EVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: REFORM, REVOLT AND CHANGE

A series of addresses presented at the *Seventh Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs,* sponsored by The Middle East Institute

March 6–7, 1953

EDITED BY

SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER

PUBLISHED BY

THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

OTHER ANNUAL CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

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EVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST: REFORM, REVOLT AND CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

GEORGE CAMP KEISER
Chairman of the Board of Governors, The Middle East Institute

ACCORDING TO THE NOW well established custom, for the seventh time The Middle East Institute's annual conference comes as a harbinger of spring. This time, as on all others, The Institute has attempted to present a program that will be found both timely and interesting. The title of this conference was selected only after our Committee had given the subject considerable thought and found that it appeared to express most completely the present state of affairs in the area.

I should like to ask you to consider with me for a brief moment some of the facets of our interests in the Middle East. Surely by now we realize its strategic importance to us and know of its value to us as one of the most important links in the chain of free peoples facing the lands behind the Iron Curtain. We also realize what the great natural resources of Middle East oil mean to the West, how necessary it is to keep it flowing in this direction and how disastrous it would be if it did not. Some of us go so far as to consider the value of this area as potentially rich for future private investment and for trade, provided conditions are favorable for such enterprises.

It is not necessary at this time to justify our interest in the Middle East or to explain it. We have gone far beyond that. What is most urgent now is for us to improve our relations with the peoples of the area if we are to maintain satisfactory contacts with them. Our relations are now at a low ebb and with all the ingenuity that we pride ourselves on possessing and all the financial resources at our command we are apparently unable to improve our position there. It is a sad commentary on us as a people if we cannot do something about this state of affairs and do it soon. Any delay is bound to be costly. Substantial delay might be disastrous.

In considering the subject before us, we should do so in an attempt to understand this process of evolution as well as to understand the

people involved in it, and how best to deal with the conditions brought about by it where we meet them face to face. Lack of knowledge of the languages, customs and evolution of the cultures of the area on the part of some of the otherwise most understanding of us can often be a severe barrier to making valuable contacts with the people of that part of the world.

If we were only to take as an example the many people from the lands of the Middle East who have made supreme efforts to understand Americans and pursue a similar course with respect to them and their countries, might not the result of our contacts with that area be many times brighter? With a few notable exceptions, Americans have made little effort to do likewise. Though it is true that it entails hard work, how can we expect to achieve rich rewards without it? This Conference is one attempt to bring to a greater number of Americans a fuller understanding of some of the cultural, political, economic and social processes at work in the Middle East in 1953.

First Session, Part I, Friday Morning, March 6th
Presiding: HARRY N. HOWARD, *Department of State*

EVOLUTION IN EDUCATION

HABIB KURANI
Chairman, Department of Education, American University of Beirut

THE ARAB WORLD, today, is in a state of profound social change. The evolutionary nature of society places a tremendous burden upon the educational institutions in Arab lands and presents them with a most challenging opportunity. Because of this great responsibility should not one first ask what is the nature of education in Arab countries, how has it evolved, what are the major problems and what are its major tasks?

In considering the problems of education and their relation to the process of social change, it is important to remember that Arab lands are lands of sharp contrasts, both geographically and socially. Geographically they include such areas as the sandy deserts of Arabia, the fertile plains of Syria and Iraq, and the mountains of North Africa and Lebanon. Socially, the Arab world is also a land of contrasts. There is the beduin roaming the desert in search of water and grazing land for his camels and sheep and the simple village farmer, tied to his land for generations, sweating and toiling from dawn to dusk. There is the worker or shop owner in the inland towns, conservative and believing in a closed pre-ordained universe. Then there is the educated, sophisticated, westernized resident of Cairo, Damascus, Beirut or Alexandria whose behavior and thought patterns, outwardly at least, resemble those of the residents of any major European or American city. Therefore, when we speak of the evolution of education in the Arab lands and all of the problems facing education there, we must keep in mind the varying degrees of modernization and development which are taking place or have taken place in different Arab communities. We must not forget that their varied needs require differentiated types of education. In spite of these facts, however, there are some broad generalizations which may be made about the development of education and about the problems facing education in Arab lands.

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century, education in most Arab countries was the product of and was governed by sectarian religious

tradition. This was true of Muslim schools as well as of Christian schools. The school was looked upon as an adjunct to church or mosque. The primary aim of the school was religious and moral. It was organized to preserve the way of life of its supporting community. There were the *kuttabs* or Quranic schools, taught by religious men, and their program was based essentially on the Quran with the three R's added on the side. There were their Christian counterparts, the church schools, taught by priests with a program primarily sectarian. On a higher level, there were the *madrassahs* and for the Christians the seminaries, designed to prepare priests to teach or preach. Such was the pattern of education in most Arab countries prior to the advent of Western influence.

In Arab lands Western influence on education came from three major sources. The first was during the early part of the nineteenth century through Egypt on the heels of the Napoleonic invasion. With the aid of French experts, Muhammad Ali attempted to modernize education and set it up on a non-religious basis. The impetus which these reforms gave to secular education in Egypt contributed significantly to Egyptian educational leadership in the Arab world.

The second source of Western influence came with the Ottoman reforms of 1846, which led to the establishment of a system of public education based primarily on Western, mainly French, lines. Public elementary and secondary schools were established in Arab lands which were then under Ottoman rule. Science, mathematics and foreign languages were introduced into the curriculum. Even in Arab communities, Turkish was the language of instruction. The underlying purpose of these schools, established under the Ottoman regime, was to train government officials and officers for the Ottoman army. But in Arab lands, this Turkish educational reform, not being rooted in a deeply felt general need nor sustained by effective, devoted or enlightened leadership, did not result in any permanent or widespread educational reform.

Early during the nineteenth century, the uncoordinated educational situation in Arab lands was further complicated by the advent of foreign missionaries from Europe and the United States. French, Italian, Danish, American, German, British, Dutch and Russian missionaries came and their schools represented the third Western force influencing education in Arab lands. Missionary education was particularly effective in Lebanon but with far reaching results on all education in all other Arab countries.

The moderate and healthy climate of Lebanon and the existence of a relatively large Christian population which was receptive to Western ideas proved favorable factors for missionary work. The original purpose of the missionaries was religious conversion, and to this end, they established schools as adjuncts of their religious work. Soon, however, the purely religious aim of most missionary organizations was broadened and the enrichment of life on earth as well the preparation for the life to come became an accepted end of missionary educational endeavor. Hence, missionary education, while still maintaining its Christian spirit, began to assume an increasingly lay and civic character. One distinguishing feature of these missionary schools was the excellent preparation which they gave their students in foreign languages, such as French, English, German, Italian, and even Russian.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century with the disintegration of the Ottoman empire, the Middle East became, increasingly, a theater of conflict of Western diplomacy. Western powers, anxious to establish their prestige and influence in this area, found effective allies in the educational activities of their missionaries and gave them protection and support. Under the system of capitulations, foreign mission schools were free from governmental interference. Each mission, and there were many of them, brought, more or less modified, to the Arab lands a program of education which its members had known in their native countries. In the case of French and Italian schools, their programs were exact replicas of their respective original patterns. American and British schools, however, gave more attention to the Arabic language and culture.

Towards the close of the nineteenth century, foreign business entered the Middle East in increasing volume. While France continued to assume a predominant, pre-eminent cultural position in the area, England assumed a preponderant political role. Arabic speaking men and women who had a knowledge of English or French or both were in great demand by business and government. As Western influences in the Arab world increased, there arose the demand for trained professional leaders – doctors, engineers, teachers and businessmen. The training of such leaders demanded higher education and to meet this need the American Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions decided to open an institution of higher learning in Beirut, Lebanon – Syria at that time. Therefore in 1866 the Syrian Protestant College – now the American University of

Beirut — was established. With Protestants beginning an institution of higher learning in a country where the majority of its Christian population was Catholic or Maronite, it was only natural that the Catholic missionaries should establish their own higher institution. Thus it came about that in 1875 The Society of Jesus opened L'Université de Saint Joseph in Beirut, Lebanon. These two universities represent pivotal points around which the uncoordinated system of education in Lebanon revolves, one Anglo-Saxon, the other French-Latin.

