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\* The United States and the Middle East \*  
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A Resumé

The 22nd Annual Conference

of

The Middle East Institute,

Washington, D. C.

October 4-5, 1968

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1968

THE UNITED STATES AND THE MIDDLE EAST

*A Summary Record*

Foreword by the Conference Chairman .....i

Program .....ii

Panel A: Political

    "Area Points of View" .....1

    "The Middle East in World Politics" .....3

    "United States Interest" .....5

*Rapporteur: Michael Van Dusen*

Panel B: Economic

    "Investment and Business" .....6

    "Oil" .....8

    "AID and Other Governmental Economic Programs" .....10

*Rapporteur: Ann Armstrong Van Dusen*

Panel C: Communication

    "The Function of the Institutions of Learning and  
    Foundations" .....11

    "The Function of the Media" .....16

    "The Function of the Arts" .....21

*Rapporteur: Christopher W. S. Ross*

Closing Remarks: *The Honorable Raymond A. Hare* .....25

Dinner Address: "Settlement or Solution in the Middle  
East?" *The Honorable Eugene R. Black* .....31

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The Middle East Institute  
Washington, D. C.

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*Foreword by the Conference Chairman*

The twenty-second annual conference of the Middle East Institute, held at Georgetown University on October 4 and 5, 1968, was attended by nearly 500 persons, a record for our conferences. It was regarded as an outstanding success, due both to the nature of the subject selected for discussion -- "The United States and the Middle East" -- and to the caliber of the individuals whom we were able to attract as participants and conferees.

The Conference was organized along the same lines as the twenty-first conference. After an opening session, the conference divided into three panels reflecting the three main fields of interest of the membership of the Institute: political, economic and cultural. These three panels, meeting simultaneously, in turn devolved into three sessions which met throughout the rest of October 4. Each session was under the chairmanship of a discussion leader who first made a few brief remarks and then called on two or three previously selected participants to comment. The session was next thrown open for discussion from the floor. On the morning of October 5 the conference met again in plenary session, when each of the three panel chairmen summarized the proceedings of his panel. A further open discussion followed.

The use of simultaneous panels succeeded in stimulating a high degree of audience participation. While considerable attention tended naturally to be focused on the Arab-Israel complex, every effort was made to broaden the discussion to cover the entire area of interest to the Institute.

In order to produce a freer discussion, it was decided that no formal papers would be submitted by those participating but the following summaries cover the essential points discussed. These summaries were prepared by the student rapporteurs attached to each of the three panels and reviewed by the panel chairmen. Texts of Mr. Eugene Black's address at the evening session on October 4 and of the concluding remarks of Ambassador Hare, President of the Institute, are also included.

*Evan M. Wilson*

Program

Plenary Session

Conference Chairman  
*Evan M. Wilson*  
*Former US Consul*  
*General in Jerusalem*

Welcome from Georgetown University  
*Rocco E. Porreco*  
*Dean of the Graduate School*

Opening Address  
*The Honorable Lucius D.*  
*Battle and Mr. Rodger*  
*Davies, Department of State*

Simultaneous Panel Discussions

Panel A: Political

Chairman: *John C. Campbell, Council on*  
*Foreign Relations*

"Area Points of View"

*Roderic H. Davison, Professor of History,*  
*George Washington University*  
*Hisham Sharabi, Professor of History,*  
*Georgetown University*  
*Leon Carl Brown, Associate Professor of*  
*Oriental Studies, Princeton University*

"The Middle East in World Politics"

*The Honorable Charles Yost, Council on Foreign*  
*Relations*  
*Herbert S. Dinerstein, School of Advanced International*  
*Studies, The Johns Hopkins University*  
*Harry H. Schwartz, Deputy Assistant Secretary,*  
*Department of Defense*

"United States Interest"

*Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., USA, Professor of*  
*Social Sciences, US Military Academy, West Point*  
*John Root, Country Director for North African*  
*Affairs, Department of State*  
*Harold H. Saunders, Senior Staff, National*  
*Security Council*

Panel B: Economic

Chairman: *Kenneth Iverson, International Bank*  
*for Reconstruction and Development*

"Investment and Business"

Peter Wodtke, *Vice President, First National  
City Bank*  
George Arenas, *American Foreign Insurance  
Association*  
Harland Riker, *Arthur D. Little, Inc.*

"Oil"

A. J. Meyer, *Associate Director, Center for  
Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University*  
Elston R. Law, *Coordinator for Middle East and  
Africa, Gulf Oil Corporation*  
James E. Akins, *Deputy Director, Office of Fuels  
and Energy, Department of State*

"A.I.D. and Other Governmental Economic Programs"

Maurice J. Williams, *Assistant Administrator for Near  
East and South Asia, US Agency for International  
Development*  
William B. Bader, *Consultant, Senate Committee on  
Foreign Relations*  
Rodney B. Wagner, *Vice President, Morgan Guaranty  
Trust Company*

Panel C: Communication

Chairman: *Richard H. Nolte, Executive Director,  
Institute of Current World Affairs*

"The Function of the Institutions of Learning and Foundations"

Alan Horton, *Executive Director, American Universities  
Field Staff*  
Alford Carleton, *Executive Vice President, The United  
Church Board for World Ministries*  
Thomas D. Scott, *The Ford Foundation*

"The Function of the Media"

Roderick MacLeish, *Westinghouse Broadcasting  
Company*  
David Nalle, *Deputy Assistant Director for Near East  
and South Asia, USIA*  
Kennett Love, *Author and former New York Times  
Correspondent*  
Tom Streithorst, *NBC News*

"The Function of the Arts"

John A. Wilson, *Professor Emeritus, The Oriental  
Institute, University of Chicago*

Louis Dupree, *Pennsylvania State University and  
American Universities Field Staff*  
Charles Reinhart, *Concert management specialist*  
Mildred Vardaman, *Former Cultural Program Officer,  
Middle East Section, USIA*

Dinner Session

The National Press Club  
October 4, 1968

"Settlement or Solution in the Middle East?"

*The Honorable Eugene R. Black*

Plenary Session

October 5, 1968

Closing Remarks

*The Honorable Raymond A. Hare*

## P O L I T I C A L   P A N E L

*Session One: Area Points of View* Professor Roderic Davison emphasized at the outset that there are many political actors in the Middle East and that political issues cannot be seen in isolation from their local, regional and global contexts. The panel of three stressed the major political trends and issues in different parts of the area: Dr. Davison was concerned with the Northern Tier, i.e. Iran and Turkey; Dr. Hisham Sharabi discussed the Eastern Arab World; and Professor L. Carl Brown reviewed recent developments in North Africa. According to the Chairman of the Panel, omission of Israel from the presentations resulted from the fact that with three speakers all countries could not be covered and, in addition, it appeared that her attitudes and major political concerns were better known in the United States than other, more radically changing attitudes in the Middle East. Israel would, of course, come up in the subsequent discussion.

In laying heavy emphasis on the different forms and patterns of the colonial experience in North Africa, Professor Brown posed the following question: How does North Africa fit into the Middle East? Traditionally, it has looked in one of three directions: toward Europe, Africa or the Middle East. A few years ago the Maghrib became quite involved in Sub-Saharan African politics and the affairs of the Organization of African Unity, an interest which has declined in the last year. Europe and especially France are still extremely important to the Maghrib. Although France is less involved in post-independence North Africa, she is still a focal point in many ways - in particular, French cultural and educational influences persist and a basic sense of identification with France continues to prevail, especially among the elites. But changes have occurred; the rapid removal of Jewish and French minorities, while not complete, has had an enormous impact on the area, and partial withdrawal of France has opened the area for political and commercial relations with other European countries as well as with the United States. In reference to North Africa's relations with the Middle East, Dr. Brown noted that there has been an increase in the intensity of feeling for the Arab viewpoint on the Arab-Israeli issue since the war of June 1967. While the Maghribi countries are today moving away from an emotional involvement in the problem, there persists a definite tendency to use the Arab-Israeli issue to score points against political opponents.

Summarily, Dr. Brown characterized the present trend of the whole of North Africa as a "turning inward." In Tunisia the emerging elite wants to get on with the problems of modernization; in Algeria the revolutionary elite is trying hard to find ways of keeping the revolutionary spirit alive; and in Morocco, old styles and patterns of politics, often tribal in character, still dominate the scene. Libya, rich in resources and poor in population, exists between two groups, the Arab East and the Maghrib; at present she inclines toward the Arab East. One important aspect of the general trend toward turning inward has been the effort by North African leaders to see their problems in a Maghribi context. Despite tensions (as, for example, the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute), some economic cooperation has begun.

Turning to a discussion of recent political trends in the Eastern Arab World, Dr. Sharabi made the following observations: 1) All points of view in the Arab East since June 5, 1967, toward the United States are determined by the US attitude toward the Arab-Israeli issue. 2) Area points of view exist on two levels, popular and government. Of the latter, three points of view must be distinguished - the Jordanian, the Syrian and the Egyptian. The masses, however, tend to show a greater solidarity with the Palestinian people. 3) Egypt is the spokesman for the Arab states; what the UAR decides has the greatest chance of success. Egypt had a policy of nonalignment; only when relations with the United States deteriorated during the Johnson administration did the UAR move closer to the Soviet Union. It appears that recent US action has damaged the UAR's desired policies. 4) Egyptian or Arab pro-Soviet policies are a function of US pro-Zionist policies, not vice versa. 5) The attitude of the revolutionary circles has been increasingly articulated. Comprised primarily of students and intellectuals (but increasing in numbers), these groups view US global policies as aggressive, imperialistic and against revolutionary struggles across the globe. They subscribe to the opinion that the United States in the Arab East is trying to bring down the revolutionary regimes of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, the Yemen and South Arabia and promote the so-called "moderate" regimes. And it is further asserted that the US finds in a militant and strong Israel the best instrument to promote these area policies. 6) An improvement in US-Arab relations is intrinsically connected with United States views on the Arab-Israeli issue, and in this regard clarification is sorely lacking on two points: first, the problem exists not between Israel and a vague group of Arabs, but rather between Israel and the UAR, Syria and Jordan; and second, the problem is between Palestinian Jews and Palestinian Arabs. 7) There is need, the Arabs feel, for a Palestinian solution to a Palestinian problem. Greater participation of Palestinian elements in the problem has occurred in the last year. It is interesting to note that a Palestinian National Congress held last summer adopted a Palestinian National Charter and hopes soon to form a Palestinian government in exile.

In examining recent trends in Iran and Turkey, Professor Davison stressed four points: first, a real cooperation, primarily in the economic and communications fields, has started between the two countries over the last several years. This has occurred mostly within the context of CENTO. A fusion of these two states is not likely while increased cooperation is. Second, the Northern Tier states have problems with their Arab neighbors resulting from various circumstances, not the least of which is the political instability in Iraq and Syria. These problems usually involve border questions, Iranian and Turkish relations with Israel and the survival of Jewish communities in those two countries, and the often strained relations with Egypt - on the Cyprus issue for Turkey and on the issues of the Persian Gulf and Bahrain for Iran. Both Iran and Turkey, however, are trying to improve their relations with the Arab states; recent Iranian-Kuwaiti agreements on off-shore drilling rights provide an example. Third, for both countries there exists the problem of "infelicitous juxtaposition." For Turkey, it is Cyprus and for Iran it is Bahrain. These issues, sources of tension, are under discussion at present. Fourth, there has been a swing in these two countries away from close alignment with the West and toward the development of commercial relations with the Eastern bloc and the USSR.



