly confronted with an enormous influx of new ideas, new methods and new institutions. In the past, a new Islamic order gradually took its place. It may well be that Muslim society is even now engaged in a similar regenerative process.

The second negative factor in the Islamic legacy, to my mind, is the failure of Islam, of the Shariʿa, of Muslim society, to impose law on the ruler; the failure to make the Shariʿa a guarantee of civil and individual rights against authority and to insist on bringing erring rulers to book. Instead, indeed, the scholars took quite the opposite tack and counselled obedience to the ruler, even if it violated the Holy Law. The justifying maxim was: "The tyrannous ruler is a thousand times better than chaos." Instead of rule of law, oriental despotism became the keynote of Islamic history.

But again, there is a qualification to be made. If one looks again at the long process of the development of the Shariʿa one sees it has from the beginning been a response to the wrongs seen--perceived--by Muslim society, including the wrongs of rulers. It has thus been a tail chase, the normative attempt of the Shariʿa to throw the net of control over the ruler. There is certainly no reason to suppose that that impulse has ceased at the present time; on the contrary, one can believe that it continues still. It may succeed in time. Certainly to modern perceptions of social need, to an awareness of present-day wrongs, there is a ready echo in Islam; and one needs only to think (ijtihad!)about neglected Shariʿa sources (e.g. maslaha, the public interest) for revitalizing Muslim law in a way more responsive to present day need. Shaykh Khallaf of Al-Azhar wrote some time ago, "Wheresoever lies the welfare of men, there is the law of God." That sounds modern enough.

A third part of the Islamic legacy is what might be called the community-creating power of Islam. The emphasis on simple ritual duties as a guarantee of faith, as opposed to rigor in doctrinal content, meant that over the centuries Islam has been hospitable to all sorts of groups and conditions of men with widely divergent beliefs, going from the most primitive animism to the most sophisticated theologies and mysticisms. This openness has made it possible for Islam to expand itself over the whole surface of the globe--I remember a twinkle in the eye of that Vice-Rector of Al-Azhar when I asked him where it was spreading most quickly. He said, "In North America." And if one realizes that many of the prisoners in the recent prison tragedy in Attica, New York, were Muslims, one is brought face to face with the fact that Islam is continuing to spread and perhaps a good deal more quickly than we realize. The loose, unitarian,

non-organized, non-hierarchical nature of the Muslim religion makes this possible. And at the same time its existence as a standard setting, normative ideal has been a decisive factor over the centuries in creating out of a heterogenous hodge-podge of peoples and beliefs a stable, on the whole, law-abiding,unified, enduring community which has certainly stood the test of time. Should we assume, in the face of contrary evidence, this process has ended? One wonders if the Black Muslims in the United States feel themselves as much a part of this community as other Muslims; perhaps they do. I think probably so, I hope they do. There is an egalitarian appeal in Islam, which apparently Christianity has not been able to make credible, that gives Islam an advantage.

One recalls also from President Nasser's Philosophy his image of the pilgrimage when Muslims from all over the world, equal in their seamless cotton garments, are parading around the Kaʿba. He saw it not so much in terms of man doing his religious duty as in terms of a Parliament of the world, meeting each year -- leaders together -- deliberating and deciding upon matters of common concern. Certainly the underlying key-note was the idea of a community of diverse races and peoples brought together by Islam.

The fourth general factor in the legacy of Islam, and one which may be of great value in the future, is the personal basis of Shariʿa jurisdiction and the idea of a personal basis of law. This led to the decentralized mosaic of semi-independent, inter-penetrated and co-existing communities in Islam under the general name of the millet system which allowed each religious community, each group of co-religionists to dwell in comparative independence and security without any direct reference to geography or location.

It has been displaced by our Western notion of territoriality which apparently puts more emphasis on property, on walls, on boundaries than it does on the people themselves. In the old system, a person was defined by the religious community to which he belonged irrespective of where he lived or worked. Nowadays instead, he is defined by the territory or nation to which he belongs, under whose jurisdiction he lives. But the old principle of jurisdiction applying to persons instead of to territory may turn out to be very valuable indeed as a way of resolving the territorial and racial impasse that now divides the people of Israel and its neighbors. It seems to me at least that this might prove to be a fruitful way of getting around the problem of rival and mutually exclusive claims to territorial sovereignty. In this perspective, an Israeli jurisdiction might follow Israelis whereever they might be in Israel-Palestine, and the same with a Palestinian jurisdiction for Palestinians.

A final positive aspect of the Islamic legacy in my view is that within Muslim society there is the continuing feeling of duty to one's fellow man--a humane duty to humankind. This is an ancient impulse, and it manifests itself in the traditional hospitality that one finds among

Muslims everywhere. It manifests itself in the duty to give alms for charitable purposes and in the desirability of creating waqfs -- pious endowments or foundations -- the income from which traditionally has been used to feed the poor, to take care of the sick, teach the scholar, to support the traveler, maintain mosques and serve other worthy purposes. This reflects an ancient social arrangement which enabled Muslim society, in the absence of any formal centralized welfare and social security system, pretty much to take care of its own. This humane concern for human welfare is surely a promising aspect of Muslim society as it confronts the future.

One has had, as I suggested, the image of Islam as being a sort of Cheshire cat from Alice in Wonderland, gradually fading away leaving only the smile. But the spirit does remain. And to this observer, on balance, the smile is real.

THE LEGACIES OF THE MODERN HISTORICAL ERA

L. Carl Brown

Thank you very much Dr. Khadduri, I'm very happy to be here. My topic is a broad one and with your indulgence I'm going to try to treat it at a very high level of generalization running the risk of over-simplification and also running the risk of provocation, I hope in the best sense of the term.

My subject is the period of formal western colonial rule in the Middle East. My point of departure is the haunting title of the book written a few years ago, the excellent book by Miss Elizabeth Monroe entitled Britain's Moment in the Middle East. Now on first thought one might think this is typical British understatement. But the more I think about it the more I feel it might be accurate, that western formal rule in the Middle East was really only an interlude, short in time as measured by historians, shallow in impact. And indeed, when compared with the Ottoman Empire and with other great periods of bureaucratic imperial rule in the Middle East -- Byzantine, Abbasid, Sassanid, Roman, Achaeminid, Pharaonic, it does seem like a moment -- an interlude. As seen from within the area the period of formal western rule in the Middle East (and by the way, just for convenience I'm going to define Middle East as being both Middle East and North Africa) the Middle East did not provide an imperial experience.

There was no central core organizing the entire region or even most of it in a single political unit. There was no sultan, no emperor, no caliph, no single free trade zone, no one language -- Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Greek or Latin -- to serve as a vehicle of administration, government, or expression of political thought. During the period of western colonial rule no modern St. Paul could have moved from Libya to Tunisia or from Syria to Iraq and then when he ran afoul of the authorities, appeal to the common set of ground rules with the cry "civis Romanum sum." Instead there were portions under British rule, others under French, and as Toynbee observed a half century ago the "crumbs from the table for Italy and Spain." And to add to this complexity there were interspersed areas such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia that completely escaped formal outside rule.

Further, no uniformity governed even those specifically British or French controlled areas, and as we know it was basically these two, the British and the French, who came closest to creating a Middle Eastern empire. There was legal incorporation into the home country as in Algeria, there was anomalous "occupation" as the British in Egypt from 1882 to 1914, there were protectorates, mandates, trucial states and even a condominium.

The period of actual direct administrative control by the European powers also shows great variations, ranging from 132 years as the French in Algeria, only slightly less for the British in Aden, still less than a generation, for example the British in Iraq -- roughly from 1918 until 1932. I suggest for these reasons historians should see this age of formal western rule in the Middle East as an interlude.

It was a brief interlude between one major historical synthesis of state and society (that is, the Ottoman Empire and on a smaller scale but in many ways comparable, the political patterns that existed in Iran and Morocco) and a new synthesis yet to be created. That is to say, western rule participated in, and accelerated, the destruction of the old. Now of course it had its positive points. It was an activist period. A period of many innovations. But no new grand design was created. Instead western rule in the Middle East did not even leave behind a discernible master plan. Instead these transient pro-consults left as legacy only scattered building materials, some of which may now be used in the edifice yet to be created.

And I would suggest only three by way of illustration, although many more could be put forward. First,economic infrastructure: one immediately thinks of such items as transportation and communications networks, light industry, often usually processing and distribution and often as we know, quite clearly tied to the mother country; modern credit facilities; what might be called, in some cases the creation, and in others the acceleration of entrepreneurial agriculture or farming as a business instead of just a way of life; and in certain ways and certain purely economic ways, progress. But invariably progress at a price, creating what economists and development scholars generally call the difficulties of the dual economy, the one sector of the economy which is modernized more or less keyed-in to the international economic community the other that has remained passed by, usually the remoter parts of the country, the pastoral areas and the like. Or what Charles Issawi in his excellent studies of Egypt refers to as "lop-sided development" with all of the difficulties that ensue. First then, the whole pattern of economic infrastructure with its mixed blessing.

The second result of the Western, imperial legacy is what I would consider a changed idea within the region concerning the state and its relation to society. To set the stage in explaining what it was like

one can hardly do better than cite that paragraph from the Gibb and Bowen study Islamic Society in the West especially as pertaining to the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. They wrote: "Yet the paradox remains of a government, generally apathetic, unprogressive and careless of the welfare of its subjects, and often arbitrary and violent in its dealings with them, and a society upon whose institutions and activities such a government had little or no effect." Or to put the same notion in a somewhat more American expression, in the old Ottoman system it could be argued, no one went around the streets muttering, "there ought to be a law." They wanted government out of the way and government was willing to have it that way. People tended to regard the government, to paraphrase Saad Zagloul, "the way the bird viewed the hunter."

Now in large measure because of the Western interlude, the ideology at least has changed. One now talks of what government ought to do. However despotic or undemocratic a government might be in fact, it now feels obliged to talk of providing services and a better life to its people. To its people, note, not to its subjects. Indeed many innovations that do not appear at first sight closely connected may all be tied together as aspects of a greater sense of public participation, of a popular spirit largely ushered in by the Western interlude. I think of such things as the rise of mass newspapers, greater self-expression, individualism and stylistic freedom in modern literature, political parties, trade unions and other such things could be cited.

Indeed the virtual canonization, if not apotheosis, of the people in contemporary Middle Eastern political ideology has yet to receive the attention it deserves. It is not necessarily a blessing, let's don't fool ourselves there; but it is, I would argue, a fundamental change in the political ideology of the region and it will clearly affect, it is affecting, even if it does not govern political reality.

The third major aspect of the legacy can be summed up under the rubric of education, an education that fostered an increasingly "this-wordly" orientation and as a result developed new career patterns, increased social mobility and brought forward rapidly changed notions of social prestige and social propriety. Now of course we all realize that this new education, this new more secular education, came into being in the Middle East before formal Western rule and much of it developed outside of it. One thinks of course of the innovations of Sultan Mahmud, of the whole Tanzimat period, of the very aggressive and energetic efforts of the Khedive Ismail in Egypt, of such individual institutions as the American University of Beirut, University of St. Joseph, etc.