The service which these foreign institutions have rendered to the Arab world cannot be exaggerated. It is a well-recognized fact that these schools contributed directly and significantly to the renaissance which is taking place today everywhere in Arab lands. This they did by introducing Arab youth to the thought of the West, to the glories of past Arab civilizations and to the scientific method. Furthermore, these schools introduced Arab youth to the philosophy and political thought of the West. By so doing the missionary schools helped to liberate the Arab mind and kindled in Arab youth the desire for freedom and self-government as well as for learning and scientific training. It is no exaggeration to say that Arab nationalism was nurtured in many of the classrooms of these foreign schools. Critics, partly Arab and partly foreign, of foreign education in Arab lands believe that some of these schools, consciously or unconsciously, acted as denationalizing and dividing agencies among the Arabs. In the opinion of these critics, this is because of the emphasis which these schools placed on foreign language to the detriment of the mother tongue and because they insisted on following a program of studies borrowed from their home-lands and in many respects unrelated to the living needs of the communities which they served. Such critics maintained further that many of the graduates of these schools emigrated from their home-lands, while others, unable to use the Arabic language, found it difficult to share the fruits of their education with the people of the country. Even if we concede the truth that may exist in these criticisms, and even if we concede the limitations and the drawbacks of the foreign schools in Arab lands, still in my judgment many of these criticisms dwindle into insignificance when compared with the contribution of these schools because they have been a moderating influence and have implanted or have tried to implant in the youth of Arab lands a breadth of vision and an appreciation of human, scientific and philosophical values. Their contribution far outweighs their limitations. Some

of us believe, however, that foreign schools today, when Arab lands are gradually assuming more and more responsibility for the direction of their own affairs, are faced with a challenge and an opportunity never available to them before. This opportunity is to continue to work for the welfare of the Arab people by becoming centers of educational experimentation and sources of new and productive ideas and practices in education. In order to provide the free atmosphere by which this experimental work and new work can become more productive, the national Arab governments, in the interest of their people, must be broad-minded enough and statesman-like enough to afford many of these schools support and encouragement. One of the great dangers of the Arab world today is that its flaming national feeling, intensified by disillusionment with the results of Western diplomacy towards Arab lands, might force the Arab world to turn in on itself. Isolating itself from the broad humane currents of Western thought would, in my judgment, be a catastrophe.

The period following World War I marked a new era in educational history of the Arab world for it saw the beginning of real efforts to organize and extend public education in the different Arab countries. The national awakening which had already begun brought about the recognition and acceptance by enlightened Arab leaders of certain basic ideas regarding the importance of education. One idea was that independence, like religious beliefs, can be maintained most effectively on the basis of popular will, a fact giving to public education the important role of creating and maintaining this will for independence. Another idea was that nationalism is essentially a matter of personal conviction and a recognition by the individual of the common bonds which bind him to his fellow countrymen. To attain these ends and to bring about stability and progress, education must be provided for all children at public expense. Education was recognized by enlightened Arab leaders as the most potent weapon by which national solidarity and public welfare could be maintained and defended. Thus, in the national independent Arab states, education found a new object of worship, a substitute for the religious and sectarian beliefs which education had attempted to foster earlier. Nationalism discovered education in the Arab world just as religion had discovered education in medieval times.

Beginning in 1920, independent or semi-independent governments were established in most Arab countries. Egypt had, of course, enjoyed a semi-autonomous status considerably earlier, and thus its self-governing institu-

tions, having had a longer period in which to grow, matured considerably before those of other Arab countries. In most of the Arab states, the governments sought to inauguratte a public system of education along modern lines. Unfortunately, however, this system of education followed the same pattern of organization and administration which had been decreed to them by the Ottoman regime, namely, a centralized authoritarian system with all its ramifications. Education remained theoretical. Secondary education was emphasized. Curricula were inspired by foreign ideas and were overloaded with book knowledge, emphasizing memory. Vocational and practical education was inadequate. Elementary education was conceived essentially as a preparation for academic secondary education without useful knowledge.

These remarks represent a rapid survey of the development of education in Arab lands. What are some of the major problems which education in these lands faces? I have chosen four major problems on which I shall speak briefly. First, a most urgent problem is to extend the number and variety of public schools in order to render them adequate for the needs of all youth in each of these countries. In every Arab country important steps have been taken for the expansion of educational opportunity. New schools have been established. School enrollment has increased at a rapid rate. For example, in the past ten years in Lebanon the school enrollment increased by about 50 percent, in Syria by 111 percent, in Iraq by 138 percent, in Egypt by 70 percent and in Jordan by 280 percent. Syria is spending as much as 17 percent of its total budget on education, in Egypt and Lebanon 10 or 11 percent and in Iraq 13 percent. In spite of these valiant and sincere efforts of the national governments to expand educational opportunities, illiteracy is still prevalent in Arab states. Moreover, many of us believe that literacy by itself is an inadequate goal for countries aspiring to the democratic way of life. Effective public intelligence, not literacy alone, is becoming the aim of modern education in most Western countries. To guarantee this goal, modern public education must spring from the living twentieth century needs of the people and must not be based on programs alien or foreign to them, such as is the case in many Arab countries today. The great interest in fundamental education — the education of the common rural people in rural betterment, in vocational education and in adult education — which is beginning to be in evidence in Egypt, Syria and Iraq is an encouraging sign that education in Arab lands, in some of them at least, is at long last

beginning to tread a new and a more constructive path, one which really and effectively administers to the needs of the people.

The second problem facing education in Arab lands is to weld the population into a more solid coherent unit and to achieve a greater degree of national solidarity among the diversity of citizens. This problem assumes greater urgency today in most Arab countries in view of the "cold war" which, since the Middle East is one of its focal points, tends to disrupt the unity of each country. To achieve this unity various measures have been taken. Time prevents me from more than mentioning a few: the establishment of the primacy of the Arabic language as the language of instruction in all schools, native and foreign; the requirement of all schools to teach Arab history, geography and civics in Arabid; the regulation that no new elementary school may be opened by any foreign organization without a special permit from the Minister of Education, a permit very rarely given; and the attempt on the part of the Arab League to have a uniform curricula, particularly in the field of Arabic studies, history and geography, throughout the Arab countries in order to promote common ideas among the Arab people.

The limitation of time also prevents me from commenting on these measures fully, but I should like to make two points. The drawback of these measures is that they ignore the teacher. Upon the teacher, upon his personality and his outlook, and upon his essential sense of patriotism more than upon any curriculum or legislation depends the kind of attitude that his pupils develop, particularly in the field of elementary and secondary education. The second limitation of such legislation is that, though it is designed to inculcate a feel for and a love of Arab culture and civilization in the pupil, Arab nationalism, itself, is still not fully understood, either by the leaders or by the people. Arab nationalism today is a matter of emotion and will. It has not yet been fully interpreted. Its intellectual and spiritual bases have not yet been formulated, and if they have not been formulated they cannot be included in a school curriculum. Arab nationalism is at present a matter of the will, not of the mind. Hence, it is not understood and does not yet, although we hope that it will, act as a generative guiding force which will discipline Arab youth and induce them towards constructive action.

The third problem facing education in Arab lands is to ameliorate the authoritarian nature of institutional life and release the creative power of the children and the people. That the institutional life of the Middle

Eastern countries is basically authoritarian is reflected in the relationship of the father to the boy, of the mother to the daughter, of the rich to the poor and of the government to the governed. Educational administration is also authoritarian. Programs are devised on top by the Ministry. The teacher must teach this program. The inspector is there to see to it that the teacher teaches what she is supposed to teach. Also the teacher's success is measured by the success of his pupils in the final examination. There is no scope for creativeness on the part of the teacher. Hence, his teaching is authoritarian and this is a vicious circle. We must break that vicious circle in education. We must allow the teacher more freedom and scope for creative work and this can only be done by drawing into the teaching profession fine, free-spirited young men and women and train them adequately to do their task effectively.

Closely allied to this problem is the revolt of youth, particularly students, because of the frustrations which they feel on account of this authoritarianism in the social order in which they live and on account of the conflict of values to which they are exposed. The students in the Arab world are conscious of themselves as a class. Being vocal, they wield greater influence than their numbers might warrant. The student problem in the Arab world can be understood only against the background of the sentimental conflict which is going on in the Arab mind and soul of today. The Arab student desires to be proud of his nationality, of his civilization. But his Western education and the Western influences which surround him and are coming upon him like a gushing stream present him with a certain set of values which seem to him to be incongruous with his traditional and cultural beliefs. The steadying forces of his culture have ceased to exercise a directing influence on his life. What the young and educated Arab of today needs above everything else is a synthesis of the old and the new, of his old cultural patterns with the demands of his modern mind. To help young people bring about such syntheses and bring about integrated personalities is one of the most challenging tasks of education in the Arab world today. A well-conceived and implemented plan of study and research in the fields of philosophy, sociology and social psychology is essential in order to lay the groundwork for such a synthesis. These fields have not been strongly supported by universities in the Arab world today — at a time when the basic problem of the Arab world is in the realm of value and the social sciences.

The final problem is that concerning the many aspects of material and

social reconstruction. These are coming increasingly into the focus of attention of both governments and people and involve raising the standard of living of the common people through the improvement of agriculture, health, commerce, communication, land tenure, and the settlement of beduin tribes. The newly born governments of the Arab countries are faced with a mounting dissatisfaction on the part of the people with their poor living conditions and this dissatisfaction is becoming aggravated as a result of the cold war. Sound constructive programs of economic and social reform are urgently needed. It is in this area that education can perform a truly great service for the Arab world and unfortunately it is in this area that education shows its greatest weakness. Governed by intellectualistic and aristocratic traditions, geared to imitate the traditional education of the Western countries, and aiming to prepare youth for entry into the professions or white-collar jobs, education in Arab lands today fails to live up to the great challenge of social and economic betterment which face it.