This swing does not represent an extreme policy or reaction; it is merely an independent, middle policy. These new policies are not erratic or irrational; they are their own policies.

In the discussion that ensued, questions were raised about North Africa's orientation, the European influence, and the involvement of the Maghrib in African issues. The slow move of the Maghrib towards solidarity with the Arab East was seen as a persistent and inevitable trend that will be perhaps accelerated in the future.

With regard to Turkey and Iran, concern was expressed over the possibility that these two countries are forgetting persistent Russian aims dating from Czarist times in their dealings with the USSR. It was proposed that the economic bases of these two countries are so tied to the West that there is little danger of the Soviet advances in Iran and Turkey going too far. As for the United States view on Bahrain, it was pointed out that the US has no position since Great Britain still has treaty arrangements with that island and handles its foreign relations. The US may have to adopt a position in the near future.

The question was also raised as to whether the United States has changed its basic position on the Arab-Israeli issue in the last dozen years. Disagreement ensued; some responded in the negative, and others pointed out that any difference was related to the different circumstances surrounding the crises of 1956 and 1967. The view was expressed that the Arabs do not think historically and that their attitudes on US policy are particularly tied to the present in which they see a definite crystallization of policies along a pro-Zionist line in the Johnson administration.

Session Two: The Middle East in World Politics In this session the attitudes and policies of outside powers and the role of the United Nations were discussed.

Speaking of the Soviet Union's goals in the Middle East, Professor Dinerstein asserted that the primary interest of the Soviet Union was to "get others (the West) out" of the area. After World War II, the USSR supported the creation of Israel to move the British out of Palestine; at present she supports the Arabs in order to move the United States out. The primary aim is to become the arbiter of the area - that is, to play a role similar to the role played by the Russians in bringing peace between Pakistan and India by means of the "Tashkent spirit." To be arbiter, they have tried to avoid the extreme positions of some Arab groups and have tried to obtain more than one client in the area. But, while they have clients, they cannot control them completely as the events of 1967 dramatically showed. If a client fails you, you can withdraw support or try to help again; the USSR opted toward the latter.

According to Professor Dinerstein, the difficulty for the United States is that the situation is not symmetrical. The US does not want to be in the position of being exclusively the sponsor of Israel. In our relationship with Israel, we have little ultimate influence particularly because we failed to honor Dulles' guarantee (1957) of freedom of navigation

through the Tiran Strait and the Gulf of Aqabah. Thus, in the present situation Russia has far more control over the Arabs than the US does over the Israelis. If the present situation remains the same for twenty years, he concluded, Israel will lose. Therefore, by waiting, the USSR wins. Israel, even if it decides to hold them, cannot absorb the territories or the populations acquired in the June war.

Ambassador Yost spoke in more general terms. He suggested, at the outset, that the Middle East has been either a "subject" (that is, having the ability to act independently in international politics and making all decisions relevant to the area) or an "object" (that is, lacking the ability to act independently, leaving to others decisions relevant to the area) in history. After World War I, the Middle East was largely an arena for rivalries of the Great Powers. Since World War II, however, residual capabilities as "subject" for influencing the rest of the world have emerged. For example,

1. Insistence on not being "object:" stress on nationalism.
2. Capability of provoking conflicts which could involve others (e.g. the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Algerian-Moroccan border issue).
3. Ill-defined but powerful influence of Israel on the West.
4. Oil - dependence of Europe.
5. Communications - the value of the Suez Canal and air routes.

Ambassador Yost touched upon the Northern Tier and North Africa briefly. He considered the Northern Tier a firm barrier to Soviet military expansion and stated that new political attitudes are emerging there which will not fundamentally change the power situation. He confirmed Professor Davison's earlier remarks concerning the rapprochement between the USSR and the Northern Tier; he also noted that the countries of North Africa are less a factor in world politics than the Northern Tier and the Arab East.

The concluding section of Ambassador Yost's remarks concerned the external political and military interests in the Arab-Israeli complex. After making passing references to the residual Anglo-French and European interests in the area and the Soviet objectives there, he discussed the consequences of the Arab-Israeli complex for the United States. In particular, he noted the declining US influence in the Arab world, internal US popular support for Israel and the dangers of a US-USSR confrontation in the area. In this regard, the most vital interest of the United States is to lessen the chances of war. While the United Nations did not perform well before the June war, the resolution of November 22, 1967, provides, in general terms, the basis for a possible future settlement. The area seems unable to solve this problem as "subject;" the alternative is for the UN or the great powers to work out a solution. The UN provides the most hopeful course; recommendations and pressure from the Security Council are more easily accepted than from individual powers.

Mr. Schwartz raised two points. While he agreed that the United States supports Israel's existence, that it must do so and will continue to do so, this support does not necessarily mean that the US supports all of her policies. He then asked: Is US influence in the Middle East

declining as Ambassador Yost or others suggested? More important, if this is so when was that influence stronger or greater? Without explicitly saying so, Mr. Schwartz questioned whether US influence in the area was ever so strong as some today believe it to have been.

During the question period, the three discussants agreed that there was little influence of the Czechoslovakia crisis on the Middle East, although some disagreement was evident.

In concluding, it appeared that Ambassador Yost was more optimistic than his colleagues; he continually stressed the role that the United Nations could play in changing the situation and creating a more viable peace arrangement than that offered by the armistices of 1948. Professor Dinerstein was less so; he saw little chance for the United States to maintain a position on a par with Russia.

Session Three: United States Interest It was generally agreed that the United States has four basic interests in the Middle East. 1) To avoid hostilities that might lead to a US-USSR confrontation. 2) To block Soviet domination of the Mediterranean Sea. 3) To maintain access to resources in the area and especially to oil. 4) To maintain the existence of the State of Israel. The three speakers delineated, refined and put into a global context these interests and their parameters.

Mr. Root viewed these concerns within the context of North Africa and said that United States interests there were largely the same as in the rest of the area. He added that 1967 was a watershed for North African-Arab East relations. While he agreed with Professor Brown's earlier thesis that there was a "turning inward" movement in the Maghrib, he said that North Africa was strongly influenced by events in the Middle East, in particular those between the Arabs and Israel. US interests in North Africa are older than those in the Arab East, he concluded, but today the Maghrib is influenced by US policy in the Arab East more than ever before.

Colonel Jordan, looking at US interests in the Middle East in general and the Northern Tier in particular, suggested that in calculating our interests, we must examine the following question: Does the Soviet Union seek to eject the United States from the area or is it prepared to settle for a position of influence? Colonel Jordan stressed the importance of the answer to this query, asserting that much could follow from any formulated response. In the Northern Tier context he proposed that the United States, regardless of how it responds to the question there, keep a maximum military posture because the detente with Russia could end overnight; the US must maintain maximum flexibility. In conclusion, Colonel Jordan pointed out that the US could follow one of three courses for the purpose of maintaining and protecting US access to the Middle East: first, the US could follow a policy of minimal involvement, a policy of countering Soviet blackmail at a distance. Second, the US could pursue an interventionist policy; it could seek to impose settlements on the area (e.g. working with Russia to end the Arab-Israeli conflict). However, we do not have the influence to impose such settlements nor do we want the responsibilities that go with the interventionist policy. A third choice is a

policy of constructive but limited engagement. Colonel Jordan felt that the US had followed such a policy with success in the Northern Tier.

Mr. Saunders, in relating our four basic interests to global interests, posed two questions. Are these US interests vital or merely very important? And, are US interests mainly military and strategic in character, or are the four interests of equal importance? Also, the question is sometimes asked whether, if our interests in the area are not vital to the US, might not it be better to work with internal forces in the area, i.e. nationalism, and focus on all four interests at the same time. Disagreement was evident on this point. It was conceded that the oil resources of the Middle East were vital to Europe and Japan and that both appear to be able to keep access open without the military help of the United States.

The discussion which followed centered on the nature of US interests and the degree of their importance as a means of judging what are the right policies. The Middle East, it was noted, is not important in and of itself but because of its relationship to other factors in the world balance. Some participants made a comparison of US interests in Vietnam and in the Middle East and the relative priority of these interests, but Mr. Saunders emphasized that the situations in the two areas are completely different. It was agreed that thought should be given to a more precise definition of US interest in the Middle East as a means of clarifying the questions for policy decision.

#### E C O N O M I C P A N E L

Session One: Investment and Business The discussion of investment and business in the Middle East recognized and focused upon two points of view: the interests and resources of the investor, and the interests and goals of the host country. On both sides there are mixed feelings about the desirability of close contact. The Arab governments are suspicious of the involvement of the United States in the Middle East, but at the same time respect and want the benefits of US technology and management techniques. Many of the countries in the Middle East have not been among the nations most popular with US business and American businessmen feel that the political, economic and social instability of the Middle East creates an unfavorable "climate for investment." Nevertheless, the growing markets in the Middle East (due to oil income, increasing population and demand) offer great, even unique opportunities for investment.

The problems which face the American businessmen who wish to invest in the Middle East were enumerated and elaborated upon by many of the participants. The most widely discussed were the following:

1. Continuous political tension and the resultant unfavorable investment climate.
2. Technological and educational gaps not only between the West

and the Arab countries, but also within the Arab countries, between the urbanized educated classes and the traditional rural society from which the labor force must increasingly be drawn.

3. Lack of organized labor. Where labor organizations exist, they are largely political organizations. There are few respected organizations which establish criteria for professionalism or minimum working standards. Thus, hiring workers for a new business is done largely on an ad hoc basis.
4. Limited human, financial and natural resources other than oil.
5. Governmental red tape. All three panelists urged US businessmen to acquire a better knowledge of how the Arab governments function and noted that a lack of respect for their procedures leads only to suspicion and lack of cooperation.
6. Competition from foreign firms. The Middle East is not limited in its trade dealings to American business; in fact, several of the participants noted that American firms were in a less advantageous position vis-a-vis European firms. Not only are foreign firms often subsidized by their governments, but US inflation gives them a comparatively better price structure.
7. Scarcity of thought-out investment projects. The American businessman who wishes to invest in the area will have to develop sound investment opportunities, and the cost of feasibility studies often makes investment costs prohibitive.

American-Arab business relations, it was pointed out, are a two-edged sword, and there are as many problems from the point of view of the host country as from that of the US investor. For example, there is the general suspicion of US economic colonialism. This suspicion is not based merely on nationalism; it has its roots in the history of the foreign economic relations of Middle Eastern countries. Four aspects in particular were mentioned as being prejudicial to increased Arab-American economic relations.

