VIOLENCE AND DIALOGUE IN THE MIDDLE EAST:

THE PALESTINE ENTITY AND OTHER CASE STUDIES

A Summary Record

The 24th Annual Conference

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PROGRAM

October 2, 1970

PLENARY SESSIONS

Keynote Address: Alan W. Horton
Executive Director, American Universities Field Staff

Panel Discussion: "The Phenomenon of Violence"

Michael Hamilton, Chairman, *Canon, Washington Cathedral*
Landrum R. Bolling, *President, Earlham College*
Irene Gendzier, *Associate Professor of History, Boston University*
Don Peretz, *Director, Southwest Asia-North Africa Program, State University of New York at Binghamton*

Panel Discussion: "Palestine Entity I"

D. W. Lockard, Chairman, *Associate Director, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University*
David Farhi, *Instructor, Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University, Jerusalem*
I. L. Kenen, *Executive Vice-Chairman, American Israel Public Affairs Committee*
John P. Richardson, *Executive Director, American Near East Refugee Aid, Inc.*
Elias S. Shoufani, *Assistant Professor of History, University of Maryland*

Panel Discussion: "Palestine Entity II"

Paul C. Warnke, Chairman, *Clifford, Warnke, Glass, McIlwain & Finney*
Leonard Binder, *Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago*
Roger Fisher, *Professor of Law, Harvard University*
Simha Flapan, *Editor, New Outlook*
Emile A. Nakhleh, *Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mount St. Mary's College*

DINNER SESSION

Address: Calvin H. Plimpton, M. D.
President, Amherst College, and Chairman of the Board, American University of Beirut

October 3, 1970

<div align="center"><u>SIMULTANEOUS PANEL DISCUSSIONS</u></div>

Panel A: <u>"Cyprus"</u>

Philip H. Stoddard, Chairman, *Chief, Near East Division, Office of Research and Analysis, Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State*

Elias Georgiades, *Doctoral Candidate, School of International Service, American University*

Kerim K. Key, *Adjunct Professor of History, American University*

Harry J. Psomiades, *Professor of Political Science, Queens College of the City University of New York*

Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Assistant Professor of Political Science, Texas Wesleyan College*

Panel B: <u>"Kurds and Arabs"</u>

Talcott W. Seelye, Chairman, *Country Director of North Arabian Affairs, Department of State*

Ernest N. McCarus, *Chairman, Department of Near Eastern Languages and Literatures, University of Michigan*

Grant V. McClanahan, *Sociological Analyst, Division of Foreign Demographic Analysis, Census Bureau, Department of Commerce*

Shafiq Qazzaz, *Doctoral Candidate in International Relations, American University*

Dana Adams Schmidt, *Foreign Correspondent, <u>New York Times</u>*

Panel C: <u>"North African Arabs and Non-Arabs"</u>

James J. Blake, Chairman, *Country Director for North African Affairs, Department of State*

Charles A. Micaud, *Professor of International Relations, University of Denver*

John Waterbury, *Assistant Professor of Political Science, Center for Near Eastern and North African Studies, University of Michigan*

<div align="center"><u>FINAL PLENARY SESSION</u>

Closing Remarks

The Honorable Parker T. Hart
President, the Middle East Institute</div>

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Alan W. Horton

          Several years ago, the late genius of MIT, Norbert
Wiener, pointed out that within the isolated system called earth,
man is the principal organizer and holds the forces of chaos
at bay. Man builds houses and bridges, he moves earth and
plants seed, he devises power systems and organizes networks
of roads and railroads and airlines -- whose aircraft he occasion-
ally organizes to hijack. When we speak of ourselves living
in an increasingly technologically oriented world and hence an
increasingly interdependent one, we are also saying that we
live in an increasingly organized world, one whose natural
tendency toward chaos is challenged more and more by the energy
of human organizers. Man organizes more than the physical world,
of course. He also organizes himself. Since his beginnings,
he has organized himself into groups of kinfolk -- family,
clan, tribe -- according to differing principles that tell him
to whom he owes first loyalty. In one instance he is told to
support his mother's relatives against those of his father, in
another he is told he should die for his father's clan but not
his mother's, in still another he is instructed to give presents
at Christmas time to relatives of both sides if they are first
cousins or closer but for heaven's sake send only cards to second
cousins. With the neolithic and urban revolutions of more than
5000 years ago, new and cross-cutting territorial loyalties
became common: the village, the city, the empire, the nation.
It is this loyalty to nation, of course, that can be both very
good and very dangerous. A group of men may organize a nation,
develop loyalties toward it, and come into conflict with a parallel
development elsewhere. Thus loyalty -- a word we feel to be a
good one -- can lead to organized death on a massive scale.
In an age of atomic technology, no more important matter exists
than to think again about the nature of national loyalty, its
scope, its limitations, and in what areas it should or should
not be intensified. Currently there is <u>not</u> much evidence to
suggest that our national loyalties are <u>not</u> leading us toward
holocaust.

Man organizes in still another way that is germane
to the theme of this conference. He organizes his mind so that
he perceives some things and not others. If handfuls of pebbles
are thrown randomly on the ground, each mind will seek to organ-
ize the scattering into some kind of picture. One man will see
a baseball diamond, another a mountain vista, a third will see
his wife's baleful eye watching him, another may see the face of
Sigmund Freud. Confronted by the same data, each person will
find a special way of organizing it, a pattern that for him will
become reality, and each mind will fail to see or reject data
that does not fit his special pattern.

Conventional wisdom has it that people "see things
differently." The trouble is -- we hear the cliché and do not
pause to remember its precise meaning. Each person has his
special vision of reality: he perceives according to the patterns
of mind put there by his upbringing and experience. He inter-
prets events according to his mind sets, his points of view.
The significant fact is that by its nature a point of view,
which is a pattern to help the mind organize what it sees and
hears, tends to ignore other points of view. In that scattering
of pebbles, I do not see the design of a baseball diamond unless
someone points it out. Indeed, the longer I look and see only
my wife's baleful eye glaring at me, the more likely I am to go
on obsessively seeing it that way and the more difficulty I
will have perceiving other patterns that friends may point out to
me.

One is reminded of the story of the psychologist doing
research who asked a series of individuals what the waving of
a white handkerchief reminded them of. The first said that it
reminded him of the departure of his sainted mother on a long
trip years before; the second spoke of a surrender during World
War II; the third said that he was reminded of an attractive
blonde in a black negligee lying on a couch. The psychologist
was astonished and asked why on earth this was the case, and the
man answered: "Well, it's very simple; you see, I think of
nothing else."

What I am getting at is plain. The human tendency to
see some patterns, some points of view, to the exclusion of
others, is at least doubled when an emotion factor is put into
the equation. Apply the equation to the relationships between
the nations of the modern world, and it is not hard to see that
in what has become an arena for competing nation states organized
violence on a gigantic scale can easily result.

What is meant by the phrase "emotion factor?" Just as
we are all human, so are we emotional -- and a world without
emotions is not a place I choose to reside. Yet there are
instances when a close approach to objectivity is possible.
In the solving of a mathematical equation one can be relatively
objective; one seeks the mathematically correct solution, no
matter what answer may result. Other activities of a similar
nature spring to mind, activities in which the ego and the
emotions do not influence the outcome.

But in the kinds of human activity under discussion
at this conference, human loyalties are heavily involved. What
we seek is not objectivity -- which by the nature of our topic is
impossible -- but balance. It has been said that objectivity
is possible only when human beings do not give a damn; at this
conference all of us do give a damn -- and this _is_ required to
achieve balance. Indeed, perhaps the best way to define balance
is to say that it is the state of mind that seeks to understand
the positions of all those who give a damn, including oneself;
that tries conscientiously to see the other patterns among the
pebbles. What I am speaking of, then, is a new level of commit-
ment; a commitment to seek emotional balance above and beyond the
human tendency to commit oneself to one side or the other. In
terms of the settlement of disputes, this means that one must
want to conciliate rather than want to win or be right.

The difficulties of achieving a balanced view are
well known to us all. A principal difficulty appears to be man's
urge to attach connotations of good and evil to different words
that describe the same behavior. Here, for instance, is a short
list of words I have found in common use for the "good guys" in
a dispute between nations: Loyal, patriotic, freedom fighting,
dedicated, consecrated, public spirited. Parenthetically,
please do not think I am always against these emotional qualities.
I am against them only when they lead in the direction of my
own obliteration. And here is another list -- with the same
meanings but translated so that they are suitable for use with
reference to the bad guys: fanatic, dogmatic, terrorist, zealous,
and nationalist.

Because we are human, most of us will express our
opinions using similar vocabulary. In a public-spirited way,
and in an attempt to inject variety into the debate, I have
done some research in a thesaurus on your behalf. Here are
more adjectives you can use for the other side: belligerent,
bellicose, pugnacious, combative, rash, savage, and aggressive.

When referring to your own side, I suggest you use: courageous, gallant, intrepid, high-spirited, lionhearted, enterprising (that word comes highly recommended if you seek the support of the American business community), dashing, strong-willed, and -- this one is subtler than the others -- confident.

Please note that I have not yet used the adjective "peace-loving," which has had an interesting and instructive career. It is all right in this country to be interested in peace, concerned for peace, even to love peace, but not to be peace-loving because that is the expression used by the other side. Indeed, the whole concept of peace finds itself in a curious position in the political climate of our times. Because of the atomic threat, the increasing interdependence of nations, the extraordinary communications revolution, there is no responsible political leader who does not claim to be in favor of peace. Yet because the structure of our thought and our loyalties reflects the division of the world into nation-states, we are closer to annihilation than at any time in human history.

Well, you say, at least we now _talk_ peace and give lip service to the concept in a new way. When we participate in organized violence, we do so not only in the name of the national interest but also -- with increasing frequency -- in the name of peace. This may be an improvement in the sense that our long-term efforts must be to establish within each political system a genuine consensus that would allow political leaders a greater latitude in the reaching of peaceful solutions, a public commitment to a balanced view of war and settlement. But for the moment -- and let no one indulge himself in dangerous optimism on this point -- our lip service to peace has produced no dramatic results.

The problem is not that people do not sincerely seek peace. I believe they mean it when they say they would like nothing better than peace. The problem is that they understand so little about what makes peace or that they are not prepared to pay its psychological costs. In the final analysis, the making of peace _is_ a psychological process; the willingness to compromise, like the achievement of a balanced view, is a psychological prerequisite to peace. If one is not faced with the necessity of compromise, it costs nothing to prattle on about settlement and conciliation, but the nearer one gets to the necessity of compromise, the more the human psyche fights it off with elaborate rationalizations involving concepts of good and evil. The peace that ordinary humans like you and

me seek is, of course, a peace that we can live with psycho-
logically; the compromises we seek are ones that are satisfac-
tory to us. If those humans on the other side are in an equal
and opposite position, equally impervious to what the other side
can live with, the threat of violence is constant.

But, somebody asks, what if peace is imposed by one
side? What is wrong with the question, of course, is that while
one can perhaps impose a settlement, the imposition of peace --
if I am right that the making of peace is essentially a psycholog-
ical problem -- is a contradiction in terms. For that matter,
one cannot recommend the imposition of settlement by one side --
by which I mean using the weight of political power or military
victory to dictate the terms of settlement. The result is
almost bound to be violence once again -- as soon as the other
side, its ego in tiresome disarray, finds the means to start it.
The only kind of settlement that can be commended to this confer-
ence for its ultimate practicality is the kind that fosters
conciliation, or the making of peace. Such settlements must be
freely negotiated.

And so on. Most persons in this room are, I suspect,
well acquainted with the theory of what makes peace and what
makes war. An extensive literature exists -- though, to be sure,
its messages do not always appear to have gotten through. The
heart of the matter is the human ego, which turns out for each
one of us -- no matter how we fancy ourselves -- to be a most
fragile instrument. And in an era when people identify easily
with nations, national egos are not much different. If you
feel the job of the group or nation seeking settlement and con-
ciliation to be a simple one, consider for a moment the care
with which you handle the ego of, or avoid inflicting hurt upon,
your wife or husband.

Now, unlike most conferences I know about, this one
is well conceived and it could be useful. Like Franklin Roosevelt,
we say we "hate war," and now we are being asked to test our
ideology with actual cases. As any lawyer would say if you
gave him half a chance, this is a good method. Are we really
interested in paying the psychological costs of peace, allowing
the other side to retain dignity, admitting to ourselves the
essential humanity of the other side, committing ourselves to
the search for settlement as over against the search to justify
what our side has done in the past? As I. F. Stone put it in a
brilliant article written after the June War, "the essence of
tragedy is when it is the struggle of right against right."
Are we really interested in saying to ourselves that we cannot

have it both ways, that one cannot both insist on being right <u>and</u> reach the kind of settlement that can lead to conciliation.

One case we will be discussing only peripherally is the conflict between Northern and Southern Sudanese. For most of us in this room, this case is a relatively simple one because most of us are not involved. With a measure of dispassion, we can discuss the pros and cons. Looking clinically at the problem, we can determine what points of view must change on each side, what compromises each side must make in order to reach a settlement. We can make some good suggestions also about what social engineering will be necessary before settlement can lead to conciliation. Forgetting the human psyche, we may wonder what the fighting is all about and we may assert that because the case is lucky enough to have commanded the attention of almost no outsiders, a simple two-sided agreement should be easy to come by. Yet the case is not a simple one. Its complexity stems from the intensity of feeling among those involved. The statistics one is able to get are about as reliable as body counts in Vietnam, but with a reasonable certainty -- leaving out the recent bloodbath in Jordan -- more have died than in any other case we'll be discussing.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is different for us. Many of us in this room have been or are involved and therefore concerned. Put another way, there are fewer people in this room who feel that an Arab-Israeli agreement should be easy to come by. Not only do we see the case's complexities -- including the very real involvement of a staggering array of outsiders -- but as we approach a discussion of possible compromises in a possible settlement, we find ourselves almost automatically putting phrases together in our minds, to be used later to defend or justify hopelessly one-sided positions. Presumably our dispassion was spent in the Sudan.

Indeed, with reference to the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is important to realize how unhelpful most of us have been in the past and how unhelpful we are probably preparing to be at this conference. Leaving aside Arab and Israeli nationals (and remembering their equal, perhaps greater potential for unhelpfulness), let us consider for a minute our unhelpful American selves. As citizens of a great power that will inevitably have a major influence in the achievement and terms of a settlement, we have an extraordinary responsibility, which we've spent a lot of time evading and very little time meeting. The responsibility I'm referring to is that of fostering (both inside our own country and elsewhere) a commitment to the search for peace, a commitment to look for mutually acceptable compromises.

What involved American groups are more or less identi-
fiable? Here I speak in greatest generality, throwing misrepre-
sentations around with great ease. Please assume in what follows
all the careful qualifications, statistical and otherwise, I
could put in if I had time and inclination.

For instance -- American academics who have Middle
East interests. They constitute a cross-section of American
life. They fancy themselves well informed, and often this is
quite true, but only in a few instances has the availability
of information resulted in balanced views of the conflict.
For the most part, academics have single-mindedly pursued their
disciplinary interests, and in what they publish, they seem to
mention the conflict as little as possible. Whereas in the
Vietnam conflict it would be difficult to find a scholar of
Southeast Asia who had not written a partisan letter to The
New York Times, in the Middle East conflict the tendency has
been to avoid upsetting the academic community by publicly
espousing the cause of one side or the other. The problem is,
of course, that the community is split in a way that is not the
case concerning Vietnam. In my experience members of the aca-
demic world have strong views on the Arab-Israeli dispute; in
remaining reluctant to give those views an airing, they have had
to do without the moderating influences of being forced to say
it in print.

What of the business community? It has also been
unhelpful to the search for peace. To analyze what business-
men are searching for is not an easy matter these days, because
from their critics there is such an abundance of anti-establish-
mentarian and other doctrinaire nonsense floating about. But
by and large they have, like other Americans, sought to exert
their influence on one side or the other. If some business-
men have taken it upon themselves to assist the Arab cause in
this country -- as some clearly have -- others, not perhaps in
such numbers, have with equal vigor supported the cause of
Israel. As far as I know, there has been no major effort mounted
by the business community to seek agreement among themselves,
let alone contribute anything substantial to those who seek
to bridge the gap between the actual belligerents. What efforts
are made seem often -- despite notable exceptions, especially
among the big oil companies -- to have a public relations
function, namely, persuading one side or the other that the
business concern is friendly. In the Arab world, far from
being concerned about the search for peace, some businesses
have become deeply involved in the struggle between the Arab
right and the Arab left, searching instead for ways to slow
down the forces of change.