It is in this area that the system of centralized theoretical education, particularly on the elementary level, fails so dismally. The kind of education being offered in the public elementary schools in many Arab lands tends to draw away youth from the villages and the farms and makes them unfit for work in the fields. It is not without significance that, when Arab states want expert advice on any broad practical problem, they have to seek such help from the West. A ray of hope, however, lies in the fact that this lack is being acutely sensed by Arab leaders and that there are signs that it is being tackled. Egypt here is leading the way. The greatest obstacles to the extension of practical education are the dearth of well-trained teachers, the great expense involved in establishing practical and vocation schools, and the belief, commonly held, that working with the hands is undignified. These obstacles must be overcome before education can become a generative and constructive force in Arab society.

In order to solve these major problems which education faces in each of the Arab lands, the people and the various ministries of the governments—health, public works, agriculture as well as education—must cooperate. In summarizing the problems of education and its most urgent tasks, I would mention three. First, education must create in Arab society an awareness, a clear awareness, of its problems and of the means by which education can solve them. Second, education must imbue the youth with an understanding of science and the scientific method and must give

the youth a skill in using technology for the solution of society's problems. Education must place less reliance on an all-powerful God who would ultimately set things right without our aid and must teach a greater recognition and acceptance of the fact that we are partners with God and must assume responsibility for our own salvation now and here on earth. Third, Education must imbue the youth with a fuller appreciation of the worth and dignity of the individual, of every individual, and of his right to an opportunity for life and happiness. It must imbue our youth with the fullest sense of social responsibility, responsibility not for himself alone, or his family, but for his community at large, responsibility for world peace.

First Session, Part II, Friday morning, March 6th
Presiding: HARRY N. HOWARD, *Department of State*

EVOLUTION IN RELIGION

JOHN S. BADEAU
President, American University at Cairo

I CONFESS THAT I BOGGLE a little bit at the word, evolution. It may be because as a philosopher I do not believe in the transference of biological ideas; it may be because I have my questions whether affairs in the world, in general, and in the Middle East in particular, have really become that much better since 1939. I would rather describe the situation in the Middle East in terms of one of the familiar stories of my friend Guha. Now, those of you who speak Syrian Arabic will call him, Juha, but of course his real name is Guha, or if you live in Turkey you know him as Nasr-ed-din Hoja.

Just before I left Cairo I heard the story of a neighbor who came to Guha, and said, "Guha, what in the world was that noise I heard in your house last night, that screaming, that yelling, that shouting, that bumping? Was somebody murdered?"

"No," said Guha, "It was just my wife throwing an old coat downstairs."

"Well, how could an old coat make a noise like that?"

"Oh!" said Guha, "You see, I was inside the coat."

Now, ever since 1939, the Middle East has shared in the disturbances which have shaken our world and I take it that the purpose of this conference is to find out what was inside the overcoat and what is involved in and lying behind the changes, the evolution, and the reforms that have affected the Middle East. Certainly, religion is one of these forces. It was, as I remember, in 1939 that a group of Egyptians, some of them high in the government, was meeting to discuss the policies of the newly formed Ministry of Social Affairs. Some very radical proposals for social advancement were made. After some discussion, someone said, "But, what about the Al-Azhar religious leaders? What is the Islamic attitude toward this sort of thing? Will they help us do it?"

The answer was, "Well, if we cannot do this with the help of Islam, we are going to do it without the help of Islam."

That, I think, was fairly typical of the attitude of the national leaders

of most Middle Eastern countries prior to World War II. As evidenced in Turkey and in Iran, the mood was one of secularism. The cry for social progress was following the western pattern. Religion was identified very largely with the old "stick-in-the-muds" who did not want to go along, and if social progress could not be done with religion, it would be done without it.

Now to this, contrast that which met my eyes when on January 27, 1952, I returned to Cairo, having been away for a very vital six months. Going to the University, I found written all over the University walls, as over all the inviting vacant walls of Cairo, such slogans as, "Islam is the religion of the world." "The Quran is the basis of government." "O Believers! protect the country." It was visible evidence that from the political confusion of the previous year there was a resurgence of religion in the practical affairs of the state. In all this change that Egypt, herself, was seeking, religion was playing a role.

Today, if you will go across the Middle East and look carefully, you will find my initial impression fully carried out and a wide resurgence of the place of religion in life, a resurgence which many people before World War II would not have believed possible. In Turkey, after the death of Atatürk, there was a revival of religious feeling; in this case it was not merely a revival of historic traditionalism but an attempt to restate Islam and find a place for it in a society that had become somewhat secular. The same thing has happened in Iran, only there it is very largely a conservative religion that has returned. With the disappearance of Reza Shah and the group that gathered around him, there has been the re-instating of the *mullah* as shown by the present significance of the political party led by Mullah Kashani. Once again, the strongly religious aspects of Iranian life are to the fore.

The resurgence comes in such simple things as the general heightening of interest in religious holidays. For instance, this year in Cairo, on Maulad al-Nabi, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, I sat at my radio and listened not only to a long program in Arabic but to a long and very well-produced program in English, explaining the meaning of the Prophet and of the ideals that he brought to the world. Within these post-war years, Maulad al-Nabi is becoming an increasingly important holiday in the roster of official holidays in Egypt.

Or, turn again to the political news that makes western headlines and see how frequently in the disturbances in Iraq, in Iran, in Egypt there

is a religious connection, a religious party, a religious leader involved, or a religious slogan shouted. All of this, I say, is a hasty pointer to the fact that since 1939, for some reason, religion has come back to the Middle Eastern scene. The secular trends have been checked. The projected disintegration of Islam has not occurred and today religion must be taken into account, perhaps more seriously than it was before the war, at least as a social factor. Having said that, however, let me make it clear that this return of religion is not primarily an intellectual rebirth. Modern Islam, like modern Christianity, has gone through serious challenges.

One of the responses of the Western world has been to produce new thinkers. We have had our Tillichs and our Niebuhrs and our Bishop Sheens, all of whom are attempting to find some new pattern of thought in which our Faith faces the challenges of today. Now, during this period I see no evidence of what I would call an intellectual revival of religious thinking. The Arab world has produced no Niebuhrs. It has produced no Tillichs. So far as I know from my rather limited experience in Egypt, only one book that is aimed directly at this religious topic has been written in recent times, and this is a book of minor importance.

Some of you may have seen in the *Muslim World* (volume XLII, pp. 48–55, January, 1942) the article by my university colleague, Dr. Schoonover, in which he presents a study of the most important books that have appeared in Arabic, not merely since 1939, but since the Arab renaissance. The article is based on the judgments of a great number of Arab world people who answered questionnaires on this topic. He makes up a list of the twenty-five books which, in the opinion of current Arab leaders, represent the best of their literature. The significant point is that, outside of the few books written by Taha Husayn and Abd al-Razik before 1939, there is not a single book that seriously faces the intellectual problem of religion in the modern world.

Thus, it seems to me that this return of religion is not primarily, at this point, an intellectual return; it is not an attempt to create a new philosophy of religion; and it is not a restatement of the place of religion as over and against the penetrating intellectual forces of today. Instead, it is truly the rebirth of religion as a social force, as a political party and as part of the organism of society. Wherever you see religion most vigorously at work today, and making the headlines most dramatically, you will see it as such a force.

I think this is true for two reasons. The first is that Eastern religion

in general, and Islam in particular, is just such a socio-political force. I think it is Hogarth in his *Arabia* who says that Islam is not a state religion nor is it a religion of the state. It is a religion which is a state. Almost inevitably, therefore, any revival of Muslim feeling is, *per se,* the revival of religion as a political and social force, since the same inspiration that reveals the unity of God and the leadership of the Prophet reveals the social and political objectives of early Muslim society.

The second reason why this return to religion has been primarily political and social is because it is a reaction against certain problems of the Middle East, problems particularly in the social and political sphere. I see, therefore, in this attempt to revivify religion as a socio-political force, the endeavor of the Middle East to answer, or at least to react against, certain specific problems. Thus, to understand what is happening and has happened to religion, I think we have to turn now to these forces in the war and post-war years that have been filling the popular mind and creating the problems of today and ask ourselves, "How are these forces related to religion and what has been their effect on the religious revival?"

The first factor since 1939 that has been involved in religion, as well as in a great many others aspects of society, has been the renewed political pressure and interference from the Western world. Between the two great wars, the process of adjustment between East and West was going on with some difficulty, yet nevertheless going on. Egypt made her 1936 treaty, Iraq signed her 1930 treaty, and the French with a great deal of reluctance showed signs that they were beginning to start to commence to get ready to consider their withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon.