Nevertheless I believe that we can say that Western rule, where it existed, intensified and standardized these trends. And such institutions as College Moulay Idriss in Fez, Sadiqi College in Tunis,

Gordon Memorial College, now Khartoum University, in Khartoum, are not just symbols -- they are the keystone to a complete system. Thus old ulama families have their sons educated to be engineers, doctors and economists. There is an increasing tendency to bring women into the mainstream of social and political life. But as with any great break-through there is always a somewhat shadier side and there is at the same time the devisive legacy of that second language -- in some parts of our area English, in other parts French. These three points (and others could be mentioned) must in each case be either discounted or upgraded according to the specific situation. For example, to what extent did this or that portion of the Middle East have intensive, formal, direct rule for a long period of time. Nevertheless even the longest was only a brief interlude as the historian would see it. Even more, it was a period during which many hands were working at different paces and according to different plans. It was therefore not a unifying experience and it did not even point the way toward some plausible new unity.

Now, what does this interpretation of the Western interlude tell us about the contemporary Middle East which is the major subject of this conference?

I would confess it offers only hazy answers. I would also admit to you that the historian who would dare to be a diagnostician or, even worse, a prophet had better learn to speak in oracular language that can easily be reinterpreted as required. I will not try to do that. Instead, I will conclude with three points concerning what could be the impact, the legacy, of the Western interlude for the contemporary Middle East.

The first point: I have discounted the importance of the period of formal Western rule. I have argued that it's too brief in time, was too brief, too divided and contradictory in its tendency. Now this argument that we discount the formal Western rule as a formative influence opens the field for a more careful consideration of earlier legacies. This brings us to the Ottoman heritage -- the Millet system, a notion which still survives, often on the surface, always under the surface. There are residues of older ideas about the relations between state and society, and I would suggest a better knowledge of this more venerable background, well beyond the brief interlude of formal Western rule, can help the outsider understand political behavior which would otherwise seem quixotic or even contradictory.

Second, by understanding the divisiveness of the Western interlude we can better appreciate the at times awkward, at times poignant efforts to create a new unity within this area. What Time Magazine facetiously called about a decade ago "the urge to merge." And let us hope that while appreciating it, while appreciating the sentiment and the

problem we can do it without becoming emotionally involved, pro or con. In learning from the past, let us pray that the days of the outside king-makers and map-drawers have ended in the Middle East. For whether the individuals and governments involved were well-intentioned or malicious, the cumulative record associated with such names as Cardinal Lavigerie, Wilfred Blunt, Lawrence, Balfour, Philby, Eden, Catroux, and Spears in the '40s and for that matter, Dulles in the '50s, the cumulative record associated with these names does not add up to a model which either we in the West or leaders in the Middle East would care to adopt today.

Now a final point with, alas, a pessimism for the future which matches the unenthusiastic appraisal of the past era of formal Western rule. What I have in mind is this: With few exceptions (one thinks immediately of Algeria) formal Western rule in the Middle East was more nearly tantalizing than harsh. It was kind of a half-way imperialism, things were never done decisively. It was a pattern of domination sufficient to keep indigenous political forces off balance but usually not sufficiently intense nor consistent to provoke clearly delineated new forces in response to the challenge.

Thus we see the dismal pattern of formal independence in Egypt after 1922, or Iraq after 1932, which while seemingly liberal at the time may well have hampered a more normal development of political structures and fostered a very debilitating cynicism towards the political game. Thus the absurd pattern of France changing the ground rules in the territorial division in Syria and Lebanon every few years during the inter-war period. Thus the irony of the Anglo-Egyptian struggle over the Sudan in the 1940s and '50s, a limited battle that largely avoided bloodshed but perhaps in the process may have undermined previously encouraging developments in administrative modernization, nation building and democratic institutions. Thus also the whole struggle, always at several levels at the same time -- local, regional and international -- over Palestine.

Now the term "Western interlude" in reference to an earlier unity before that interlude implies that some new synthesis is in the offing -- some new unity or if not perhaps total unity, some new synthesis, some new cultural cohesion. Unfortunately, this may well not happen. At least not in the foreseeable future. For if one looks back at the Western interlude of formal colonial control of the Middle East, if one looks back at that interlude in historical perspective, one sees that the Middle East, though never thoroughly dominated by the West, has also never been completely freed from the now two-centuries-old Eastern Question.

Middle Eastern leaders still tend to conduct their diplomacy and politics the way it was done during and even immediately before the

Western interlude, with an eye over one shoulder to see what the outside powers are up to. And the outside powers still jockey for position in this absurd race that never ends and thus never pays a purse to any victors.

So today as yesterday we see little wars, constant tension, the clucking of Great Powers, within the region, the deep cynicism that comes from being constantly tantalized and, in the outside world, a second rate re-run of the times of Lord Palmerston, Monsieur Thiers, of Muhammad Ali and Emir Bashir, leading perhaps to another Crimean War which we can only hope will be no worse than the first.

Thank you.

THE LEGACIES OF THE MODERN HISTORICAL ERA: THE INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES (TURKEY, IRAN, AND SAUDI ARABIA)

C. Ernest Dawn

In attempting to answer the question of what Middle East governments have done to represent the real interests of their people and to create viable permanent means of articulating these interests, we must first remind ourselves of the truism that not all people are alike in interests or desires, and then confront the problem of determining what it is that concerns or attracts all the people. We must also note that it will be much easier to discover the focus of attention for some segments of the people than it will be for others. Obviously, it is easier to discover the obsessions of newspaper editors than the desires of peasants.

To begin, we may as well note that, for many persons in the most visible segment of the population, we hit a nerve when we class some countries as independent. To such persons, no country in the so-called Third World has been or is independent in the age of imperialism. The great ease with which so many suspend the laws of logical contradiction to show that both politically independent and politically dependent countries are the slaves of capitalism indicates that in the twentieth century as in the nineteenth, the defense of the self-view has been a major concern of an important element of the people. Conversely, the actions of the governments have been in a major way a response to the injured self-view of the educated classes.

In the nineteenth century, the political classes of both Turkey and Iran were made aware that their culture was deficient in comparison to European culture in certain important respects. The result was cultural Westernization. At the same time, following the universal human pattern, the need to imitate the alien injured the self-view of the borrowers. Consequently, sensitive persons rejected Westernization. In its stead, they put modernization, that is, the view that modernity is not of West European origin, but is a stage that is possible for other cultures. In fact, they held that the Islamic peoples were the true creators of modernity, had taught the West, and then had declined because they had deviated from their own true culture. The way to salvation, of course, was to return to the true Islamic way of life. This return to first principles would liberate the culture from its alien bonds and stimulate a tremendous leap forward into full modernity, and the lost power and glory of the Muslims would be regained from the infidel Franks. What the most visible segment of the population desired

above all else was reason to believe that their culture was fully adequate to the needs of the modern world, the equal, nay the superior of the civilization of the West. Statesmen and governments of course attempted to satisfy the desire by in fact reforming government and society so as to meet the definition of modernity. This was rarely sufficient, since modernity was supposed to entail power and glory, and no amount of modernization could move the Islamic world closer to the European powers in military and economic strength. But governments and intellectuals could offer hope and solace by showing that their peoples, by returning to true principles, were on their way to the great day acoming.

Concern for the self-view and modernity is manifest in the behavior of the governments of Turkey and Iran after World War I. The intensity of feeling among Turkish intellectuals is indicated by Gökalp's continued adherence to Ottomanism and the caliphate until the mid-twenties. Mustafa Kemal's achievement in replacing the Ottoman self-view with a Turkish self-view looms all the larger in retrospect. We may smile at elements in Kemal's historical and linguistic theories, but scientific or scholarly goals were not his purpose. In the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire and of Ottomanism, many Turks were on the verge of despair. To restore the Empire and Ottomanism was impossible. Kemal's Turkism, combined with his vigorous action, undoubtedly responded to and satisfied the deep need of the Turkish political classes to feel that they belonged to a great people who would soon be able to lift itself from its present unbearable lowly state. The Pahlavi achievement is of like nature. Iran appeared to be destined to extinction by incorporation in the British or Russian empires, and the existing government did not exhibit skill even in creating symbols to stir men's souls. Reza Shah's emphasis on the Iranian nation and its essential greatness, combined with his action in politics and diplomacy, gave Iranians reason to look to the future with hope.

The need of the political classes to feel that their country is modern, their culture adequate to modernity, has shaped political ideologies and the form and policies of governments. Despite the rejection of the equation of the Western with the modern, Turkish and Iranian intellectuals have used Europe and North America as the measure of the modern. In the nineteenth century, when legal status and the mode of government dominated European politics and political thought, Iranian and Turkish thinkers concentrated on law and institutions. In those days, modernity was equality before the law for all citizens and representative government. Politicians promised to ensure the equality of religions and sexes and to rule in accordance with the will of the majority. Parliaments and European legal codes or modifications of the Islamic shari'a were the result. Intellectuals showed that the adoption of these principles and institutions was a return to true Islam and the realization of the modernity implicit in it. As the West turned more to economic and social theories, so did the Middle East. Kemalist

Turkey and Pahlavi Persia both stressed national economic independence and development. In this, both governments were applying the latest ideas from London and Paris. The same tendency is to be seen in the spread of elements from socialist and Marxist thought. But the general relative stability of the régimes in Turkey and Iran were the probable reason for the failure of these two countries to produce precise analogues to Arab socialism.

The defense of the self-view has been an important interest of the intelligentsia in Turkey and Iran, countries which have been unhappily aware of the European for over a century and two-thirds. The dominant linguistic and cultural groups in the two countries, the Turks and the Persians, as the ruling elements in independent states which were adjacent to Europe, could not avoid comparing their culture to Europe. The same is not true of the third major section of the Middle East which remained politically independent in the modern era, the historic core of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, i.e., Najd and the Hijaz. Here Europe was remote until relatively recently. The Arab elite of Arabia thus was not forced to compare its culture with that of the Franks. The result is clearly discernible in political life.

Until relatively recently, Arabian politics arose from purely regional concerns. In the amirate of Mecca, the interests of cameleers, of Bedouin tribesmen and chieftains, were the popular interests which sharifian amirs and Ottoman valis had to take into account. As the power of Europe was not demonstrated to many in Arabia, the leaders of the Hijaz could adopt the position of the most traditional defenders of Islam. Thus the last amir, Husayn ibn-'Ali, was a loyal representative of the traditional Ottoman sultan against atheistic Young Turks and anarchic tribesmen. In the end, Husayn's local concerns led him to adopt Arabism in the conditions created by World War I.

The West was of little significance in Saudi Arabian politics until after World War II. We cannot, as some do, consider Wahhabism to be the first Islamic reaction against the West. Muhammad ibn-'Abd al-Wahhab and his followers for generations after him had no intimate experience of Europe. In part, at least, the Wahhabi movement is best considered a manifestation of the inner tension in Islam between the followers of the Sufistic consensus and the Hanbalite purists. The adoption of Arabism by King 'Abd al-'Aziz in the 1940s arose in the need to defend the political interests of the dynasty and kingdom from the threat of Hashimite restoration, not from the interest of the Saudi population in Arabism.

The rapid expansion of the oil industry did for Saudi Arabia what European armies and commerce had done to Iran, Turkey, Syria and Egypt in the early part of the nineteenth century. Oil brought the alien to Arabia and took the Arabian to the West in an unprecedented way.