American Zionists have also been of little help. Their approach has been extraordinarily one-sided -- for whatever understandable reasons -- and on Israel's behalf, though sometimes to Israel's embarrassment, they have with consistency insisted on a position of no compromise. Speaking to large groups on campuses in this country, I have found Arab students and American Zionist students to be equally unwilling to think in terms of settlement.

In their fashion as unhelpful as Zionists, but much smaller in number, is a group that is emotionally pro-Arab. Just as the Zionist group crosscuts many other groupings of American life, so this group is drawn from the ranks of teachers, missionaries, businessmen, anti-Zionist Jews, and others. Some, but certainly not all, are found in this group because they have reacted against what they see as the dominating political influence of Zionism. Their group posture is essentially defensive and one-sided; it may lack the emotional content that one occasionally discerns among American Zionists -- many of whom, of course, identify strongly with Israelis in a way that is impossible for this group with Arabs -- but with few exceptions the result has been the same. Those who have sought to know what mutually acceptable compromises exist are very hard to find.

Where does all this leave us? If the Arab-Israeli conflict is the struggle of right against right and if we are all so human that we tend to take one-sided positions, what hope is there for a settlement? It is a good question to which there are no easy or short-term answers. Yet there is one American group involved with the conflict that against considerable odds has consistently sought compromises acceptable to both sides. It should be instructive to know why this is so.

I refer, of course, to the Washington bureaucracy, and I refer principally to bureaucrats with Middle East concerns from the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. This group comes from all walks of American life. Some are Jews; some are not. Some are Ivy League, but most are not. It is a group that is considered to be particularly subject to Zionist influences emanating from the White House. That members of the group are subject to not just Zionist influences but influences of every kind there can be no doubt. The remarkable fact is that despite being pulled this way and that by every group seeking influence in the nation's capital, they are united by a concern to reconcile the various forces at work and to get a settlement.

I do not mean to pat this group unduly on the back, and in fact I am not going to. At some moments I admire what they do and at others I take my cue from the Vermont story of the educated urbanite who was driving north and came to a fork in the road with signs in both directions pointing to White River Junction. The urbanite leaned out and with care asked a Vermonter: "Does it make any difference which of these roads I take?" And the Vermonter's response was: "Not to me it don't."

What is instructive, it seems to me, is that within this group a climate of opinion or consensus about goals has been established, and it has been done on the basis of an overriding concern. In this instance the overriding concern is not settlement or peace for its own sake but what is seen by the group to be the American interest. Please note that I am neither defending nor attacking any particular definition of the American interest; I am simply saying that to overcome the potentially violent factionalism in any conflict, an overriding concern is a necessity. And what goes hand in hand with an overriding concern is a consensus on goals.

Though successful in persuading the small specialized world of the Washington bureaucracy to seek a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the American interest as an overriding concern is not always helpful. If the Washington bureaucracy has a relatively balanced view of Arabs and Israeli, the same cannot be said for its view of other conflicts. Indeed, the bureaucracy's present hang-ups on rivalries and conflicts <u>directly</u> involving United States prestige suggest that we should be wary of the phrase "the American interest." Many definitions of the phrase exist. If the current operating definition has helped lead us to the present states of tension with the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, and mainland China, we would be well advised to seek ways to broaden the definition -- and with more than deliberate speed.

In closing, one hopes that this conference during its short life will develop an overriding concern that <u>subsumes</u> the American interest, broadly defined, -- and subsumes the interests of other nations as well. Most of us, I suspect, are a bit tired of hearing that world peace should be an overriding concern. Yet I speak as a man interested in practical solutions, in preserving his own and his friends' lives. Given modern technology and a modern age, peace is more than ever indivisible, and it is important that each one of us help establish the consensus that will make settlement and conciliation a possibility. As we approach the conference's cases of conflict

over the next 30 hours, and as we indulge ourselves in normal
human one-upmanship, I plead that it be the one-upmanship
neither of seeing who can place the most blame for past action
nor of justifying most eloquently present political postures
but the one-upmanship of seeing who can devise the most workable
and mutually acceptable compromises.

Thank you.

THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE*

The first session of the Middle East Institute conference was concerned with the phenomenon of violence in the Middle East. Why have violent ideologies arisen? What social conditions have been associated with the escalation of Middle East conflict which, in the Arab-Israeli case, in the words of one panelist, has since the days of Judah Magnes, resulted in deaths which can "no longer be counted in hundreds, but in thousands and tens of thousands." In addition to descriptive analysis of ideologies and violence-producing conditions, two panel conferees considered questions relating to the utility of violence. Can violent means be used to achieve desired goals?

Frustration and despair have been primary conditions which have, in the words of keynote speaker Alan Horton, meant that the "heart of the matter (of violence) is the human ego." This frustration may be the result of a personal identity crisis, particularly among youth, in a world caught up in accelerating change. In this respect Middle East violence may be viewed as part of a world-wide trend. Viewed from another perspective, however, conditions of frustration may be viewed as the result of violence and injustice which have found no redress. Traditional methods of communication have engendered no response. In situations of frustration and despair, individuals may undergo "a kind of psychological collapse." But others, "again and again people who have somehow found a way to overcome the inner compulsions to defeat" experience a kind of "regeneration, emotional, psychological, even spiritual." Violence seems to offer release.

Such was the case of Frantz Fanon, the theorist of violence "produced by the West" whose ideology has affected advocates of violence in the Middle East as elsewhere in the Third World. In Fanon's ideology, violence serves as a means to release from impotence and to the re-creation of life. Fanon's ideology grew out of the colonial dichotomy: colonizer and colonized, oppressor and oppressed. Attempts at dialogue in such a situation proved to be attempts to communicate with the deaf, and violence seemed to be the only way "ignored men" could make themselves heard, reemerging as people, "living, knowing and moving." Al-

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* Owing to a number of requests the full remarks of the panelists are included as addenda to the Summary.

though not a religious man, Fanon spoke in the language of the
Apocalypse: of the blood from which a new man will be born,
of death to end all death. Fanon's experience was that of many
non-Westerners, and his ideology has therefore struck a respon-
sive chord. As a man of a world long more acted upon than acting,
he represents a demand to be heard.

Contemporary revolutionary theorists have associated
Fanon's ideology with revolutionary movements. A resulting dilemma
for the West, and for those against whom the revolutionary ideol-
ogy is directed, is to find a way out: for violence results in
polarization and engenders more violence, making non-violent
"political action virtually impossible." Contemporary revolu-
tionaries have, in the opinion of another panelist, become so
caught up in the "mystique of violence" that they don't know
"what forces they are unleashing."

In the Palestinian case conditions of frustration and
humiliation have obtained. Palestinians have been "ignored
men" whose grievances have not found redress and whom the world
has known, as for example in United Nations Resolution 242, only
as "refugees." In this situation, according to one panelist,
"many of the people who resort to violence are people who have
come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, 'that you do not
take me seriously, and I will make you take me seriously.'" Frus-
tration has been felt, along with a sense of betrayal at the
hands of the United Nations, the Great Powers or the Arab govern-
ments. "The world will not hear us, the world will pay no atten-
tion to us. Therefore, we must now take our destiny into our own
hands, and we're going to do this. If we have to fight, many
of us will have to die. But eventually, we or our sons or our
sons' sons will solve this problem and we are going home!" Those
who speak this way "have in some measure been able to overcome
their own sense of despair."

In a broad sense, violence in Arab-Israeli relations
may be seen as the result of violence turned against both parties
by others which they subsequently turned against each other.
Jewish nationalism, expressed in the Zionist movement, and in
growing immigration as German repression worsened, was the result
of European anti-Semitism. Arab nationalism, given impetus by
Turkish repression during World War I, grew in Palestine as
Arabs feared the rising tide of immigration, and, "seeing Jewish
aspirations develop from homeland to national state, were interested
less in dialogue than in stemming the tide, with force if neces-
sary." Attempts at dialogue (summarized by Don Peretz in a

paper at the end of this volume) proffered by moderate Arabs met
no response due to preference on the part of the Jewish nation-
alist leadership for the achievement of total goals with the
support of European powers rather than the achievement of lesser
goals through accommodation with the indigenous people who lived
in the "land without a people." The Arab response was ultimately
an uncompromising one. Now positions have polarized to the point
where few on either side consider a non-violent solution of the
problem efficacious.

In the view of at least two panelists violence, however,
engenders in such a situation only greater violence. Under present
conditions the result can only be polarization, bloodshed, and
conflict escalation. According to one panelist:

> Just as the United States and Russia are each learning to
> co-exist with ideologies that are antipathetic to each
> other, it must be necessary for survival of Jews and Arabs
> in the Middle East that they accept -- in the name of
> survival -- modification of their ideologies. Past in-
> justices can no longer be washed away by blood, for such
> retribution can only compound the injustices of the past.

Dialogue can only be achieved through recognition of
the other side's humanity and appreciation of its circumstances.
If Zionists did not recognize that Palestine was occupied by
people with legitimate hopes and aspirations, Palestinian revolu-
tionaries consider secondary the people involved on the other
side.

A further condition posited as leading to violence in
the Palestinian case is overcrowding. According to current
biological theory, with an increase in the density of popula-
tion and reduction of the field in which an individual has some
sense of freedom, the reaction is one either of withdrawal or
hostility. "Any one of us," commented one panelist, "who has
spent any time in some of these miserably overcrowded Arab refugee
camps cannot help but wonder whether the kind of research being
done in the quiet of American and European university research
laboratories doesn't have something to say about the inhumaneness
of these shabby, overcrowded, refugee camps. Because it is
from these, as we know again and again, that some of the most
violent members of the violent groups have come."

PALESTINE ENTITY I

That Israelis and Palestinian Arabs and Westerners with
more exposure to one side or the other find little or no area
for common agreement is one of the fundamental reasons why there
continues to be more violence than dialogue in the Middle East. On
one level, there is the birth and development of two nationalisms
with strong ties to the land of Palestine, each nationalism em-
ploying in its time various kinds of violence and, it seems, each
nationalism showing little, if any, regard for the other. On
another level, there are differences concerning the nature of the
Arab-Israeli problem today, the facts of the issue, and, even if
the parties to the dispute are willing to contemplate such an idea,
whose responsibility it is to make the first move, or concession,
so that there can be more dialogue and less violence in the area.

One participant counselled that for his fellow Ameri-
cans to understand the nature of the Middle East conflict today
certain aspects of modern Jewish history and the rise of Zionist
nationalism must be fully appreciated. Four themes were discussed:
first, there are some parallels in the histories of Jews living
in Europe and in the Middle East; second, crucial to the history
of Zionist nationalism is the struggle of European Jewry during
World War II for survival and after the war for recognition by
the international community as a people; third, the Jewish fight
for statehood in Palestine in the 1940s was marred by sporadic
violence and is therefore an aspect of the history of violence
in the area; and fourth, the Jews are not today alien intruders
in the Middle East. It was felt that through an appreciation of
these four points and their ramifications an understanding of
Israeli presence in the area might be better obtained.

For centuries, Jews in both the Middle East and Europe
were targets of religious intolerance in varying degrees. In
Europe, it was hoped in the nineteenth century that, with the rise
of rationalism, the ghetto walls might be destroyed and that
Jews might win emancipation from ancient prejudice and servitude.
But hope faded with three developments. After centuries of
religious intolerance there grew up hateful racial doctrines
with pseudo-scientific premises -- which reached their terrible
climax in Naziism in Germany. Second, as the proletariat and
peasantry began their climb to higher economic standards, Jews
who lived in the towns and worked in trades and handicrafts
found themselves exposed to envy and hostility, and erosion of
their economic status. Third, modern nationalism in Europe found
expression in xenophobia and the Jews were special targets of

an intolerant nationalism which incited large masses of people against them.

To a greater or lesser extent, these phenomena were found in the Middle East. While it is true that there were periods of tranquillity in Arab-Jewish relations through the centuries, the participant felt these periods were exceptional interludes. He indicated, however, that the position of Jews in Egypt was much better than that of the Jews of Iraq and Syria and the Yemen. During and after World War II, the existing situation deteriorated significantly: there was a bloody pogrom in Baghdad in 1941 and another in Libya in 1945 in addition to attacks on the Jewish quarters in Cairo and Damascus. With the establishment of Israel, Jews started coming from all over the Arab world. Between 1948 and 1967 some 688,247 Jews came to Israel from Asian and African countries while 555,573 came from the rest of the world, mostly from Europe. The largest sources of immigration from Muslim countries were Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, some of whose Jews went to Europe prior to coming to Israel. Today, there are about 70,000 Jews still living in Arab countries, again mostly in North Africa: this figure compares with some 330,000 Arabs living in Israel proper.

As important as the Oriental Jews are to the development of Israel after 1948, European Jewry was the focal group in the rise of Zionist nationalism and the struggle for the creation of Israel in the 1940s. Without making any reference to the possibility of a comparison with the situation in which the Palestinian Arabs found themselves in the 1960s, the participant charted the diplomatic effort by world Jewry to gain international recognition for Jews displaced during World War II. He considered it incredible that the world community was seemingly forgetting recent history so easily: after failing to save Europe's Jews from Hitler in the 1930s, the international community averted its eye from the plight of the 100,000 survivors of the concentration camps. But this number grew quickly as doors were increasingly closed to other Jews when they returned to their former European abodes. As displaced persons camps grew Palestine loomed as the only alternative. A floating and landless nationality, detached in spirit from their past localities, was in search for a home: the Jewish Agency was determined that it would be no other place than Palestine. The Agency estimated in 1947 that there were some 268,000 refugee Jews in Germany, Italy and Austria who wanted to leave Europe and that at least 60 per cent of the remaining 190,000 refugee Jews of Europe would not be able to stay in that continent.

Concomitant with the diplomatic struggle in Europe, was the growing violence in Palestine itself. It was felt that the two Jewish terrorist groups, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Lechi, did not operate within the discipline of the majority of the Jewish community which had its own paramilitary force -- the Haganah. While the Haganah spent most of its time trying to rescue Jews from Europe and bring them to Palestine on ships, some of which never completed the trip, the terrorists committed many acts of violence -- all repudiated by the American Jewish Conference. These acts did not really advance Israel's cause which the participant thought won international recognition on other grounds. Three were mentioned: the UN Special Committee was deeply impressed with the urgent need of Jewish survivors of Hitler and recognized that they had no alternative sanctuary; the constructive development of Jewish Palestine, not its terrorists, impressed the UN with its reality; and if violence played a part it was violence of Jewish terrorists against the British. In fact, the Jews had been the victims of violence, both the savage war waged by the Nazis and the repressive war by the Mandatory régime.

Lastly, the participant indicated that the Israelis cannot be considered alien intruders to the Middle East. It is a significant fact that 44 per cent of the Jews of Israel were born there and, of those born abroad, 12.8 per cent were born in Asia and 14.4 per cent in Africa -- both mainly in Muslim countries. This means that 70 per cent of Israel's population is indigenous to the Middle East. The guerrilla ideologues who speak of an exodus of Jews from Israel back to Arab lands do not understand what has happened. Today, there is no difference between Zionist and non-Zionist Jews. To speak of the de-Zionization of Israel is about as absurd as to speak of the de-Arabization of Jordan.

Some of these themes were brought up again by a Palestinian Arab to prove other points. Feeling in the 1960s somewhat the way the Jews felt after the war, the Palestinians, it was said, are today indicating that they will never willingly or unwillingly negotiate their national being out of existence. Having lost in 1948 on the battlefield, the Palestinians seemingly have three alternatives: for those under Israeli rule to stay there; for Palestinians to seek a new habitat; or to pursue the struggle for their homeland in any way feasible. The Palestinians, the participant stated, flatly reject the second alternative and think that the first would be only a temporary solution because eventually the "natives" would rise to overthrow the yoke of the colonizers. The experiences of the 330,000 Arabs in Israel are anything but conducive to peaceful co-existence between Arab and Zionist and the recent years have been characterized by more alienation than integration.

It was in this situation that the third alternative --
to pursue their struggle in every way possible -- became the
only viable choice for Palestinians. The world community has,
for twenty years, neglected the Palestinians and now, it was
asserted, the Palestinians are taking their own future into
their hands. The major element of this new effort is the Pales-
tine National Liberation Movement (Fatah) founded in 1965 and
thrust into the forefront of the battle after the June 1967
War. Put succinctly, as long as Zionists are Zionist, the
only significant contact between Palestinian Arab and Zionist
Jew will be one of violence. The participant felt that the
Palestine Liberation Movement was seeking a solution that is
radical in that it goes to the root of the problem. At this
stage, victory means the establishment of a Free Palestine,
open to all Palestinians for citizenship on an equal basis.