First, the pricing of US goods substantially reduces their market in the Middle East; related to this is the need to tailor the products to be the sort to meet market demands. A second problem arises from the businessman's attitude toward area nationals: while local personnel are trained in the vocational skills and as technicians, there is little encouragement of and preparation for local participation in management. Local participation at all levels of the business would not only indicate the interest of US business in the development of the region but would also demonstrate business's long term commitment to the country. Such a demonstration of commitment is especially important in view of a third problem, the feeling of many Arabs that the businessman wants to "make a fast buck" and depart. A fourth problem was touched upon, that of the inflexible credit terms offered to Arab businessmen. The American businessman should be prepared to be more flexible and discard the attitude too frequently taken of "take it or leave it."

The participants then discussed three considerations which should guide American businessmen's activities in the Middle East in the near future: choice of projects, choices of modes of participation and encouragement of local participation. Future projects should be long term, with the interests of the host country as well as of the company in mind. Joint participation in the planning of projects would do much to encourage support. The types of US businesses involved in the Middle East range from those completely foreign-owned and run to those completely controlled by local subsidiaries. The recent trend has been toward joint ventures, but only lately have local nationals been recruited into senior management. The desirability of training nationals to staff all levels of the business operations is twofold. First, it is difficult to find Americans who are willing to stay in the area or who have the linguistic and cultural background to be effective. More importantly, the encouragement of nationals in upper management as well as in the technical skills will encourage the trust of the host government in the long range profitability of the project.

In summary, it was asserted that the United States has a good reputation for efficiency and straightforward operations. American business can offer its technology and management techniques, and access to international markets which Arab economies need. But, it was urged, US business must be flexible in its dealings with the Arab governments and businesses; it must continue to be straightforward, patient and, more importantly, concerned with the long range profitability of its projects. On the other hand Arab governments should decide on a rational program for development, identify the industrial projects which make sense to the national economy, and seek out the appropriate kind of foreign investor. At the same time they must be aware of and sympathetic to the problems which face a foreign investor in the Middle East.

Session Two: Oil Following the war of June 1967, there were predictions that Europe would switch to an alternate form of fuel whose continued supply was assured. These predictions have not been realized, and it was in the light of the continued and even increasing demand for Middle Eastern oil that this discussion was held.

The closing of the Suez Canal has accelerated the production of supertankers (by the early 1970s supertankers will be able to transport one third of all Middle Eastern oil), as well as plans for pipe lines in Israel and Egypt (both the Egyptian and Israeli pipe lines are designed for a maximum through-put of one million barrels per day). Furthermore, OPEC's activities have greatly increased in the past year, and it is credited by the Arab governments with increased per barrel profits since 1967; thus, it seems that inter-Arab consultation on the marketing of oil will continue.

The vast oil reserves in the Middle East are of great importance to the US from the point of view of trade, commerce and national defense. There is a widespread realization that the United States cannot remain self-sufficient in oil and, since the proven reserves of the Middle East are enormous, oil companies have been bidding to increase their share in oil production in the region. It was generally recognized that oil revenues are a very important part of the US balance of payments, both directly, from

company profits, and indirectly, from increased exports to the oil rich countries. In fact, it was noted that the value of military equipment purchased in the West was probably greater than the dollar amount of the USSR-Egyptian military equipment.

Four issues relating to Middle Eastern oil were discussed in great detail: oil as a political weapon; the role of the Suez Canal; the prospects of nationalization of oil companies; and the role of national oil companies.

1. Oil as a political weapon. Although European countries dependent on Middle Eastern oil did not have to ration oil last June, these countries would have been in a very difficult position had the boycott continued another month. Aware that even a partial boycott could be damaging, European countries began stockpiling oil and searching for alternate suppliers. Even more far-reaching in its consequences is the prospect of control of Middle Eastern oil by the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Thus, the participants were almost unanimous in denying the contention that Middle East oil is no longer important.

2. The Suez Canal. Dry cargo from Asia and Africa, as well as Middle Eastern oil, have been re-routed around Africa at a considerable expense to the European consumers. The production of supertankers (by 1972, if construction continues, supertankers will comprise a third of the estimated world tanker fleet of 150 million tons) will have far-reaching implications for Suez, for the oil companies, for the governments and the tanker operators. The canal could be operating at its pre-war capacity within six months following a political decision to open it. However, none of the countries in the area or involved with the area seem to think that such a political solution will be found. In anticipation of the continued closure, Israel and Egypt are planning oil pipe lines and the production of supertankers continues.

3. The prospects of nationalization within the next decade. In general, the Arab governments recognize that it is not in their interest economically to nationalize the oil industries. However, political moves are not dictated by economic considerations of profitability. If tensions continue and lead to another showdown (and there was some disagreement on the likelihood of this) and if the United States is again implicated in supporting one side in the dispute, then nationalization of the oil companies is almost inevitable.

4. The role of the national oil companies. One aspect of economic nationalism in the Middle East has been the proliferation of national oil companies. The Arab governments are willing to pay the "high tuition" (in terms of lost markets and inefficient management) to learn the principles of oil industry management. In fact, several countries have already become involved in distribution and refining operations. The national oil companies offer their people top jobs in management, a top priority of the Arab governments which was discussed in the first session. However, the participants of this session did not feel that the trend toward national oil companies would force American business from the area. There is recognition on the part of the Arab governments of the need for a complete

integrated industry and for access to European markets which the foreign companies afford. It was felt that a modus vivendi would be reached between the Arab governments and US oil companies.

*Session Three: AID and Other Governmental Economic Programs* It was recognized from the outset that United States foreign aid has a political as well as an economic and humanitarian context, and the attempt was made to define the criteria by which foreign aid projects are judged and approved.

First, the United States insists that its aid goes to "independent and stable governments." Second, there is an assumption of a degree of friendship; although the US does not think it can buy friendship, neither does it wish to support hostile governments. Third, there is an attempt to avoid ideological criteria in allotting aid. Fourth, the aid must be used effectively. The recipient governments must demonstrate an interest in development and a desire to help its citizens, and must avoid involvement in non-developmental projects.

It is often suggested that private business take a larger part in the economic development process of countries. The private sector, however, has a number of complaints with the government's foreign economic programs. Government regulations, such as investment restrictions, limit the scope of activity of the American businessman, and thus prevent him from maximizing his effectiveness in the implementation of economic programs. Furthermore, the bureaucratic procedures involved in a joint business-government operation abroad make the venture highly complicated and undesirable to the businessman. Finally, the American businessman often disagrees with the type of AID programs which are approved. One of the panelists pointed out that the projects are frequently short-sighted and lead to bottlenecks; for example, not enough attention has been paid to the marketing problems of the fertilizer industry being financed by governments. The problem in this case is no longer the production of fertilizer but its distribution.

Many of the participants expressed the concern that the US aid program was being cut annually, but that there seemed to be little soul searching among USAID officials about the requirements of a truly successful AID program. It was suggested that the United States must reassess its criteria for giving aid. It is perhaps unrealistic to limit aid programs to "independent and stable governments" since economic development and stability are often incompatible. It was also suggested that the US must reconcile the short and long term goals of its foreign economic programs; one reason for the crisis which the AID program faces today has resulted from the short-sighted view of aid as a strategic, political weapon.

The problem of assessment was felt by most participants to be the greatest problem; concern was expressed that there was little effort on the part of the government agencies to evaluate projects and to utilize these assessments in designing future programs. It was also felt that there is need to evaluate the relative merits of project and program aid. It seems that, at a time when there is the greatest need for aid programs, there is the least amount of interest in them - on the part of governments, private business and international organizations. Before the United States



can design effective programs it must define the reasons for and the desirability of foreign aid in general. Some participants felt that the drastic cuts in aid will lead to genuine discussion and redefinition of its purposes.

There was almost unanimous agreement among the panel that the wealth, position and interests of the United States require the continuation of its aid programs. While it is unlikely that bilateral aid projects will be abandoned, two other types of aid programs were suggested. First, foreign assistance might be offered to regional institutions rather than to individual governments. Administration of aid in such a manner would encourage stable regional development, which is a prerequisite of stable international order. Second, multilateral aid, administered by international organizations on the basis of internationally accepted criteria was suggested. It was felt that many of the problems which the US aid program has faced will be eliminated when aid can be administered on objective, economic, humanitarian and non-political criteria.

#### C O M M U N I C A T I O N   P A N E L

##### Session One: The Function of the Institutions of Learning and Foundations

Alan Horton: Historical Perspective Mr. Horton began with a few comments designed to provide a backdrop for the rest of his talk. He characterized the area under discussion as one in which rapid social change had occurred: the landed aristocracy was being replaced by new groups with non-traditional educations; the ethnic minorities controlling the commercial life of the cities were on their way out; economic and political centralization was occurring, sometimes under the name of socialism, although management skills and an adequate technology were sometimes lacking; the army in many countries was increasingly being relied upon as both a) an agent of stability, and b) an agent of change; culturally, the area was becoming more and more "Western," and sharing in the universalist culture of modern times as reflected in mass education, industrialization, the acquisition of armaments, and the desire to play the game of nation-states in making decisions independently.

##### The Determinants of the Situation of Educational Institutions and Foundations

Thirty Years Ago Mr. Horton noted the factors which influenced the entry and position of educational institutions and foundations in the area thirty years ago. These were: 1) the existence of Western dominance; 2) the belief among Westerners that Westernization was good; 3) the belief among Middle Easterners that Westernization was good. Mr. Horton observed that in Egypt, for example, it was not until 1936 that the reaction against excessive Westernization occurred.

##### The Determinants of the Situation of Educational Institutions and Foundations

Now He defined the determinants of the present situation of Western educational interests and foundations in the Middle East as follows: 1) an absence of Western domination; 2) the existence of a belief among both

Westerners and Middle Easterners that modernization is a good thing. The concept of "Westernization" has evolved into this more useful, less charged concept; modernization is a universal good.

The Institutions Surviving the Shift Mr. Horton characterized the institutions which have survived the shift described above as those which have avoided or shaken off any identification with Western dominance, which, in the minds of Middle Easterners, was both political and cultural-religious. The easiest transition was made by the secular foundations - Rockefeller and Ford. The American colleges and universities - The American University of Beirut, The American University in Cairo and Robert College - also made the shift easily through a policy of secularization by which their boards of trustees and their traditions became secular. The mission schools have had a much more difficult time. In making the transition, all Western educational institutions have come under some control. AUC accomplished this by keeping the Egyptian government informed of everything taking place at the university, thereby giving it the feeling of control important to all Middle Eastern governments.

Rules of the Game for New Entrants Mr. Horton concluded with a presentation of the conditions under which Western educational institutions and foundations may be expected to enter the area in the future. 1) Henceforth, entry into Middle Eastern countries will be by invitation of the host government only. Area governments will originate, or be made to feel as if they have originated, the ideas behind new institutions or projects. Where centralization is the going system, new entrants will have to be a part of the central socio-economic plan. 2) New entrants will have to avoid exhibiting attitudes of cultural superiority and will have to show respect for the culture of the host country. This can be difficult when one believes Western culture to be infinitely superior. However, any ambivalence will certainly be detected, not by the educated elite, but by the middle government officials who have intuitive gut reactions for foreigners' cultural attitudes.