The Saudi intelligentsia, with its new experience of the West, followed their predecessors in Turkey and Iran (and also the Fertile Crescent and Egypt) by being concerned with the self-view. The tendency has been given added impetus by the recruitment of non-Arabian Arabs, especially Palestinians. But if the Saudi intelligentsia had been closed to all but natives to the Kingdom, we can be sure that current fancies regarding neo-colonialism would have spread within the Saudi educated class.

Government also has had to deal with the material and practical interests of the educated classes, most notably the desires and aspirations of its members for position and income. Although the last two centuries have witnessed some important changes, government service (including teaching and of course the religious institution and the military) still provides the best change of employment to educated persons. In Turkey and Iran, as in most Middle East countries, government expenditures constitute a significant portion of the GNP. Of like importance has been the value of political position in opening of other avenues of economic opportunity. Traditionally, title to land has been at the sole disposition of the state, and the tradition lingers on. In Turkey, successive land laws in the course of the nineteenth century resulted in the creation of landed property comparable to the European freehold, but even in the 1960s titles in some regions are so obscure and so subject to dispute that they can be secured or gained only by resort to politics and government. The Iranian land reforms of the 1960s in part represent a public phase in the traditional political process which previously took place in a less exposed manner.

This facet of the political process, which is, of course, universal rather than peculiarly Middle Eastern, has strongly influenced the adoption and adaptation of western political forms and practices, which inevitably were operated by the same kind of people as were the older forms. At least partially for this reason, certain features of the traditional political structures have survived through constitutional monarchies and republics.

Through all changes of form, the older tradition of leadership has survived. The imamate of acquisition, that is, suzerainty acquired by seizure and legitimized by the principle that possession is ten points of the law, and the monarchical absolutism whereby the chief is supreme and the entire government his dependency, continue to be rules of government. In Turkey, the existence of a thoroughly western constitution has not eliminated the traditional ruler. Mustafa Kemal literally seized power from its lawful possessor, and presidents and prime ministers since then have frequently been able to convert tenure obtained through nominally parliamentary procedures into seemingly indefinite one-man rule. Iran, too, has exhibited the same preeminence of personality over dynastic or electoral legitimacy with respect to both succession and governance. Reza Shah displaced the enthroned Qajar Shah, and the present shah himself

has been seriously threatened, most notably by Dr. Musaddiq. The same openness of careers to talent may be seen in Arabia, where the Saudis displaced the Hashimites in the Hijaz, and where a reigning monarch has been replaced before his natural death. We should note that personality plays a great role in governments as disparate as Franco's Spain and Mao's China, France under whatever republic, the Soviet Union, and the United States. But it is worth emphasizing that the Middle Eastern tradition assigns little value to dynastic legitimacy and regards one-man rule as the natural form of government.

In similar fashion, the importance of the army and the bureaucracy in the older state has survived the introduction of parliament and republic. The crucial role of the army in creating both Turkish republic and Pahlavi monarchy needs no underlining. The vitality of the tradition is manifest in both states. In this respect Saudi Arabia is somewhat different, since the apparatus of government was not as highly developed there as in Turkey and Iran.

But what of the people who have not received a college education? Their primary concerns must continue to be land and jobs, as in the past. It is also clear that today as in the past the masses and the notables often exist symbiotically. Until relatively recently, tenant often had some leverage with landlord owing to the latter's need for labor. Masses joined with notables in competition with similar groupings for political and economic advantage. Recent developments appear to have heightened one aspect of the interaction of masses, classes, and central government. Suzerains have consistently sought to create an apparatus independent of the local magnates. This was possible, even though at most times the personnel of the central administration was recruited from the notables. Notables in office, usually being stationed in alien territory, identified with the central government, not their local peers. Furthermore, poor relations of powerful and rich people, having no alternative to state service, frequently have conceived of the state as nothing more than a means of breaking the power of the wicked landlords. These intrinsic tendencies of the political process have been strengthened by the thrust of modernization. Modern armies, transportation, and communications have reduced the military power of local magnates. As resistance to the central authority came to be useless, many could keep up the fight in a different way by joining and competing through the central administration. Thus, we find the central administration and the notables, who tend to merge even more than in the past, utilizing more direct appeals to the masses, by organizing political parties and by making promises of direct material gain to the masses.

As the elites turn more to the forms of representative government, the capacity of the masses to participate in and to utilize representative government has been increased by past government policies, which resulted from the desire for modernization. Most notably, the

expansion of public education, beginning in the 1920s, especially in Iran and Turkey, has increased the awareness and competence of the traditional middle class of shopkeeper and clerk, at least, if not of the true masses. The same policies laid the foundation for the economic expansion which has raised the average income in the cities and improved the material conditions of life everywhere and which has resulted in some significant incipient changes in economic structure since 1960. The great economic surge of the sixties in Turkey and Iran could not have taken place without the expansion of public primary education, the construction of railroads, roads, ports, and airfields, between 1920 and 1950. During this same period, a parallel process occurred in Saudi Arabia in the development of transportation and communication facilities.

The extension of the government to the masses, both as a means of expressing mass interests and as an institution subject to mass desires, has developed primarily out of pressures from the educated political classes. The elite pressures originated in the emotional or ideological and material concerns of the elite, which consequently shape and move the new institutions, whatever their ostensible forms and functions may be. Nevertheless, the usual political contest within the elite continues, as in the past, to induce the leaders to represent their own mass followings. The growth of centralized authority has also strengthened the old conflict between bureaucracy and local notable. The participants in the conflict look to the masses for support, and the general desire to be modern has disseminated the ideas of representative government or democracy widely, which strengthens the inclination of elite elements to look to the people. At the same time, the educational and economic policies of the government have increased the capacities of the people to participate in representative government.

THE MONARCHIES: THE RECORD OF THE TRADITIONALIST SOCIETIES

The focus of this session on the traditional societies of the Middle East was first, their prospects for stability, and second, given stability, their prospects for development and modernization. It was readily agreed that Tunisia did not belong in this discussion; however, it was thought worthwhile to outline the specific differences between the traditional monarchies and Tunisia in order to focus attention on the distinctive aspects of traditional regimes.

First, Tunisia's success lies in its stability, and its stability in the fact that it is not a monarchy. Because there was no assumed, traditional mode of loyalty, Tunisian leaders have had to cultivate and create their own legitimacy. These attempts at legitimation have given the Tunisian political system a dynamic stability and have ensured institutional renewal. While it is true that much of the legitimacy of the Present Tunisian regime may be due to Bourguiba's personality, his charisma is not the regime's only trump. The National Assembly has taken on more responsibilities and roles in national politics; open elections for party cells and a new Constitution are now being discussed; and a new Party Congress is soon to meet to ratify the many changes which have recently taken place. These political developments indicate the growing probability of factional party splits; any resultant proliferation of parties will, in turn, transform the present cooptive regime into a competitive regime. By encouraging the articulation of the demands and the political participation of citizens of all levels of the society, the prospects for stability are greatly enhanced.

The Tunisian example stands in clear juxtaposition to the Moroccan, Iranian, and Saudi Arabian monarchies. Saudi Arabia probably comes closest to the model of a traditional Arab society. In describing the stabilizing factors in the Saudi regime, we are, to a greater or lesser extent, describing those features of other traditional regimes which have enabled them to survive the political turmoil of the modern Middle East.

First, Saudi Arabia has been relatively isolated from the West; its regime is a local Arabian evolution, created autonomously, albeit violently. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has never been occupied by Westerners. The importance of this fact is both psychological and practical: Saudis are confident of their equality with westerners; they are able to negotiate successfully with the West without either posturing or obeisance. There is, in addition, no second language problems such has plagued the many occupied and mandated countries.

Second, the Saudi regime is legitimated by religion. Wahhabism has been successfully substituted for nationalism as the legitimating bond between ruler and ruled and the mandate for the ruler's authority.

Third, Saudi Arabia has enjoyed a political continuity and a succession of strong rulers since the early eighteenth century; this historical continuity has meant that change, and there has been change, has taken place within a known and accepted framework.

Fourth, until very recently there has been a lack of modernization; thus, the expectations of citizens and their demands upon the government which usually accompany efforts at modernization have not been a major source of problems in Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting, however, that the recent prodigious effort at economic and social development will inevitably lead to some of these social problems. Indeed, the nature of the challenge which the Saudi Arabian regime faces today is precisely demands for political equality, social justice, nationalism and universal education - in short, the populist spirit - which have been fed by the recent development in communications.

In addition to the old interest groups - tribes, Shi'ites, the royal family, and the religious hierarchy - modernization has meant the addition of new interest groups to the Saudi political system. These include businessmen whose number has increased with the growing oil industry, and the army, which has been well taken care of by the Saudi regime. They also include, however, two particular groups whose demands have not been accommodated by the regime; the young intelligentsia, returning with their diplomas from western universities to a situation where they cannot use the talents and expertise they have acquired, and the foreign Arab nationals, most notably Palestinians, who are impatient with the regime's conservative policies.

The constitutional changes which have taken place have not gone far toward meeting these modern populist demands. Although the creation of a Council of Ministers in 1953 paved the way for a regime based on other than one man rule, King Faysal has not been willing to relinquish any powers. Second, in 1963 the Law of Provinces sought to rationalize local administration, not by encouraging local participation but rather by centralizing control over local administration in the national government. The TV and radio communications network, too, is centralized in an attempt to minimize the impact of foreign cultural intrusions into the traditional social fabric.

In other areas, there have been some attempts at adaptation There is a Ministry of Justice, a fact which implies some recognition of secular law; however, the Court of Appeals is based on religious law, and the Qadis have been organized hierarchically in an attempt to fit Islamic law to modern adjudication. It is notable that commercial law has been taken out of the realm of Islamic law; "commercial committees" have been formed to deal with legal problems arising in business and economic transactions. It is also notable that, despite limited resources, economic development, especially in the areas of education and health, has proceeded rapidly.

In summary, the adaptation which the traditional regime has made

to the modern problems which it faces has involved a devolution of authority from the ruler to the ministries, and a centralization of administration from the local level to the ministries. Arab politics including the Yemen war, relations with the UAR, and the Arab-Israeli confrontation have posed certain problems for the Saudi regime. However, the range of interests of the interest groups - from the foreign Arab nationals and young intellectuals to the businessmen and the army to the tribal and religious leaders - is sufficiently broad to enable the regime to balance their many diverse demands. Since attitudes on the many political issues of the area vary from person to person and from group to group, the Saudi position on these foreign policies has not been the destabilizing factor it has been in other conservative Arab regimes.

The balance among interest groups which the present Saudi regime has struck seems to have accommodated change to date; furthermore, King Faysal is a strong ruler, and unwilling to diminish his present authority. Thus, the prospects for creating new political institutions such as are now developing in Tunisia are dim for the duration of the present Saudi regime.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iran has experienced occupation and control by foreign powers. It is for this reason that the major goal of the Iranian political system during the first six decades of the twentieth century has been national independence. In fact, the search for national independence which has overshadowed the other two goals of the Iranian regime - modernization and democratization - may be seen as the real motivation for many of Iran's past policies. For instance, although the development of the national railway system in the north and the south may have encouraged economic development and national communications, its primary objective was to dislodge the Russian and British domination of the country. The Civil Code which was rushed through the Majlis was formulated not because of local citizen pressure, but rather to convince the foreigners that Iran was ready for independence. Similarly, Mossadegh's actions in the Oil Commission of the Majlis in February 1951 were motivated not so much by the issue of land ownership as by the desire to eliminate British domination of the Iranian oil industry.