To do this, it is felt that the movement must first
show that Israel's military supremacy cannot safeguard its
citizens and that Zionism can never be secure in the Middle
East; second that Israel is not the solution to the so-called
Jewish problem; and third that Israel cannot serve as an outpost
for Big Power interests in the area. Action on both the mili-
tary and political fronts is essential: long the victims of
violence, the Palestinians are now using it to obtain their
goals. A popular war of liberation which entails both the
politicization and mobilization of the whole Palestinian
population is the essence of the movement. On the political
front, the Palestinians seek to convey their own rationale
for a secular democratic state in Palestine. The primary
means of this communication is the education of Palestinian
masses, Arab masses and even the rest of the world, including
the Israelis.

The participant felt that at this early stage in the
struggle for liberation the movement could not really discuss
the definitive nature of the new liberated state but he was
willing to give it certain parameters. The new democratic
Palestine is not a substitute for liberation, rather it is the
ultimate objective of it: the state is to be created on Palestine
of its pre-1948 borders and will not be a client state on some
portion of that territory. Second, Palestine is for all
Palestinians -- all Jews, Muslims, and Christians and atheists
living in Palestine or forcibly exiled from it will have the
right to Palestinian citizenship. The movement rejects the

supposition that only Jews who lived in Palestine prior to 1948 or prior to 1914 and their descendants are acceptable. But it also rejects the Zionist law of return which confers upon all Jews all over the world automatic citizenship in the state should they so desire. Third, the new country will be anti-imperialistic and will resist all imperialist intrusions into the area; it will have to sever lines of total dependence on the United States. Fourth, integration within the Middle East will be among the foremost objectives of this new Palestine. In addition, Palestine will also reject bi-nationalism and will not be built around three religions or two nationalities: thus the Lebanese model is totally alien to the movement. Lastly, the new state must be democratic, progressive and provide equal opportunities for its people in work, worship, education, political decision-making, and cultural matters.

Because of this growing movement's goals and its very nature, it cannot, the participant urged, accept any political peace effort which it feels undercuts the national and human rights of all Palestinians. Such attempts, he feels, are the Rogers Peace Plan of 1970 and UN Security Council Res. #242. These international efforts want co-existence, they want to sanction Israel as a "legitimate, sovereign state."

He concluded that there has never been a common ground between Zionists and Palestinians, and the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state on territory belonging to the Palestinian Arabs is hardly a prologue to dialogue. Violence, thus, will continue to be the name of the game under present circumstances.

As inattentive as the Palestinian participant considered the world of his people, another panelist expressed the hope that finally the international community was becoming aware of the determination, cohesiveness and aspirations of the Palestinian Arabs. With this awareness that the Palestinians are no longer "invisible men" on the world stage, it was hoped there would come an acknowledgement by the world in general, and the United States in particular, that they have a responsibility to help the Palestinians find the justice that has so long been denied.

Basic to this change is an appreciation of a great many more facts about the Palestinian situation. One central

fact is that the Arab people of Palestine until a few decades
ago constituted a settled, predominantly agricultural society
in Palestine, a traditional society firmly rooted on the land --
not wealthy but more literate and cosmopolitan than other
Arab societies in the Middle East. Along with many other
areas of the world coming out of a colonial phase and confront-
ing the challenges of independence, modernization and Great
Power rivalries, Palestine had the additional problem of con-
fronting a greater threat in the form of Zionism. Indeed,
the panelist indicated it was an historical tragedy for the
Palestinians and perhaps for the Zionists themselves, that the
place chosen for the creation of the state was Palestine, a
land already populated by a large majority of Christian and
Muslim Arabs who lived in the towns and villages and who vigor-
ously farmed all of the land from which crops could be coaxed.

Of the 750,000 Palestine Arabs who left their homes
during the fighting and violence of 1948 that accompanied the
creation of Israel, some 650,000 were destitute. The major
areas to which these people moved to seek shelter were the
Gaza area, Eastern Palestine, the West Bank, Transjordan,
Syria and Lebanon, areas that already had a surplus of farm
workers for the existing agricultural base. These Palestinians
became dependent on international charity while existing in
refugee camps.

Since 1949, the main source of this international
help has been UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency, established by the UN General Assembly to provide as-
sistance and rehabilitation for dependent refugees. Over the
years UNRWA has played a major social role in the Arab east
through its educational and training programs. The refugees
themselves have consistently utilized every opportunity for
gaining education and training and taking jobs wherever they
are available. Pressure on openings in the UNRWA schools and
vocational training centers is tremendous. Refugee parents,
often without formal schooling themselves, have been energetic in
seeking increased mobility for their children.

While time has elapsed for a whole generation to grow
up in these camps, Palestinians have found all attempts to try
to return to their former homes and lands systematically and
continuously blocked by the Israelis. The panelist felt they
were denied return not because they were Muslims, not because
they were Christians and only partly because they might consti-

tute a "security risk" for the state of Israel. Rather, re-
turn was denied primarily because they were not Jews. Today
every Palestinian in the world seems to be in one of three
categories: either he is an exile living in someone else's
country; or he is living under Israeli military occupation;
or he is living as a second-class citizen in Israel, with rights
and opportunities limited by Israel's continued policies as
a Zionist state. While the June 1967 War created 150,000 new
refugees and another 150,000 became refugees for the second or
third time, it did not diminish their desire to return to
Palestine. One scholarly study of 1967 indicates two important
conclusions. First, people fled areas occupied in 1967 because
of fear, especially airplane attacks, psychological pressures
of Israeli occupation, destruction of homes and villages, and
economic pressures arising from occupation. Second, and more
crucial, eighty per cent of the new refugees and seventy-five
per cent of the old refugees interviewed in a sample of one
refugee camp expressed the desire to return to their homes
in Palestine under any circumstances.

It would seem, the participant indicated, that rather
than bringing down the curtain once and for all for the Pales-
tinians, the ashes of the 1967 fire have fed the flower of
Palestinian nationalism, as expressed through the commando
organizations, to the point of a Palestinian regeneration.
He went on to say that the Palestinians no longer consider
themselves as refugees, rather they look upon themselves as
"homeward bound Palestinians." It is with the transformation
of the Palestinian people that the world is finally taking note
of their existence, their goals and their need for justice.

The Israeli participant shared some of this panelist's
optimism for completely different reasons. He indicated that
while everyone was talking about the commando organizations
as the most important post-June War development, a far more
significant dialogue has been beginning to develop on the West
Bank, in Gaza and Jerusalem between Israelis and important
elements of the Arab community. At the heart of this dialogue
are attitudes, he felt, on a wide range of issues that do not
conform to what the commandoes are saying. For example, the
Supreme Muslim Council wanted to repair the al-Aqsa mosque
despite a commando warning not to do so. The "National Pact
of the West Bank" is another manifestation of the independent
line many of those on the West Bank are taking: this pact

supported both the Security Council Res. #242 and the Rogers
Peace Plan -- two efforts rejected by the commando organizations.
Other public utterances of this independent attitude can be
seen in the series of articles written recently in an Arab
newspaper entitled "Where Are We?" One private manifestation
was the sending of a West Bank group to President Nasir in an
attempt to play a mediating role in the Middle East conflict.

While these Palestinians have failed in efforts to
play a role in the larger problem, they are making daily de-
cisions of great importance. Initially after the June 1967 War,
all Arabs in the occupied areas answered inquiries from Israelis
with the statement "See our, Jordanian, government." Since then,
some have been taking more interest in the possibility of a
separate settlement. The overall impression, he said, is that
they do not want to return to King Husayn and they do want to
see the Palestinianization of the Jordanian government. This
desire for more self-determination only increased after the
Jordanian civil war of the fall of 1970.

In this development of what the participant saw as
a new political consciousness and new leadership of a signifi-
cant portion of the Palestinian people, four groups have played
an important role. They are: party members of the political
right and left, the Ikhwän and the Baʿth; intellectuals who
have regained the feeling that they might and can participate
in the direction of their community after years of inaction;
members of the ex-Jordanian establishment; and local leadership
in the many villages and towns of the West Bank. Jerusalem
has served, it was noted, as an intellectual and social mixing
bowl for some three years now.

On the basis of these fundamental recent developments,
the panelist offered two conclusions. First, if this reëvalua-
tion of their position and future by many West Bankers is
allowed to progress unhampered and if a growing dialogue between
certain West Bankers and certain Israelis is allowed to nurture
quietly, important peace developments might result for this
war-torn area. Second, the Israeli attitude is changing and
there is in government circles an increasing concern for and
understanding of the Palestinian position: the Israelis will
be willing to recognize a Palestinian entity.

Indeed, all four participants were able to agree on
this point -- namely that there is a growing need for some

kind of a Palestinian entity or state. But the agreement and
dialogue ended right there. What kind of entity, how steps
towards its implementation should be taken, who will lead this
entity, what will be its relationship to Israel on the one
hand and to Arab states on the other, what areas it will occupy
and will this new state itself be its own guarantor -- all
these questions have many answers and it is on them that dialogue
gives way to the established patterns of violence. But does
this leave the problem where it was in 1948? The participants
seemed to be answering no: the universal recognition of the
need for a Palestinian state is one small product of the past
two decades of violence.

PALESTINE ENTITY II

The discussion began from the premise that the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian "entity" was not only a worthy endeavor,
but also a top priority in the Middle East. The program focussed
on the various positions on and potential reactions to such a
Palestine entity; the panelists, in their preliminary talks and
ensuing debate treated all major viewpoints: Palestinian spokes-
men, Jordan, Israel, Nasir and the other Arab leaders, the US,
USSR, and the UN.

The Palestinians

Until very recently, perhaps as recently as the
September 1970 hijackings, there has been a presumption of ineffi-
cacy if not irrelevance concerning the Palestinian resistance
movement; not only were Palestinians unable to voice their
demands and grievances effectively, their opinion on the future
of a Palestinian state, because it was considered irrelevant,
was not often solicited.

Despite Nasir's friendship with some Palestinian
leaders, he was unable or unwilling to deal with the problem
of their representation in meetings dealing with the Palestine
problem. Husayn, for his part, assumed that the Palestine
resistance movement would quickly exhaust its resources and
enthusiasm, and that the Palestinians would, in time, see
themselves as members of the Jordanian state. Conservative
Arabs, as well as Israel and the United States, have been pre-
occupied with not creating a guerrilla movement, not taking
actions which would encourage such a development; their inatten-
tion to the plight of the Palestinians was, in large part,
responsible for the increased frustration which spurred the
growth of the resistance forces. Some of the more radical
Arab states, Syria in particular, tried to mould and direct
the Palestine movement; but no one, perhaps not even the
Palestinians themselves, had confidence in the longevity or
importance of the resistance movement.

The Palestine movement has reached a turning point,
a fact which is reflected in the change in attitude of all the
major actors in the Middle East. The surprising resistance
of the Palestinian groups to Husayn's army in September sparked

major reorientations. Nasir began to ponder the necessity and/or desirability of a successor régime to the Jordanian monarchy, which was seriously undermined by the "September massacres," Husayn's declaration of victory to the contrary. Syria's offer of aid to the Palestinians, and its attempted intervention in the civil war served to focus world attention on the Palestinian dilemma. Nasir was unable to act, Russia unable to speak; Israel and the US could only offer Husayn moral and other support, offers which were declined. The Palestinian movement, which had achieved notoriety days earlier by the series of hijackings, was receiving better international press coverage than ever before.

The civil war in Jordan was viewed as a watershed in the development of the Palestine resistance movement. During the first stage of its development, the movement was composed of loosely organized groups and frought with internal rivalries, the most notable of which was that between Habash and Arafat. During this period the Palestinian organization had acted irresponsibly and unrealistically because they enjoyed the protection of several Arab governments. With the civil war has come the realization that the Palestine movement can protect itself; this realization, in addition to the general embarrassment which the Arab governments experienced at the September hijackings, had led to a situation in which Arab states are less willing to offer these groups complete political immunity and autonomy. As one panelist expressed it, despite their very strong feelings for Palestine, the other Arab states do not want to Vietnamize themselves as Jordan has.

There is a growing awareness among Palestinian leaders that the new political climate requires a reorganization and unification of the movement, and an emphasis on responsible action. The situation demands that they move from violence to statesmanship to achieve their goals; the task of realizing the goal of a Palestinian entity must be done by the Palestinians, and there is reason to believe that they will prove themselves serious and able negotiators. Not only must Palestinian leaders play an active role in the future Middle East negotiations; their participation is crucial if the negotiations are to bear fruit.

Israel

To a certain extent, the key to Israeli intransigence lies in the hands of the Palestinians; more than ever before

Israel is ready to negotiate a permanent peace. Israel would accept negotiations with a group representative of Palestine, and it is the task of Palestinians now to organize such a representative council.

In both the Arab and Israeli camps there has been a growing recognition of the impossibility of reaching a solution by force, or by imposed settlement: neither path can lead to peace. Debates indicative of changing public opinion in Israel, as well as increased international pressure towards peace negotiations, have encouraged a change in attitude in the new Israeli government. Israel has agreed to use the Security Council resolution as a basis of settlement, and to withdraw from occupied territory; through its readiness for negotiations, the government hopes to induce a change in the rigidity of the Arab position.

There is discussion within Israel of the future of a Palestine entity, recognition that Palestine is the common homeland of two people, and acceptance of the right of both to establish a sovereign state. In fact, the binational state solution now has the support of some Israelis. However, whatever Palestinian or binational entity may eventually be established, what is most important, both in terms of Israeli acceptance and in terms of its own viability, is that this "entity" be seen as a state for Palestinians rather than a springboard to Arab unity. One of the major reasons for the long term lack of solution to the Palestine problem is that it has been confounded with the problem of Arab unity and pan-Arab nationalism. Such confusion of issues has been responsible for Israel's wariness of peace negotiations, and Palestinian frustration at the shelving of their problems in favor of those with which they were much less directly concerned.

Although there is some support for a binational state in Israel, it by no means represents the majority opinion; indeed, to many observers outside Israel, such a change in policy or opinion is not perceived at all. But whether the change is real or wishful, there is a consensus that any movement away from inflexibility is a move toward peace. Thus one panelist, though unconvinced of the change in climate of opinion in Israel, nevertheless noted that internal pressure for greater flexibility was inevitable. The violence consequent to the establishment of the Zionist state has been disruptive to Jewish cultural growth; this disruption will create pressures within Israel, if it has not already done so, to make whatever changes in policy are necessary so that Israeli

society can continue to develop. This change may mean a dis-
avowal of a theocracy, although some contend theocracy is a
false image of Israel. It may mean de-Zionization, another
term on which there is some disagreement on meaning. Whatever
changes are required can only be decided by those Israelis
who are seriously concerned with guiding their state to an era
of peace.

The role of "outsiders"

Equally important as the shifting alignments and
interests in the competing sides is the need for effort toward
a final peace settlement; in this effort, the other countries
of the Middle East, as well as the US and USSR, and the UN
have important roles to play.

In the past such peace efforts have concentrated
on static solutions; the emphasis was on a plan, a negotiating
formula, a seating arrangement. What has been neglected is
the fact that the process of negotiation produces its own mo-
mentum toward settlement. Face-to-face negotiations per se
will not yield anything conducive to settlement; what is im-
portant now is not agendas, but action, not plans but pres-
sure, and pressure with a strong admixture of public relations
work.

The problem has been that each side believes that
its action is justified by the behavior of the other; such
mutual justifications lead only to an endless rehash and re-
writing of the history of the conflict, which is both uncon-
structive and tediously beside the point. If there is genu-
ine pressure within the countries on both sides of the con-
flict for a solution, so much the better for successful nego-
tiations. However, to the extent that there exists no internal
pressure for peace, and, even more, pressure not to negotiate,
the governments on both sides must be convinced of the desira-
bility of paying a domestic price in order to get negotiations
started. This means that the leaders of both sides are being
asked to make sacrifices in terms of security and domestic
popularity, with only a promise of success; it is the role of
the US, as well as the UN and other concerned nations, to
insure that promise.

There is a Palestinian entity in the minds of two
million people; the question is how that entity should be
expressed. Hijackings and guerrilla activities have been the

mode of expression in the past; outsiders, and the US in particular, can and should encourage the development of a more creative idea of the Palestine entity.

What can the US say to the Palestinians? Perhaps the first and most important step would be an admission that the Palestinian people have not received just treatment; the frustration of anonymity, which was in large part responsible for the development of the resistance movement, gives evidence that such an admission of injustice is important to the Palestinians. It would also be constructive for the US to say that there should be a Palestinian entity, and that there will be one if the Palestinians themselves desire it. Furthermore, the US should offer to meet with Palestinians, and offer guarantees that these people will have a say in the future of the area.