Alford Carleton: The Institutions of Learning Mr. Carleton began by commenting on Mr. Horton's remarks.

The Acceptability of Educational Institutions Mr. Carleton disagreed with Mr. Horton's observation that secular foundations had been more acceptable than religious educational institutions in the past. He stated that educational institutions had been the only point of cultural contact between the United States and the Middle East for many years, and that they had been accepted because they were non-political, and not because they were non-religious. Religious motivations were understandable and therefore acceptable to Middle Easterners on a non-political level. The secular organizations could not gain acceptance as easily.

The Question of Cultural Arrogance Mr. Carleton stated that none of the American educational institutions in the Middle East exhibited cultural arrogance. Indeed, many educational institutions avoided "Westernization" by such things as refusing to teach English and immersing themselves in the local culture. The pressure for "Westernization" came as a pressure for "Europeanization," and the American educational insti-

tutions eventually became the unconscious allies of the Middle Easterners in their attempts to "Europeanize" without the assistance of the Europeans.

Mr. Carleton attributed the continued operation of Aleppo College to the continuing desire of some Aleppo families to send their children there to receive an education in an environment which, unlike the European-inspired national schools, stresses a close pupil-teacher relationship, independence of thought on the part of the student and the importance of sports and other activities in complementing the formal curriculum. While creating this environment, Aleppo College was careful to obey indigenous authorities and, like most schools of its kind, it is now in the hands of local religious communities or other groups. However, the type of education they have offered is still accepted and honored in the Middle East.

Thomas D. Scott (The Ford Foundation): The Foundations Mr. Scott opened by commenting on Mr. Horton's statement that, in the future, the ideas behind new projects and institutions would be generated by the host countries. He noted that the Ford Foundation does not wait for ideas concerning grants to come in - although it acts on requests alone, it works to develop these requests themselves.

The Role of Foundations Mr. Scott stated that in an atmosphere of nationalism and independent decision-making, the contribution of the foundations should be that of serving as vehicles of communication introducing new ideas tested elsewhere into the Middle Eastern countries, especially on the basis of regional projects. At present, the foundations are serving to help link up the wheat projects of each national entity in the Middle East with the similar projects of other entities in the area.

The Problem of Cultural Imperialism Mr. Scott expressed the belief that cultural imperialism is a problem. He asked why, for instance, AUB and AUC did not have indigenous presidents, as is the practice in the Far East where all American institutions do have local presidents. Significantly, AUC developed a warm relationship with the Egyptian government only after being sequestered, a step which led to the appointment of an Egyptian liaison officer. Unfortunately, the mission schools and other institutions have no sense of when to yield to local control, and this extends from schools to church buildings.

Mr. Scott added that cultural imperialism also exists among scholars. As an example, he observed that a study on Saudi Arabia cannot achieve a good reputation unless it is done by Americans; a study done by Saudi scholars would have no stature and is certainly not considered publishable. The use of Middle Eastern scholars in faculties and as advisors exhibits the same cultural imperialism - research and advisory teams especially need more Middle Eastern scholarly participation.

The Problem of Political Development Mr. Scott described what he calls American "Marxism" vis-a-vis the less developed countries: Americans are convinced that if the problems of economic development are solved, all other problems will automatically be solved. However, this is not so - inadequate political institutions and political ideologies can become barriers to or can destroy economic development. Although the

examination of political institutions is a sensitive field, the question remains: have we, through our educational institutions, established enough contact with the political men of affairs as we have with the scholars?

The Inadequacies of American Universities Mr. Scott expressed the view that the universities in the area were not doing enough; he described them as houses of prostitution in which research is no longer performed unless someone pays for it and physical extensions of the plant are no longer undertaken without an AID contract. Clearly the universities can do something to open lines of communication between the Middle East and the United States. Professor exchange programs could be enlarged to permit American professors to work in the Middle East and Middle Eastern professors to work in the United States. The example of AUC might also be followed; under a new plan, Egyptian professors in the national universities are brought to AUC to do research not possible at their home universities because of heavy teaching responsibilities. In many ways, American universities could help the career development of Middle Eastern scholars; in addition to research sabbaticals, publication assistance might also be offered.

After the panel presentations several issues were raised in discussion.

The Activities of AUC A participant expanded Mr. Scott's remarks on the activities of AUC in attempting to involve Egyptians more and more in their programs. In addition to providing research grants for Egyptian teachers in the national universities, AUC trains Egyptian secondary school teachers of English and encourages its Egyptian faculty to conduct research in solid state studies relating to glass and social studies connected with the Social Research Center. The research of the Social Research Center is all performed by Egyptians, and only one American is on the faculty of the department concerned with solid state studies. Mr. Horton commented that as AUC moves more and more into the mainstream of Egyptian education, it becomes increasingly successful.

The Problem of Appointing Indigenous Presidents to American Universities Mr. John Wilson made some observations on the question of appointing local presidents on the basis of his experience in helping find a president for AUB. He noted that if an indigenous president is selected, the question will always arise: who selected him and for what reason? What, for instance, was the role - open and hidden - of the Ministry of Education or of the faculty? In some countries, especially Lebanon, confessional questions would intrude. If an American is selected, at least it is known that he was chosen in the traditional manner. Mr. Carleton, who had experience trying to find a Syrian to head Aleppo College, added that those who wanted a Syrian president clawed him to pieces over local rivalries as they never would have done to an American. The appointment of a non-indigenous president ensures both recognition of the choice as having been objective and support in the future. Mr. Scott rebutted the remarks of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Carleton by observing that one can always find obstacles to making changes; yet changes must nonetheless be made. The

appointment of an indigenous scholar to the post of vice president of AUB was more insult than reward - the duties of the post are not those of a vice president, but those of a public relations man designed to placate local nationalist feelings. It is no coincidence that AUC finds itself pleased with an Egyptian in a major leadership role. Whatever the obstacles to selecting an indigenous university president, they are surely little different from the obstacles in choosing the president of a university in the United States.

Changes in Educational Quality The question was asked whether there had been an improvement in the quality of education in the Middle East after the espousal of nationalism and modernization. Mr. Wilson noted that education in the Middle East was exhibiting the same trend toward specialization that American education has been displaying for the last forty years, although to a lesser degree; he was unsure whether this meant improvement in education or not. At least the application of education to the specific needs of each country, while still incomplete, is much more intense now than it used to be. Mr. Carleton described the steady progress which has occurred in the national system of each country, especially in Syria, over the last twenty or thirty years. In Syria, the quality, devotion and skill of personnel from the Minister of Education down to the lowest levels has greatly increased. The Minister of Education is no longer chosen merely to satisfy the needs of confessional balance in the cabinet. In many countries in the area, there has been some resistance to the chauvinism of nationalist programs; many have, in fact, passed us in the quality of their secondary schools. For fifteen years primary schools have made heavy use of the excellent teaching skills of women.

Mr. Horton added that there is a question of mass involved - eighty three per cent of those who should be learning are doing so in Egypt. This has been accomplished by allowing high school graduates to teach in primary schools without a bachelor's degree. Much of the apparent deterioration of educational quality has occurred in faculties which are no longer useful - law and commerce, for example - into which the worst students (with the lowest test scores) enter in the greatest numbers. Again the question was raised as to whether the education available in American universities in the Middle East has deteriorated over the last ten years and whether growing national control of American schools has led to a decline in the overall quality of education. Mr. Scott stated his belief that AUC is now much better than it was ten years ago when there was no social science research; the participation of Egyptians has been the sine qua non of this activity. As far as national universities are concerned, some improvement has also occurred. With help from the University of California, the Physics Department of Ain Shams University has become topnotch. It must be remembered that, in most cases, the national universities are brand new.

Ambassador Hare noted the appearance of another kind of educational institution different from the national university or the American university - the international university as exemplified by the Middle East Technical University in Turkey. This is a new type of institution, neither national nor foreign, and has a Turkish president, an international faculty and instruction in English.

The Relevance of American Ethical Standards One observer described the clash between basic standards of academic integrity accepted in the West and Turkish perceptions of the same. He noted the occurrence of much plagiarism and copying and questioned whether one should condemn such practices or accept them as being natural in the Turkish cultural milieu. Mr. Carleton urged the need to educate Middle Eastern students in this ethic - they must see the stupidity of trying to get grades without knowledge. However, he did recognize that different cultures consider different things honest and dishonest.

The Role of the American University in the Middle Eastern Society One observer, on commenting on earlier discussion of the effect of greater government control of education on the improvement or deterioration of knowledge and education, rejected as misplaced complaints of government interference with foreign schools. It was stated that such schools existed to complement and improve the national way of life, not to change it through revolution. Revolution must come from within; this being so, foreign schools should complement the national life, affecting it in evolutionary, not revolutionary, ways. Mr. Carleton interjected that he hoped that this is what American schools are doing and have done. However, he did indicate one area in which American schools have been revolutionary - the inculcation of independence of thought in the minds of students.

Session Two: The Function of the Media Roderick MacLeish:  
Problems of Communication with the Middle East and Especially with the Arab World Mr. MacLeish dealt with three problems complicating the communication of the United States and the Arab World: 1) We deal with the Arabs largely in terms of crisis; at other times they "disappear." This situation is not the fault of reporters, but that of editors. Because of space problems (even in The New York Times), relevancy and pertinency are essential. In-depth features have difficulty finding a "news peg," and an editor will almost always sacrifice a feature on Egyptian birth control, for instance, in favor of war reporting. 2) It is very difficult to translate context, to convey the standards of one people to another. A small town audience will be ignorant of Nasser's relative moderation - he is not a moderate in the small town context, although he is such in the Arab context. Americans tend to judge persons and events on the basis of their own context - it is thus hard to explain, for example, why Nasser must maintain his prestige. Furthermore, this phenomenon works both ways. According to a recent BBC survey, only one Palestinian in twenty knows who is running for President of the United States. This being so on a simple question of fact, how can Americans convey the much more complex matter of their context to the Arab world, especially with the press controlled. How, for instance, can Americans express the nature and purpose of their contentious politics to a society lacking in such a tradition? 3) The news media of the United States tend to cover the Middle East like a sporting event - the good *versus* the bad. Clearly, the American public has chosen the Israeli side - they are viewed as the underdogs with a long history of persecution. This attitude is a disservice to all, including Israel, for it blocks the growth of knowledge through journalism. If one hears only a discussion of what is good or bad in terms of Israel and her interests, the Middle East problem eludes him.

Tom Streithorst: Television and the Middle East Mr. Streithorst observed that of all the areas of the world, the Middle East is the most poorly covered on television in the United States. Both difficulties on the scene and difficulties at home are to blame.

Difficulties in the United States Two major difficulties exist: 1) Time on major networks is at a premium and it is thus hard to get a story on the air. 2) The press, and especially television (which is the most conventional medium), does not exist in a vacuum - it reflects the ideas and attitudes of the societies in which it exists; it has to interest large undifferentiated groups of people. The government and public of the United States are sympathetic to Israel, and for this reason a reporter doing an Arab story faces automatic resistance because the subject matter is unconventional and not what people are saying and talking about. Nevertheless, these problems are sometimes overcome and one can occasionally get his story on the air.