By 1960, however, the emphasis in national priorities had changed. The land reform program marked the beginning of a new effort at modernization - an effort which was underwritten by the allocation of 80 per cent of oil income (now estimated at somewhat less than $1.5 billion) for development.

Despite this impressive effort, there have been several socio-economic problems, among them the poor marketing facilities for agricultural goods, the low level of efficiency of the local administrations, and the imbalance in the educational system between vocational and academic training. Traditional attitudes, of course, are always a problem for a modernizing society; but equally problematic are the

frustrations which are fueled by the inability of the government to make good on the promises which its development program has offered the people. Certainly one example is the frustration of the hopes of many secondary school students for a university degree, for, at Tehran University for instance, only one student in seven is accepted.

Political problems as well plague the Iranian monarchy. Although democratization is a goal of the regime, it is not the primary goal. That the lack of popular participation has not yet created the instability which characterizes other modernizing regimes is in part explained by the character of attitudes toward the government. There is a certain portion of the citizenry which will support any policy of the regime, and another which will be opposed, no matter what. There is also a third group which is selective in its support of government policy; it is this group which has been urging more popular participation in government, for they are the only group which believes that their participation will make a difference in government policies.

The Shah rejects the idea of representational or social democracy. He maintains control primarily through his secret police, and he insists on his right to intervene in all aspects and levels of society. These facts have implications for both his domestic and foreign policy. For instance, the police intervention to expose an alleged Baghdad plot against the Iranian regime led to a rupture in relations between the two countries. Domestic politics, too, reflect the Shah's rejection of political democracy. At the national level, there is not much room for popular participation; party politics are dominated by one party, and an alternative, the New Iranian Party, has only one seat in the Majlis. Although the Constitution provides for popular participation in local government, the first local elections were not held until September 1970. Locally elected representatives are charged with overseeing the provincial departments, building schools, et cetera; however, it is as yet too early to know whether local elections will in fact encourage popular participation, or whether popular participation at the local level will provide some counterweight to the central government.

Because the Iranian regime is neither purely traditional nor guided by any particular ideology, predictions are difficult. Several observations, however, may be made. First, the tempo of development will increase in the next decade, with the private sector keeping pace with the growing public sector of the economy. Second, increasing attention will be paid to agricultural development, including the marketing problems which now plague the economy. Third, the present concentration of power at the national level will be maintained, despite growing demands for democratic party politics. The basic problem which the Iranian monarchy now faces is the need to match its many socio-economic accomplishments with institutionalization of popular political participation. The stability of the country demands both.

If Saudi Arabia represents the case of a lack of domestic

political opposition, and Iran, the control of opposition forces, then Morocco's politics since independence may be characterized as the wearing down of political forces in confrontation with the King. At independence, the King and the nationalist movement were equally powerful; however, when the movement split and party politics developed, the King's position was enhanced by his quasi "honest broker" role. Furthermore, since the King had the right to call elections, he maintained effective control over party politics.

That this confrontation has also worn down the King is evident from the major trend in recent Moroccan politics toward periodic disorganized and anomic outburst by a generally cynical and apathetic citizenry. For instance, the 1965 student and worker riots in Casablanca merely represented an eruption of frustrations with the government: the rebels did not want to change the government; they simply wanted to express their grievances. Similarly, the 1971 attempted coup by military cadets was nothing if not ill-conceived and poorly executed. The apathy of the public was clearly demonstrated by the fact that there was neither a reaction to the announcement that the King had been killed in July 1971, nor to the subsequent announcement that the coup attempt had been foiled.

Furthermore, there is no indication that this trend will change, except that future political outbursts may be better organized and more effective. Certainly one important result of the 1971 coup was the recognition of the desirability and feasibility of a coup, and a better understanding of the "enemy". Party politics will continue in their weak position, for, given the King's supervision, they are unlikely to turn revolutionary.

There have been three turning points in the post-independence Moroccan regime; each decision contributed to the present unstable position of the King today. First, in 1960 the King took personal control of the government; second, in 1965 he abrogated the Constitution and dissolved Parliament; finally, by his weak response to the attempted coup in 1971, he indicated that he no longer had any options - no alternative Cabinet which had not been discredited, and no alternative but to rely on the army. When it appeared that the army had revolted against him, he was left with no political counterweight.

Since the King himself is acting like a politician rather than a diplomat, and since the conduct of his regime might best be titled crisis management, it is useful to ask in what ways the Moroccan monarchy might be considered traditional. Basically, the King is traditionally (religiously) legitimized, and he has not thought it necessary to prove his legitimacy to the Moroccan citizenry. His mistake is in not recognizing that the number of people who acknowledge this type of legitimacy is decreasing. He has operated as if Moroccan society resembled Saudi society, when in fact it is much more similar to Tunisia. The prospects

for governmental change in Morocco point almost inevitably in the direction of the Tunisian model.

In returning to the original focus on the prospects for stability of the traditional monarchies, there are three factors which seem to characterize these traditional regimes: they have been able to match the strong centrist governments of the modernizing socialist states; they have substituted a religious or charismatic loyalty for nationalism; and they have suppressed or failed to encourage popular participation in politics. It is ironical, but nevertheless true that the prospects for _instability_ are directly related to the prospects for development and modernization, the second major focus of this session. The nature of the threat to these traditional regimes, though it is more pressing in some countries than others, is that the frustrations engendered by the coexistence of socio-economic development and political traditionalism cannot be accommodated or defused by the traditional monarchial regimes.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ELECTED DEMOCRACY

Israel

One of the most unusual characteristics of the Israeli political system is that on the one hand, it looks like a very cohesive political system quite capable of taking care of its own; but on the other hand, it is a very disruptive political system. There are 13 political parties in parliament and attempts to concentrate on a few basic issues of policy have never really succeeded. In order to understand the achievements of the Israeli political system in terms of managing to present a multiparty, relatively open society under conditions of extreme external and internal pressure, one must take into account not only the pressure itself which may be quite functional on many levels of Israeli society, but also something of the traditional aspect of Israeli society.

It has often been argued that one has to attribute the democratic structure and the multiparty system of the Israeli society to the European origin of the founding fathers of Israel. Now this is to a certain degree historically true, but today, given the present composition of Israeli society, more than half of the Jewish population of Israel doesn't come from Europe at all, but from the Middle East and brings with it a Middle Eastern culture and political culture. Secondly, the people who came to Palestine originally didn't bring with them a democratic tradition from their own countries of origin precisely because immigration to Palestine didn't come from democratic liberal countries, since in those countries there was hardly any reason for Jews to emigrate. Immigration to Palestine and the immigration that created the infrastructure for the political system in Israel came from non-democratic countries and the founding fathers of Israel came from czarist Russia, and later from communist Russia, from Poland, from Romania before 1939 -- countries that had all kinds of political structures but certainly not a democratic structure. Neither was it also a conscious adaptation of any Western parliamentary model. In order to understand the combination of basic consensus with a multiparty system that hasn't managed to create coalitions of a two or three party system, one has to go to the structure of Jewish society mainly in Eastern Europe and to its political and societal modes of behavior. In Eastern Europe, particularly under the Russian czarist empire, there was a degree of internal self-government in the Jewish community because of (a) the alienated place of Jews in Eastern European society, and (b) the absence of a hierarchical church in the Jewish tradition. A strongly representative communal system has existed in Jewish communal life since the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The only way to elect a rabbi, to have Jewish religious schools, to have a Jewish old-age home in the context of (a) gentile society, (b) the non-hierarchical nature

of the Jewish religion, was to base this on representation and election. There have been Eastern European Jewish communities which were more oligarchic, others more egalitarian and democratic. There have been super-communal authorities in areas of Poland where there was an autonomous Jewish parliament in the 17th century, legislating for affairs of mainly education, welfare, and religious services. The question is not what the religious precept has been, but what the social practice has been. This societal mode of representative behavior brought by Jewish immigrants has been one of the elements of continuity in the Israeli political system.

There are a number of problems in the development of the Israeli political system. The first is the question of the extreme impact of security problems -- the fact that Israel has an enormously impossibly high defense budget -- and the army stands very central in the symbolic imagination of the polity. It is almost a blueprint for a military take-over. The practice of the last few years can give a few examples of the tendencies. First, at present, there is far more openness and readiness to discuss quite delicate problems of a security nature and foreign policy than there had been ten years ago when the external pressures were not as strong as they are today. Secondly, when Premier Levi Eshkol died one and half years ago, the two obvious contenders for the premiership were two extremely popular cabinet ministers with a lot of charisma, both of them ex-generals in the Israeli army -- Moshe Dayan and Yigal Allon. Neither won, and a 72-year-old pensioned grandmother became prime minister. It seems that while the system has managed to create (a) much basic consensus, it has (b) managed to keep both the army and those who come from the army away from the height of power; it is likely that the next prime minister will not come from the ranks of ex-generals either.

A second problem, which has been in the news mainly due to the Israeli Black Panthers, is the question of the political integration of the new non-European immigrants. The economic integration has been extremely unsatisfactory; however, the political integration seems to be quite satisfactory, and a very interesting process is going on. On the national level, Jews from Middle Eastern countries have only 12 per cent of the representation in parliament. They are about 50 per cent of the population, so on a national level they are underrepresented; there is only one cabinet minister of Middle Eastern background. But the process of integration at the moment is occurring not on the national level, but on the local level. In the last six or seven years, the local political machines of the powerful labor alliance, of the trade union, are being taken over by Israel's "Italians" and "Irishmen" who, although of socio-economic low status, are political activists. For example, Beersheba, the fourth largest city in Israel, has an Iraqi mayor, in Jerusalem there is a Moroccan deputy mayor, etc. The Iraqi community is sometimes over-represented in local politics beyond its proportion in the population. Of course there are

disruptions and the Israeli system will have to do quite a lot of adjustments in terms of income distribution in order to accommodate the new group, but it may just happen that the next generation of Israeli leaders may come from the Oriental community rather than from the Israeli-born sabras; and the Dayan-Allon type may be the lost man of Israeli politics.

A third problem is the integration of the Arab minority into Israeli political life. Here again, a slow evolution is taking place. So long as the conflict continues, there is no doubt that both subjectively and objectively, the Israeli Arab minority is in a very precarious situation. This is self-evident given the present external situation of the Middle East, but even so, a number of processes are underway. The Arab in Israel proper are being slowly integrated in a way which would be inconceivable 10 or 15 years ago. First of all, Israeli political parties which usually had an Arab adjunct party (and this is mainly the case of the Israeli labor party), have decided to open full-fledged membership to Arab members. In this Parliament there is for the first time, an Arab deputy speaker of Parliament. Last spring the cabinet appointed the first Arab deputy minister. Even four years ago this was almost unthinkable, but this has been happening under the present situation and under the pressures of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Speaking now about the occupied territories, in Jerusalem, the Arab population was given the vote in the last municipal election. About 80 per cent of the Arabs boycotted the election for obvious political reasons. Some of those who were concerned about Arab representation tried to talk to some of the Arab community leaders to put up a list of candidates, be it anti-Israeli as it may, but at least have representation in municipal government - and then protest. Most of them decided not to do it; they were probably under pressure, but the outcome is that there is no Arab member of the municipality. Of those Arabs who did vote, most of them came from low-class families who for the first time were given the vote, because under the Jordanian system, there had been a property qualification for elections and only middle and upper class people could vote.