What can the US say to Israel? First, the US might approve the Israeli open bridge policy, and encourage its continuance at the rate of, perhaps, one thousand returnees per week. The risk of keeping out Palestinians who want to return is greater for Israel than the security gained by keeping them out; the Israeli military leaders themselves have admitted that the greatest threat comes from people crossing over the border, and not from those Arabs who are settled within the state. A second policy which the US might suggest to Israel is a "model town" program. The only hope that many Palestinians now have is a Fath victory; it is in Israel's interest to give these Palestinians alternative, if less comprehensive, goals. It is the responsibility of the US to offer whatever assurances are necessary to both sides to start the conciliation process.

The US should impress upon Husayn the importance of a Palestinian voice in deciding the future of the area. The Palestinians must have a say in determining the future of the West Bank; if any peace solution is to last, it is the Palestinians who will make it last: they must agree from the very beginning on what is to be done. While the US encourages responsible action on the part of the Palestine resistance groups, it must also urge Husayn's moderation, such as was not evidenced in September in Jordan.

The US might solicit Soviet support in this effort toward a responsible role for Palestinian leaders in peace negotiations; many Palestinians would find it easier to make

the necessary sacrifices if the USSR were in support of the
effort. The United Nations, as well, has a role to play:
it is the only institution that can give legal recognition
to a Palestinian delegation; it should encourage the formation
of such a group. Unless the world community begins to recog-
nize Palestinians, and to encourage the rational development
of a Palestinian identity and entity, their problem will con-
tinue to be shelved; the world has already witnessed the futility
and frustration of non-action.

A Palestine entity?

What might a Palestinian "entity" look like; of what
should it be composed? Palestinians are the only people over
half of whose population are refugees; the refugee problem
must be resolved within the framework of a state which the
Palestinians regard as their own. For some, it is logical
that it be comprised of the West Bank and Gaza; at present
there are over one quarter million Palestinians living in the
Gaza strip, an area which is claimed by no one. For others,
the solution is the unity of the East and West Banks; they
argue that the Palestinians are largely responsible for the
development and modernization of the Jordanian state since
1948, and that the Palestinians and Jordanians have proved
themselves efficient co-workers. Others are convinced that a
binational state including Arabs and Jews within the territory
of pre-1948 Palestine is the best workable solution. And
finally, some feel that the Palestinian entity should not
have a national orientation -- be it bination, Arab, or strictly
Palestinian -- at all. They argue that the nation-state
system which exists today must give way to one not based on
nationalism. A step in this direction would be a Palestinian
assertion that they do not seek a parochial national state,
but rather a new society, a new human synthesis. The only
Palestine entity that will work is one comprised of individuals
who regard themselves as men -- not Arab, or nationalists,
or anything else; the Fath guidelines for settlement are seen
as a step toward the post-nationalist era.

Perhaps the optimism with which the prospects for
settlement were viewed by all the panelists in "Palestine
Entity II" has parallels in previous discussions of the Middle
East by people who sincerely desire a peaceful solution in the
area. What was truly unique about this discussion, however,
was that, perhaps for the first time in the long history of
discussions of the Palestine problem, there was total agree-
ment that there should and will be a Palestine entity, and
that only the Palestinians themselves can decide what it should
be, for they are the only group which can insure its success.

CYPRUS

Since the independence of Cyprus in 1960, a peaceful acceptable settlement and an end to suffering has been sought but without success. Cyprus has had the benefit of the example of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the two parties are at least talking to each other -- although they sometimes doubt that they have anything to say to one another, each accuses the other of failing to find a solution, and what dialogue has taken place has failed to produce a lasting settlement. However, it is agreed that continuance of the status quo, i.e. inaction -- no violence -- no dialogue -- is less risky than that of vigorous activity.

A panelist outlined several points of disagreement between the two sides, namely (1) the establishment of separate municipalities. The Greeks are opposed to separate communities where Greeks and Turks function under different laws, but the Turks insist on having separate municipalities to preserve their cultural identity. Each community continues to have its own laws. (2) Composition of the civil service. The civil service is made up of 70 per cent Greeks and 30 per cent Turks. The Greeks claim that the Turks do not have enough qualified people to fill their 30 per cent quota, and the Turks feel that the 30 per cent should be implemented, if necessary by assigning some Turks lower positions. (3) Income tax legislation. Income tax is needed for schools, etc. Other taxes are collected, but the income tax is not enough for the communal chambers and the Greeks want the income tax to be under the control of the federal government. The Turks claim that this will mean the income tax would be under Greek control. (4) Integration of the Cypriot army. The army is made up of 60 per cent Greeks and 40 per cent Turks. The Turks do not want to be mixed with the Greeks due to language and religious differences. (5) Separate majority rights in the House of Representatives. The Greeks claim that the Turks abuse the powers of the house and want to abolish separate majorities in the house. (6) Veto power of the President.

The Greeks propose a unitary form of government and argue that the Turkish position of separate local governments violates the concept of a unitary state. They note that a unitary state would benefit the Turks since they are not localized but scattered throughout the island. The Greeks also

claim that separate local administrations prevent the creation
of a feeling of citizenship and national identity.

The Turks on the other hand say that a unitary
form of government would be Greek-controlled, leaving the Turks
in a minority status and politically impotent. The Turks
feel the Greeks are attempting to combine a political dominance
with an existing economic dominance. They feel economically
isolated, because the Greeks control the export-import busi-
ness. This leaves the Turks in a position of dependence
for goods from abroad, while enriching the Greeks. The economic
integration of both communities is starting but it will take
a great deal of time. The Turks feel that the Greeks do not
want to expedite a settlement because of their economic well-
being.

The panelists rejected the solutions of enosis (union
with Greece) and taksim (partition of the island), positions
which were supported by Greeks or Turks respectively. Taksim
is rejected on the grounds that it is impractical and unworkable
-- the Turks of Cyprus are not concentrated in one place, but
are scattered throughout the island. This would involve re-
settling hundreds of people and their possessions. Outside
help would be needed to implement this scheme which would have
to be carried out by force; it would be not only extremely costly
but would cause too much suffering to both Greeks and Turks.
Besides this, the island is too small, it will not resolve the
problem permanently, and it would be a constant source of fric-
tion and hostilities between the two sides.

Taksim is seen as a counter-proposal of enosis,or a
kind of double enosis, i.e. -- if the Greeks insist upon
uniting with Greece, the Turks, fearful of losing their rights
and security, would insist on partitioning the island (a sort
of enosis with Turkey). Therefore, to prevent taksim, the
Greeks should give up their desire for enosis.

Enosis, on the other hand, would not work either.
The Turks could never accept it without having taksim; it
would mean losing their identity and rights. Enosis, like
taksim, would have to be carried out by force, which would
mean more violence, more suffering to Cypriots. Besides,
some Greeks are now pressing less for enosis, especially
since the military government in Greece came to power in 1967.
This present government is seen as weak, undesirable, and
undemocratic; so fewer Cypriot Greeks wish to be a part of
such a government. But there is no guarantee that this govern-

ment will last very long and, should it change for the better, enosis might easily gain popularity again.

The solution to the Cyprus problem is seen in the creation of Cypriot nationalist feelings. This spirit of nationalism in Cyprus has failed to develop because of (1) differences in religion, (2) culture, (3) language, (4) tradition (the two cultures do not intermingle much and do not intermarry), (5) allegiance (Greeks or Turks are more loyal to their respective fatherlands -- Cyprus is a country with no national anthem), (6) literature, (7) unity and (8) patriotism. With these principles of nationalism absent, there is no impetus for Cypriots to feel patriotic and instead we have two communities, at odds with each other.

Cypriot nationalism will take a long time to develop. One panelist thought that the integration of all schools would be a great step toward solving this problem. There are already some integrated schools and the panelist reported that they are successful and their number should be increased. In integrated schools, children could be taught to think of themselves first as Cypriots, secondly as Turks or Greeks. It is not expected that all Turk and Greek Cypriots will ever become completely de-Turkified or de-Hellenized but a nationalistic feeling would help eliminate the majority-minority consciousness while preserving each culture's identity.

In the meantime, both parties felt that the UN peacekeeping force should remain until a permanent solution is achieved, and that the intercommunal talks should continue. A panelist said that the Greek side wants, accepts, and promises to follow accepted principles of the UN, and wants the solution to be settled by, approved by and in the framework of the UN. In this respect they say human rights of both communities should be recognized. They are willing to accept an international commission on human rights to respect human rights after the settlement.

The strategic position of Cyprus should be taken into account. A NATO base with the Greek and Turkish troops is acceptable but a UN presence would be better. Alternately, one or two English bases could be kept as a training place for future peacekeeping operations.

The panelist said that the Cypriots should stop
fighting the wars of Greeks and Turks of the 18th and 19th
centuries -- after all, it is the Cypriots who suffer. Both
Greeks and Turks should press for programs of cooperation,
integration, modernization and educational reform. Some
sort of conciliatory mechanism should be established, as
something to refer the issues to, and to provide them with a
means of trying to find a solution themselves, instead of
resorting to violence.

Another panelist thought that we should take a
look at what is going on in Turkey and Greece, since it is not
easy to isolate them from the problem. He felt that both govern-
ments are weak and that the best they could do for the problem
is to stay out of it. Another panelist thought that both Greece
and Turkey were mainly concerned for the safety of their fellow
Greeks and Turks in Cyprus, regardless of the strategic loca-
tion of the island. A panelist claimed that the Soviets
would like to see trouble between Turkey and Greece and would
be opposed to a Balkan pact. He said that by solving the
Cyprus problem the Soviets would be kept out.

It appears that Ankara and Athens sincerely want a
solution and that they are promoting their own interests less
and trying to preserve the independent status of Cyprus. Cyprus
may be the ultimate remedy for Turkey and Greece, a kind of
bridge of friendship between these two to resolve their old
animosities.

*   *   *   *   *

During the discussion period, the following exchanges
took place:

(1) What would the "conciliatory mechanism" be?

Such a body would be composed of Greek and Turkish
Cypriots, judges, politicians, etc., who would try to find
a solution themselves, perhaps with help from outside such as
the UN. It would be a factual investigation such as Gunnar
Jarring's fact-finding mission. A peacekeeping force such
as the UN is good, but it should not become a crutch and
should get out when finished. Money could be saved by not having
armed forces, since they are not needed, or should not be
needed.

(2) What are suggestions for the establishment of a Cyprus university?

This is desired by both parties and should be looked into and well planned. It would prevent the outflow of money since 5,000-6,000 students are now educated abroad each year. However, there is not enough money to build such a university and Cypriots cannot do it alone. Another point to be considered is that at present the community is not absorbing all its college graduates.

(3) The basis of all conflict is passion. Each side is full of fear and mistrust and rationality makes little impact in such a situation. What are the realistic options?

Cyprus feels like a pawn between the two big powers. But at least they are talking and want to preserve the national interests of both communities. Greeks and Turks realize that they were wrong and are now examining their mistakes. Although the masses are not yet ready to build a future together, the leaders of the dialogue are friends and hopefully will guide the people into cooperation.

KURDS AND ARABS

The Kurdish Nation

The Kurds view themselves as a distinct nationality. They share a strong Kurdish identity: a strong consciousness of their origins, history and culture with a literature that can be traced back to at least the eleventh century. Their history identifies them with the Medes of Persia and the Kalduchon of Xenophon's Anabasis, with their language being Indo-European, not Semitic, in origin.

From their tribal, nomadic origins, the Kurds inherited a strong sense of family solidarity, a strong spirit of independence and real ability as fighters. Although the Kurd rejects military service by conscription, he is typically brave in battle with much of the Kurdish literature devoted to legends of battles or historical epics.

There are at present anywhere from five to seven million Kurds, with the largest Kurdish communities in Turkey, Iran and Iraq. The Kurds in Turkey, numbering from three to four million, are firmly controlled by the government. No political activity among what the government calls "mountain Turks" is allowed and all of the Kurdish uprisings have been firmly suppressed. The Kurds in Iran, numbering from one to two million, are not as severely suppressed. In 1946, they set up the short-lived Mehebad Republic. And the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (DPK) began there. While political activity among the Kurds is suppressed, Kurdish publications are allowed and Iranian Kurds were allowed to attend the July congress of the DPK in Iraq. The Syrian governmental policy toward its Kurdish population, numbering less than one million, has been one of assimilation. Kurds have few political rights in the country, and are deliberately resettled by the government away from areas with Kurdish communities so that large Kurdish communities will not form and become politically active. Only in Iraq has the Kurdish community of roughly one million been allowed to play any political role. For the past decade, the Iraqi government and the Kurds in Iraq have alternated between open warfare and peaceful settlement, with the latest agreement of March 11, 1970, hopefully a blueprint for peaceful coexistence.

The most significant provision of the March agreement, to the Kurds, looks toward the expansion of the "Kurdish people's exercise of all their rights" to "insure that they enjoy self-government...." The Kurdish concept of Iraq as a political entity emphasizes its bi-national character - the existence of two distinct nations, Kurdish and Arab, within Iraq's borders. The Kurds look toward Iraq evolving into a system of government in which a Kurdish autonomous region will exist within the larger political unit. And, in the long run, this aim is not seen as contradicting the Iraq Arab aspirations for Arab unity.

The Kurds in Iraq

Fighting occurred during much of the five years from 1963
to 1968 between the Kurds, under Mualla Mustafa Barazani, and govern-
ment forces. In 1966, however, Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman Bazzaz
worked out terms for a peace, now called the Declaration of June 29,
1966, or the Twelve Point Program. The program provided for:

- recognition of "Kurdish nationality";

- decentralization of government, with wide powers to be trans-
  ferred to locally elected councils;

- Kurdish representation in the National Assembly and all branches
  of public service in proportion to their numbers in the total
  population;

- appointment of Kurdish officials to Kurdish districts;

- promotion of Kurdish culture;

- early Parliamentary elections;

- a general amnesty when the violence ends, to include persons
  already convicted and deserters reporting with their arms;

- disbandment of the Iraqi Army's Salaheddin Cavalry;

- reappointment of absentee officials if possible to their former
  posts;

- formation of a special ministry to coordinate reconstruction and
  compensation;

- resettlement of persons evicted from their homes or compensation.

The unpublished articles of the Program included the release of all
political prisoners, permission for the DPK to function publically and
the formation of all Kurdish districts in the Mosul *liwa* into a new
liwa of Dihok.

Peace between the government and the Kurds followed, lasting
through 1967 although little was done to implement the Program. Early
in 1968, fighting did break out between the "old" DPK under Barazani
and the "new" or younger DPK forces under Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim
Ahmad. Throughout, however, there was no real government force used,
with Kurdish leaders moving freely in Baghdad and Kurdish publications
allowed.

The new Bathist government, under President Bakr, did announce
it would work for a solution of the Kurdish question on the basis of

the 1966 Program. Decrees were issued providing for the formation of
a Kurdish academy and university. A general amnesty was proclaimed,
waiving the condition that the Army and police deserters must return
their arms.

The government, however, took advantage of the Barazani-
Talabani split, appointing a Talabani supporter a Minister of State,
thus forcing the resignation of two Barazani supporters from the Cabinet.
And, on September 28, 1968, the government promulgated a Temporary Con-
stitution which declared that the "Iraqi people are part of the Arab
nation and that their aim is comprehensive Arab unity," and that the
government "obligates itself to work for the realization of this unity."
Reference to the Kurds was made only in the article guaranteeing
"Arabs and Kurds" equal rights before the law and guaranteeing their
national rights "within the framework of Iraqi unity."

Open fighting broke out between the Kurds and the government
in October and continued throughout 1969. During the whole course
of the fighting, there were rumors of peace settlements. Only in
January 1970 was it clear that talks were being held and that both
the government and the Kurds, under Barazani's leadership, were work-
ing for peace. When the actual agreement was finally signed, two of
Barazani's sons were present and, after the government announcement
of the agreement, Barazani broadcast a statement endorsing it.

The March 11, 1970, Agreement

The provisions of the agreement have not been published, but
were announced over Baghdad Radio on March 11 as follows:

- recognition of the Kurdish nation and amending the constitution
  to read "the Iraqi people consist of two main nationalities:
  the Arab and the Kurdish nationalities";

- unification of the provinces and the administrative units with
  a Kurdish majority to insure that the Kurds "enjoy self-govern-
  ment...";

- recognition of Kurdish along with Arabic as the official language
  in predominantly Kurdish areas;

- appointment of a Kurdish Vice President and other Kurds to insure
  proportional representation in all executive and administrative
  bodies, including the army;

- requirement that administrative officials in districts with a
  Kurdish majority must be Kurdish or at least speak Kurdish;

- promotion of Kurdish culture;

- permission for Kurds to establish youth and adult organizations
  and publish Kurdish books and papers;

- proclamation of a general amnesty for all who have taken part
  in the rebellion;

- provision of new housing for all Kurds unable to return;

- granting of pensions for Kurdish soldiers and compensation for Kurdish soldiers killed in battle;

- economic development and rehabilitation for the northern districts;

- agrarian reform for the Kurdish areas;

- provision that arms held by the Kurdish forces will be surrendered during the final stages of the agreement's implementation;

- formation of a mixed High Commission to supervise the agreement's implementation.