Difficulties in the Middle East Three major difficulties were cited by Mr. Streithorst: 1) The Arabs distrust pictures, yet television thrives on them. Because of the attitude of Arab governments, there was no live battle reporting from the Arab side during the June war. Photographed instead were airport arrivals and other ceremonial occasions. However, television reproduces reality and those were not reality. 2) Entry into some Arab countries is difficult - Saudi Arabia is more closed to the television man than to the liquor salesman! And once the television man gets there, suspicion arises over his photographing anything out of the ordinary. 3) Movement within some Arab countries is difficult. In Egypt pressmen cannot leave Cairo without permission; in Cairo itself, they must travel by bus in groups of thirty or forty. This kind of restriction stifles journalistic initiative.

David Nalle: The United States Information Agency Mr. Nalle described the function of his agency as that of advancing American foreign policy by all appropriate means, through communication from the United States to the Middle East. He cited the difficulty of such communication; how, for example, can one explain to an Arab the recent Hirschmann article in Look? It is not enough to say that while there are pro-Israeli articles, there are also articles favorable to the Arabs - an Arab will find such an explanation inadequate from his point of view.

The Activities of the USIA in the Middle East Mr. Nalle mentioned the several avenues open to USIA. 1) The agency operates a radio facility, the Voice of America, which broadcasts six hours a day in Arabic. One purpose of VOA is to set the record straight, to correct the distortions which may occur in controlled press reports. Special emphasis is given to actual facts in VOA newscasts. It is estimated that two hundred thousand persons in the Eastern Arab world listen each day to VOA's medium-wave Arabic broadcast. 2) The agency produces and attempts to place television programs. It has had some success in placement, but the general pattern of state control of television has made the use of this medium difficult. 3) For the press, the agency produces a wireless file of about ten thousand words per day. It carries, for example, the full text of foreign policy speeches and is available both to local newspapers

and to embassy personnel seeking information and guidance.

At present, a major problem for USIA in its efforts to communicate with the Middle East is its lack of access to several Arab countries, especially the UAR.

Kennett Love: The Problem of the American Double Standard Mr. Love noted the presence of a double standard among Americans on Middle Eastern affairs. This was clearly exemplified by the apologetic reaction of the mass media in reporting the attack on the USS Liberty and their later indignant reaction in reporting the sinking of the Elath. It was also exemplified in the sneering reaction of the mass media to Nasser's "hypocritical" resignation and their acceptance of Israeli statements denying any desire for territorial conquests at a time when Dayan was saying, "we are in Jerusalem and we are here to stay." The double standard which such attitudes exemplify is culturally conditioned and has deep roots; from the time of the Crusades and even before, the Arabs have been folk enemies of Christendom. There is a double standard even in what Americans remember of the Bible - it is forgotten that Egypt twice saved Israel from starvation and saved the Holy Family as well. Nasser today is equated with Pharaoh and Hitler. Further, the Zionists have actively helped make the Arabs folk enemies; a contempt and dislike exists for the Egyptians in particular - for instance, an article in the Overseas Press Club Bulletin sneers at the Egyptians and speaks of "Nasser's toothpaste smile." The Egyptians are in fact a very pacific people who view war as the act of repelling the invader, not as an operation to be conducted outside their territory.

Americans have accepted the double standard and have eagerly taken sides in the Arab-Israeli dispute on this basis. Most of the other Great Powers, most of the world's population, favor the Arabs. If one counts the Chinese and others, eighty per cent of the population of the globe is pro-Arab. Yet, the double standard is so ingrained that Americans are unaware of it. The United States and Israel have now nailed their flags to each other's masts; if the United States should ever slip, Israel would really be in trouble. We are greatly handicapped in the area by so close an identification with what has, of necessity, become a Sparta, a narrow nationalism. Both Israel and the United States thus find their options greatly reduced by their close identification with each other.

Following the presentations, comment was made on the problems of teachers attempting to get the Middle East across to students, most of whom learn about the area from the media. The observer had spent the summer in Algeria and had thought he could provide the media with something that would be useful for students. However, the attitude of the media leaders was that, while the reporting was interesting, it was not political, not foreign policy oriented. Thus, the domestic social change on which the visitor had written remained unreported.

Mr. Love continued by observing that the news of the mind is not covered. Americans have no sense of wholeness about many peoples,



no familiarity with their movies and their books. Israel provides the exception - its problems seem to be closer to ours and we are thus probably more interested in the problems of Israelis, what they do in blackouts, etc. Arabs remain one-dimensional in the American mind.

Mr. Streithorst illustrated further difficulties in reporting the news of the mind, the news of the whole man. He described a meeting he had had with a representative of the Metropolitan Museum of New York in Cairo, who had come to transport the museum's temple; Mr. Streithorst thought this would make an interesting story as a way of demonstrating how - in spite of the break in diplomatic relations and the vitriolic reporting in newspapers - an American museum official could come and pick up a tomb! The museum official cooperated in describing the friendly and cordial treatment he had received from Egyptian officials and the thanks that these officials felt for the assistance rendered by the United States in Nubia. He agreed with Mr. Streithorst that the final article well illustrated the underlying cordiality of the two peoples. However, the Antiquities Department of Egypt refused to permit the publication of the article and wanted the temple shipped with no publicity. Thus, while in the United States we tend to stress the problems of getting stories into American papers, there are problems on the Arab side as well.

Mr. Nalle supplemented the previous remarks by emphasizing the need to differentiate among the media. A Middle East program was being shown weekly on educational television. The question of transmitting the wholeness of a people revolves around the suitability of a given medium - a professor exchange such as the excellent one formerly operating between Florida State and Syrian universities is a good medium for communicating the wholeness of different cultures, while Huntley-Brinkley newscasts may not be. Mr. Carleton closed by asking how one could transmit "wholeness" when the element of motion, of change, was a large part of the picture and when the dangers of engaging in hate-mongering and various maudlin activities were great.

The Polarization of Attitudes on the Arab-Israeli Dispute A question concerning events which could have been reported to show that the Arabs do anything good and the Israelis anything bad, with added comment that most of Europe did not feel as Mr. Love had reported them to feel vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli dispute, was raised. It was further noted by the observer that there was a need to be aware of the special nature of the audience attending the Middle East Institute's conference as one might have expected an organization whose membership was drawn mainly from the academic and business worlds to be balanced and unemotional; the conclusion was that it was, in fact, a very pro-Arab group, a very interesting group, and should be recognized as such. Mr. Streithorst addressed himself to the observer's skepticism concerning the existence of facts which might show the Arabs as good and the Israelis as bad. He observed that news is not merely the reporting of facts. After the sinking of the Elath, American television cameras did record the shelling of refineries in Suez, and because fires look good on television this footage did get on the air. The incident was notable in that the Egyptians finally did cooperate with American television. However, Streithorst had prepared

an opening to the script which noted that: "...an oil fire is an awesome sight, all the more so when it is caused by human decision, not by accident. This one was caused by an Israeli decision in retaliation for the sinking of the Elath..." The London editor for NBC cut the opening lines, so that the script began with "This one was caused by an Israeli decision..." He thus removed all the observations on the shelling as a product of human decision. Many stories could be done if the editors in the United States were interested. For example, in March 1967 Mr. Streithorst wanted to do a television profile of Nasser. His producers said that no one was interested and that he should forget it. Of course, if it had been done, it would have been ready for the June war.

A reiteration of the statement that world opinion had not supported the Arabs was made, with comments to the effect that there exists a Communist-Free World dichotomy paralleling the pro-Arab - anti-Arab dichotomy on the Arab-Israeli dispute and that, in fact, this dichotomy was now evident within the Communist countries themselves. This brought comment from Mr. Love that the Zionist approach was indeed to make it extremely uncomfortable for anyone to disagree with Zionism and the actions of the State of Israel. Ben Gurion called his critics anti-Semites from 1945 on. Such accusations are simply not true. Nonetheless, the Zionists, in fostering the double standard, have made a successful effort to equate Arabs and Fascists. While this is wholly false, it has been accepted by the American public. The Communist - non-Communist issue is a complicating factor - anyone who argues that Jews are not so extremely persecuted in Russia is likely to be called an anti-Semite and Communist to boot.

Regarding the importance of radio in the Middle East, it was brought out that such broadcasting is important; in isolated villages where no other media are available, the radio is the only link with the outside world.

The Influence of Advertising Money on American Media Comments on the influence of advertising money on radio, television and press coverage were requested. An example was provided by one observer who described an episode in which he, Elmer Berger and two rabbis were to do a program on the background of the Arab-Israeli problem. The program was cancelled under pressure from the listening public and the manager of the station lost his job. Mr. MacLeish restated the question as one asking whether Jewish money causes bias in Middle Eastern news coverage and then affirmed that he has never experienced pressure to slant news; his organization's supervisory staff is mostly Jewish, yet their major complaint is that MacLeish and his staff cover Arab news inadequately. Mr. Streithorst agreed that there is no pressure; he observed that at the network level such pressure is ineffective, although at the local level it would be effective to some degree. Most networks seek controversy and advertising influence is slight. Mr. MacLeish added that of all newspapers, The New York Times offers the best coverage of both sides; this is true in spite of the fact that it is a Jewish-owned newspaper. Among other things, it has a long tradition of excellent correspondents in Cairo. Mr. Love said that right after the Second World War, The New York Times was anti-Zionist and Arthur Sulzberger was known

as "the Arab." After 1947, the Times did face a boycott of Jewish advertisers because of anti-Zionist coverage. However, it brought suit on the grounds of monopoly market restraints upon it and won its case. After 1947 and the creation of the State of Israel, the Times did become sympathetic; however, C. L. Sulzberger is today criticized by the Israelis.

The Absence of the Arab Point of View In the point of view of one observer, after the Six Day War, reading The New York Times and listening to the television all day for several months did not produce anything presenting the Arab point of view. Saying he was neither pro-Arab nor pro-Israeli, this conferee expressed the need to be aware of give and take on both sides; Greenwich, Connecticut was cited as one area where some people don't even know how the Palestinian refugees came to be; when they are told, they are astounded. The conclusion was made that someone has to tell the American people about the peoples of the Middle East, and if someone doesn't make this his business, we are sunk.

Television Specials and Other Documentaries One conferee, a secondary school teacher teaching in the Middle East two months a year, commented that he used network sixteen millimeter documentary prints and had occasion therefore to go through film catalogues. He found a real dearth of good materials on the Middle East, except in the television prints; but even in that case, the only worthwhile thing he had seen on Middle Eastern history was a 1964 CBS series on World War I, which had included a number of half-hour Ottoman Empire programs. He questioned why there could not be any secondary level programs with wider Middle Eastern coverage. It is understandable how, in daily coverage, things get lost but asked about the lack of materials on the Middle East on the secondary program level.