The last problem is one about which the adaptation has been a negative one. This is the question of religion and state. The religious parties hold the balance between the left wing and right wing parties and although they have only 15 per cent of the vote, they are able to extract quite a number of concessions from the non-religious parties. The major one has to do with the fact that there is no civil marriage in Israel; marriage is according to religious law. There is an unhappiness in the majority about that, and there has been a very interesting case study of religious attitudes among university students, where one would expect the balance to be more liberal and secular than generally in the population. Eighty per cent of the students stated that they are in favor of the introduction of civil marriage in Israel, but when asked if they would personally go through a civil procedure, only four per cent said they would prefer the civil procedure to the religious. This means that while there is an enormous ideological

liberal consensus about the advisability of civil marriage on grounds of principle, the consensus changes when it comes to considering one's parents and relatives.

A final remark about the party system: Although it seems to be a very broad one with little party unification, two trends currently stand out. First of all, the 13 traditional parties were (a) led by charismatic figures and (b) there was a highly centralized ideological conformity within the party which meant that if there was dissension and a certain issue became polarized on majority and minority groups, the minority group was not allowed to have freedom of action within the party and had to leave the party. These two things have begun to wither away. First, the old charismatic generation is dying out or leaving the scene, such as Mr. Ben-Gurion. The leadership is becoming far more collective, and far more pragmatic than the old charismatic leaders. Secondly, the parties are losing their old ideological conformity, so now there is far more ability to create bloc coalitions and ultimately unification of various parties. The left wing and right wing parties have created blocs and something similar is happening to the religious parties. This again leaves the religious party in a strategic position, but at least there is less atomization and fragmentation.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ELECTED DEMOCRACY

Lebanon

The transition that the Lebanese political system has gone through in the middle and late 1960s has been a transition from a kind of covert military rule under the regime of President and former General Fuad Chehab and his hand picked successor Charles Helou to the new regime of Suleiman Franjiyyah who was elected by a narrow parliamentary margin in August 1971.

The power structure of the Lebanese executive and parliament is apportioned along religious lines. The Lebanese system *in toto* constitutes a very elaborate and formalistic constitutional effort to control and minimize some very important latent - and sometimes manifest - primordial conflicts among the Lebanese people, who are themselves highly heterogeneous in terms of religion, political outlook and class lines.

There have been a number of efforts to explain why the Lebanese have attained something that looks very much like elected liberal democracy. One such explanation is a model called "consociational democracy"; the essential features of the model is a high degree of cooperation and interaction among the elites of divergent and conflicting subcommunities. At the same time, there is relatively little interaction between the masses of those communities and hence, according to the model, relatively little opportunity for basic hostilities to break out in open conflict. The elite within each respective subcommunity have solid control over their masses. Another explanation for the relative stability in the Lebanese case is a kind of "balance of power" model. The only problem with these models is that external factors, which are present in the Lebanese case, have continually and persistently caused problems for the basic stability of the Lebanese order. One of these, of course, is the general phenomenon of social mobilization, whereby people become more actively interested in politics; another is the unhappy external environment, the struggle going on in the Middle East.

Looking at the events of the past decade or so, one finds that first, Lebanon has had to recover from the traumatic effect of the 1958 civil war. It had also to contend with increasing turbulence within the Arab world itself, and as the Palestine question heated up in the middle 1960s, the repercussions for Lebanon became very serious indeed. Then in 1966, there was financial disaster; the huge Intrabank collapsed, dealing a serious blow to the Lebanese economy. The June 1967 war, in which Lebanon was involved on the sidelines, had repercussions which are still not entirely worked out. It has been, in short, a very rough period. Looking at these difficulties on (a) the social scene, there has been a considerable degree of continuity through the 1960s, although not complete calm if one looks at the crude

but interesting indicators of basic socio-political malaise. One does not find clear evidence of further disintegration of the Lebanese political culture -- suicide rates, crime rates in general have held reasonably constant over very difficult periods. The only exception is the rather surprising jump in the number of murders, but basically one does not see signs of serious social disintegration.

On the (b) economic scene, again the evidence is toward continuity and certainly not clearly indicative of collapse, despite the Intrabank disaster, and despite the problems of Lebanese tourism after the June war. One finds moderate growth of GNP through the late 1960s, and 1971 looks like a very good year as the Arab tourists came back in droves. However, economic growth continues to be unbalanced. Industry has improved somewhat, coming up perhaps to 16 per cent GNP in 1969; services, however, continue to grow and they make the Lebanese economy a rather lopsided one. There has been, in addition, considerable labor unrest and strikes.

Looking now at the (c) political scene, _per se_: already mentioned were the traumatic events of the period: collapse of the Intrabank in 1966 and the trauma of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The exacerbation of Arab nationalist feelings on the one hand, and rather conservative Christian feelings on the other should also be noted. In 1969 and 1970, there was an extremely serious challenge to the basic Lebanese order from the Palestinian guerrilla movement - a near insurgency existed at certain times; and following a raid by the Israelis on the Beirut airport at the end of 1968, there was a rapid and dramatic growth of Palestinian resistance sentiment in Lebanon. In April 1969, following a bloody clash between Lebanese security forces and the guerrillas and their supporters, the government fell and Lebanon went into a seven-month constitutional crisis. Then again in October-November of 1969, were more troubles with the Palestinian guerrillas on a much larger scale and several sections of the country were indeed out of government control. The 1968 parliamentary elections were a crucial event in this time of trouble. The election results weakened the regime of President Helou and they were widely interpreted as a repudiation of the regime's identity with the Nasser regime. Now we look at the 1970 presidential elections. By the closest of votes in a 99-person parliament, President Franjiyyah got 50 votes. There was some highly emotional disputation at the time the votes were taken as to whether he really had gotten a majority or not, but the problem was settled and President Franjiyyah took office.

Certain (d) structural changes seem to be evident in the Lebanese system. If one looks at parliament, not in terms of distribution of parties but in distribution of occupations, one finds a continuing decline in landlord representation, going from approximately 28 per cent in 1964 to 15 per cent in the 1968 election. The genealogical continuity within the parliament is another aspect of its institutional

flexibility. Lebanon is one of the rare countries not to have changed its ruling clans since 1936. This is not to say that it is a gerontocracy; members are succeeded by their children and grandchildren. Looking at the cabinet one notes further signs of institutional vitality. It is one of the youngest and largest cabinets in Lebanese history. This reflects again the general expansion of governmental functions and possibly even expansion of governmental capabilities. Those in the present cabinet were almost entirely new faces, except for the premier; this may be compared with the new entry rate of about one-third under the cabinets during the regimes of Presidents Chamoun and Chehab.

In conclusion, it may be fair to say that one may continue to have some faith in the innovative and adaptive characteristics of the Lebanese system as a whole. The present President is a strong leader; the management of foreign policy has been unusually skillful after the transition; there are signs of a short to medium-term economic upturn. Of course, as in any political system, there are difficulties. One of these is the continuing structural lopsidedness of the economy. The possibility of long-term serious unemployment still remains in prospect; strikes are still a problem. Social imbalances are very much in evidence. The northern and other areas are still heavily tribal and have only token governmental representation in rather large expansive areas of the country; there have been gun battles between the gendarmes and the tribal forces and resident outlaws. There isn't any major discernible governmental movement on growing social problems other than a growing awareness of them. Water pollution of the Lebanese coastline is a threat to the tourist business. Less visible to the Western tourist are the huge disadvantaged and unrepresented communities of Kurds, Shiites, Syrians, and Palestinians in refugee camps. One notes furthermore, considerable unrest among students in Lebanon. There have been persistent strikes at the Lebanese University and at the American University of Beirut, reflecting a certain dissatisfaction with the way the elite is running the country. It also reflects the regional political situation; the radicals tend to have a pro-Palestinian caste to them. The inadequacies of the education bureaucracy of the state are also evidenced.

Finally, the real danger is the persisting Arab-Israeli crisis. While at the moment, the situation is relatively calm, it seems that Lebanon's continued tranquillity and prosperity is a hostage to the successful settlement of the crisis. Lebanon's southern border problem with Israel, incursion from one side, heavy reprisals from the other side, is a kind of hemorrhage of the legitimacy of the army and state as a whole. The present situation calls for structural durability and adaptability of the Lebanese system and the most astute management of domestic and foreign affairs. We shall have to wait until the next crisis to see if the traditional system which has passed successfully through this one, can continue to survive.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ELECTED DEMOCRACY

Turkey (Osman Nur Yalman)

> ....On a fateful day of March of this year, I spoke at the panel of the Middle East Institute regarding increasing polarization of Turkish politics and the dangers to democracy as follows:...I mentioned the armed forces; foreign journalists and professors sometimes write as if the Turkish military establishment is like a chained and caged lion about to spring upon the constitutional order. I seriously doubt this, I said. First as General Tağmaç so clearly indicated a few days ago (this was in March) in a remarkable talk, the military establishment gets what it needs from the state; second, I said, the higher officers at least know and this is what the chief of the general staff said, "where there is military rule, there is no state, and how could we govern this nation of 35 million....that is the task of the party." And third, I went on to say, this is perhaps most important: it is now very dubious, given the 1962 and 1963 experience and the amazing published memoirs of the officers involved, that the immense military institution in Turkey could act with any degree of political unity as it did in 1960. I said, it's anybody's guess as to how the election statistics are refracted in the officers' corps. I would not see them in the pocket of any party. Then I went on to say I'm cautiously optimistic about stability in Turkey; Turkey is operating with a really free and open system for the first time in the long history of the Turks; the institutions are new, unfamiliar, and they are being tested. They will continue to be tested for some time. If the economy can be kept moving, I expect them to withstand the shock.
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> The shock came soon afterwards, in fact, almost the next day. As is well known, the senior commanders of the military sent the president of Turkey a note on the 12th of March (I'd spoken on the 10th) in which they expressed first, their lack of confidence in the government of Prime Minister Demirel without implicating him personally; and second, the need for a new respected and strong government to guide Turkey away from the tide of anarchy...Thereupon, the Demirel cabinet resigned immediately...Must I now eat my words and accept that the military was a chained and caged lion about to spring upon the constitutional order? And what about long-term stability?....

First it will be useful to review the events which have led to this present state in Turkey. In the general elections of 1965, there had been widespread hope among the left for the Turkish Labor Party to

receive a large mandate, if not win outright in certain localities. They actually received a stunningly low 3 per cent of the popular vote. Two points to note: (1) Observe the extraordinary unrealistic nature of the expectations of the radical left in Turkey compared to their actual performance at the polls; (2) Note again that even this achievement would have been out of the question without the real support and practically a parliamentary shield provided for them by the venerable old People's Republican Party of Inönü. This radical left wing Turkish Labor Party has now been closed down by the present military cabinet. However, it was not only the radical labor party which was deeply disappointed by the 1965 polls: The hopeful Republicans only received 28.7 per cent of the vote. The Justice Party of Demirel received 52.9 per cent of the popular vote which gave him a clear majority to rule even though both the electoral laws and the constitution had been designed by the sympathizers of the Republican Party, as a strictly proportional representative system, to forestall just such an opportunity.