If there had not been a world cataclysm, it is probable that the process of adjusting Eastern life to Western control would have gone on normally. But the war broke out and set back the clock of this adjustment. The war made it necessary once again for the West to control the East. The war made it necessary to force a certain government on Egypt. The war made it necessary for American and British troops to come into Syria and Lebanon and eject the French. The war brought Russian, American and British troops into the heart of Iran and ultimately resulted in the deposition of the Shah. All of this, I say, reintroduced the problem of the political pressures of the Western world. This history did not stop with the war, for since its end, through the United Nations, through the struggle with Russia and through imperial considerations of defense, there has been a continued pressure on the Arab world.

At this point, you must not forget the significance of the creation of Israel as one of the symbols of this pressure. Whether it was, in fact, is not important. In the eyes of the surrounding countries of the Middle East, the creation of this issue was a symbol of the renewed interference of the major Western powers in Eastern affairs and produced, as we know, one of the major political problems for those governments. And so, there has been this increasing pressure from the West, entering into, penetrating and dabbling with the actual political affairs of Middle Eastern countries.

The effect of this renewed political pressure was, first, to rob the West of its attraction as a civilization and as a culture. If you are either a parent or a psychologist, you know that the little child first grows aware of its own identity when it begins to oppose you. "No" is a very important word for the development of personality; I only exist because you exist, and I react against you. So, as the Middle East reacted politically against the Western world, it began to call into question, more than previously, the attraction of the Western pattern or the meaning of Western culture, each of which was identified with this renewed political pressure.

In the second place, in this political struggle with the West, there was a need for calling out and unifying local resistance. How can you get the British out of Egypt if you are going to be divided? You have to call on every force that you have and find the kind of force that will take you down into the ranks of the people.

In the third place, this renewed pressure began to create among large groups of the literate voters a popular will which had to be accepted by governments. In Egypt, for example, the problem can be stated very clearly. A government like the WAFD comes in, but no government in Egypt today can last very long unless it is willing to attack the British problem, because the great mass of common people who know really nothing about politics just know they want Britain out. Therefore, the influence of the common electorate, the uneducated man and the fellah of the village tends to grow under conditions of national pressure.

For all three of these effects—the loss of respect for the West, the necessity for creating unified local resistance, and the driving of the governments down into the common ranks—religion formed an answer, for religion could offer a non-Western, a non-"democratic" pattern of culture. It was not only a language, it was a society. As the reputation of the West sank, the alternative was to resuscitate the pattern of the East, the religious pattern. Religion, by itself, was a powerful force. As we well

know, if you want to get people stirred up, just start to argue about religion. Religion, therefore, could be used as a unifying factor in a national struggle.

Finally, religion was a common denominator with the common people who could not read or write and knew nothing about politics but who did know about religion. Therefore, it could be used to attach them to a cause. I believe, as a result of all of this, there has been this re-emergence of religion as a political force in the Fadayyan Islam, in the Ikhwan al-Muslimun, in the Shubban Muhammad, and in all of the various groups scattered across the Middle East. Religion once again has entered the political scene.

There is a second problem of the Middle East that is, likewise, related to this resuscitation of the socio-political aspects of religion. To the renewal of the political pressures of the West in the decade since 1939 should be added the increasing breakdown of internal stability. An Egyptian historian, in a book about the creation of the French North African empire, said that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the Western imperial powers thought that all of the problems of the East could be solved by administering a little dose of constitutionalism. So, all through the East there was introduced just enough of the Western concept of a parliament, responsible government with a prime minister, and a party system to start this wonderful method of political life on its way in the Middle East.

Anyone who looks at the history of the Middle East since it had its little dose of constitutionalism realizes that either it did not have enough or it was the wrong kind of medicine, because the fact is that parliamentary life all through the Middle East has shown dangerous signs of failure. I know it best, of course, in Egypt, but I think the forces at work in Egypt are the same as the forces at work in every other country. To realize that something is wrong with the political system all you have to do is to remember that since 1922 no single Egyptian cabinet has ever fallen from a vote of no confidence; yet the average of a government is only one and one-half years and last spring we had a government of fourteen hours.

I saw it, although at not quite such a rapid rate, in Iraq when I lived there. The succession of *coups d'etat* that went on in Syria, likewise, was evidence that something was wrong with the system, itself. Not only was this little dose of constitutionalism insufficient or perhaps wrong, but the

governments created by it were faced with post-war problems that they could not solve. You had, therefore, the decay of frustration.

Consider some of these problems. The Egyptian government is faced with the problem of trying to push the British out of Egypt and the Sudan. That is a man-size order. The Arab governments around the Middle East are faced with the problem of Israel, created by the West with international support and with international financing. Think of the problem of the Iran government in its struggle with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Compay. Now, it makes little difference whether the governments were right or wrong in facing up to these questions—they were the problems of the post-war world and one after another the governments that dealt with them have disintegrated because the problems were too great.

Not only were the problems too great, but these governments that were created by constitutionalism were too narrow in their bases and were too identified with the social and political classes of privilege. Therefore, when the governments were faced with the rising tide of social discontent, they became shaky at their bases. As a result, and this is certainly true in the parts of the Middle East that I know, there has been an increasing uneasiness among young people about the bankruptcy of their party life, about the bankruptcy of their old leaders and about the loyalty of nationalism which expresses itself in governments that in the end reach impasses.

Thus, on the whole, there has been an attempt, particularly by young people, but not by them exclusively, to find some other sector for political loyalty, to find some alternative for the old system. In Egypt, if you wanted to be popular, you had to vote the WAFD, because the WAFD, like the Democratic party in the American South, was "The Party." And when the WAFD shows that it is unable to meet the situation, then what do you do?

It was in this vacuum of loyalties, in this lack of internal cohesion and in this disintegration of the forms of government that not only a movement of Muhammad Nagib arose, but that such movements as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Muhammad Youth flourished. They came to people as an alternative to other types of political action. I happen to know that many young people in Egypt joined the Muslim Brotherhood, not because they were narrow-minded and not because they believed entirely in all the combined Islamic and political objectives for which the Brotherhood stood, but because literally there was nothing else to join. It was

the only alternative to a party system which they thought had failed, and religion, therefore, came forward with a new attraction, giving a new answer and giving for many people the only alternative to the internal systems which had failed to meet the post-war challenge.

A third influence from the war and post-war years, affecting this rise of religion, is the challenging of the goal of national life. It was twenty-five years ago this year—my, that makes my knees creaky—that I went out to the Arab world. When I went out to Baghdad, and Mosul, and later to Syria and Lebanon, and finally to Egypt, there was not really very much question in the minds of national leaders as to what kind of a country they wanted. They wanted a country like the West; they wanted a country like the United States; they wanted a country like Britain or France or Sweden or Germany, for during the post-war period the general social, democratic pattern of the Western world went practically unchallenged. It was considered axiomatic that if these people were given their chance they would grow into it. Everybody knew that and that was why a man could say, "Well, if we can't do it with Islam, we'll do it without Islam." It is well to remember that since 1939 we have had all of these national goals challenged, challenged by the rise of Nazism and Fascism and challenged by the rise of Communism, for the first were almost political successes and Russia is now a political success. For the first time, therefore, the confidence, especially of the rising generation, in the political pattern that we identify as Western Democracy began to be shaken.

One particular shaking of that political pattern has been closely associated with the revival of religion in Arab lands, though not in Iran. Again, that is the creation of the State of Israel, and for one very simple reason. Israel is a religio-political state, however you may define it, and many of my Arab and Egyptian friends said to me quite frankly, "Now we've got clearance! If America and Great Britain can create a religious state in Palestine, why can't we Muslims have a religious state?" Therefore, both as the effect of this creation of Israel and because of the fighting against Israel, there has come a tendency in the post-war period to revivify Islam as a new national ideal, as a pattern of government organization. Such movements as the attempt to produce a Civil Law Code based on Shariah Law or the program proposed by the Muslim Brotherhood are definite attempts to interject into the national questioning by the Muslim peoples the idea that Islam offers an alternative both to Com-

munism and to Western Democracy and, therefore, that Islam can move into the question mark that the last years have left.

Finally, in addition to these three forces, there has been the force that has come out of the rapid, almost catastrophic, changing of social patterns. Is it necessary to remind you again that in the past thirty years the social patterns of the Middle East have probably changed more than in any previous two or three centuries? There are two causes for this change. One is the further penetration of the Western world. More than a year ago when I was in Dhahran, I discovered that there was a crisis between religion and education. Under the Wahhabi system prayers are obligatory, and you stop at three o'clock and say your prayers. A very important new school was opening there to train young Saudis to become oil engineers. When three o'clock came, Ibn Jalulis' soldiers appeared at the door and said, "Come on boys, it's time to go out and pray."

The American teacher, who is a good hard-headed engineer, said, "All right boys, I don't care if you pray, but you can't pray and learn to run oil machinery at the same time." Thus, he objected to the boys leaving.

The case was taken all the way up to King Ibn Saud, and the engineer said, in effect, "Now look, King, you gotta make up your mind. Do you want these boys to learn how to run oil engines, or do you want them to learn how to pray, because they can't do both at the same time." And this in the heart of the most conservative part of the Muslim world!