Secret clauses reportedly include: provision that Kurds can maintain their own "border guard" of about 10,000 men to defend the northern frontier which will receive its pay from the Iraqi army, the disbandment of the Iraqi Salaheddin Cavalry, withdrawal of the Iraqi army units from Kurdish districts and the provision that the government will sever its connections with the Talabani group.

Motivations for the Agreement

The Bathist government did not suddenly have a change of heart on the Kurdish issue, nor did Barazani abandon the Kurdish aims. The government was probably interested in coming to some kind of settlement because the open warfare was too costly both in men and matériel. The government has said the agreement was reached to free Iraqi forces for the war against "imperialist Israel" although the statement reflects "more rhetoric than reality." Instead, the government probably wanted to conserve its economic and political strength to pursue its objectives in the Persian Gulf, with the "real push" for settlement coming from the Soviet Union. The government may also have felt the Kurdish threat to the Kirkuk pipelines and the resultant loss of oil revenues. On Barazani's part, the war was also very costly in men and arms. With the time bought by the settlement, the Kurds can begin the rebuilding of their war-torn area; the education of their young, the reconstruction of homes, the development of their economy. Further, although the present agreement may not be permanent, the new governmental recognition of Kurdish self-government probably will last. As the new agreement was built on the 1966 Program, so any future agreement would probably be based on the March 11 provisions.

The Agreement's Implementation

The government has carried out several of the agreement's provisions. Five Kurdish leaders were appointed to the Cabinet. The DPK has been allowed to operate openly and to publish newspapers. Some roads in the north have been built or improved. Civil servants who joined the revolution have been able to return to their posts in the

administration, the army and the police. The government has withdrawn troops from the Kurdish areas. The government has issued a special agrarian reform law for the Kurdish areas. Kurds have been appointed to minor administrative positions in the Kurdish areas and the government has formulated plans for reconstruction for much of the Kurdish area. But much remains to be done. The five ministerial appointments were to posts of little significance. Nothing has been done to implement the agrarian reform law. While Kurds are in minor district positions, the Governors of the provinces are not Kurdish. And while plans for reconstruction for the north have been formulated, implementation of them has been piecemeal at best. Perhaps the issue causing greatest apprehension is the October 26 census for Kirkuk, deciding the proportion of the district's Kurds to the total population. The government has redrawn many district lines within the area and has decreed that the large Turcoman population there must register in the census as either Arab or Kurdish. To show their lack of confidence in the government's implementation of the agreement, the DPK leaders in the Party's July Congress postponed the nomination of a Kurd for the Vice Presidential post.

Prognosis

The agreement does provide a blue print for Kurdish-government dialogue. To the Kurdish leaders, it is an important first step toward an Iraqi national front which will include all political forces within the country. Its terms include most of the important provisions of past Kurdish-government settlements. But, most importantly, it includes the recognition of Kurdish nationality, of the Kurdish right to self-government. The durability of the agreement, however, will depend on its complete implementation, and the ability and willingness of both sides to lessen tensions and mistrust. The presently imcomplete implementation provides some hope that more will be done to carry out the agreement's terms. But more of the terms must be carried out to allay Kurdish suspicions that this agreement, like others of the past, will not be abandoned when it suits the government's purpose. The agreement was a "marriage of convenience," reached between a conservative, feudal leader and a racist, Marxist government not so much out of mutual trust as a mutual desire for peace.

Kurds in an International Setting

Within the Kurdish area, the Iraqi Kurds will continue to play the most significant role. While Syrian and Iranian members of the DPK did send representatives to the July Party Congress, their presence was only symbolic. Only Iraqi Kurds have significant political power within their country. In the Cold War context, Barazani, despite his support from the Soviet Union in the early 1950s, is now reported to be seeking American support for his Kurdish forces. Such support for Kurds is very difficult to foresee, however, in light of the close relations between the United States and the governments of Turkey and Iran.

NORTH AFRICAN ARABS AND NON-ARABS

Non-Arab communities have existed in North Africa
for many centuries and can be considered in two groups. First
are the Berbers who have maintained their own distinct culture
and language amidst constant Arab and European influences.
Secondly are the various groups of foreign nationals with his-
torical roots in the countries of North Africa but remaining
distinctly isolated from the general Arab society. Examples
of such are the Italians in Libya, the French in Morocco and
Algeria and the Greek and Maltese communities scattered through-
out the area. The following discussion will focus on the
Berbers of Morocco and Algeria where dialogue rather than
violence has been the outstanding principle of Arab-Berber
relations. A brief discussion of the situation in southern
Sudan will offer a point of contrast wherein extreme feelings
of racial separateness have developed and led to recurring
outbreaks of violence.

It is often commonly assumed that ethnic identifi-
cation within the Berber communities of Morocco has been the
sole source of tension between this group and their Arab neigh-
bors. Rather than accepting this simplified statement, it may
be more revealing to try to ascertain the importance of other
factors of motivation such as political grievance and economic
unrest. The Moroccan Berbers have never attempted to establish
their own state independent of the French or Muslim state and
it is somewhat short-sighted to view disturbances involving
Berbers as simply ethnic drives for autonomy. 'Abd al-Karīm's
revolt in the Rif Mountains in 1920 was for the purpose of
establishing a Riffian Berber Republic but beyond this it was
designed to appeal to all Moroccans alike. In 1936 the first
labor strike was called and 1500 Berbers left work in the
sugar refinery in Casablanca. Was this to be considered a
Berber or more rightly a proletarian strike for economic gains?
A final example is the closure of the Algerian-Moroccan border
in 1955 to Riffi laborers, prompting Berbers to join the
Moroccan Liberation Army in violent resistance. Again economics
may as easily account for this occurrence as ethnic determination.

Strictly speaking, the term Berber is not an ethnic
but rather a linguistic label, appropriately applied to 40 per
cent of Morocco's population. Arabs are generally considered
to be Arabized Berbers. The majority of Berbers are mountain
dwellers but many are forced to go to the large cities in

search of employment, and find themselves working with Arabs
daily. It is not difficult to understand then that although
Berber-Arab conflicts do exist, there are many possibilities
for cooperation between them. Inter-Berber strife in many
cases is equally if not more strong, preventing a consensus
of opinion.

The concept of Berber separateness has evolved some-
what artificially from the original emphasis placed on it by
the French colonizers. Berber schools were set up which stressed
the glories of an ancient nation and pictured the Arabs as
usurpers of an older heritage. In many cases, Berbers were
reminded of their old tribal confederations by the French and
not by their own tribal leaders.

With the end of French colonial domination, ethnic
politics came into play as various new leaders appealed to
group sentiments for votes. Not knowing the strength of the
other politicians, each felt himself pressed to act quickly
and mobilize as much support as possible. Political activity
in the period closely following independence in 1956 tended to
be somewhat ambiguous, based as it often was on a contrived
sense of ethnic identity.

Several examples can be cited which point this out.
In 1957 Addi Ou Bihi, governor of a province in southern
Morocco, led a revolt of Berber notables proclaiming to pro-
tect the Moroccan throne from the expanding power of the
Istiqlal Party. At the same time he was of course trying to
maintain his own patronage system in the province, fearing
the Istiqlal Party would soon control many of the positions
in the courts and postal system. The revolt aroused support
by appealing to Berber pride, and lacking a firmer foundation
was peacefully put down. The Rif Uprising began in 1958, trig-
gered by the founding of the Popular Movement, a rural Berber
party. Like Addi Ou Bihi's revolt this insurrection also felt
itself a counter to the single party tendency of the Istiqlal.
Dr. Khatib, co-founder of the party, tried to appeal for party
unity strictly along Berber lines; he himself lacked a credible
Berber lineage and had to create an extensive genealogy chart.
The king gave his support to this movement until the uprisings
in the Rif got out of hand and he was forced to intervene
militarily and crush it. Here again one may ask whether this
uprising was an outgrowth of Berber identity or a result of
economic depression caused by the recent integration of the
Rif Mountain area into the southern economy following the end
of the Spanish protectorate.

A final example is the Popular Movement itself, a coalition party countering the Istiqlal and encouraged by the palace for its votes in the occasional elections. Based on Berber identity, it serves as a channel of patronage for Berber notables and in return makes few demands on the government. Berber language instruction in school and more Berber music on the radio are the main requests.

The King himself is personally responsible for encouraging the idea of a Berber-Arab conflict, thereby making his presence and policy essential for bridging the cleavage. Berbers are actually to be found in many administrative positions in the Ministries of Justice and Education. Trained by the French to be bi- and trilingual clerks and teachers, they have continued in these jobs since independence. A policy of segregated employment, though, serves to keep Berbers out of the more prestigious offices such as the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Finance. It is the Arabs, pictured as wealthy city dwellers by the Berbers, who dominate here.

Another minority group, less numerous but very influential, also exists in Morocco, that of the Jews. Previously they constituted the largest Jewish community in the Middle East, numbering 225,000 in 1942. Today perhaps 50,000 remain. Moroccan independence particularly caused many of them to immigrate to Israel although King Mohammed V reassured them of personal safety if they stayed. A group of Jews formed the Judao-Muslim Entente, but it failed to achieve real political integration for the Jews. The general trend now is for the wealthy and the skilled to leave, encouraged by an elder Jewish community which does not feel it can make the move.

The Berber situation in Algeria too seems to present very little evidence of violence engaged in for the purpose of ethnic determination. There has been no claim to autonomy and it is probable that whatever ethnic consciousness exists has been created by social mobilization.

Geographically, the Algerian Berbers are divided into four isolated regions, Kabylia, Aures, M'Zab and Tuareg. These natural divisions prevent any sense of community although all are Sunni Muslims and speak Berber. It might be noted that Berber is not a written language, only an oral one. This may partially account for their willingness to adopt another culture, preferably the French, for social and economic gains.

The Kabyle Berbers in particular have shown a great
degree of adaptability for living in two cultures at the same
time. Their villages tend to be over-populated and very poor,
forcing the men to migrate temporarily to the big cities in
search of employment. This allows the Kabyles to acquaint them-
selves with modern methods and ideas while maintaining loyalty
to their tribe. Earlier the French, recognizing the usefulness
of this adaptability, trained the Kabyles as teachers for the
whole of Algeria; by World War II they formed a rather educated
élite. But when independence finally came, they easily trans-
ferred allegiance from the French to the state of Algeria,
realizing that the existence of a unified state was essential
for their economic survival. Many became violent nationalists,
having retained their traditional structures and values in their
isolated villages. While other areas had been totally subjected
to colonization and were therefore less likely to organize
against the French, the Kabyles proved strong in their resistance.

Political unity amongst the Kabyles was myth both in
the years before and after independence, and remains so today.
During the movement for independence almost 45 per cent of the
top leaders were Kabyles, yet there was no cohesion amongst
them. Personal Kabyle rivalry instead was dominant. All
the political factions vying for power could count Berber
members but there was no single leader to unite them.

The scramble for power following 1962 showed Kabyles on
all sides and clearly not divided along lines of ethnic identity.
In 1963 Ait Ahmed formed the FFS, Front des Forces Socialistes,
and began an insurrection against the state with the aid of
Colonel Mohand, a Kabyle leader. Almost half the Kabyle
deputies stood against the revolt, and when in 1964 a border
war broke out with Morocco, Colonel Mohand quickly switched
his support to Ben Bella. This is a clear example of a leader
using the peasantry for his own personal leverage in the govern-
ment. The Kabyles were not actually revolting for autonomy
but rather to show the government they felt administratively
neglected in terms of employment and educational prospects.

Finally, notions of ethnic solidarity have been some-
what weakened by conscious efforts on the part of the govern-
ment to appease the Berbers. Knowing the danger of adding to
their frustrations, the government has maintained a high pro-
portion of Berbers in positions of leadership and administra-
tion. Boumedienne was responsible for the improvement of
Kabylia's economic situation and the construction of many new
schools. The more it is to the Kabyles' advantage to remain
within the larger Algerian society, the less likely a Kabyle
insurrection will occur. Perhaps in the future the Algerian
government will liberalize its policy towards a multi-party
system and allow a Kabyle party to form with a strong central
Kabyle leadership. Until then there will be only minimal
Berber identification.

From these brief discussions, it becomes clear that there are four factors necessary for the formulation of a cohesive ethnic awareness. The first of course is a sense of identification, fostered by linguistic, cultural or religious distinctions. Secondly there must be a sense of grievance felt which will trigger a general feeling of unrest. Geographical distribution, a third factor, must be centralized to facilitate political action and allow the minority group to feel itself unified and separate from the rest of the population. Finally a person of leadership must come forward, emphasizing ethnic differences and introducing methods of political organization.

Sudan, unlike Morocco and Algeria, has not been able to contain and assimilate its ethnic elements and instead has found itself in violent opposition to them. A minority population of 3-1/2 to 4 million live geographically concentrated in southern Sudan and refuse to pay allegiance to the central government. They consider themselves racially apart from those in the north and maintain that their real kinship links are with the tribes in the Congo and Kenya. Nor do they feel religiously bound to the Muslim society of northern Sudan; the majority are animists, but some 500,000 Christians are also active in the separatist movement.

The Sudanese government refuses to admit that there is any cause for grievance and insists these people are Sudanese with all the rights of citizenship. It sees the problem as stemming from the 1930s when the United Kingdom effectively walled off the south by a series of restrictive measures. Arabic was not taught in the schools there, no Arab traders or administrators came through and the tribes were permitted to rule themselves. By the time of independence, southern Sudan had its own separate administrative system which did not easily fit into that of the north.

The problem then has been in existence since 1956 and has created a great internal drain of manpower, resources and energy. Estimates put 12-17,000 Sudanese troops stationed in the south and 20-30,000 southern Sudanese in armed revolt. It has been suggested by the government that certain border countries and possibly Israel are supplying military aid in support of the insurrection. Whatever the external help, the people of southern Sudan definitely feel there is no room for compromise with the northern Arab administration and continue to violently oppose its rule.

Dialogue has thus been an effective tool in North
Africa where it is much to the benefit of the Berbers to
remain within the state even while retaining their own language
and culture. The Jews, too, have for a long time been part
of the larger Moroccan society and only since 1948 or more lately
1967 have begun to respond to the Zionist appeal. The pros-
pects of a peaceful co-existence between northern and southern
Sudan, though, are few indeed and violence will likely continue
until the insurrection is militarily crushed or granted its
demand of political autonomy.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Parker T. Hart

The discussions of yesterday and this morning have thrown into relief many facets of group thinking in areas where violence prevails and where it has yielded to dialogue. At this point, no one wants to hear another address; therefore, the considerations I select for you are necessarily brief.

From the splendid keynote address of Dr. Alan Horton through a series of exceptional plenary and simultaneous panels there is a common thread: group identification in the Middle East and North Africa, as we have always known, is an ancient and intense force which in much of the region grew out of extended family, clan or tribal loyalties as the primary source of pressure on the individual. It has historically exacted a commitment made at the mother's knee, so to speak, to win or to die in the process rather than to conciliate, to assert one's right rather than to see the other's right; and as one commentator has written, "The essence of tragedy occurs when there is a struggle of right against right." This has risen to the national level. Right is what your group demands. Nor can it be easily seen otherwise when there is a background of family tragedy, whether it be the gas chambers of Ozwiecim and the callous disregard of the world at large or 20 years of degradation in refugee camps a few short miles from one's own farm now utilized by others. It is the inability to do anything about one's own frustrations which in group misery generated among Jews in Europe and Palestine and Arabs in exile the desperate conclusion of the new generation. With their youthful energy they must do something where their elders failed. Often holding the older generation in contempt and usually bored with its repetitious self-justifications, this youth of the nether world of crowded barracks has found that host Arab societies have failed their cause in every way. They must take arms against a sea of troubles, prove their manhood, realize some semblance of ideal or die. Among them may be the aberrant figure with unusual chromosome patterns or other medical ground for violent behavior, becoming a rallying center for extreme action; but generally the youth is found to base his new ideology on cynicism over those who were thought

to be his friends, but never were. There is no instinct for compromise as long as by extreme acts he can make the world which has so long ignored him, come to him and beg for the release of hostages or when he can intimidate Arab rulers against negotiations with the United Nations mediator.