Mr. Streithorst stated that although NBC is going to do a new series every month called "First Tuesday" aimed at the opinion-makers, the network will nonetheless seek high ratings. Few people are interested in the Balfour Declaration, for example, so it is unlikely that a program on that will emerge. There are problems from the Arab side as well: after the June war, NBC told Mr. Streithorst to cover the Arabs at the United Nations. However, little Arab cooperation was forthcoming: the Jordanians were sometimes available; the Sudanese foreign minister was never available; the Lebanese would talk off the record; the Egyptians were unreachable. In order to make his time worthwhile, Mr. Streithorst ended up talking to the Israelis, and consequently only one side was reported on television.

Session Three: The Function of the Arts John Wilson: The Negative Aspects of Artistic Contacts Mr. Wilson began by stating that he takes it for granted that the arts have their positive side, which is perfectly clear and obvious. They are things to be heard, seen and read, and have an element of the universal which can cross barriers. However, the arts do have less admirable elements.

Artistic Identity The questions arise, how can a nation establish an

intellectual or spiritual identity? What is this identity, and furthermore, how is it changed? When power is worshipped, art may become identified with power. As this happens, things of beauty change - a refrigerator becomes beautiful, Western dress becomes beautiful. Artistic imperialism associated with political imperialism, can effect changes in artistic identities well established.

*Painting and sculpture:* There is a long tradition of painting and sculpture in the Middle East based on principles of abstraction possessing their own standards of beauty. Western art brought new standards of beauty and new forms. Eastern artists took over the ready-made new forms. *Dance:* Dance had its own channels in the Middle East - professional dancers and amateur village dancers. The West brought formal descriptions and new forms. *Literature:* Traditional Middle Eastern literature was abstract and typed, far from everyday life. The West introduced the novel - a fiction based on reality - as well as autobiography and the short story. *Architecture:* The Oriental house was adapted to the climate; nonetheless it was replaced by the Western house because it was not economical in its use of space in the new kinds of cities.

Artistic Training Many art students cannot maintain their talent in Western art schools. Upon leaving the Middle East, they lose their awareness of the sharp definition of forms and bright colors of Egypt, for instance, and become aware of only the murky colors of Paris or other European cities. This is the price paid for exporting the assured art forms of the West to the Middle East.

Art Patronage In the West, there is always some kind of art patronage. In the Middle East, who will patronize artists? If anyone does, presumably he will be among the rich, who reflect the set of patterns of Europe thirty years ago. Thus, the local Ecole des Beaux-Arts will be well patronized, but will reflect tastes long since gone: painting and sculpture will be pre-1915; music will be baroque, without experimentation; drama will be imitation Pirandello; architecture will know nothing of Le Corbusier. All of this is "safe," and the Middle Eastern art world will remain unaware that the Western world to which they want to relate has moved on to other things. The pressing need is to export individuals to teach and demonstrate new methods. The failures of the past in sending artists abroad should be avoided. A community of appreciation must be established - an interchange of artists with both sides talking and listening.

Louis Dupree: The Relevance of Western Art to Middle Eastern Society Mr. Dupree considered it important to make brief mention of the eighty-five to ninety per cent of the population of the Middle East which is illiterate. While there is much talk about media, there is little talk about illiterates and their culture. The bulk of Middle Easterners live in peasant-tribal societies with little time for media. In such societies, Western art has little relevance to the indigenous culture.

In the West, art is seen as a means for the individual to express himself in a society and to engage in social and political commentary

interpreting his society favorably or critically. In the Middle East people are born into a set of answers, born into a group closed off from other groups. In this milieu, art cannot operate as it does in the West. One's identity vis-a-vis other persons and other groups is already defined, and society has no appreciation of individual expression or societal criticism.

Charles Reinhart: The Performing Arts Mr. Reinhart opened by remarking that, although he has seen much of American performing arts groups in the Middle East, he has not seen much of indigenous professional performing arts groups there. Artistically, American groups seem to have had little effect; politically and emotionally, however, there has been much reaction.

Artistic Reactions Indigenous performing arts groups today are not going to copy us in the performing arts. They must take their own road, within their own traditions. We can only encourage the first steps.

Political and Emotional Reactions The purpose of sending American performing arts groups to the Middle East is to say that "things are happening in the United States, we are going forward. You should not copy us, but just be aware that we are progressing, not decaying." The emotional reaction arising from this realization is important. Mr. Reinhart cited his experience with a dance company performing in the Egyptian opera house as an example - the Egyptians were all very interested in the fact that the United States has "liberated" the forms of music and dance inherited from Europe. We have gone somewhere with these. This is the political point to be made: a society which allows something like this to exist must have something fantastic. To the foreigner, our rich art, especially in jazz and modern dance, is an indication of other good things in our society. Opinion-makers see these performances and say "Wow! There's something new and exciting here." Art can make a point where political roads are blocked.

Mildred Vardaman: The Cultural Exchange Program Miss Vardaman made several historical observations relating to the entry of the United States into the cultural business. Before World War II, the Department of State had a Cultural Cooperation Division concerned with Latin America; binational centers were set up. After World War II, the United States attempted to put across a broader image of itself and of its cultural values; libraries and other facilities were set up. In the Middle East, the American effort of the 1940s and 1950s was made difficult by the fact that the British and French controlled culture there. Since the early 1950s, however, the United States has had a cultural program in every country (until June, 1967). Miss Vardaman noted that philosophies on how to run cultural programs have come and gone, as have arguments as to the identity of the proper audience for our efforts - the mass or the elites. However, all have agreed that the United States should do things the host country and the host people want.

Successful Programs in Recent Years Miss Vardaman stated that much has been learned in recent years, especially in the field of coordination

among government agencies. This coordination, as well as the cooperation of the private sector, has made possible several very successful programs.

1) The Smithsonian Institution, the USIA, Department of State and the Pratt Institute cooperated to produce a print workshop for Karachi. This workshop offered instruction in print-making as well as the facilities for local print-makers. Pakistanis who have made print in this workshop are soon to tour the United States under the Smithsonian auspices.

2) The Gray Foundation of Minneapolis has purchased modern American paintings. Mrs. Gray tours various countries with these paintings, buys local production and sells it in the United States, sometimes bringing the local artists back. Recently she presented a sculpture foundry to Tehran University.

Following the four presentations, discussion and comment centered on the following:

Artistic Reactions to American Performances Mr. Reinhart was asked to expand on his comments about the lack of artistic reaction to the visits of American performing groups. While the political elite of a country like Egypt may see and appreciate Western performing arts, Egyptian art may die through lack of interest among Egyptians. Mr. Reinhart reiterated that there is no artistic influence as such; there is no copying of art, but merely of breakthrough. When local groups ask how the breakthrough was achieved, the answer will always be that the local groups must take what they have in their traditions, digest this, and break through. Artistic copying as such occurs only where the countries involved are economically and educationally similar. Miss Vardaman added that the United States is not trying to influence art forms; it seeks merely to exhibit the range of possibilities obtaining in a dynamic society.

Art and Architecture Mr. Wilson expressed the hope that a breakthrough will occur in allowing the use of traditional methods and forms in architecture in a modern setting. Although the Oriental house is presently not economical, technological advances may change the situation. One conferee commented on her exposure to Iraqi art produced by Iraqis who studied in London and returned to Baghdad. The art was found to be typically Arab, having nothing to do with London; it was beautiful art. Similar comments were made about Syria. A conferee found during residence in Damascus that artists can live in the Middle East and make a living; he found evidence in a group of Damascene artists who do just that. In the realm of music, one sign of effervescence was his son's formation of an Arab rock and roll group, much in demand for parties and concerts.

Cultural Exchange In regard to recent analyses of USIA operations in Iran, it was asserted that more is gotten out of a dollar spent on the performing arts than out of a dollar spent on communications media. In analyzing USIA budgets, they are seen to be shifting to performing arts and other forms of cultural exchange away from communications media. The observer approved of this, suggesting that we are at last operating where we can project a different image of ourselves - an image as a civilized, cultured people. It is a shame that the Department of State's cultural section has had fifty per cent of its budget cut when cultural programs

are the more effective ones. It was questioned whether we should not perhaps forget ourselves and concentrate on perceiving and projecting and educating people of other countries in the art of their cultures, which may be salvation. The discussion was continued by one who lamented both the absence of any Middle Easterners on the Communication panel and the cut in cultural appropriations. He noted that while the counterproductive sales of arms grow and grow, investment in more enduring cultural matters declines, and urged concerned citizens to get basic human priorities away from violence to art.

Returning to previous remarks about concentrating on the art of other cultures, one conferee described his success in taking slides and lectures on Islamic art to the Muslim countries. In 1958, Egyptians appreciated these lectures on their architecture and were impressed by the devotion to their art. It was an effort to show that Americans are interested in Middle Eastern culture and was seen as a good way to communicate. Unfortunately, it was felt, too many try to exhibit their knowledge rather than their devotion and Middle Easterners know intuitively what one's attitude toward them is.

The Presentation of Middle Eastern Groups in the United States Comment was made on Turkish-American cultural relations and on the popularity of Shakespeare in cities and towns throughout Turkey, as well as on the large numbers of troupes, musicians, etc. in Istanbul and other cities. Considering the fact that culture is a two-way process, it was questioned whether any of the Turkish theatre or other groups had come to the United States. Mr. Reinhart replied that no American institution is willing to bring Middle Eastern groups here. The European groups are sponsored by their governments, while the Asian groups are sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation. Miss Vardaman commented that last year the Cultural section of the Department of State attempted to make the cultural program two-way, but that no appropriations were made although legislation had passed.

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Closing Remarks by The Honorable Raymond A. Hare

Several months ago I happened to participate in a conference of the Foreign Policy Association in New York on the subject of "Toward the Year 2018," that being the association's prospective centenary. This future projection of the conference was hardly unique in view of the plethora of publications, studies and discussions on this subject of late, stimulated in part by the mystique of a terminating millennium, coupled with the fancied wonders of such technological devices as cybernetics, systems analysis, gaming, linear planning, etc., in exploring the mysteries of what Stephen Leacock once termed "behind the beyond."

However, the future-predictors have not had the field entirely to themselves, as was brought out trenchantly in the June issue of

Commentary in an article by Robert Nesbit, who undertakes not only to explode the storybook concept of technological efficacy in divining the future, but also takes issue with Leibnitz's time honored law of continuity as set forth in Principles of Nature and of Grace where he asserted: "The present is big with the future, the future might be read in the past, the distant is expressed in the near."

The error of such historical philosophers and also technological experts, says Nesbit, lies in their confusing chronology with continuity in a situation where the present does not contain the future any more than the past contains the present. Genetic growth may apply to the development of physical organisms but not to human behavior. "Events don't marry events and have little events that grow into big events," nor do "small social changes...accumulate directionally and continuously to become big changes."

This point of view was also echoed at the Foreign Policy Conference by Professor Kenneth Boulding who opined that all predictions of the future would be wrong in view of the element of "potential surprise." Predictors were very fine but shouldn't be believed for fear of making decisions under the influence of a spurious certainty. "He who hesitates," quipped Boulding, "is saved."