The clear-sighted decision of the King was, "Well, I want them to learn to run oil engines. They can pray after sunset." So, a crack appeared in the social pattern because of this intrusion of the West. That is only a symbol of what has been going on with increasing rapidity. When you think of the average American G. I. set loose in Egypt and in the villages of Egypt, you can then understand how much social patterns change.

But the change of social patterns was brought not only by the increasing impetus of the West. It also came from the East, itself. As Dr. Kurani has just reminded us, Eastern leadership has begun to discover that you cannot have a country that is poor and ignorant and illiterate and sick, and also strong and able and equal in the eyes of the world. There has been, therefore, increasing pressure from government leadership to change social patterns. I suppose the most dramatic illustration is what Muhammad Nagib has done in Egypt, where he said, "Nobody but nobody can own more than two hundred feddans of land." Even the huge estates of the former king—some 200,000 feddans—are being broken up.

So, there have come increasingly radical social operations, born in the East and supported by the governments. It was from the hall of the American University at Cairo, "that revolutionary institution," that Madame Doria Shafiq marched with her pickets last year to surround Parliament to say, "We want votes for women." An Egyptian movement, you see!

This decay of a social organization both by Western penetration and by the efforts of their own leaders naturally arouses resentment. First, it arouses resentment amongst those who are dispossessed, the people who give up the land and men who cannot share their votes. It arouses resentment amongst those people of conservative religion who under the impetus of the early forces see in a religious pattern the answer to life. Therefore, since the end of the war there appears, as there has in Iran, a combination of social conservation and religious conservatism reinforcing each other in the attempts to stave off the radical changes to which this society is being subjected. All of these forces—renewed political pressure from the West, the changing social patterns, the challenge of national ideals, the decay of internal stability—point in the same direction —the revival of religion as an alternative to the socio-political organization that has at least until now characterized the Middle East in the modern world.

Having said all this, I must not leave you with the impression that this is the entire or unanimous Muslim mind in the Middle East. There are a great many people who do not go along with this alternative. It is interesting to note that the present government in Egypt for all of its support from the Ikhwan al-Muslimun has not gone along with it. Indeed, you will see in the exhibit room of The Middle East Institute that very striking poster showing mosque and church side by side, put up by the Egyptian government in all the villages, with this inscription over the top, "We are all Egyptians," At the bottom are the words of the poet Shawqi, "Religion is God's business. If God had wanted everybody to believe the same thing, He would have made you that way." This is an attempt to stave off this alternative.

But if you ask what has changed in religion since 1939, the answer must be that religion has been reborn as a social and political force. Its ability to meet the challenge of the new day will determine ultimately whether religion disappears and the Middle East goes on in a secular way or some kind of reborn religious organization becomes permanent.

First Session, Part III, Friday morning, March 6th
Presiding: HARRY N. HOWARD, *Department of State*

EVOLUTION IN LITERATURE

MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA ZIADA

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THE TWO PREVIOUS SPEAKERS have stressed the position of Egypt in modern trends in the Middle East. I appreciate the stand they have taken, and I shall take refuge in it, for my subject is limited to modern trends in Egypt, not the whole of the Middle East.

The Industrial Revolution in England and its effect upon the economy of the rest of the world can be taken as material for analogy, not too seriously, of course, and not too embracingly to understand intellectual trends in Egypt and their impact upon the thought of the rest of the Middle East. One should not take even this statement too much to heart, because many leaders of reform in Egypt, from the middle of the nineteenth century onward, have had their friends, brothers and sisters, from every part of the Middle East, collaborating with them and assisting in formulating what is now the current of modern intellectual trends in Egypt. If I mention Abd al-Razik or Taha Husayn, as has President Badeau, I must also mention Rashid Rida of Syria, Sayyid Amir Ali and Iqbal of India (Pakistan), and the present Rector of Al-Azhar University who is a man of Tunisian origin.

As a spring board for my discussion, I should like to use the fact of the impact of the Western world and its benefit to the Middle East, Muslim and non-Muslim, including Jewish. But an impact cannot be produced in a void—you have to have something to impact upon or against, in order to produce any results. Thus, it was not only Western impact; it was also the culture, the heritage and the legacy of Egypt, Babylonia, Medea, Syria, Phoenicia, Greece, Rome, Judaism, Christianity and Islam that were there in the minds of the people. The result of this Western impact was to activate, motivate and direct Middle Eastern civilization in comparatively recent years.

My discussion, however, will be limited to Egypt and modern literature. I am postulating literature in its wider sense, in order to present an outline of intellectual trends in modern Egypt, as reflected in con-

temporary Egyptian publications in the fields of both history and literature proper, together with general works of a popular nature. Though authors in the last of these categories of publication do not aspire to belong to the realms of either history or literature, their output is significant in any analysis of life and thought in present day Egypt.

Western impact upon Egypt, whether violent as during the Napoleonic expedition and the British occupation or in a gentle form as a result of the normal interplay of peaceful commerce and culture, has been responsible for some, but not all, of the intellectual trends in modern Egypt. This statement is intended to be as objective as I can comprehend. When the Napoleonic expedition produced eventually the monumental *Description de l'Egypte* in a great many volumes, touching upon various branches of knowledge relating to Egypt, no Egyptian participated in its compilation and it was hardly written for the Egyptians, either. It did prove, however, to be a potent leaven for the Egypt of the future; Egyptian scholars, in different walks of learning, now go back to it for information, using it as an historical document for many fields of research. But, at the time of the Napoleonic expedition, Egyptian historians were humble servants, if not slaves, of clericalism and traditionalism, as Shotwell would correctly say in his famous *Introduction to History*. The Egyptian historian Al-Manufi, for instance, wrote a short history of Egypt with a sonorously rhymed title, under which he described history as the "choicest fruit in delectable converse, and the ever best in beauty and utility, because it is the record of great events of time, and the register of determined march of events." Under this sonorous title and a grand definition of history, Al-Manufi recorded in the whole book little more than lists of dynasties and their rulers, along with a few anecdotes and dates as dry as the desert air. Such was the caliber in Egypt before the nineteenth century.

The impact of the West was again felt by the people of Egypt—this time in a gentle form—during the time of Muhammad Ali. A number of Egyptians studied in Europe, and they returned to their country brimful of enthusiasm and determination to shift Egypt's orbit gradually into the world of modern knowledge. Their endeavor had all the attributes and all the limitations of a first generation of intelligensia, but the works which they managed to translate into Arabic from French and Italian, particularly in history, opened the eyes of the Egyptian reader in the middle of the nineteenth century. Continuously increasing numbers of

Egyptian students, at European universities, became noticeably conscious of the glaring fact that most work in Egyptian history and archeology, had been produced by a long and brilliant array of European and American scholars.

Those Western scholars, representing practically all of the European nations and America, had not confined their efforts to the publishing of outlines and monographs in their several languages but also had done a great deal of excavation and investigation in the field of Egyptology. In addition, and with much patience, they edited historical Arabic chronicles of medieval Egypt, chronicles which had slumbered for centuries in the darkness of manuscript rooms in scattered libraries, museums and private collections. Nor was this great zeal limited to an elucidation of Egyptian history; it actually covered all periods of the history of the Middle East, including Arabia before Muhammad and Islam. It is, therefore, not in mere grateful homage and loyalty to this dispassionate and persistent Western scholarship that one must mention here such illustrious names as Quatremère, Maspero, Lipsius, Dozy, Wustenfeld, Becker, Junker, Steindorf, Amedroz, Browne, Margoliouth, Nicholson, Snouck, Huronji, Bevan, Arnold, Nallino, Caetani, Evetts, Torrey, Popper, Van Berchem, Marçais, Demonbynes, Bresswell, Wiet and many others.

The inception of modern university education in Egypt by Egyptians since 1904, in the Peoples' University, in Al-Azhar, and the three government universities, which may soon be four, has been administering additional fillip to this new consciousness of the necessity of undertaking excavation work on sites of ancient Egyptian history and of editing Arabic manuscript material of medieval Egypt, by the Egyptians, themselves. Under the salutary influence of this novel spirit, highly finished digging in Egyptology has been performed, and some effort has been concentrated upon the careful editing and annotating of valuable Arabic source material. These developments are important, if only for the sake of taking that double task off the shoulders of European and American archeologists and orientalists.

Part of the task of editing Arabic texts has been assumed now for some years by the National Egyptian Library, the Cairo and Alexandria universities and a number of private publishing firms, such as the Committee for Translation, Editing and Authorship, with grants-in-aid for that purpose from the Egyptian Ministry of Education. It is being realized at last that no definitive work on Egyptian history can be

produced before all pertaining manuscripts have been through the press, and the first harvest of well-edited Arabic material includes several volumes of Ibn Taghribirdi's *Nujum* and Maqrizi's *Suluk,* as well as the *Qawanin* of Ibn Mammati, the *Nihayat* of Nuwayri, the *Dhakhira* of Ibn Bassam, the *Hisba* of Shayzari, the *Kharida* of Maqdisi and with many others in progress, such as Ibn Wasil's *Tarikh* (History of the Ayyubids).