Yet there are outer limits of any group right and it may be that the over-assertion of right is becoming clear among some Palestinians in the aftermath of the Jordanian civil war as among Israelis who see that new territorial accretions offer no real security for their state. These are civilized men and as we have heard, "Violence is a wasting asset." There is no security for families, even welded into small nations, amid an atmosphere of mounting catastrophe. Two thousand dead in a state the size of Israel (or its population equivalent, the Palestine Entity now being born) is a terrible drain. On percentages, it is like 200,000 dead Americans; and twenty thousand is like 2 million. This cannot go on without re-examination of extreme positions. The mood that condemns lies and hypocrisy in the tradition of Frantz Fanon, becomes submerged by the greater horror. Heroism as an isolated, exhibitory gesture becomes irrelevant when there is no longer an audience to cheer, only one to grieve. If people cannot live in Eastern European or Jordanian refugee camps in a state of despair, they can also not live in mutual annihilation.

This suggests that as the fires of extremism subside in the bitter experience of Jordan, and as the Arab leader toward whom the Israeli Government was most allergic is replaced, there may be a new moment for moderation. It should not be allowed to pass.

But who is to utilize this moment to positive effect? We have seen from Buchenwald, Palestine, Cyprus and Biafra how great powers can be emotionalized by the outcry of small communities, and how the latter can acquire enormous leverage in free Western societies for their immediate objectives, asserting their claim of political right as they command deepest sympathy for the outrage committed against their persons. Their ability among free societies to carry human empathy into governmental support for full sovereignty as the only means to preserve themselves against further outrage contrasts with their inability to accomplish this transition among closed societies. Governments like that of the USSR make the deliberate decision whether to extend support for the statehood of a small community or not. They make it free of such domestic pressures as are felt in the US, Great Britain or Western

Europe. These pressures can distort or deflect the power
of open societies to make decisions based on their broad in-
terests or on considerations of long-range peace. They
add to the proliferation of small states with myopic vision
and disproportionate influence in world affairs -- a very
bad combination -- and they increase the danger that a large
part of humanity may be drawn into the vortex of human con-
flict. What has commonly been referred to as the tyranny of
the small and the weak over the great can produce a confron-
tation endangering the structure of world peace on which the
survival of these small societies must ultimately depend.
The arsenals of great powers cannot without risk be opened
to those who see only their own narrow right.

Both Moscow and Washington are caught in the toils
of a short-sighted arms policy. The vicious cycle must be
broken. Both Athens and Ankara had to learn this in two con-
frontations (1964 and 1967) which threatened mutual devasta-
tion and the breakup of NATO. The ability of the tiny to wield
power over the large enormously inflates what our keynoter
referred to as the corporate ego "in tiresome disarray," and it
does nothing for communal relations. This willingness to
compromise vanishes in a euphoria of over-confidence; positions
harden, arrogance mounts. At this point, if the worst has not
already happened, we are fortunate if a corrective mechanism
begins to function. There may occur a slackening of sympathy
in the large societies. Public questioning of the local cause
may mount, and help to the appealing parties may be less assured.
This in turn may trigger an intensive review of communal atti-
tudes, as in today's Cyprus and Israel.

The behavior of large powers, such as the United
States is therefore critical. We cannot afford to lose our
balance and our perspective, our broad view of our own and
mankind's interest.

This obviously brings to mind the importance of the
human rights mechanism of the United Nations and its power to
spotlight injustice -- or genocide -- against those
societies which have no chance of self-determination and no
outside champion. It also emphasizes the potentialities of
the UN to act for world interests in substitution for the
over-involvement of great powers harassed by the demands of
smaller communities which have captured their commitments.
Here a power such as Israel may resist as long as it feels
it can get more out of the US while one like Cyprus may feel

it can get more out of the small nation vote in the United Nations General Assembly. Certainly the United States and Western Europe have no corner on the recognition of injustice or the power to correct it. Disregard of the potentialities of the United Nations is at best short-sighted, at the worst an arrogant assertion of the desire to manage affairs as we wish. We must get behind the United Nations in this year of its 25th Anniversary. There is no time to lose.

One thing in our shrinking world is certain: no community and no state can claim or assert absolute security for itself. Absolute security cannot be pursued unilaterally. It is inseparable from the security of one's neighbor and it cannot be asserted against it, whether he be a Palestinian Arab, an Israeli, a Greek or Turk Cypriot, a Kurd or a member of a minority in North Africa.

I am deeply grateful to the outstanding speakers, Chairmen and panelists who have expended so much uncompensated energy and time to share their thoughts with us and on behalf of the Middle East Institute I extend to them our warmest appreciation.

I declare the 24th Annual Conference adjourned.

THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE

Landrum R. Bolling

Our chairman has indicated that he hopes we can approach this discussion of violence in a non-violent way. I'm not quite sure whether, as a Quaker, my real cue should be simply to declare a silent meeting for 15 minutes in place of saying anything. But Quakers, in spite of their reputation for silence, I've always found, are never loath to express their opinions.

There is a mistaken notion, fostered willingly or un-willingly by the Quakers themselves that Quakers are experts on war and violence, and on how to stop war and violence. Not that anybody really believes that they're able to do much about these matters, but as a gesture of courtesy they're often accorded status as honorary experts on violence. And since Quakers have an incurable propensity for gadding about the world, to where the violence is, they are, I fear, given credit, at least fleetingly and intermittently, for knowing more than they know.

Indeed, anyone who turns up again and again at the scene of a crime is bound to be suspected of being a criminal, a policeman, a sociologist-researcher, or just one of the in-satiably curious. And when he's rarely reluctant to give the world the benefit of his views, then his impertinence at times gets him invited to mingle among his academic betters. Such is the case this morning.

Search for Peace in the Middle East. This little paper-back I hold before you in the new revised edition just published, is, I suppose, the chief reason I was invited to be in this meet-ing today. It is a typical example of Quaker chutzpah.

It will not be mistaken for a great piece of academic, original scholarship. Nor was it so intended. It is simply another in a long series of efforts to try to record some under-standing of what those caught in a tragic conflict are feeling, thinking and trying to accomplish as they carry on their battles. It is an effort to find some responsible way to point up some emerging assessment of possible means for escaping the patterns of violence.

In particular, I suppose, it is the self-appointed and childlike role of Quakers to be forever standing on a street corner crying out that the emperor of violence has no clothes. But the ancient Quaker testimony against violence, and the accompanying appeal to see that of God in all men, and to live in that spirit which "takes away the occasion of war," this kind of affirmation of faith does not carry us very far toward understanding the practical contemporary problems of violence in the Middle East or elsewhere.

Yet, it is just such a faith as this, shared by peoples of many diverse religions and of no ostensible religion, that is bound to influence the thinking of all of us who try to find pathways through and around the dark and frightening maze of violence in the world, and particularly, as we're considering today, the violence in the Middle East.

Having warned you of certain biases and hopes (and deficiencies in scholarship) let me share with you some of the simple insights which have emerged, at least for me as a member of this working Quaker group, out of our study of the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past two years and more. First, I would say, speaking quite personally, there is perhaps the innocent observation that those who glorify and use violence are not necessarily, in the popular sense, evil, malevolent men. For the most part they exhibit the common human tendencies towards tenderness and sensitivity. They are, many of them I have known, deeply concerned about human suffering, moved by pity and compassion toward the victims of violence, even as they use violence. And this I have found as characteristic of the attitudes of men who are in official armies and those who are in irregular guerrilla forces.

This is not a surprising discovery, but in a sense it is contrary to what so many people think. We so often believe that if one can put a label of evil upon an individual, we think we have somehow dealt with the problem that he represents.

Second, there is the equally innocent observation that the users of violence are not stupid, ignorant clods. Many of them, in all kinds of ideological factions are highly intelligent, sophisticated, well educated men and women. We tend to adopt the notion that formal education must mean that man has thereby been turned away from violence. We like to think that somehow if you raise the standard of living, raise the cultural level, provide the people with education, you then cure human beings of their propensity for violence.

These notions are myths which the prophets of inevitable progress, of the 19th century and later, have persuaded many of us to accept. It is precisely through the use of reason, the sifting of much knowledge, that some of the leaders in movements of violence have come to the logical conclusion that violence is their only hope.

Third, it seems to me that the powerful forces operative in shaping the attitudes supporting violence are very often linked to feelings of frustration and despair. But those feelings are somehow redirected by some inner chemistry away from surrender and collapse, towards a focus of affirmation of hope and action. When we speak about people being frustrated and despairing -- and many people in the world in all kinds of situations feel frustrated and despairing -- we must recognize that many of these people become totally apathetic. Some undergo a kind of psychological collapse. But the people who espouse violence are again and again people who have somehow found a way to overcome the inner compulsions to defeat, to surrender, and who make a new affirmation, make a new leap of faith.

"No longer." "We don't have to." "We can." "We will."

These are the sounds of psychological breakthrough as desperate people burst open the walls of hopelessness. And we very much fail to understand the appeal to violence if we do not see how for many people this is a kind of regeneration, emotionally, psychologically, even spiritually. Some among those of us who live on college campuses, I think, have had some education in this. Some of the most telling, and in a sense poignant descriptions of the reactions of some of the more extreme radicals in campus disorders have expressed themselves in precisely these terms of psychological, one might almost say, spiritual or pseudoreligious rebirth as they suddenly found, somehow, that they no longer had to despair as they turned to acts of violence.

I deplore this. I think it's an ersatz kind of religious conversion. But the fact that people feel this way has to be taken into account. A recurring theme of the Palestinians which you hear again and again is, "We have been betrayed by the United Nations, we have been betrayed by the Great Powers, we have been betrayed by the Arab governments. There are none of these institutions or these leaders who speak to our needs. And so we have been cast into outer darkness. The world will not hear us. The world will pay no attention to us. Therefore, we must take now our destiny in our own hands, and we're going to do this. If we have to fight, many of us will have to die. But eventually we or our sons or our son's sons will solve this problem, and we are going home!"

This is the kind of rhetoric that one hears from Palestinians in the camps, Palestinians in the organization offices. How much of this rhetoric they really believe as a basis for a practical program is difficult to know, but this is the way they feel. And certainly by coming to feel this way, to talk themselves into this mood, they have been able to overcome in some measure their own sense of despair.

Fourth, for some, perhaps for many, violence is a way of coping with a personal identity crisis. In a society that is breaking up, in a world caught up in accelerating change everyone, particularly the young, has difficulty deciding exactly who he is. How does he define himself, what are his values? What are the things to which he can relate himself, and what are the things to which he is willing to give, if necessary, his whole life.

Again, those of us who live and work on college campuses are very much aware of the continuing problems of youth identity. And while this particular psychological jargon perhaps gets a bit stale and irritating at times, there is a reality here with which we have to cope. In my own casual observations with guerrilla groups, with students of Arab universities, it has seemed to me that they experience much the same kind of psychological identity crises that are to be found among our own students on American campuses, and more. As they see the breakup of the societies from which they come, as they see a falling away from the values and standards and ideas of their parents and of the community, as they become increasingly disillusioned about what the older genera- tion and the old forms of society had to offer, they push harder than ever to try to find themselves within some new framework.

Part of their problem, and part of the problem they help to bring upon the Middle East, is the problem of defining who they are: testing their powers, proving their courage, affirming their manhood. This is one of the deep and dark problems with which all people must wrestle, and regarding which we have to make some judgment with respect to political leaders even in sophisticated and developed countries.

Fifth, another insight which seems to have come through to me is this: that violence provides for many, most importantly, an escape from humiliation. So many of the people who resort to violence are people who have come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, "that 'they' do not take me seriously, and I will make 'them' take me seriously. 'They' ignore me, I will compel 'them' to see me and respect me."

This again is one of the questions that comes up over and over and over again with respect to the Palestinians. At the very bottom of their rage against the world, their rage against the Israelis, their rage against the Arab governments is their feeling that the world is not taking and has not taken us seriously. This feeling is confirmed and re-enforced by many of the things which we in the rest of the world do, which all of the governments trying to involve themselves in this area and its problems have done.

The very fact that UN resolution 242 makes no mention of the Palestinians except as quote the refugee problem unquote is to most Palestinians who think much about it and say anything about it, a kind of insult. And one of the reasons so many of them are opposed to the UN resolution 242, I am convinced, is not just disagreement with the substantive proposals of that resolution. I think many of them would accept them. But they reject the whole thing out of hand because the Palestinians are not, somehow, plugged into the process.

How they can be plugged in is one of the most difficult, baffling questions before us. But I, for one, have a deep conviction we'll get no where ultimately until the Palestinians are made seriously, significantly, and with respect, parties to this search for some solution. And I would say that if we're going to move out of the present stalemate that we're in, there's going to have to be some new initiatives on the part -- let me be very specific about this -- on the part of Israel and the United States to find some way to recognize the existence of the Palestinians and to give them some encouragement to find ways to concert their voices, and to be heard.

And it does no good for the leader of a state involved in this conflict to make speeches, as has been done on more than one occasion, saying, "Who are the Palestinians? They do not exist, there is no such nation." These are counter-productive insults which further fan the fires of resentment and hatred and desire for revenge.

Sixth, I have been puzzling about a certain bio-psychological factor that seems to relate to violence, and I believe has relevance to violence in the Middle East. As a non-scientific layman I am intrigued by some of the laboratory research being done on the effects of overcrowding on animals. This has to do with the relationship of overcrowding to hostility, aggression and violence.

The biologists, as you know, have been studying for
several years the effects of overcrowding on rats and monkeys and
various other animals. What they find is very impressive, about
the way in which, when you increase the density of the population,
when you reduce the field within which an animal has some sense of
freedom, the individual reacts with increasing withdrawal, plus
hostility, plus aggression. In time, there is disinterest in
food; in time disinterest even in sex.

Well, the ethologists, and other scientists who are
studying these problems, are wondering if there aren't some
very real lessons for us in these studies of animal behavior for
the human family. As one looks at the problems of the ghetto
slums of New York and Chicago and elsewhere, and as we look at
the problems of the crowded refugee camps, I wonder if we don't
have to take into account the possibility that part of the source
of violence must be found in this fairly simple biological-
sociological factor of overcrowding.

Anyone of us who has spent any time in some of these
miserably overcrowded Arab refugee camps cannot help but wonder
whether this kind of research being done in the quiet of American
and European university research laboratories doesn't have some-
thing to say about the inhumanity of the shabby, overcrowded,
refugee camps. It is from these camps, as we see again and again,
that some of the most violent members of the violent groups have
come.

In the next place, I've been led to think more and more
about the overall mystique of violence as an essential for social
change. Many of those who are caught up in revolutionary move-
ments throughout the world, and certainly those caught up in the
commando movements in the Arab world, have been bemused by the
romance of revolution, have adopted the Utopian thinking and the
Utopian rhetoric of many past and contemporary revolutionaries.
One of the things which we obviously lack, it seems to me, for
our time, the kind of social invention somebody ought to help
create, is a new model for revolution.

This is a silly kind of statement to make, I suppose,
but in one sense I think it gets to the heart of the question.
So many of the people who are trying to change the world are
trying to change it in terms of old and outmoded ideas, con-
cepts, patterns of behavior, economic and social models, and
outmoded rhetoric. Here is one of the desperate needs in this
situation, because we know that change has got to come, drastic
change has got to come; revolution is in the works. But what kind
of revolution? By what means, under what leadership? And to what
end?

All too often the leaders of contemporary revolutionary movements seem so caught up in the mystique of violence that they do not clearly see what forces they are unleashing upon the world.

Eighth, there is, of course, in the pattern of violence, among the people who resort to violence, a desperate hunger for some effective means of communication. Communication with an unseeing and unhearing world. I gather that my colleagues on this panel are going to develop this theme. I think it is one of the most important ones for us to consider: violence as a means of communication, violence as a substitute for other means of communication.

And then finally, I would say that as I have reflected on these questions and tried to find some understanding of the phenomena of violence in the Mideast, I have gained a renewed, perhaps at times shaky belief, a growing conviction that with some wit, some wisdom, some goodwill, an escape from violence can be found and must be found. I affirm, reluctantly perhaps, that up to a point violence may work. Indeed, violence seems to have proved that it can produce some benefit, some redress of grievance, which is not possible or seems not to have been possible by other means.

Yet violence is a wasting asset. It can too easily become the end itself. It too easily falls into the hands of the most calloused, the most brutal. It is not, in the long run, a productive instrument for the constructive kind of change that we seek.