Faced with this confrontation between the political geneticists and their would be debunkers and also well aware of James Russell Lowell's admonition in the "Bigelow Papers" - "Don't ever prophesy unless you know" - I still think that we might take a few small peeks at what we might expect in the Middle East by the year 2000, which incidentally is not so very distant, being within the anticipated life span of most of you here today.

First of all, like Ambassador Battle yesterday, I would single out Turkey, Iran and Pakistan as worthy of recognition for the way in which they have combined their own initiative and resources with foreign assistance - largely American - and made real progress toward what one might call economic independence. The political framework in which this has been carried forward has varied in each case from benevolent dictatorship in Pakistan, to modern-traditional kingship in Iran to a progression from dictatorship through a sort of oligarchy to the rough and tumble of parliamentary government in the case of Turkey, but all have shared two important characteristics - an adequate degree of governmental power and a genuine interest in the welfare of their people. In other words, they are basically on the right road and, if political stability is maintained, they should be doing well twenty-five or thirty years hence.

Turning to the area to the south and west, i.e. the Arab complex including Israel, the existing situation is much more involved and troubled.

Rodger Davies discussed the Arab-Israeli problem with you yesterday and found the current prospects bleak. It is more than that; it is dangerously explosive, as was just brought out in the summary by John Campbell and by Eugene Black last night. As to how this problem might look at millennium's end, my guess would be that some sort of accommo-



dation will probably be reached in due course which will diffuse the danger by assuaging the very real fears which trouble both the Arab and the Israeli, and that the area will lose its tinder box character. However, there is a question whether reciprocal assurance of security will, in the time span we envisage, be accompanied by political and economic good-neighborliness, desirable as such would be. And this would hardly be surprising in a world where, after fifty years, we find our relations with the Soviet Union just barely correct and our modest attempts at cultural exchange in the process of "defraternization" following the Czech crisis.

Now, leaving the Arab-Israel confrontation aside and looking at the Arab countries per se, we find them going through a dual and basic transformation - dual in the sense of a transition from exterior domination to full independence accompanied by a political, economic and social surge in quest of so-called modernization; basic in the sense of the nature and magnitude of the changes of value involved.

These would foreseeably generate major stresses and strains in any country at any time but the fact of their coming together and in a troubled international atmosphere has understandably increased their impact both internally and externally, including the relationship of Arab state with Arab state and the disruptive effect of an ever increasing Soviet presence, with the Arab-Israeli problem thrown in for over-full measure.

But long term, I think that we might reasonably hope to see this situation in a more favorable light, not only in the Middle East itself but also in terms of its relationship with the West. I say this in respect of prospective political development because by that time the newness and awkwardness of newly acquired independent status should have worn off and confidence should have replaced the uncertainty which now nourishes so much suspicion and leads to such defiant tirades over the airwaves. However, this is only how it might be and hopefully will be, for we must never forget the law of "potential surprise" which so often confounds our most carefully reasoned expectations. But don't let that inhibit you unduly, for we shall never be able to take advantage of a more kindly fortune if we are unable to recognize it except in retrospect.

Economically and socially, I would also look to the year 2000 in the Middle East with no small degree of hope based on several factors which give it an advantage over, and distinguish it from, the rest of the great underdeveloped world in respect of which we are warned that the gap between the developed and undeveloped is ever widening and will continue to do so during the remainder of the 20th century. But the Middle East, I submit, differs from the other less developing countries in two basic respects.

In the first place, except for Egypt, it is not overpopulated and we need not be holding our ears for fear of being deafened by a population explosion in that area in the foreseeable future. In the second place, thanks largely to oil but also to other income-generating

resources, the Middle East does not, and should not, have an unduly difficult problem confronting it in the form of foreign exchange availability. Tobacco and cotton may still present their marketing problems like other so-called colonial products but oil is by way of being a latter-day miracle in giving the Middle East and North Africa economic vitality and thereby providing the necessary base for vigorous political and social statehood and for progress toward modernization goals.

In this connection and by way of illustration I would cite two remarks made to me by President Nasser during my tenure as Ambassador in Cairo. I do not recollect exactly what the occasions were but I do recall that in one instance we were discussing economic aid and he observed that he would greatly prefer a normal commercial transaction to concessionary assistance. For instance, if we could just see our way clear to purchase Egyptian cotton, he would not be concerned what disposition we made of it. The remark was simple but its significance was basic; it was an expression of desire for economic independence, or, otherwise expressed, for economic to complement political dignity.

On another occasion we were discussing what he would like to accomplish for his country and he put it succinctly and graphically in a single sentence: "We want what you have." Now he didn't mean that he wanted to take anything from us but rather that his country could have the kind of things which we have. In other words, he was talking of modernization. And in so doing, he was not speaking merely in terms of modernization as an abstraction but also as something epitomized in Western achievement - a phenomenon, it might be observed, which is apparent in developing countries generally in the sense that modernization tends to become synonymous with Westernization in a developmental as distinct from a political sense. Without wishing to over stress this point, I do feel that it has hopeful pertinence in terms of developing relations of this country and Western Europe with the Middle East, as well as with other developing areas in the years to come.

The fact that all of North Africa and much of the Near East fronts on the Mediterranean, or is oriented in that direction, also constitutes an added natural bond with the European West and tends further to set off the Arab lands from other areas.

In sum, and Nesbit notwithstanding, I believe that the omens for the Middle East by the year 2000 are much more favorable than the excursions and alarums of today, but perhaps at this point I should inject an "inshallah," bearing in mind the story of Turkey's legendary Nasreddin Hodja who, on leaving the house one day, was asked by his wife where he was going. He said he was going to the coffee house and his wife said that he should say "inshallah," that being the conventional expression of propitiation in circumstances of future undertakings. Nasreddin said that he didn't have to do so, went to the coffee house and returned without mishap. Several days later Nasreddin was leaving the house and again his wife asked where he was going. To the next village, he replied, and again refused to respond to her advice to say "inshallah," with the result that he returned without untoward incident. Still later, the same

routine was repeated when Nasreddin set off on a trip to Istanbul, but in this case it happened that he was set upon by a band of robbers and relieved of everything he had but his underpants and had to trudge back home in this rather embarrassing attire. Arrrived at his house, he knocked feebly at the door and his wife, before opening it, asked who was there. "Inshallah," replied Nasreddin, "it's me."

Well, I have one advantage over Nasreddin since I don't expect to be here in the year 2000 to give an account for my optimism of today. But I would hope to see you here again next year and renew our study of things Middle Eastern.

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Dinner Address

SETTLEMENT OR SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

*The Honorable Eugene R. Black*

I thought long and hard before agreeing to accept Ambassador Hare's flattering invitation to come here today. I am not a Government official or a lawyer or a professional diplomat and the dire problems of the Middle East today cry out for the immediate attention of such people. I am painfully aware of the importance and the delicacy of the Jarring Mission. I know only too well that the task of the peace-maker is often made as difficult by the words of those who merely wish him well, as by the words of those whose interests he must somehow reconcile.

I view world problems, including those of the Middle East, as a practitioner of development finance. Thus I am accustomed to taking a long view of world problems. "Development" is not a "problem" that can be solved; it is a continuing process that involves all aspects of life. I believe that only as nations come to concentrate more on that process will the danger of wars, great and small, decrease.

But "development" takes for granted that in the real world nations usually cannot solve for once and for all the problems that divide them. As Jean Monnet said recently, the best nations can hope to do is to move around insoluble problems.

I accepted this invitation in the hope that a consideration of the long view might help to increase the chances for achieving in the near future some settlement of the perilous issues which are inflaming the Middle East today to a degree I have never yet experienced. I do not intend to talk to those issues. Others are doing that more expertly than I can. But because there exist today so many plausible suggestions for settlement--formulas which would reflect and enforce the key interest of Israel in its national security and survival and the key interest of the Arab states in recovering lands lost in war--I am moved to point out that the reasons why these formulas have not resulted in settlement is that there is not now enough confidence, enough trust, or enough hope on both sides to permit settlement. That this should be so should surprise nobody familiar with the realities of the Middle East. It should, however, command from us coolness in rhetoric and discussion, but I am afraid we Americans still have a lot to learn about how to "play it cool" in international affairs.

To illustrate what I mean, let me cite three fallacies--three dangerous non-sequiturs--which threaten to become commonplace beliefs to the grave peril of us all. Each of these fallacies starts with a fact. But each fact has given birth to a false conclusion which could, if taken seriously, raise the temperature of the Middle East to a new

flash point,--one which could even spark World War III.

The first fallacy has been used to freely feed hatreds in the Arab states. It is the fallacy that the policies of the Israeli Government are made in Washington...or that Washington's Middle East policies are made in Israel. There are several facts behind this fallacy, and I won't attempt to enumerate them. The basic fact which gives plausibility to this fallacy is, of course, the fact that Israel was established in part by an international enactment in which the United States and the former imperial powers of Western Europe played the leading role. Even in the absence of a large Jewish population in the United States, Arab leaders would still be inclined to attribute to Washington an official connection with the policies of the Israeli Government which had little relation to reality.

It has until now proved nearly impossible for the United States Government to follow a policy in the Middle East which did not recruit converts to this fallacy. Yet how different reality is! The United States Government today has almost as much difficulty getting its way with Israel as it does with any Arab Government. You know this to be true. I know it to be true. For the fact is that no nation in the world today is going to permit the United States Government to speak or act for it where vital issues of national security and survival are at stake. And those are the issues which Israeli Government leaders quite naturally believe to be at stake.

The second fallacy is much like the first and is gaining dangerous currency in the non-Arab world. It is that Arab policies are or can be made in Moscow. This fallacy begins, of course, with the undeniable fact that the Soviet Government has in the past few years realized Russia's centuries-old dream of becoming a Mediterranean power. Arab dependence on communist sources for arms and armaments helped make this possible. But to jump to the conclusion that the Arab states are willing to become a huge backyard of the Soviet Union is especially dangerous.

The infiltration of Russians into certain Middle East states today is very alarming. This is because the Russians are acting in the Middle East in the classic imperial tradition. They are there to divide and rule, as were the British and French in decades past. Insofar as we Americans feed the fallacy that Arab policies are made in Moscow, we are helping the Russians at their game. It is a game that cannot succeed, but that can greatly increase the chances of a new war.

The third fallacy is perhaps the most dangerous of all because it is such a temptation for those who wish it were so. This is the fallacy that peace in the Middle East can somehow be handed down as the result of a Russian-American entente. Here again the fallacy grows out of a fact--a very important fact. There will be no settlement of outstanding issues in the Middle East unless both the United States and Russia at least agree to acquiesce. It may be that discussions between Israel and her neighbors will not even get started until Russia and the United States make it clear that they must. But it is very dangerous to conclude that any settlement can be imposed from Washington and

Moscow. Neither party has any such influence or any such ability to control affairs in the Middle East. Particularly after the recent events in Czechoslovakia, no one can take much comfort in the hope that Russia and American can sit down together and arrange a peace in the Middle East. That can only come as the two powers make possible negotiations between the aggrieved parties.