This recent print of modern Egyptian editing, together with previous endeavors by European scholars, is having the desired effect on dissertation work in Egyptian universities, where Western prototypes of scholarship are being served as models of methodical research. Attention is also being drawn to the importance of archeological material, which is pressed into the service of the historian in modern Egypt. In fact, history is now being taught in Egypt as having many influencing and helpful neighbors such as geography, sociology, numismatics, and diplomatics.

In the realm of literature, poetry and prose, impact of the West in the form of the British military occupation of Egypt, towards the close of the nineteenth century, had its immediate effect. It roused the poet of the day, Al-Barudi, to produce an Arabic poetry of a fiery nationalistic Egyptian character, adhering though he did to old meters, cadences and classicist forms of diction, in reverent imitation of Arab poets of the old Islamic empires in Damascus and Baghdad. A group of Barudi's emulators treaded the same path and followed the same models, preferring an archaic simile of desert imagery to forms of speech more in tune with the Nile valley and its green pastures.

But the teens and the twenties of this century witnessed Shawqi occasionally sallying forth with a new poetry, in a trilogy of historical drama and a number of lyrics of extreme beauty of form. Also there came on the scene Hafiz and Matran; yet the former was, in fact, a neo-classicist of artistic mastery of the poetic style. Matran, however, proved to be the standard bearer of romanticism in his magnificent odes of rich musicality, lofty ideal and liberal attitude towards causes of feminism, nationalism and modernism in general. Nevertheless, the classic style of heroic couplet persisted even in Matran's ethereal poetry, and it has been only among young rebel poets, such as Abushady, Nazi and Mahmud, of the budding schools of surrealism, symbolism and psychoanalysis in Egypt that one finds revolutionary poetic novelties. These comprise prose verse, blank verse, poems in stanzas of varying rhyme or in what approximates Alexandrines.

But if modern Arabic poetry in Egypt, and elsewhere in the Middle East, has not achieved as yet all the freedom of expression which is the natural birthright of all verse, Arabic prose has risen to a high degree of emancipation, ease, beauty and smoothness. The old forms of rhymed prose alliteration and other measured artificiality have now become the laughing stock of the new writers as well as their readers. Here again, the Western impact in its gentle pattern cannot be denied, because most protagonists of modern prose in Egypt drank deeply of the free springs of French and English literature in the works of Anatole France, Victor Hugo, Dickens, Meredith, Zola, Poe, Twain, Proust, Shaw, Huxley and others.

First among those in this school of fresh Arabic prose are Lutfi al-Sayyid, Taha Husayn, Ahmad Amin, Haykal, Al-Aqqad, Al-Hakim, Al-Mazini and Abu Hadid. Every one in this first Egyptian galaxy of writers has a number of remarkable books to his credit, in all of which there is a pervading vein of realism and courage to look at things fairly and squarely. Lutfi al-Sayyid, charming octogenarian of a fine personality, had shone earlier in the century in the world of serious Egyptian journalism and high politics. He had also served, continuously and unstintingly, as the guide and moral support to the present generation of modernists in Egypt. Yet he found time, while serving as first president of the first Egyptian university in Cairo, to render Aristotle's *Politics* into Arabic. Haykal, his kinsman and disciple, wrote in 1914 the first novel to be published by an Egyptian writer, in which superstition and saint worship came in for open condemnation.

Taha Husayn, a man of extraordinary talent, spared no effort in his autobiography, *Egyptian Childhood,* in exposing the rampant shortcomings of Egyptian society of his boyhood days. Ahmad Amin, a man of versatile energy, showed almost the same openness in his own more recently published autobiography. Taha Husayn has also written a book portraying lives of early Muslim martyrs, on the line of early Christian martyrs, under the arresting title of *True Promise of True Faith.* Ahmad Amin, too, produced a work of far-reaching penetration, entitled *Leaders of Reform in the Muslim East,* giving in a series of fleeting biographies that, in spite of the fact that the Gate of Interpretation had been shut by theologians, some reforming souls did their utmost to manipulate the bolt, to allow some good air to stir in Muslim society.

Al-Hakim wrote *Bird from the East,* a novel in which he traced differ-

ences between Western and Eastern conditioning of individual conduct, asserting, incidentally, that oriental spiritual values were bound to outlast occidental materialism. The same writer tried his hand successfully at the story of the Seven Sleepers of Ephesus, which he aptly called *The People of the Cave.* He also attempted to write in Arabic a new version of *Oedipus Rex.* Another outstanding writer is Abu Hadid, who produced *Zenobia,* a historical novel of Roman days presenting certain eventful pages of Arab history before Islam. Abu Hadid has other works of historical fiction of high level of style and audacity in *The Marble Urn* and *Flowers of the Thorn.* He betrays in all of his writings a passion for delineating the past to show doubts of the present and fears of the future. Al-Mazini took Cairene middle class respectability as his field of operations, slashing wherever he could with acid sarcasm, such as in *The Scribe, Ibrahim* and *Harvest of Hay.* In Egyptian weeklies and monthly magazines, Al-Nazini gravitated towards the lower strata of Egyptian society in motley descriptions of domestic poverty, misery and street scenes of Old Cairo.

Turning to popular literature, one is first struck, not unreasonably, by the variety of topics—the variety in itself is quite significant—and by the unexpected type of writers who had shone well before in philosophy, politics and education. To judge by the quality of their writings, these authors seem to have put aside their own particular pursuits, for a while, to give the people some of their ideas in lighter publications. A limited selection of these works suggests at once that a number of intellectuals in modern Egypt have embarked upon a campaign to put the Egyptian "in the know" concerning his environment and his place in world culture. Al-Aqqad, who belongs really more to an "exclusive" circle of rebel poets, produced a number of racy books representing several men of genius in the history of Islam, beginning, of course, with the Prophet Muhammad. Salama Musa, a man of a philosophical bent, wrote *Egypt, Cradle of Civilization* and *India of Ghandi,* besides books on the history of freedom of thought, psychoanalysis, evolution, and birth-control. He has a work on modern English literature, as well as collections of essays which tell of his close familiarity with Western thought.

Although this outline can only be cursory and necessarily incomplete, frequent reference to impact of the West, in its two opposite modes of activating intellectual trends in modern Egypt, should not go unqualified and so give the impression that it was the sole prime cause of revival,

and its intensity and momentum. An impact, let me repeat, an impact cannot be produced in a vacuum. It should always be remembered, in surveying the present scene in Egypt from any of its political, sociological, economic or even intellectual sides, that layers of good historical heritage have for centuries been accumulating at least in the subconscious of the average Egyptian. A thickness of rust and dross of a kind hid the metal of this heritage almost completely for many centuries. But the metal was bound to show and shine again under the rub, the tread and march of events, of which the impact of the West on Egypt and the Middle East constituted both one phase and one factor of awakening and progress.

A kindly critic, whose opinions were earnestly solicited concerning these remarks, was rather disappointed to learn that all publications, herein cited as examples, were written in the Arabic language. The Egyptian writer in modern Egypt is actually laboring under a real dilemma—whether to write for his people in their tongue so as to be instrumental in the mental uplift of Egypt's young democracy, or to use a foreign language, as English or French, to make his country and himself known to the outside world. Even those who could somewhat comfortably do both, to be sure, have not escaped this perplexity, and their output has consequently become divided and rather meager in either media of expression. A few Egyptians who chose to write only in English or French have remained, together with their ideas, complete strangers to their monolingual countrymen. Certain Egyptian publications in Arabic, having aroused considerable appeal outside of Egypt, soon found interested translators for English, French, Russian and even modern Hebrew editions. Notable among these are Taha Husayn's *Egyptian Childhood,* Ahmad Amin's *Leaders of Reform in the Muslim World* and Al-Hakim's *Bird from the East,* besides other works not pertaining to these three men of letters.

Timur, author of short stories of social poignancy and discernment, has had many of his collections translated into both English and French. Enan, lawyer and journalist and one assiduous in the study of history, wrote *Decisive Moments in Muslim History,* which has been translated into English in India and has already reached a third edition. The Arabic studies of some Egyptian scholars have also found their way into well-known works of established authors in the English language, such as Jean's book on astronomy, *The Stars in Their Courses,* Hill's *History of Cyprus,* Rosenthal's *History of Muslim Historiography,* Hitti's *History of*

the Arabs, Guillaume's *Legacy of Egypt,* Troop's *Criticism of the Crusades* and Arberry's translations Shawqi's poetry. All of these works give proof of Eastern impact on Western authorship; it seems to mean that modern Egyptian scholarship is tending not merely to respond to the Western impact by aping it but to contribute to it in some original form.