It was this telling demonstration of impotence at the polls which pushed the supporters of the radical left into the street. This was countered by the rapid development of the radical right wing group. At the same time, every issue was utilized to increase xenophobia against the West and NATO in general, and the United States in particular. When the elections were held in the fall of 1969, the radical left wing Turkish Labor Party received an even lesser mandate of 2.7 per cent, the People's Republican Party 27.4 per cent and the Justice Party of Demirel once again received a massive 46.5 per cent of the mandate (which in fact gave them only an edge in terms of the parliamentary seats). Immediately after the elections, the left wing newspapers started arguing for extra-parliamentary opposition (EPO); their argument being that parliament was a reactionary and conservative body made up of peasants and farming and business interests which were strangling the new dawn of socialism in Turkey. Another argument was to pretend that the 65 per cent participation in the elections of 1969 did not give Demirel the right to form a cabinet and then for the radical left to form secret organizations in the universities and in the military.

It has been said that the military interfered with the normal process of parliament to stop the drift of anarchy. It should also be noted that by this time (March 1971) the Demirel cabinet was teetering on two or three roads. When Demirel stepped down, a new cabinet was formed which was supposedly above the contending parties, but in fact mainly People's Republican Party in outlook. The new prime minister too, with all his real attempts at neutrality, is inescapably identified with Inönü. There are many questions which come to mind as to the motives of the high officers of the military. There is a good deal of evidence now to suggest that they acted as they did to forestall more radical attempts by other secret groups in the armed forces. The high officers and the president obviously had sympathy for parliamentary rule and democracy; and they were able to stop at the last moment the radical left wing attempt from within the army ranks. Hence, this is the reason

probably, why parliament was not dissolved at that time, why Demirel was not personally implicated, and why the Justice Party was not banned. In other words, the events of 1960 were not repeated. So in theory at least, Turkey is still operating in a constitutional order, especially so since the new cabinet has actually received an even larger vote of confidence from all the parties in parliament than any other government before.

However, there is something of an uncertainty in the present set-up. Parliament exists but it could be abolished by the military and the president if it hinders the work of the cabinet too much. The cabinet turns to parliament and makes every effort to work through it, not wishing to appear too dependent upon crude military power -- and the balance here is probably held by President Sunay and the top echelon of the military. But the balance is a delicate one. It may last until the projected elections in 1973; it might also come apart under the initiative of any one of the groups involved. The fundamental question is: If the balance does come about, is the electorate likely to accept major restrictions on exercise of a free system?

Ottoman and Islamic tradition emphasizes autocracy legitimated with reference toward divinely revealed constitution. Just as Plato's ideal republic was to be run by a specially prepared elite corps of men, Islam too favored an ideal constitution, the shari'a, administered by philosophers, the ulama, and the ideal philosopher king, the sultan.

The elite classes have been reacting increasingly strongly against the right to vote of all citizens. A deputy prime minister has even suggested that those who are illiterate should not have the franchise. Some of the bureaucracy and some of the members of the new ulama, the university professors, have indeed embraced the new modern scientific ideology, communism, which again makes it possible to have the elite corps with some claim to infallibility, the divine representatives of the proletariat, maintain an absolute rule over the innocent, enveloped in pre-Marxist doctrine. Every manifestation of the popular vote is explained away by some fine Marxist rhetoric or other.

However, it is likely that some grounds of agreement can be found between the two major parties, the People's Republican Party and the Justice Party, to maintain and defend parliamentary rule and democracy in Turkey. The parties remain the major instrument for the mobilization of public opinion and action in modern Turkey. Those at the top of these parties are experienced politicians, unlikely to prefer an unpredictable autocracy to a system with which they are familiar. Even the present cabinet with its military staffing had a very hard time making changes in the present constitution which might have restricted personal liberties ever so slightly and getting these changes through parliament. The very first actions of the new reformist cabinet consisted of strictly parliamentary attempts at modifying

the constitution to grant more power to the executive. This was indeed part of the very program of the Demirel cabinet, which had been ousted, and for which they had not been able to muster enough support. It is ironic indeed that the new cabinet found itself supported in Parliament on this issue by the very ones they ousted, and opposed by those who most sympathized with them.

There is a kind of national schizophrenia in Turkey. There has been a cultural revolution in Turkey, and an extraordinary attempt to move from an Islamic conception of the state to a secular modern European model. There is no country in the world, not even Maoist China, which has undergone such radical social and political surgery as Turkey and still survive. The changes that have taken place since 1918 are simply beyond the comprehension of those who have been fortunate enough to have been brought up in a fairly continuous cultural tradition. The catalog of changes in Turkey leave no item of the nation's cultural life untouched. The abolition of the califate is like the destruction of the Catholic church and the Pope, and the Protestant revolution all at the same time. The changing of the Ottoman script, in which the entire Muslim history of the Turks is written from the 10th century on, is an act not attempted by the regimes of the most revolutionary countries in the 20th century. The adoption of the Swiss civil, Italian penal, and German commercial codes decorates the top of this extraordinary edifice of Westernization.

At the back of the disagreements of the parties lies this significant revolutionary heritage. And on top of the revolutionary heritage comes the vision of parliamentary democracy. Since 1950, Turkey has been in the throes of free elections, mass parties; and governments have known the real pressure of the electorate. Since 1960, Turkey has operated with constitutional freedoms unmatched in the history of the Turks since they were a kingdom on the borders of China in the 3rd century. It is hardly surprising that these extraordinary new and complex institutions should indeed be severely tested from time to time. But at the root of all lies the political problem of Plato: Who is to rule? The chosen elite or the people?

TWENTY YEARS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL IMPACT

Walter Laqueur

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, it may be a little churlish after these very kind words, to begin with a number of complaints but this is an age of protest and dissent and I want to conform with prevailing fashion. My subject is "Twenty Years of Soviet Impact." I have twenty minutes -- one minute for each year of impact. Now this is either too much or too little. My command of the English language is imperfect, but I still believe one should try to be precise. The subject of this morning's session is "Marxism in the Middle East" but I'm not altogether sure what it means -- perhaps Marxists in the Middle East, though I strongly doubt that strictly speaking the number exceeds the number of those present, in this hall. What do we mean? Certainly not the military and governments in the various Arab countries. I'm sure if we made a kind of ideological analysis, we would find that the doctrinal inspirations are somewhat nearer to Colonel Papadopoulos than to the late Karl Marx. European terms like "Marxism," even "socialism" and "left" and "right" should be applied with caution in the Middle East.

'Soviet ideology', after twenty years of study -- I'm not altogether sure what it means. I'm not altogether sure that it makes sense inside Russia. According to my impression, more or less everyone in Russia believes some of it -- I have yet to meet someone who accepts all of it. And if I'm not altogether sure that the Soviet ideology makes sense inside Russia this goes a fortiori for countries outside the Soviet zone. In other words, if the Soviet Union has made considerable progress in the Middle East during the last twenty years, I believe it is only to a very limited extent owing to the fact that it espouses a certain ideology. If this ideology has helped in some respects, it has been a stumbling block in others. If the Soviet Union has made spectacular progress this is mainly owing to the fact, to put it somewhat crudely, that since the Second World War, or at least since Stalin's death, it has given up its isolationist policy; it has emerged as one of the two super-powers, and it is the one superpower that is geographically nearer to the Middle East than the United States. It is also due to the fact that the area is weak in terms of economic and political power and that it is rent by internal strife. Now, these two factors may well have been inevitable or this may have happened even if Marx and Lenin would have never lived. But there is a third factor which I do not think is inevitable. I mean that some

of the governments in this area, while very much striving and fighting for independence have, to put it mildly, not always followed a policy which will guarantee their independence. All this is rather obvious. If you happen to be a small country and if you are located near a super-power and in addition a super-power which, unlike the United States, is not a status quo power, at least not yet, then you have to be very cautious and very careful. And if you are not, well then, the consequences may be bad. I do not want to amplify on this topic though I'll be very glad to do so if provoked during the question time -- I only want to make the point that in the Middle East even some of the geographical facts of life are not yet fully known and if anyone doubts what I'm saying I suggest a little test. Ask your friends and acquaintances in the Middle East what is the geographical distance between the Egyptian border and the Soviet border. In nine cases out of ten, the distance will not be only wrong, it will be very wrong and most people will overestimate it. And if you tell them that in fact the distance between the Egyptian border and the Soviet border is slightly less than the distance between Cairo and Khartoum, and Cairo and Tripoli, you will be faced with disbelief.

Having, so to speak, played down the impact of Soviet ideology, I should immediately add a caveat. There has been a process of ideological radicalization in many Middle Eastern countries and most signs indidate that this is likely to gather even further momentum in the years to come. Twenty years ago, it was widely argued that such a development was highly unlikely, if not impossible. It was argued that Islam and Arab nationalism constituted insurmountable obstacles as far as the spread of such ideas was concerned. I have always regarded these arguments as slightly irrevelant. No one doubts that Islam is a very important factor. So is the Catholic Church in Poland. No one doubts that Arab nationalism is very important, a very potent movement but, ladies and gentlemen, there is no such thing as pure, unalloyed nationalism, neither in the Arab world nor anywhere else. Nationalism usually goes together with a great many other political beliefs -- in China, in the Soviet Union, in many parts of the world. It could be argued again that this process of radicalization has extended so far mainly to the elite, intelligensia, the students, to a much lesser extent to the other parts of the population. And if there were parliamentary elections tomorrow I have no doubt that those ideologically motivated in the way I just indicated would be a very small minority. But I think we all agree that the chances for parliamentary elections in the near future are small. The political structures in the Middle East are weak; we have a situation in which 200 determined people -- even 20 determined people, can seize power provided they are near enough to the levers of power, namely the Army and the political police. These men do not live in an ideological vacuum and the recent defeats of the pro-Russian factions in Khartoum and Cairo are not the end of the story. The process of radicalization and the progress of Soviet influence in the area do not proceed in a straight line -- they have their ups and downs -- the story neither begins nor ends in 1971.

Who would have imagined twenty years ago for a single moment that one day there would be such a thing as a pro-Russian faction in Khartoum or in Cairo able and willing to challenge the powers in being? So far I have made my comments from the outside, so to speak. How does the state of affairs look from Moscow? From the Soviet point of view the progress made by them is of course highly gratifying. They had some ideological difficulties; they did not know how in the beginning during the first years how to explain military leadership -- after all this did not conform with the traditional Marxist-Leninist scheme and it took a little while and some ideological contortions until they invented the theory of military socialism. However, in recent years, to be more specific, during the last two years, Soviet policy makers and ideologists have had second thoughts and they have realized from bitter experience that military juntas can with equal ease turn left and right in rapid succession -- again I apply European political terms with great reluctance but sometimes one has to -- and these inconsistencies are usually explained with reference to the "petty bourgeois" origins of the new military leaders. But again Soviet observers are beginning to understand that such label making is of very limited help. How meaningful is the term petty bourgeois if they apply it to Colonel Qadhafi, a man born in a bedouin tent, who now disposes of thousands of millions of dollars. Some petty bourgeois!