I close by affirming to you, as an individual groping Quaker, that man deserves and is capable of finding a better way out of his difficulties, even in so bitter and complex an area as the Middle East, than violence. But we will not come to the point where we can escape from the trap of violence until we come to some greater understanding, some greater compassion, some greater toughness of thinking about why the violence exists in the first place, and what are the practical steps that must be taken to get out of that pattern of violence.

THE PHENOMENON OF VIOLENCE

Irene Gendzier

I want to tell you some of my thoughts about a man who was relevant to Algerians, and is relevant today, to Palestinians and to American blacks; a man who somehow fits in, in a very paradoxical way, in this whole question of violence. I am speaking of Frantz Fanon.

I suppose he's probably much less important as an individual than for what he represents. He has been associated with the mystique of violence, and one can find words in his texts that confirm this view. But I think if one begins with this conclusion, one risks losing the essence of the man's message. I agree with Dr. Bolling. The issue is not violence. The issue is conditions that make it possible, desirable, and, perhaps, inevitable.

Speaking and writing from Algeria, Fanon said, ironically using words only as an intellectual can -- a category he despised -- was that violence is not there (in Algeria, only) it's here, in the West. The violence doesn't come from the East, it's also in the West. Violence is not a source of death, it's a way to approach life. Violence is not an alternative to dialogue, there is no dialogue. It's a dialogue of the deaf, and where there's a dialogue of the deaf, sooner or later that barrier is broken.

He was not a political man in the sense that he never held power. He was supremely irresonsible, which is probably the ideal position to be in. No government could tolerate him, no government, fortunately, had to tolerate him very long, because he called for a kind of consistent and constant self criticism, lucidity, that none of us could accept for any length of time.

Fanon's message has been mingled with that of the Algerian revolution and the FLN, although he was not from Algeria, he was from Martinique, a man who "found" himself, as we would say, in Algeria. He suffered from crises for which

psychiatrists would have names. We would have cured him, adapted him and adopted him in a special place in which we put such people.

All that may be correct. It's also profoundly irrelevant, because from his own situation, choosing to remain inactive except by words, he was able to speak to people and for people, to whom he made a great deal of sense -- very troubling sense. He recommended the cathartic of violence, and all the paradoxes that follow from this conception, as evidenced in Kenya and in his view, in Algeria. Here was a man who loved life and who preached violence; who hated words and used so many; who loathed France and the West and America and all that the capitalist West stood for; but who could also recognize that in this world, while we still live on only one planet, one must collaborate.

He was moved certainly by a kind of existential wish to deny the ultimate injustice: his own death. And he wrote his most powerful book when he knew he was dying. Yet those people who read his books ignored this fact while recognizing that they were dying themselves in some way that was comparable to his agony. What Fanon saw and suffered, then, was intensified by his personal experience. I emphasize this because we talk about the identity crisis. Everyone has it -- there are institutions that study it, and once we've disposed of it, we recover and become nice, sane, complete and identified. But it would be a great mistake to assume that Fanon's crisis, which is a crisis common to many men, was nothing more than a misguided stream of poorly controlled emotions.

Born in Martinique, Fanon went to Algeria after having lived and studied in France. He saw that the path of silence of the colonized world was false; that it was not silent, that it was not "non-violent," that it was not peaceful or peace loving. It was merely pacified. He recognized there was some close identity between the violence of those in power and the mood, the contemporary mood, the tension, that curious stillness which he found in Algeria itself.

In this dichotomy between colonizer and colonized, oppressed and oppressor, he found a formula that he transferred from his experience in Martinique to his experience in France. It applied to Jews, it applied to blacks, it applied to Algerians. The idea caught. He was not the first to present it, and he has certainly not been the last to broadcast it.

But he translated it in a very effective way. He wrote of the Manichean quality of this colonized world, the third world. He wrote of the division between the world of power and the world of the powerless; the division between those who impose and those who accept. He found a way of expressing it that was recognized and he did not stop there.

What he urged was that the powerlessness not become impotence, and in order to prevent this he recommended violence. Although he was not a man who had much love for the church, the synagogue or the mosque, his language is full of a spirit of the Apocalypse, of all those things one associates with the ultimate legitimate source of goodness and truth. And I suppose that one has to remember at all times that he wrote in a country at war. And he spoke not to professors, intellectuals, and politicians. He spoke, even if only in his imagination, to those who were outside the halls and would never come in, even if they had the choice.

The third world sees itself and identifies with that marginal man, with the outsider who has for so long been ignored, as Dr. Bolling said a moment ago in reference to the Palestinians.

Fanon understood that violence was a mad folly, that spontaneous combustion in the end would destroy those who practiced it. He risked recommending it because he thought that there was no choice. It is a conclusion to which others had also come.

For him all life was struggle. Perhaps this is a key for an understanding of Fanon and for our own situation. But one must ask: Is all struggle physically violent? Is all revolutionary struggle, struggle on the battlefield? Fanon discussed this. It is, unfortunately, not this part of his work which has been taken up by those who read his books.

What Fanon represented, then, was a lucid, impolite, indiscreet, unwanted but required exposé of how one lives individually and collectively. What he wrote about so defiantly was the hypocrisy of government propositions, suggestions, offers in the world he knew, that of Algeria and France at war. What he offered to his contemporary militants was the challenge of self-consciousness. And what he wanted was to discover some means whereby the masses could achieve political self-consciousness.

He elaborated many doctrines. The cathartic of
violence is the one that has become, unfortunately, most
popular. It is a troubling doctrine which one must not cease
to question independently of its author. But Fanon is also
the man who speaks for all those individuals and movements
who are in a state of resistance in a political and existen-
tial sense. He advocated resistance as a step in knowing,
being, moving. It isn't surprising, as I said before, that
no government, even the government that buried him and
acclaimed him could tolerate him alive. Because he repre-
sented the kind of disquieting search that no establishment
could long tolerate. But Fanon was a man whom we produced.
We of the Western world. This mad man who loved the prospect
of this death to end death, who lived in a terror of dying
himself, and who, for the ultimate irony, as Joseph Alsop
seems to find no end of joy in telling us, died in the arms
of the CIA here in Washington, this man and all his negations
and all his anger and all his rage, was a man demanding to be
heard. But what he produced was nothing more than an agonized
statement for those who cannot speak and for whom he chose to
speak.

The failure of a Fanon was to show us a way out of
the impasse. And the danger of a Fanon was that he advocated
the kind of total commitment which results in polarization
and makes political action virtually impossible. It seems to
me that people like us have to find a way to legitimate the
other option, the other choice: to advocate change and radical
reform but not at the expense of all lives.

Finally, perhaps the most memorable aspect of
Fanon's message is not that his words have become popular
among the Palestinian guerrillas, the Panthers, or even that
he was heard by the FLN. What is important is that he talks
to us about us, about our part of the world and our kind of
people, myself included, who fall into that category of poten-
tial abusers of the word.

VIOLENCE OR DIALOGUE IN ARAB-ISRAEL RELATIONS

Don Peretz

As the number of hapless victims drawn into the whirl-
pool of Middle East conflict increases and increases, as
possibilities of dialogue seem more and more obscured and
incidents of violence grow by gargantuan proportions, one
is tempted to think of lost opportunities for peace, against
the background of violence that has characterized the half
century of conflict between the Jewish and Palestine Arab
nationalist movements.

Both movements, so closely attached to the city of
peace, were born in violence. The irony of history is that
the violence that was turned against them by others, they turned
against each other.

Jewish nationalism, expressed in the Zionist move-
ment, was in large measure a product of violent Russian anti-
semitism which sent the people without a land in search of
a land without a people. It was the violent French anti-semi-
tism of the Dreyfus affair that ignited the first sparks of
passionate Jewish consciousness in Theodore Herzl, who formed
the concept of the Jewish state and founded the Zionist move-
ment in 1897.

Arab self awareness was also given life by Ottoman
Turkish repression in the late nineteenth century, and by
the Turkish onslaught against Arab patriots during World
War I. The first world war provided the occasion for British
intrusion as the supposed benefactor of both national move-
ments, an intrusion that failed to provide for dialogue between
these two national groups, each of which soon came to regard
the other as an intruder in the country which each claimed as
its own.

Born through violence of others, these national
movements soon turned against each other, each in fear that
its very existence was imperilled by the national claims of
its antagonist. Jewish nationalists soon discovered that
Palestine was not, in the words of Herzl, a land without a
people awaiting a people without a land. Its Arab inhabitants
were live and real, with their own aspirations and claims, and
passionate desires for independence. Palestine's Arabs, fear-
ing the rising tide of immigration that increased the Jewish
population tenfold within a quarter of a century, and seeing
Jewish aspirations develop from homeland to national state,
were interested less in dialogue than in stemming the tide,
with force if necessary. Initial attempts at dialogue, such
as the Weismann-Feisal talks, were futile since the good senti-
ments of participants in the talks were never channeled into
creative political action. Instead mistrust fed upon mistrust
making Palestine into a battlefield between Arab and Jewish
militants and their British benefactors.

It was the violence of others, that turned the con-
flict in Palestine into a full-scale civil war during the
1930's. As European repression of Jews grew from scattered
incidents in Poland to liquidation in German and Nazi occupied
Europe, Jewish anxiety and determination for survival increased
pressures for large-scale immigration to Palestine, and Pales-
tine's indigenous Arabs foresaw the spectre of becoming a minority
in their own homeland. Arab fears, fed on the Jewish passion
for survival, erupted into a nation wide Arab revolt against
Zionist nationalism and British occupation.

There were attempts at dialogue through this period.
Only recently I was rereading a now historical document pub-
lished in Jerusalem during 1947 by Martin Buber, Judah Magnes
and Ernest Simon. Called, "Towards Union in Palestine -
Essays on Zionism and Arab-Jewish Cooperation," the book is
by no means anti-Zionist and certainly not anti-semitic. One
of the essays by Nathan Hofshi, an early Zionist settler, and
a pacifist recalls some of the attempts at dialogue. Let
those who want to know about them, he reminds us, read in
Medzini's Ten Years of Politics

"of the Jewish-Arab conference which was to take place
in Lebanon in 1913, but was prevented by our leaders on
the ground that "it is not necessary, the Government is
on our side." Let them read of the energetic warning
given by one of the Arab leaders in reply to our refusal.

Further, let them read the details of the plan which was
accepted in 1919 by King Feisal, the pan-Syrian Congress
and the leaders of the Palestine Istiklal party. This
plan, which was excellent in all respects, especially
in respect of free Jewish immigration into Palestine <u>was</u>
<u>rejected</u> by the "Commission of Delegates" of the then
Zionist leadership, who were actuated by contempt for the
Arab movement and by faith in our power in Europe and
America. Since then, there have been further opportuni-
ties, especially in 1928 and again in 1930. And then in
1936 -- in the midst of the terrible disturbances -- an
agreement was proposed granting 30,000 Jewish immigrants
annually for the next ten years. This proposal, too,
was turned down, since our national "prestige" demanded
everything or nothing. And it was thus that we paved the
way for the "Patria," the "Struma" and similar tragedies . . .
Even in recent years, there were various important proposals,
as recorded by B. Rabinowitz in "Zionism and the Arabs"
and the pamphlet "Banativ" (On the Path), both published
in Hebrew by the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation. The
last Arab offer, as recorded by "Banativ," was submitted
to the Jewish Agency in the beginning of 1943 through
the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, the main points
being as follows: ---

1) Palestine to be a bi-national State.

2) Jewish immigration to be kept within such limits as
    to enable the Jews to reach numerical parity with the
    Arabs in the course of some years. (This paragraph
    meant <u>the immigration</u> of 700,000 persons in the very
    near future.) No decision to be made regarding immi-
    gration after parity has been reached.

3) Bi-national Palestine to join a federation of the
    neighbouring countries."

    Shertok <u>rejected the Arab offer</u>, it being "contrary
to the fixed policy of the Jewish Agency"!

    Neither Jews nor Arabs who advocated dialogue based
on mutual concessions and acknowledgement of mutual rights in
the contested land fared well. Jewish advocates of non-violence
were often ostracized in their own community, as they still
are if they advocate a non-violent approach to Arab-Jewish
relations; and the few Arab advocates of peace with recognition

of Jewish national rights were physically imperilled, as they are today for daring to recommend a non-violent approach to the conflict.

I well remember one of my last visits with Dr. Magnes and the deep gloom with which he faced the already sporadic opening of conflict between Jews and Arabs after announcement of the partition resolution. One comment that struck me was his concern about his few Arab friends who still clung pre-cariously to the hope of peace. One of his close Arab asso-ciates, a notable of the Husaini family, had to cut off contact after having his skull fractured by nationalist thugs because of cooperation with the Jews.

Because of the growing determination by both the Arab and Jewish communities to resolve their differences once and for all, not by dialogue but by force, Magnes despaired that peace would come. He foresaw the over escalating cycle of violence that since those days has made three full scale wars and countless border struggles the accepted form of Arab-Jewish relationships.

Since then violence rather than dialogue has indeed become the pattern, commonly accepted by partisans of either side. One has only to look at the deep mistrust with which both Israel and the Arab states view any dialogue or steps toward peace. The now suspended cease-fire was entered into only after the greatest pressure was exerted on the govern-ments concerned. And at that, the very idea of peace caused political disruption -- within Israel when the militant Herut party left the coalition government, and in the Arab world when President Nasser and King Hussein were assailed by more militant national leaders and Palestinian commandos for even thinking of compromise.

A most unfortunate aspect of this situation is the intellectual violence, the violence done to the very idea of peace by the antagonists. While the abstract idea of peace is acceptable to Israelis and Arabs, prevailing attitudes re-mind me much of a comment made by a pacifist friend of mine about Americans: "They are vegetarians between meals and pacifists between wars." But the war between Israelis and Arabs has never ended thus there are few, if any, pacifists among them.

The ideological character of the dispute increasingly places a premium on total identification with one party or the other. Discussion of the conflict raises the fundamental question put by Dr. Judah Magnes in his opening address at the Hebrew University for the academic year beginning in October 1947:

"Are the ideological and real differences between nations so deep, in truth, that because of them it is really essential that war come? The differences between the dictatorships and the democracies are fast disappearing. If there was one victory as a result of the last war, that was the victory of totalitarianism. Even among the democracies which were once liberal, there are those which consciously or unknowingly are becoming totalitarian, i.e. they aim by force and violence to subject the free man to a single idea and a sole will, to make him a silent and paralyzed cog in the political and spiritual machinery of the state. The dispute is not over the absolute need of control in the economic sphere. Poverty, ignorance, degradation, the enormous gap between the rich and the poor are too much to bear. A strong hand is required to deal with this laissez faire and to set the crooked straight. But political freedom and spiritual freedom are possessions so sacred and so vital to the human soul and society, that they cannot be yielded. Yet to our dismay and our hurt these values also are being attacked not only in the dictatorships but in the democracies as well. Is it really necessary that this atomic war break loose, in order to determine which totalitarianism is the stronger?"

Sentiments such as these were considered subversive then, and questions such as these are still regarded by many as subversive. When large numbers of people -- a majority, advocates violence:

"Is one to sanctify these majority decisions above every other sacred thing? More than that, is there not laid upon that man (the teacher, who thinks the method of force and violence to be a savage and idolatrous belief) the sacred task, despite majority decisions, to warn the people, to teach, to point to its error, nay perhaps its iniquity, when it sharpens its swords, and to the destruction that may overtake the people and the land? Is there no place in our totalitarian society for those who dissent from the decisions of the majority, and who, conscious of their collective responsibility, obey the command of their conscience by lifting their voice, not for murder

and destruction, Heaven forbid, but for peace and under-
standing among the peoples?"

Since the days of Magnes the cost of war has escalated,
not only in money, but in human lives, so that deaths in the
confrontation between Jews and Arabs are no longer counted in
hundreds, but in thousands and in tens of thousands. The con-
flict now threatens to engulf not merely the Middle East, but
the whole world as we have seen from the ever increasing danger
of Soviet American confrontation. But still each side believes
that righteousness is totally on its side, failing to see an
iota of justice with the enemy. Furthermore those who raise
questions about the wisdom of using force are labeled by one
side as anti-Israel, or even as anti-semitic, and to suggest
dialogue to the other side labels one a Zionist imperialist agent,
leading to blacklisting by governments, which fear that talk
of peace or compromise may subvert their very existence.

I am not ashamed to disavow the use of force, even
during a war, as well as before and after one. I have no hesita-
tion in disavowing statements such as: "The Arab revolution ...
was created and is being nursed in the shadow of the guns,"
or "power is derived from the barrel of the gun," or "pre-
emptive self-defense was a holy right, in Jewish and non-Jewish
tradition alike."

If to disavow such statements is a criminal act,
then I admit guilt and in the words of five guerrillas recently
sentenced to life imprisonment in Israel, I say, "Yes, I
am guilty and I am proud of it."