This feature of intellectual trends in modern Egypt shows, presumably, that Egyptian endeavor in the ever-flowing stream of knowledge bids fair to be a part of the main current of human progress. It also proves, fairly conclusively I submit, that the removal of the hampering obstacles of a political or economic nature, in good spirit and real earnestness, will help the good metal of the Egyptian heritage to be visible and to create eventually for itself an established place under the sun. Certain popular works in Arabic, so far unmentioned, indicate that these obstacles have materially impeded a norm of development. Even the titles of some of these, as *Englishmen in Their England, From Where to Begin?, Dawn from the West, What for Tomorrow, The Patriot's A-B-C,* and *Old Governing Machine,* are eloquent calls for freedom of thought in a new Egypt, which frankly is willing to be friendly in a democratically-minded world.

This last observation may well be applied to other countries in the alerted Middle East, especially Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Iran. A number of persons in these lands have already distinguished themselves in high academic circles and institutions of the United States, in the world of literature and in the international spheres of the United Nations. To this word of recogniton, one is more than justified to add India and Pakistan, which, though neither Arabic speaking nor Middle Eastern countries directly contributing to intellectual trends in the area, have produced accomplished masters in the service of international peace, security and imperishable human rights.

Second Session, Part I, Friday afternoon, March 6th
Presiding: RICHARD H. SANGER, *Department of State*

POLITICAL EVOLUTION:
THE ARAB MIDDLE EAST SINCE WORLD WAR II

FARID HANANIA

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BEFORE I START ON MY SUBJECT PROPER, may I say that if the West today is impatient with the slow progress of the political development in the Middle East it must be remembered that, had the countries concerned been given the chance of national self-determination in 1919 according to the doctrine propounded by Woodrow Wilson, the picture today, I am sure, would have been a happier and healthier one to all concerned.

Energies in the inter-war period were, therefore, devoted in the main to the struggle for independence and the riddance of the shackles of dictated military treaties—energies that would have otherwise been used for the necessary constructive growth and reform. In my opinion, the surest and most salutary way of national development is the organic development by trial and error *from within* and by example, but without the so-called "assistance" of a foreign imperialistic or colonial power. But be that as it may.

World War II brought in its wake many changes and elements of future change in the political evolution of the Middle Eastern countries, both external and internal. In the Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East, the most important political changes and reforms brought about by the War in the external and inter-Arab spheres were:

First, the unconditional liquidation of the French mandate over Syria and Lebanon, resulting from the weakening of France's international position, the pro-axis policy of the Vichy forces in the Levant, and the agreement—for various reasons—among the Big Three that Syria and Lebanon should be granted complete independence.

Secondly, the crystalization of the Jewish-Arab tension in Palestine. On the Jewish side the tragic fate of European Jewry and the enrollment

of Palestine Jews in large numbers in the British army appeared as two new decisive factors. The former supplied an incentive for extremism and the latter the potential means for implementing a policy of extremism. The new Zionist demands, as expressed in the Biltmore Program of 1942, now included the establishment of a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine.

Thirdly, the increasing tension in the treaty-bound countries, especially Iraq and Egypt, for a revision of their respective treaties with Britain. To a large extent this was occasioned by the usual friction created between a civilian population and an occupying army during war, but basically it stemmed from the fact that the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 were never considered by the nationalists as more than stepping stones towards the ultimate goal of complete independence.

Fourthly, the American oil investment in Saudi Arabia and in the Persian Gulf Arab shaykhdoms. Its potential influence on the political evolution of those countries must not be under-rated. Already Ibn Saud is sending hundreds of his subjects annually to universities in the neighboring Arab countries and abroad so that they can qualify for the many administrative and technical posts opening to them. Together with the revolutionary changes in transport and communications inside Saudi Arabia, this is bound to create a more politically conscious Saudi public opinion which will demand in due course a constitutional monarchy in order to have a say in the running of the country.

And fifthly, the emergence of the Arab League. The movement for Arab union gathered new momentum during the war, partly as a result of the liberation of Syria and Lebanon, and partly as a reaction against the increasing extremism of Zionism. It was also helped by the fact that Britain—now in military occupation of the entire Middle East—was officially favorable to the idea.

The first concrete Arab proposals were put forward by the veteran Iraqi statesman Nuri as-Said in his 1942 Blue Book. Said envisaged a Fertile Crescent Union with an enlarged Syria—including Palestine, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan—in federative union with Iraq. The Maronites in Lebanon and the Jews in Palestine were to be given autonomous cantons within this union. The scheme met with opposition from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. To Ibn Saud, any new accession of strength to the Hashimites was a danger to him, for the Fertile Crescent Union could be

the first step towards the incorporation of Saudi Arabia. Egypt's opposition reflected Faruq's desire to keep the Arab countries under Egypt's leadership. Having squashed Nuri as-Said's plan with Saudi support, Egypt now offered her own plan which was for the creation of a loose association of soverign states to include Lebanon, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Yemen.

As finally formed in the early summer of 1945, the Arab League provided, at best, a permanent machinery for inter-Arab consultation and voluntary co-operation. The seat of the League was to be in Cairo and it was to have a Secretary-General. The League Council was to meet twice a year and majority decisions, taken at the Council sessions, were binding only on those who accepted them.

The formation of the Arab League is an important landmark not only in the external relations of the Arab countries, *i. e.,* vis-a-vis the outside world and one another, but also in the history of the internal Arab political leadership. The politicians who dominated the League were those who had dominated their respective countries for the previous quarter of a century. In general, these politicians belonged to the landed aristocracy, the higher professional class and the bourgeoisie. Their political views may be described as being vaguely liberal. So long as foreign control in the form of a mandate or a restrictive treaty continued, the hold of these politicians over public opinion was undisputed. For, whatever else may be said about them, they were consistent in their demand for independence.

With the relaxation of foreign control either through the disappearance of the mandates or at least by the ratification of a temporarily acceptable treaty with the former occupying power, these ruling classes found themselves suddenly confronted by public opinion instead of being at its head. They were the more handicapped in their new role not only because of the poverty of their socio-economic ideology—if they had any at all—but also because their traditional role of opposition to the foreign controlling power had produced an ingrained habit of negativity.

In the independence period—in Syria and Lebanon since 1943, in Iraq since 1932, and in Egypt since 1936—these ruling classes exercised control over their countries through control of the two centers of political power common to all of these countries: (1) the peasantry, forming the overwhelming majority throughout the Middle East, and mostly illiterate and disease-ridden; and (2) the urban proletariat. The former were

controlled through the feudal system of land-tenure, the latter through a mixture of repression, demagoguery and favoritism. It was the "passive" votes of the peasants and the proletariat that ensured the re-election to office of this ruling class. Potential opposition to this class began to emerge in the younger Western-educated generation and in the growing middle classes. In the 1930's a great number of new political parties began to appear throughout the Arab world. For the first time their programs had social and economic contents; for the first time, indeed, there were carefully thought out programs—as opposed to simple demands for freedom and liberty and to attachment to particular personalities. The weakness of these parties, however, lay in their limited appeal. To the masses of the peasantry and the proletariat, their contents were unintelligible and, even if intelligible, sounded too fanciful to be trusted. On the other hand, many of the new-type political leaders were political dilettantes and were, themselves, to be blamed for failing to reach the people.

A much more serious challenge to the authority of the ruling class was the rise of national armies. Indeed, as early as 1936—only four years after the achievement of independence—the Iraqi army carried out its first *coup d'etat*. Although the military regime lasted only for a few months, Iraqi politics continued to be dominated by military intervention which culminated in the second—this time pro-Axis—*coup d'etat* of 1941. On each occasion the army intervention was an illustration of the artificiality of the bases of power of the ruling class: the former *coup* had a genuine, if inept, social program—which was never implemented—and the latter had a strong political accent stemming mainly from pan-Arabist bitterness over Palestine and Syria.

The influence of the War was to strengthen the position of the ruling classes. In Iraq the *coup* of 1941 was taken as an opportunity to purge the army thoroughly and so give Iraq's ruling clique a new lease of life by eliminating the most serious source of danger. In Syria and Lebanon the independence won largely as a result of British and American pressure could be and was represented as the crowning achievement of the nationalist politicians who belonged to the ruling class and who had so persistently fought the mandatory power. In Egypt the position was more complex. There power was shared almost equally between Faruq, who, as the descendant of the creator of modern Egyptian military history, enjoyed the support of the army and had considerable mass appeal, and the Wafd party, headed by Nahhas Pasha, which controlled the voting

strength of the countryside and could count on having a sweeping majority in any freely-conducted election.

The opposition between Faruq and Nahhas represented a clash in personalities. But perhaps on a deeper level it represented the interests of a foreign dynasty—Muhammad Ali was of Albanian origin—as opposed to those of an indigenous population—Nahhas sprang from fellah origin. Each side did well out of the War. Nahhas became Prime Minister and Faruq, since Nahhas was thrust upon him by the British, was able to pose as a martyr.

But perhaps what strengthened the ruling classes most was the creation of the Arab League. In spite of its weaknesses and omissions, Arabs everywhere rejoiced that the ideals of Arab union should once again be recognized, however inadequately. The general belief was that the League was, at least, a step in the right direction.