Soviet authors such as Iskandarov have begun to realize that sometimes the leaders of a military coup d'etat -- and I quote -- are motivated less by political considerations than by a career inspired desire to seize power. This "sometimes" seems to me one of the understatements of the century. And yet, from the Soviet point of view, the fact that they have to deal for the time being with military men who may be, "career inspired" and whose ideology differs from their own in very important respects is not necessarily a disaster. What from the Soviet point of view is the alternative? Of course the Soviet Union would like to see in power, in the Arab capitals, men whom they can trust implicitly, but this day may not be near. Moreover, the communist bloc is no longer monolithic. There now are a lot of family quarrels and, as Tolstoy once said, family quarrels are the worst quarrels. The fact that a man is a Marxist or a communist does no longer mean that he will stand necessarily by the Soviet Union. China is a communist country, Algania is a communist country, Finland is not. And yet we all know that the Soviet Union greatly prefers the Finnish government to the Peking or Tirana governments. To give another example. At the time of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet leaders said in fact to the other communist leaders, paraphrasing a famous saying by Disraeli, "damn your principles, stick to your party." But many of the communist leaders did not stick to the party and opposed the invasion. On the other hand, the governments of Iraq and Egypt, far from being Marxist, gave their wholehearted support. There is an obvious lesson in this thing. If the chips are down, you can trust your clients more than you can trust your followers because the clients need you, the followers may not.

Now a few words about that inevitable subject, the Arab-Israeli conflict. I will touch upon it only in the context of my topic here. The Soviet leaders have realized, and I think we all agree, that the conflict has to a substantial extent helped the growth of Soviet influence in the Arab world. Without this conflict there would not be many thousand Soviet military advisors in Egypt, there would be no base in Marsa Matruh and so on. Yet, on the other hand, I do not believe that the conflict has been the only and probably not the single most important factor. If we look at the map of the world, we find that the Soviet Union has made progress in the Third World even where the Arab-Israeli conflict did not play any role. Further, if we look more closely at the map of the Arab world, we find that the places where the communists came closest to power, for example Iraq in 1958, or the Arabian Peninsula and the Sudan in 1971, were not necessarily places where the Arab-Israeli conflict played the central role.

Ambassador Yost said last night that if there were peace, Soviet influence would rapidly dwindle, if not disappear altogether. I wish I could share his optimism. More importantly, the Soviet experts who deal with this subject do not share his views either because they are quite aware that while the Arab-Israeli conflict has very much helped their penetration up to a point, it has become a stumbling block at the present stage. They have realized that but for the existence of the Arab-Israeli conflict there would be, in the Soviet view, a great deal more tension, even anarchy, with "progressives" fighting "reactionaries" and the "conservative" régimes in the Arab world would be in great danger. But all this antagonism, all these frictions, are now swept under the carpet because there is one overriding enemy, namely, Israel, and everything has to be subordinated to the struggle against this one enemy. This national solidarity impedes the consolidation of Soviet influence in the Middle East.

Growing Arab nationalism is used -- I am quoting again -- "to dull class consciousness so that no discordant notes should sound in the general nationalist cause." In a recent investigation as to why Arab communists have not made more progress in recent years, one leading Soviet authority specifically referring to the Palestinian question, has said that it is used by the anti-communists in the Arab world to impose a policy of national solidarity. In other words, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become a stabilizing factor from the point of view of the conservative forces in the Arab world. And in the Soviet view this makes it much more difficult, if not impossible, for the local communists and themselves to make further progress.

To return to my starting point. How important is the impact of Soviet ideology in the perspective of two decades? I emphasized earlier that the full acceptance of Soviet ideology by people outside the Soviet borders has become more and more difficult to the extent that the internationalist elements in this Soviet

doctrine decrease in importance. Those who have to accept Soviet ideology fully and without reservations do so for the most part because geography has put them in the immediate vicinity of a big power from which they cannot afford to dissent. Others, more fortunate, can pick and choose. There is no denying that Nasser and other Arab leaders have been impressed by certain aspects of Soviet policies and methods. The changes in the Egyptian, Syrian and Algerian economies -- the nationalization of the means of production, the organization of the state apparatus, the new lines -- these and other measures, not to mention the new style of political rhetorics -- indicate that there has been such an influence. I would still be reluctant to use the term "socialist" in this connection. What matters in the final analysis is not that the means of production are nationalized or that the state has a monopoly of the foreign trade. What matters is who is running the state, who has the power.

Of the various elements of Soviet doctrine, Lenin's theory of imperialism has been the most successful by far. It has been accepted often unknowingly, even by people who have otherwise nothing in common with Marxism. On the other hand, the doctrinal elements in Soviet ideology which have been most difficult to transfer to the Arab world concern the insistence on the supremacy of the working class. Since industry in most of these countries is as yet underdeveloped, communism has its supporters, if any, almost exclusively among the intelligentsia. Dialectical materialism has not evoked much interest in the Arab world and atheism has been considered more of an impediment than a help, certainly on the tactical level. On the other hand, I would like to note, at least in passing, that there has been in recent years a new literature in left-wing circles very critical of the historical role of Islam and its present function and it is quite possible that this critique will spread to the extent that the general ideological crisis deepens.

Lastly, I mention the emphasis put by the communists and by the Soviet Union on the central role of the communist party. This, as we know, has been a major bone of contention. The local communist party members of course favor this -- they call it the democratization of political life. But the military men in the Arab world, like Castro and like others, have no desire to see party bureaucrats dictate to them their course of action. On this background, there has been much tension and more can be expected. It can be said without much fear of contradiction that the task of the Soviet Union in the Middle East would have been easier if local communist parties had not existed. But these parties do exist. Moreover, the Soviet Union, is not just a big power, it is a leader of the world communist movement. It cannot simply abdicate from this role, especially not at a time when its leadership is challenged. This creates all kinds of tensions and I am sure there will be more of it in the future.

MARXISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST: IDEOLOGY AND REALITY

It is virtually impossible to attach any ideological "ism" to the progressive regimes of the Middle East. Indeed, many would even question the word "progressive" in reference to Egypt, Syria and Algeria. Certainly, if by socialism we mean a vague commitment to social justice and equality, then these three regimes are socialist. They are also Islamic: despite progressive or secular policies, in all three countries Othodox social respectability is very important. The leaders of these countries, in other words, deem it wise to keep the confidence of the people by paying lip service to Islamic ideals; this does not mean that their policies are guided by religious tenets. Similarly, socialist rhetoric does not signify acceptance of Marxist principles as the guidelines for state policies. Indeed, the fallacy of one Arab socialism is highlighted by the observation that Egyptian socialism is expressed primarily in the acceptance of a large bureaucratically organized government; Syrian socialism, in the mobilization of previously disenfranchised elements of the population; and Algerian socialism, in central economic planning for development. All these aspects of socialism characterize modernizing regimes; but whether they also indicate a common ideological framework is highly doubtful.

In fact, there are few Marxists in the Middle East, and those that do exist are certainly not the "socialist" army officers who have directed economic and political developments in these three countries. It would be more accurate to drop all reference to ideology variants in the Middle East, for Western notions of "left" and "right" simply do not obtain. Soviet influence in the Middle East has not resulted from the appeal of Soviet ideology. The present Soviet position is quite simply the result of its proximity to the area, and its willingness to advance aid to poor and unstable Arab regimes.

But, while Marxist ideology has not played an important role in the area, there has been an ideological radicalization of Arab elites. This radicalization has played a much more important role than the small numbers of intellectuals would suggest; since power is not determined by electoral procedures, numbers are much less important than social and political position. And this radicalized minority is strategically placed.

This ideological radicalization, while highly gratifying to the Soviet Union, is nevertheless somewhat suspect. For a long time, Soviet Middle East experts had trouble fitting the realities of Arab politics in their own doctrinal framework. They resorted to a theory of "military socialism" which explained the unpredictability in ideological orientation of military regimes by the bourgeois origins of the young army officers and their career orientation. As for the Arab-Israeli dispute, Soviet leaders argue that the confrontation has channeled

internal Arab friction outward, and that without the external enemy as a focus of attention, the domestic affairs of these countries - "socialist" and "non-socialist" alike - would be chaotic.

The reality of the Soviet presence in the Middle East is, in fact, that its present influence exists despite its ideological orientation. The only element of Soviet ideology which has been accepted by the local Arab governments has been Lenin's doctrine of imperialism. Other ideological tenets, including the supremacy of the working class and dialectical materialism have been ignored; and still others, particularly atheism, have been emphatically repudiated.

The Soviet Union has an answer for the failure of Soviet ideology in the Middle East. A leading Soviet specialist on the Arab world, Georg Mirsky, has argued that Arab nationalism has served to dull the class conflict in the area. According to Mirsky, anti-communists are imposing nationalist solidarity as a conservative and stabilizing factor in the area.

Although the number of leftist groups and the pressure for open party politicking is growing in the progressive Arab regimes, the Soviet Union recognizes the reluctance of military leaders to encourage competitive or doctrinal politics. The Soviet Union is learning to deal with people with whom it does not agree ideologically, for it has learned that clients - whatever their ideological outlook or lack thereof - are more trustworthy than doctrinal fellows. In the future, as in the past, Soviet influence will be in spite of its ideology and not because of it; and, as in the past, Soviet proximity will be the major element in Soviet influence.

The impact of socialist ideology on Egypt's revolutionary regime has been particularly overemphasized. In fact, the concept of government in Egypt has not radically changed during this century. Egyptian society has long been socially homogeneous and geographically compact, and both factors have contributed to the necessity for and acceptance of central bureaucratic control. Many have overlooked the historical continuity of centralized government in Egypt, and have assumed that the present administrative apparatus is the vehicle of socialist ideology.

Egypt's bureaucracy is in fact an over lapping network of hierarchies. First there are the traditional bureaucrats, the managers. Second, there are the new bureaucrats - the technocrats concerned with the massive problems of development and particularly the managers of finance. Third, there is a network of army officers, not to be confused with the army hierarchy itself. Rather, this is a group of individuals who have had personal contacts with one another since the early 1950s. This army network, because of its association with the top levels of government, overlaps with the technocratic and managerial networks. Fourth, there is a security network, again overlapping but independent. Nasir's

reliance on the intelligence network has been generally recognized, though somewhat repudiated by his successor. Finally there is the Arab Socialist Union which is not a mass movement in either an ideological or revolutionary sense. The Arab Socialist Union is a bureaucratic attempt at pre-empting political activity. True, it does train the lower classes in political participation; however, the terms of participation are set by the authorities. Under no condition could it be considered a vehicle for revolutionary action.

The past accomplishments of the Egyptian regime are many, and the prognosis for stability is good. Nasir had moved cautiously in his domestic policy, seeking a consensus before he took action. For instance, the economic measures of 1961 were aimed at a small, weak and isolated class. The land reform, too, hit the minority who held more than fifty acres of land; the many powerful middle level landowners were left untouched by land redistribution policies. The result of his cautious domestic policy is that today more and more people are finding something to thank the government for, even if it is only a tolerable niche in Egyptian society.