I can understand the great emotional appeal of a
democratic-secular state as an answer to the injustices and
suffering that the Arab-Israel conflict has brought to the Middle
East. But I seriously doubt that such a lofty goal can be
realized through the gun or through violence nor for that matter
will Israel be able to exist as a light to the nations if the
light must be kept fueled by heavy artillery, phantom jets,
and thousands of troops. Violence will only bring ruin on
both Palestine Arabs and Israel, and perhaps all the world.

Just as the United States and Russia are each learning
to co-exist with ideologies that are antipathetic to each
other, it must be necessary for survival of Jews and Arabs in
the Middle East that they accept-- in the name of survival --
modification of their ideologies. Past injustices can no longer

be washed away by blood, for such retribution can only compound
the injustices of the past.

Therefore, after having seen three wars at first hand,
after having heard of the tens of thousands of casualties
of the last weeks, I must associate myself with that small
group of people who have kept in mind realities of war, who
have never been swept into the emotionalism and rhetoric of
violence, the group of people who I joined in drafting The Search
for Peace in the Middle East. This document, recently published
by the American Friends Service Committee, or Quakers, I have
heard labeled by some as an anti-semitic tract, by others, as
pseudo Zionism disguised as American liberalism. Since time
is short, I will commend it to all those who prefer peace to
war, dialogue to violence, compromise to rigid ideology, the
slow pace of the tortuous and patient search for justice, to the
illusion of a massive retribution against enemies which fails
to distinguish the guilty from the guiltless.

DINNER ADDRESS

Calvin H. Plimpton

There are a number of things that you look forward to
in life if you are a man, and I suppose that now, with liberation
among us, a woman can look forward as well. For me, however
unlikely, there are three things I would dream of receiving.
The first is a Nobel Prize. The second is the Congressional
Medal of Honor. The third is an introduction by Mark Ethridge!
Hence, tonight I am already at third base, running backwards
rapidly!

It is a great honor to be here, but it is unnerving
to be discussing the Middle East. First of all, there never
is a good moment to talk about the Middle East, and events are
now moving so rapidly it is like putting together a jig-saw
puzzle where both board and pieces are moving. Secondly, every-
thing important was either said during the conference today,
or written in those two excellent booklets "A Palestine Entity?"
and "Search for Peace." But the title of this conference "Violence
and Dialogue" is so completely beguiling that it is irresistible.
This is especially so when, with a little sleuthing, I discover
that the staff of the Middle East Institute have abbreviated this
to "VD in ME"!

There are three aspects of violence about which I would
like to comment: historical, medical, and as seen in the university.

While wars have been deplored at least since the days
of the liberated women in Lysistrata, violence, as Professor
T. E. Hale has pointed out, only became a matter for academic
study at the start of the Renaissance. He reasons that this
was because wars enlarged, were fought farther away from home,
and instead of a matter of self-defense, were involved in religion
and money. War became very expensive, and with the advent of
printing presses, the brutalities involved became better known.
"Even More's utopians were prepared to fight, not only in self-
defense but to succor others and to take over lands which others
did not appear to be putting to productive use." (T. E. Hale,
Shadows of the future.) Others felt all arms should be barred
to Christians as a means of reducing the brutalities practiced

abroad by soldiers and also on their return home. Erasmus
asked, "Can someone be even minutely sensitive about killing
one person when mass murder is his profession?" Many efforts
were made to allow men to channel their aggressive instincts
into areas with fewer repercussions on their fellow man. Tests
of virility were moved onto football fields and boxing rings.
But it is obvious from history that we have a very long way
to go in our understanding and management of violence.

The medical aspects of violence should perhaps be
recognized as only a digression. Their recognition is useful
if only because they represent one very distinctive approach
to violence. Usually violence is ascribed to social and politi-
cal problems, poverty, discrimination, ghetto, fragmentation,
isolation, and sometimes, as one great man said, "the problem
of permissiveness." All of these cause frustration which can
lead to violence. But it is not inevitable. Lorenz and others
have shown that except for ritualistic sexual and territorial
battles, unprovoked violence among animals is very rare. Since
we are related to animals, there may be hope for us as well.

While not ignoring the social factors, the medical
aspects only shed some light on the mechanisms involved in the
phenomenon of violence. There are a number of conditions which
give rise to it in human beings. One of the infectious vari-
eties is described by Boerhaave in 1715, on what he calls,
"a dog madness", in man:

> "Afterwards doth everything consistently
> grow worse, and you will see him loll, and his rough
> tongue gaps wide, speak hoarse and have a great
> drought: growing raving at every attempt to drink
> at the sight or touch of any liquor, gather froth
> in and about his mouth, to endeavor the spitting of
> the same upon by-standers, even against his will.

> "He gnashes his teeth with froth, snarling
> like a dog; his pulse now, and breathing, begins to
> fail. Cold sweats break out on all sides. Raves in
> highest degree. Notwithstanding which, he is all
> the whole while sensible, and is afraid for the by-
> standers that he shall unwillingly hurt them."

There are other infections, but hydrophobia or rabies is touching because it reveals the victim's own concern that he do no harm.

Much attention is now focussed on genetic abnormalities associated with violence. Normally the sexual chromosomes in the female are XX and in the male XY. Violent males with normal XY pattern usually have violent siblings and have been reared in an unhappy environment. Males with an XXY pattern come from normal families and tend to show very anti-social behavior. This pattern occurs in 0.2 per cent of the general population; it is found in 4 per cent of criminal or institutional population. Males of an XYY pattern show an unusual incidence of violence, and you have read about them in the papers. Murderers plead their chromosomal patterns as excuses. The males tend to be unusually tall and on behalf of those of us over 6'3" I will plead the Fifth Amendment before revealing our chromosome pattern!

In addition to infectious and genetic causes, there are those forms of violence associated with very special forms of epilepsy, usually temporal lobe, and again one of the pathetic features is that, like the man with rabies, they, too, will call for help when they feel an attack coming. It is similar to the "cry for help" of suicides, only this time it is to prevent murder.

Now I am not suggesting that we perform brain surgery or pass out dilantin wholesale in the ghettos or the Middle East. Actually such a degree of control as is possible with electrodes planted in the brain and stimulated from a distance is most frightening. But as we talk about violence -- as some violent behavior seems inexplicable -- we should remember that perhaps we can learn something from a medical approach to the problem.

The third area where violence interests me is obviously the university. And here, alas, our experience is growing. What started as peaceful dissent is gradually escalated to coercion, obstruction, strikes and the closing down of colleges and universities. What started as freedom of speech rapidly became freedom to hear one point of view only. What started as liberalism quickly became illiberal. What started as simple littering to express one's disdain became that glorious new word,

"trashing," and went on to vandalism. What started as a dia-
logue about Cambodia, for instance, immediately became a mono-
logue. All of this, of course, with the inevitability of a
Greek tragedy, is leading to more repressive laws, more FBI, and less
support, financial and otherwise, from taxpayers and alumni.
It has also led to the tragedies at Kent State and Jackson.
It leads to the eloquent Kerner, Eisenhower, Linowitz and Scranton
Commission reports.

Without dwelling on the problems of society, the
universities themselves are in a very weakened state. The term
professor used to engender respect, but not now. The word
student used to excite admiration, but no longer. Universi-
ties have obviously brought a good deal of this on themselves
by their rigid adherence to tradition and their resistance
to change until pushed. And their problems have by no means
reached rock bottom. The great vulnerability persists, there
are no guards, there is a permissive society, there are students
with the great energy of youth, and their great sensitivity
and volatility. Nothing has occurred and, in my opinion, should
occur to change this great vulnerability. But new pressures
are appearing to make universities take positions on specific
issues -- either by faculty and student resolutions, by use of
its portfolio, or by attempted mobilization of its alumni body.
Some of this may be perfectly proper, but there are tremendous
dangers. If a specific position were adopted by a university
as a university, it might destroy chances for that dialogue and
discussion so central to a university's purposes. We have seen
this last spring when professors who felt there might be some
justification for going into Cambodia just would not speak out.
In the self-judging academic world this could have been their
political suicide. Another danger is that if a university goes
into public affairs it will dilute its energies available for
education or subtract from them. And finally if a university
goes into the field of politics, it is inviting politicians to
come onto the campus. These are dangers which must give us
pause, for they will eliminate Melville's "quiet grass-growing mood"
so essential to creativity.

This is a gloomy picture of the university and higher
education and it is true in varying degrees around the world.

There's another factor in universities that brings
violence -- the new student. It is somewhat similar to the

Middle East where we have a new Palestinian. The old Pales-
tinian refugee was a peaceful, quiet, starving soul, who really
was a nonentity and was so peculiarly pathetic he couldn't
even attract much sympathy. This is much like our student in
the 1950s. He was apathetic. You didn't see him. He said,
"Yes, please" and "No, thank you." He didn't get in your way.

        Just as the Palestinians have arisen as a new force,
so the students. He is a new student and, as opposed to the
Palestinian, brought up in affluence and with leisure. He has
thought about his society and has not liked what he sees. He is
frequently in college because he has been impressed by the
pressure of the draft, his parents, and the conformity demanded
by society. Before we in the USA boast that 50 per cent of those
eligible by age are coming to college, we must remember that many
are "involuntary", are in a "holding pattern" or simply taking
four years to taxi for takeoff. Some do dare to drop out --
but many, many more linger on trying to find a meaning, a ra-
tionale, a cause for their existence. Their motivation is
not something that can be turned on or off. While some find
themselves in the context of an outer environment -- a true
and frequently lasting discovery -- there are others who can
only practice the kind of self-exploration and self-concern
which leads only to self-contemplation and where the only real
world is internal. Both groups are opposed to what they find
in our society, and express this by "dropping out" (a very
small minority), or actively opposing our current practices
and mores. "New" student and, I suspect, "new" Palestinian
are very important factors for the future. We need to welcome
these new sources of energy in the world.

        I have moved from violence in the university into
depicting the current state of the university. I cannot defend
this state nor apologize for it. I only wanted to explain it
with all its weaknesses, because it is my belief that a univer-
sity is still our most hopeful instrument for continuity in
creative change. If we destroy that, all we will have is
Robert Frost's "ache of memory." And if we can, we must strengthen
the real functions of a university, of which the most important
is dialogue -- dialogue between the older and the younger,
between the contemplative and the activists, and between the
learned and the ignorant. They provide a forum for discussion,
rather than an arena for action. And the discussions will
differ from those that take place over a "finjān 'ahwi" at

the coffee houses of Uncle Sam's or Feisal's, in that some
scholarship has preceded the utterances. Not always enough
but some -- and this is a kind of progress toward understanding.

Let us turn now toward the Middle East, where nothing
more can be said about the tragedy of the recent violence or the
previous. The sequential events leading to the present situa-
tion, while instructive for our grandchildren (if they are
ever faced with similar problems, and if they will read history)
bear only collaterally on our problem of how to get "there"
from "here." It is clear in retrospect that when we pushed for
a cease-fire in June, we underestimated the strength of the
Palestinians to break up negotiations and overestimated the
strength of that gallant young King. But now where do we go --
what can we do?

With considerable humility in the midst of all you
experts, I would like to share some impressions and make some
comments. I was in the Middle East in March, in June, and in
August, in Lebanon, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. It was very
striking to see the calmness, geniality, sociability of Jor-
danians -- especially cabinet officers. Perhaps it was the tradi-
tional hospitality but I had to keep kicking myself to remember
that this country was at war and in the midst of a civil war.

With permission from the Prime Minister, I spent about
an hour and a half, in August, with Yasir Arafat. He happened
to be having a high level meeting and I met a good many of his
people. One did not get the impression that this group was
really war-like or at war. These were no storm troopers, and
they did not behave like Sa'ib Salam, Kamal Jumblatt's or
Pierre Gamayel's men in 1958. My purpose was to discover what
Mr. Arafat thought about the AUB. To my delight he felt it was
a good institution, doing a good job. Our conversation beyond
that was gossip. I did ask him if he would consider kidnapping
me and he replied that he didn't think I would bring much. I
was at once relieved and humiliated!

In August I also tried in eleven places to make con-
tact with George Habash, an AUB graduate and an M.D. I wanted
to learn his feelings about his alma mater, but at each place
"Daktur George" had just left. I am afraid he didn't want to
see me, but I don't know that.

Another interesting feature I must pose in hypothetical terms. Supposing four or five of your students at a university in the Middle East hijacked an Olympia airlines plane to Athens at a moment when the university was not in session. Supposing in addition they achieved the glorious "put-down" of saying to Mr. Aristotle Onassis, "Who are you? We have 43 hostages and you are only one man. Go away!" Then after releasing the hostages in Athens, supposing they flew to Cairo where they were greeted as heroes! Would you readmit any of them to your summer school, supposing any of this were true? There was universal agreement about this hypothetical case -- it should remain hypothetical.

Another observation I would make is a certain lack of humor on the Arab side of the equation. Sometimes the place of humor is neglected or discouraged, or felt inappropriate. Humor not only has a wonderful effect in moments of great tension, but it is also indicative of genuine understanding -- it requires a certain perspective. It can also be very dangerous when it comes with sarcasm or as a wisecrack. In June, there was a very faint flickering of humor. A Lebanese villager on the Israeli border pleads with a Commando:

> "Yesterday you shot 5 rockets into Israel,
> and they shot back 95. Today why not just shoot
> 5 rockets into our village?"

This was encouraging but there isn't much encouragement around and there isn't much real understanding. The same arguments are being repeated over and over.

Unless there is real understanding there will be no drive for peace, but only accommodations temporarily pleasing to the stronger groups. The inability to look beyond "They have taken my home, why should I wait?" is only a variation of "God has let me have cancer. Why should I believe in His goodness?" One of the things to be understood is that peace must be regarded as more important than one's rights. At the moment that is not the way the scale of values works. Another thing is that justice must be associated with patience. I like to say that in Latin because everyone understands me when I speak a foreign language even when they don't know the language. "Patienta, quae pars magna justitiae est." (Pliny the Younger).

Without recounting the enormities and atrocities of the past,
it is going to take a back-breaking degree of tolerance and
patience for progress.

Sooner or later the idea will occur in the Middle East
that peace is too important to be left to the politicians who
need votes, or the statesmen whose prestige forces them to quibble
about the shape of a table. Sooner or later the students are
going to demand to be involved, especially idealistic students
who can hijack planes. It is extremely significant that Arab
and Israeli students in the USA are able to carry on a dialogue.
For all their weaknesses, which I have described, universities
can keep saying over and over again that there are many sides to
the Palestine question. The most important thing that we as
individuals can do is to encourage the process of education
in the Middle East. As an example, it is absolutely vital that
the AUB remain an island of tolerance and, feeble as it is,
perhaps the only island in the Arab Middle East. It is vital
that it remain apolitical and not become a limb of the State
Department. It is a matter of great pride for me as a United
States citizen that no Secretary of State in my time, or in
my experience, has tried to influence the behavior of the univer-
sity in any political sense or in any way different from that of
a good university. It is also vital that the AUB not become
a weapon for indoctrination by those who would destroy Israel.
And what I say here about AUB, I devoutly hope will come true
of all the universities in the Middle East -- famous for dis-
cussion and not arenas for action.

This leads to my suggestion for the next step. It is
not to take the place of the others, but in addition. Perhaps
initially under the auspices of the UN but later under the auspices
of the universities. I would like to see seminars, preferably
in Cyprus or Rhodes, between faculty and students from the AUB
and the Hebrew University on a very informal basis for two to
three days every two to three weeks. You may think it is puckish
of me to turn students on students and you may suspect this is a
means to defuse their attack on universities. That is not so.
These are going to be incredibly difficult to arrange, for there
are a lot of highly sensitive and damaged egos involved. It
might have to be emphasized that it is patriotic to learn about
the enemy or, if that is too strong a word, the opposition.
I would hope this would grow to involve many Middle Eastern
universities to achieve understanding. The Israelis have been
slow in learning Arabic, and the Arabs much too slow in learning

Hebrew. Bringing the two best bargainers in the world to a
table for understanding can only be useful. Once understanding
is achieved, any kind of geographic gerrymandering, West Bank,
East Bank, will work. Without it none will work. In addition
to other efforts, it may be helpful to unite the energies of
"new" students, Arab and Israeli, and to capitalize on some
of the vitality of "new" Palestinian, in a drive toward under-
standing. All our efforts are going to be terribly expensive
-- to Israelis, to Arabs, to the USA, to the USSR, to Britain
and to France. Can we afford this effort? Half an effort will
not do -- it has to be total -- and I believe the "new" energy
is there to be tapped and used for peace, for justice, and for
a better world.