What I am saying, of course, is that both Russia and the United States have to live with the fact that their great military power does not endow them with an equal measure of political influence. The heightened sense of national and personal power which followed the invention and development of nuclear weapons led leaders in both nations to believe that their influence would increase in proportion to their military might. Yet the reality often has been almost the opposite. Peace, not just in the Middle East, but world-wide, depends upon both Great Powers appreciating this fact before it is too late.

The Middle East, in the very near future, could well be the place where we either learn this lesson or become accomplices of catastrophe. It is not enough just to say "Play it cool", we have to learn what that means.

We desperately want the Israelis and the Arabs to talk sense to each other about the issues that divide them. We desperately want to help Ambassador Jarring in his most responsible task. Speaking as a citizen of the United States, I think we can help only as we accept much more than we do now the realities of the situation. And once we do that, I think we will see that our best chance to help lies in convincing the Arabs of two things. First, that the United States does not, and cannot possibly forge the policies of the Israeli government any more than Russia can forge the policies of the Arab states. And second, that our influence in Israel depends first and foremost on our ability to act as advocate of a reasonable Arab position.

Only the Arab states can propose such a position in the context of the points I am making. I believe there is more hope in the positions of some Arab leaders than has been given credence here in the United States. But that is not relevant to my thesis today. All I ask here is that the next Administration recognize publicly certain fundamentals:

First, our government has very little, if any, political credit in the Arab states today;

Second, the position of our Israeli friends is made all the more perilous for this fact;

Third, our government can only exert effective political influence on the Israeli government insofar as it can support a reasonable Arab position; and

Fourth, this will not be possible until we show ourselves willing and able to develop some enduring interests in common with the Arab states.

If we cannot accept these four facts, ladies and gentlemen, we face the grave danger of finding that our great military power is no longer in reality under our own complete control. For power and influence are no longer like Siamese twins in international affairs, and this is nowhere more obvious than in the Middle East.

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We have then to begin again in our relations with the Arab states. I would like, as a development banker, to think we could begin by making common cause with the Arab world, around any of a large number of regional development problems and projects which desperately need attention. I would particularly like to believe we could make common cause with them over the problem of finding a new life for the refugees, those millions of cases of individual tragedy and personal suffering whose plight today is like a dagger at the heart of humanity. But if we are to make common cause in these matters, we must start by realizing that we have frittered away much of our credit as the builders and planners of development projects in the Middle East. Our advice is now suspect and our money scorned. Yet I still believe it is possible to make common cause with the Arab world around some of their common development problems. My belief rests on another of those fundamental realities in the Middle East which is not widely appreciated here in the United States.

Despite all the particular interests which characterize and divide the Arab part of the Islamic world, the nations there have shared a common experience and are reacting to that experience in similar ways. The personal security, the dignity, the ordained order of their great culture have been shaken to their foundations by the impact of modern intrusions from the West. Even if no State of Israel had ever existed, Arab attitudes towards us would be at best an ambiguous combination of deep resentments and sincere envy and admiration. These attitudes reflect the classic ambiguity found in any traditional society today which is passing through an historic transformation as a result of its many-sided encounters with western ideas and achievements.

In the Arab world this transformation has been particularly agonizing because memories of past glories and prophecies of future greatness play such a central role in the rich Islamic culture. Finally, the establishment first of a home, and then of a state, for the Jewish people provided a focus for historical anxieties. In the words of the distinguished Jewish historian, J. L. Talmon, it confronted the Arabs "with the injury and shame of having an alien race injected by imperialism into the nerve-center of their promised empire."

We Americans, particularly, should be alive to the poignancy of such a situation, for we live with a not dissimilar problem in our race relations here at home. We should know that real solutions in such situations are only possible when there is enough confidence and hope on both sides to permit of mutual trust. I fear we must accept the fact that until the historic transformation going on in the Arab world has run a much longer course, it is not realistic to talk of complete solutions. I believe that this is appreciated by the best minds on both sides of the conflict.

Settlement must come, then, in spite of this grave reality. Settlement must come in the absence of sufficient development to make "solution" possible. Surely the least we Americans can do is to realize this state of affairs and to reflect it in our official policy. The enduring element in our policy should be to try in every way we can to encourage cooperation within the Arab world around development problems, not just for the sake of a given settlement, but for the sake of keeping alive over time the hope for peace in the Middle East.

I know we have tried to do this, but we have failed. We have failed because we have not taken development seriously. We have time and again sacrificed the long-term reality for the short-term problem. We have allowed the burning of a library or the purchase of an arms shipment from the Soviet Bloc to obscure the realities we have to live with.

I know this from personal experience. My first acquaintance with the Arab world came in the early days of President Eisenhower's Administration, when, as President of the World Bank, I made my first visit to several Arab countries. I arrived in Egypt shortly after the revolution and heard directly from President Neguib his hopes that the United States would come to his aid, specifically to make a reality out of the promise of the great Aswan Dam project. When I returned to Washington, President Eisenhower saw immediately the importance of this opportunity and gave me every encouragement to bring together those financial resources and engineering talents needed to get the project started. The preparations were tedious and difficult, as they always are in matters like this. In particular, the normal conditions on which an investment banker must insist did not sit well with the revolutionary government of Egypt. But there was a will on both sides. Here in Washington, Secretary of State Dulles told me on several occasions that he, personally, accorded the project a very high priority. As a matter of fact, he was so anxious to reach agreement on the Aswan Dam that he even asked me at one point please not to act too much like a banker! Because of my determination to uphold the integrity and international character of the World Bank, that was a concession I could not and did not make, yet we did achieve an agreement finally, involving Egypt, the World Bank, the United States and the United Kingdom. It was the greatest disappointment of my professional life when the United States Government saw fit to back out of that agreement in the heat of the moment. It was a classic case where long-term policy was sacrificed because of short-term problems and irritations.

And war came shortly after. And the Russians have now built the Aswan Dam, one of the great engineering achievements of all time.

In President Kennedy's Administration another new beginning was sought, with similar kinds of objectives in the Arab world. But again we could not find ways to follow through in the face of various crises. Again it turned out not to be an enduring policy, which could be supported here at home and in the Arab world as well, given Arab political goals. Again war came.



The next Administration must try again, under far more difficult circumstances because of our off-again, on-again policies of the past. In concluding today I would like to make a few suggestions about how such a new beginning might be made.

As I have said, new promises of money from us are not likely to be received at all well in the Arab world today. In any case, in development matters we should curb the natural instincts which so often lead us, not to help others to help themselves, but simply to provide that help ourselves. Perhaps as part of a thorough review of our aid policies, we should make it clear that we want others to come to us with their plans and projects, not the other way around. So far as the Middle East is concerned, we should try in every way we can to make such an invitation believed. We should invite Arab states singly or in groups to come to us with their projects and plans--particularly projects and plans for cooperative river basin development, for there is a desperate need to make the best use of each drop of water in the Middle East and the rivers flow along and across international borders. We should particularly urge the Arab states to go to the World Bank, and we should use our influence in that institution to make the Middle East its special concern for the next decade. I know Robert McNamara is as engaged with this part of the world as anxiously and as deeply as I am.

As an earnest of our serious intent, I think it very important that the next Administration indicate in appropriate ways its interest in helping the Egyptian government to reopen the Suez Canal without prejudice to any final settlement. I believe that the Egyptian government is prepared to open the Canal once there is any prospect of international support forthcoming and once there is some prospect that such support will have an effect on the position of the Israeli government. I believe that the Canal should be opened in the immediate future for its continued closure is penalizing everybody, and its reopening need not prejudice anybody's vital interests.

I cannot here deliver a lecture on the economics of the canal. That would take all day. The important thing about the canal is that it is being sacrificed to political considerations to the benefit of nobody at all. All the nations of Europe, particularly the United Kingdom, are sustaining serious financial losses because the canal is closed. Japan's trade is being disrupted. Food and other aid shipments to India and Pakistan are made more costly and deliveries are delayed. A number of small states and cities--the Port of Trieste, for example, and Somalia's trade with Italy--have been seriously affected. Three Arab states--Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya--are paying the Egyptian government \$266 million a year to compensate for lost transit tolls. This money simply means less development capital for all the Arab world.

This second closure of the canal in recent years has greatly accelerated efforts on the part of the international oil companies to become independent of the canal. Through construction of fantastically large tankers, they are within sight of their goal. The big fellows can take care of themselves, as is to be expected. But most of the world community has no such opportunity. If, in general, the United

States is sustaining relatively smaller losses, it is all the more important that we recognize the position of others.

There is a further reason for opening the canal now. It bids fair to become a Cold War bone of contention if it stays closed much longer. It is widely believed that the Soviet Union itself wants the canal opened, and it is not hard to understand why. However, if we seize on this point to justify keeping the canal closed, we must seriously ask ourselves if we are helping to bring about settlement in the Middle East. The Suez Canal has a symbolic value as well as an economic function. An open canal means hope; a closed canal suggests the opposite. Is it not time we did something to increase even a little the level of hope in the Middle East?

I make this suggestion fully aware of all the difficulties involved. I am not suggesting that the United States initiate action. I am suggesting that the Egyptian government do so, and that we receive the initiative sympathetically, as an earnest of our intent to invite serious proposals from the Arab world which concern their common development problems.

I would hope, too, that without prejudice to fundamental issues the Arab states or a group from among them would come forward to the World Bank, or to a consortium of non-Arab states, with plans and projects directly concerned with the future of the refugees. Again I refer to an Arab initiative, not to an American initiative. In a very special way the plight of the refugees is a world responsibility much more than the responsibility of either Israel or the Arab states. Their plight is a result in large part of international action which fell tragically short of its goals. Should the Arab world come forward with development projects and plans related to the future of these peoples, I know the reception here in the United States and world-wide will be generous and understanding. For anyone who has visited the refugee camps as I have can only cry out, "Is there any hope for these people? Is anybody willing to invest in increasing their prospects for earning a livelihood, rather than increasing their prospects for living in continued misery and breeding hatred?"

I mention the canal and the refugees simply to illustrate in my own field of competence those kinds of reasonable Arab positions which I, for one, would willingly advocate anywhere. And, as I have said, it is only as the government of the United States can exert its influence in support of such positions that it can hope to help reduce the temperature in the Middle East, to promote settlement and to keep alive the hope that some day there will be the necessary confidence on both sides to permit real solutions.

If we are to exert an influence in the Middle East which does more than reflect the limitations of our awesome military power, we must finally adopt policies which make the exercise of influence possible. I am afraid that this is going to mean that more American political leaders will have to sacrifice some partisan appeals here at home in the name of promoting settlement in the Middle East. It may be that the Arabs have few votes

in American elections, but they have a very large voice in their part of the world. Economically and commercially the Arab world is very important to the United States and vital to all of Europe. The Arab culture does not reject war in the way ours does. And I don't have to tell you that war in the Middle East, far more than war in Vietnam, carries with it the horrible promise of World War III.

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October 4, 1968