There are many other examples of Nasir's political agility in circumventing the requirements of ideological and even economic consistency. His treatment of Egyptian communists in an instructive example: following a five year period between 1959 and 1964 spent in jail, most communists were released and given good jobs, particularly in journalism. Since this turn-about coincided with growing Soviet influence within Egypt, many of these journalists felt that they had been brought inside the regime to change it. In fact they were powerless, and used by Nasir to defuse Russian criticism of his uncomradely treatment of party members. Many point to items such as this to illustrate the reality of revolutionary doctrine in Egypt.

The Egyptian regime continues to cast a wide net of benefits, drawing in many classes, and especially attractive to young upwardly mobile ex-fallahin. The government's policy has been aimed at expanding the middle class, especially by expanding the educational system and by encouraging the proliferation of bureaucratic jobs.

Naturally, as any discussion of Egypt must recognize, the limitation on resources and the problems of population mean that there will be a saturation point in this middle class expansion; indeed, that point may already have been reached. But the one advantage which Egypt has had over other "socialist" regimes is that it did not have to seek popular approval for a centralized bureaucratic administration. In contrast to Algeria and Syria, where the legitimacy of the post-independence government has been an open political question, Egypt's revolutionary regime inherited a docile and well-heeled constituency.

Establishing such an apparatus has been a major problem and focus of post-independence Algerian politics; failure to do so is one of the major reasons for Ben Bella's demise. For many Algerians, Ben Bella's regime was an "all talk - no action" government; following the revolution there was no accepted and institutionalized base of power; Ben Bella failed to recognize this fact and neglected setting up an effective ruling machine. Boumedienne, recognizing his predecessor's oversight, spent the first three years of his regime legitimizing his power and establishing a governing state apparatus. Indeed, it was only in 1968 that he felt he had ensured sufficient stability to enable some long range planning.

Today the tone in Algeria is sober; after the chronic instability and the virtually insurmountable economic problems, there has been a no-nonsense attitude about politics and development. However, there is now a feeling of hope as well. The present regime has gained legitimacy by its accomplishments. And, given the sharp division between national and local politics, the only demand the people make on the government is some measure of stability and some evidence of an improving economic picture.

That local level politics do not affect the national leadership is reflected in the homogeneity of that elite. The military officers and party politicians today represent a substantial portion of the governing elite which emerged during the independence struggle, but not a broad cross-section of Algerian society. Indeed, a major problem but one which the Algerian government has not yet faced is to unify and Arabize the country. If the governing elite were more heterogeneous, it might feel more compelled to press forward in bringing new elements into the leadership. But, because of the leaders basic cultural similarity, and because of the lack of popular pressure for such "democratization" of the elite, internal societal divisions may continue to be overlooked.

With the growing stability and legitimacy of the Boumedienne regime, economic and social problems have become the primary focus of his administration, while the development of parliamentary institutions and the democratization of national politics have been given a very low priority. Boumedienne's acceptability, if not popularity with the Algerian citizenry stems in part from their shared experiences during the independence struggle. There is now a consensus on the need for a strong and independent state, and Algerians are wary of outside manipulation. Thus, Western fears that Algeria might lease the former French base at Mars al-Kabir to the Soviet Union are greatly inflated. The Algerians have no reason to want to make such a concession. Although there are Russian economic and military experts in Algeria, there are French advisors as well. Furthermore, the Algerians consider the French training superior to the Russian. The only circumstances in which Algeria might consider it necessary to grant these facilities to the USSR would

be if it felt threatened by the west. Given Algeria's present priorities, it might be noted, economic reprisals by the west would be considered the most dangerous type of threat.

Despite the present business first-attitude of Algerian leaders, they do consider themselves revolutionaries, and offer their support to other revolutionary groups and leaders. However, the revolutionary jargon is for external use only; it is clear that Algeria's leaders are not looking for further upheavals within Algeria itself.

Is Algeria a socialist state? Certainly universal primary education is being actively pursued, and there have been serious attempts at regional development - both to redistribute wealth and to stem the overwhelming in-migration from the countryside. However, there is little spontaneous participation in politics; there are few instances of grievance articulation, and voter turn out at local elections is unimpressive. The students, and to a lesser extent the trade unions are the only mass level groups with any active commitment to political involvement. In general, the political atmosphere in Algeria is rather relaxed.

The probability of continued stability reflects both the lack of any internal or external opposition, and the success of Boumedienne's past policies. The army and the state bureaucracy are the bases for this stability, and since the army is rather well taken care of, there is little prospect for a coup. In short, those Algerians who count, including Boumedienne's own associates, are rather satisfied with Algerian development.

If Egypt had to its credit a history of centralized governmental control over the society, Algeria too had a special advantage in its attempts at modernization. Algeria's resources, particularly its oil and natural gas, are bringing in foreign exchange; in addition, the agricultural sector, although ignored in recent development efforts, is strong by Middle Eastern standards. Algeria's basic problem, and one of which its leaders are well aware, is the lack of well educated people to staff the government bureaucracy; the serious attention which education is receiving today, as witnessed in the 1970 Four Year Plan, is evidence of the government's commitment to modernization.

At independence, Syria lacked both Egypt's legitimated central government and Algeria's guaranteed source of foreign exchange. The absence of these mitigating factors has played a part in Syria's past instability and continues to influence its prospects for future permanence.

Whether we talk of Ottoman, mandated, or present-day Syria, that country has always been a collection of regional entities rather than a unified state; appeals to nationalism, supra-nationalism

or ideology have always had to vie with strong parochial loyalties. This is not to suggest that there were no bases for a Syrian nationalism or for other loyalties which cross regional boundaries. Indeed, the economic and social structure was rather similar in each of Syria's nine regional cities: a small powerful elite; a larger group of businessmen, small landowners and professionals; and a majority of landless peasants. However, in the years before independence, when communication between regions was poor and educational and occupational opportunities negligible, only the elite had the means to transcend their local milieu.

Since independence there have been many remarkable developments in Syrian society and politics; several of these may be highlighted. First, the Syrian officer corps has been the most significant actor in Syrian politics and the major component of the new Syrian political elite. The army career was accessible and attractive to the poorest groups to which the requisite high school education was available, and for which a university education was impossible. The only other career which offered the same mobility opportunity to these ex-peasants and lower middle class Syrians was teaching; it is for this reason that many officers worked as teachers before they entered the military academy.

Second, since 1946 there has been a complete levelling of the old Syrian elite. For centuries Syria'a commercial and agricultural centers were controlled by about fifty families; the military career did not attract many members of this elite after 1920. Thus, with the shift in power to the military after independence, the old elite was bypassed, and its hegemony broken. This pattern may be compared with Iraq, where members of the elite continue to gravitate to the military; the erosion of Iraq's old elite has, therefore, been much slower.

Third, Syrian socialism is in fact an effort at village level mobilization - a rural revolution. Ba'th socialism appealed to many Syrians because it was adapted to an agricultural society and concentrated on peasants rather than on a nonexistent Syrian proletariat. The speed with which this mobilization took place reflects the complete lack of mobility opportunities for the middle and lower middle classes before independence. Syrian socialism, then, is not really an ideology; rather it is a vehicle for legitimating national control over what were previously virtually autonomous regions. In that sense Syrian "socialists" have used the peasantry, for the mobilization of popular participation in politics has certainly favored ex-peasants more than the much larger group of would-be ex-peasants.

Fourth, the two most significant political struggles in post-independence Syria have been in Hama and in al-Ladhaqiya; in both regional cities an alliance between the local middle class and peasant elements destroyed the traditional elite and catapulted the new political leaders into national prominence. The major difference between the two cases was that in Hama, by 1960, the alliance had obliterated the old

elite, but in the process had itself disintegrated. By contrast, the revolution in al-Ladhaqiya - a struggle which has religious overtones - is still in progress. That the new Syrian leaders are the veterans of the intense local struggles indicates that regional politics continue to dominate the national scene; the difference between the present and the pre-independence situation is that it is no longer Aleppo and Damascus politicians who are in the forefront.

Fifth, unlike some Arab countries, the many leadership changes in Syria have not radically affected economic development programs. Naturally with more stability, more resources, more well-trained administrators, et cetera, the pace of development would have been faster. However, it is interesting that an agenda of vital development projects was drawn up in the early 1950s, and subsequent governments, despite ideological and personal differences, have paid attention to these projects. In recent years, development plans have given more attention to rural problems; the model which Syria has used in agricultural development has been, not surprisingly, East European - a model which is ideologically acceptable and, much more important, realizable given Syria's limited resources.

Sixth, today Syrian political consciousness is expressed on two levels: in addition to the strong local loyalties which have already been enumerated, Syrians also recognize their pan-Arab ties. That there has not yet developed a middle level Syrian nationalism is due, in part, to the many border changes which Syria has undergone, in part to its history of foreign domination, and in part to the chronic instability of national politics. The result, as was seen in the case of Hama and al-Ladhaqiya, is that local struggles become national confrontations.

Finally, of the six attempts since independence to create a national political organization, the only two which have had any success - the Ba'th and the Quwwat al-Muqawwama al-Sha'biya - were those which had managed to develop autonomous cells in each of the nine regions. These cells developed local leadership and, while they were loosely tied to the national office, they were able to operate without directives from headquarters. Two failed from a lack of local leadership, or to phrase it differently, from an overdependence on the charisma of one man: these were al-Shishakli's Arab Liberation Movement and Nasir's National Union Party. Two others, the Communist Party and the SSNP failed because they did not establish cells in all nine regions.

Perhaps the greatest problem which Syria faces today is the long standing problem of regionalism. In the short run, the preeminence of regional loyalties may be a stabilizing factor; for, given a decentralized governmental administration, instability at the national level need not affect local parochial interests. Like Algeria, as long as there is some evidence of economic improvement, the present style of national politics can be tolerated. But, in the long run there must develop a national identification which will override these local

loyalties. The instability of the present situation may be highlighted by considering the prospects of a Druze "entity" in the Golan Heights - one recent suggestion for a solution to the Syrian-Israeli conflict. Given the present localized interest, such a move might provoke the Kurds in the north and the Alawis in the Ladhaqiya region to demand their own "entity." Even if this possibility now seems remote, it must be noted that all the elements necessary for secessionist movements exist in Syria today. Whether such movements materialize will depend in large measure on the nature of the grievances which each region has with the national government.

In concluding it is necessary to return to the initial question of the meaning of ideology for progressive Arab regimes today. It has been noted that Marx would not acknowledge paternity of the doctrines which have been enunciated in Egypt, Algeria or Syria. Indeed, even the Soviet Union, the nominal sponsor of these regimes, is embarrassed by the gap between socialist principles and Arab politics. The major concerns of these three regimes, as we have seen, are education, economic development, administrative efficiency, and technological modernization. These are "socialist" concerns to the extent that they deeply affect the life and well-being of people. But if we must resort to such a broad definition of "socialism," we must abandon any discussion of ideology, doctrine or principles. Rather than take the meaning out of socialist ideology, we might be better advised to take socialist ideology out of our definition of Arab socialism.