But soon both the League and the Arab ruling classes were to pass through a severe test—that of the Palestine War. If the post-war settlement of 1919 was a great landmark in the political evolution of the Arabs, the Palestine War was a landmark of even greater magnitude. I cannot go into any of the details or causes of the Arab failure. I must confine myself to the influence of the Palestine War on the political evolution in the Arab world. The Arab failure in Palestine exposed at once the political bankruptcy not only of the Arab League but also of the Arab ruling classes. Any feelings of awe, gratitude or respect towards these classes—if only because of their struggle for independence—were now considerably tempered by derision, contempt and hatred. This was the first main effect of the Palestine War. The second was the new attitude of the national armies. This attitude was conditioned not only by the feeling of frustration after defeat but also by genuine grievances at the corruption of the home governments which, in certain cases, had contributed to their military defeat.

The reaction to the Palestine War was most immediately felt in December, 1948, in Syria where anti-government demonstrations almost reached the proportions of mob revolution. It was not long before the army stepped in. On March 30, 1949, the first *coup d'etat* took place, resulting in the arrest and later exile of the Syrian President and Prime Minister and in the dissolution of Parliament. It is interesting to note that the leader of the *coup,* Colonel Zaim, sought to ally himself with the young reformist circles in Syria. However, his personal ambition, which bordered

on megalomania, and his general political ineptitude resulted in a second *coup* in August, 1949, which led to his execution and the assumption of power by Colonel Hinnawi. Hinnawi formed a civilian caretaker government, under a former Syrian President, and declared his intention to call a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution. In his Arab policy Hinnawi was in favor of closer union with Iraq and Said's Greater Syria and Fertile Crescent scheme which was a further expression of non-satisfaction with the inefficiency of the League. Hinnawi's program was cut short by the third and (so far) last *coup* in Syria since 1949.

The new military leader was Colonel Shishakli who, it has been rumored, was the brain behind the two former *coups*. His intervention seems to have been due to his opposition to Greater Syria. In his internal policy he at first tried to keep up constitutional procedure and to keep responsibility in the hands of civilian governments. He has now come out openly for a one-party regime and government by civil servants under his own direct supervision. No doubt he has given Syria a much more efficient and honest administration than it has had for a very long time. He has also considerably strengthened the Syrian army. In his reform policy he is being very cautious. His land reform envisages no requisitioning and affects only the state domain. In his foreign policy he is more inclined to the West than to neutrality—he is certainly not pro-Soviet. But he cannot come out openly for the West on account of Western support of Israel.

The reaction to the Palestine War culminated, in Jordan, in the assassination of King Abdallah in Arab Jerusalem in 1951. Abdallah's death was not greatly regretted because he was blamed for not wholeheartedly committing his Legion in the War. His disappearance from the political scene meant a greater development towards constitutional monarchy in Jordan, a development which had become all the more necessary because of the extension of Abdallah's former territory of Trans-Jordan to include the remaining parts of Arab Palestine whose inhabitants were more advanced and more politically conscious than the Trans-Jordanians. The movement towards constitutional monarchy has also been further strengthened by the deposition of Talal—Abdallah's son and successor—on account of mental derangement and the accession of the teen-aged Husayn, Talal's son.

In Egypt, the Palestine War had the immediate effect of driving popular leadership into hands of the Muslim Brotherhood, more extremist even

than the Wafd party. Originally founded in 1929 by a school teacher Hasan al-Bannah, the Muslim Brotherhood was a puritannical reactionary and militant movement. It started by mass appeal to the under-privileged lower-classes but has recently been catering for the support of intellectual circles. Its central doctrine is the compatability of an orthodox interpretation of Islam wth modern civilization. It is neither pro-Western nor pro-Communist but firmly believes in the sufficiency and validity of Islam as a guide for matters spiritual and material in the modern world. By the end of World War II the Brotherhood could count on at least a million sympathizers in Egypt and the adjacent Arab countries.

During the Palestine War Muslim Brothers volunteered on a big scale to fight the Zionists. At the end of that War it was this Brotherhood which led popular agitation culminating in the murder of Nuqrashi Pasha, the Egyptian Prime Minister, in December, 1948. Nuqrashi had been Prime Minister during the Palestine War and was Faruq's trusted Minister. Faruq hit back swiftly when in February, 1949, al-Bannah, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, was mysteriously assassinated. The death of the leader was a heavy blow and considerably arrested the Brotherhood's activity. At the same time, Faruq felt that he should strengthen his own position by inviting the Wafd back to power to counterbalance the hostility of the Brotherhood.

In the freely conducted elections of 1950 the Wafd obtained an overwhelming majority. Armed with this majority, Nahhas declared the unilateral abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. This action was partly the result of the Anglo-Egyptian tension of World War II but partly because of the bitter anti-Western feeling following upon the establishment of Israel. Domestically it served to divert attention from Wafdist corruption. Nahhas' move was followed by Egyptian guerilla warfare against the British Canal Zone, a move which provoked British retaliation, causing the death of fifty Egyptian policemen in one engagement. This, in its turn, brought on the Black Saturday of January 26, 1952, when the Cairo populace completely lost its head in a wild fit of xenophobia. Faruq used Black Saturday as an excuse to oust the Wafd Cabinet, but his later conduct showed him still to be in a frivolous mood in spite of the seriousness of the situation and months followed without a stable or strong government being formed.

All this time the Egyptian army had been watching in the background. It had taken no part in the attacks against the British but had very quickly

and competently restored order on Black Saturday. The amateurish anti-British tactics and corruption of the Wafd, the frivolity and incompetence of Faruq and the fanaticism of the Muslim Brotherhood must have served only to increase army contempt of Cairo politics. The last straw was Faruq's crass antagonism of the army by shielding relatives and henchmen implicated in arms scandals during the Palestine War and his insistence on the appointment of a junior play-boy officer—and his own brother-in-law—as Minister of Defense.

It was in these circumstances that Nagib struck some six months ago. Nagib is probably the best thing that could have happened to Egypt. Like Shishakli of Syria, he tried first to rule through a civilian government but has lately come around to the idea of a one-party regime. He has already carried out a very thorough purge of the superfluous and corrupt elements, particularly in the higher civil service, and has abolished all titles. His most spectacular reform has been the land reform. This, however, is not as revolutionary as it sounds, for the maximum of two hundred feddans (acres) per head is still very large considering that the fertility of Egyptian soil is three to four times that of Western Europe. Also there is to be no requisitioning, all land taken over is being paid for, although of course not to the satisfaction of the landowners. Again only two thousand landowners will be affected by the law. But these own some 1,200,000 feddans, or one-fifth of the cultivable area of Egypt—an eloquent reflection on the state of land-tenure.

In his Arab policy, Nagib has given his full support to the Arab League. With Faruq and Abdallah of Jordan and their dynastic bickerings out of the way, there is every chance now that the Arab League will prove itself a more effective regional instrument than heretofore. In his negotiations with the British, Nagib has shown both political acumen and ability to compromise, as is evidenced by the recent settlement of the dispute over the Sudan Condominium. I am personally of the opinion that Nagib is definitely pro-Western but will not come out openly so until British troops evacuate Egyptian territory and the Palestine Arab refugee problem is solved. The *coup* in Egypt was a source of inspiration and encouragement to reformist movements in the Arab world, for Faruq was so deeply entrenched that he was generally thought impossible to remove.

In Lebanon, the reform movement soon crystallized, too. Ruling over the country since 1943 was President Khuri, a Maronite with Pan-Arab sympathies, a fact which explains why Arab nationalists had refrained

from any concerted action against him. But Khuri had over-stepped the mark. Not only did he rule through the traditional clique of members of the landed aristocracy and the higher bourgeoisie, but he also began to develop a family business within the traditional ruling circle. The corruption of Khuri's regime finally reached fantastic proportions. Public opinion in Lebanon which finds expression in a very vocal and competent press came out very strongly against Khuri's abuse of power. When in 1947 he engineered a favorable majority in the parliamentary elections, twenty-five out of twenty-six dailies in Beirut told him so and boycotted the sessions of Parliament. But Khuri was so contemptuous of public opinion that he chose that same Parliament to extend his term of office for another six years in September, 1949. The second parliamentary elections in 1951 were much freer than the first and resulted in the election of several staunch opposition members. But Khuri's corruption and that of his family and lieutenants continued, in spite of the now stronger parliamentary opposition.

Matters came to a head in September, 1952, when almost all the political forces in the country joined hands against him. First, there was a complete strike throughout the country in all the major towns and villages; then the Muslim deputies—from whom Prime Ministers must be chosen—decided for once to resist the temptation of office and to refuse to accept responsibility under President Khuri; and then, the parliamentary opposition took to the hills and demanded Khuri's resignation under the threat of armed insurrection. Finding himself in this dilemma, Khuri called upon the army. But when the army refused to back him, he had to resign. After Khuri's resignation, the army commander, General Shehab, took over for a few weeks until a new President—a member of the parliamentary opposition—had been elected.

In many ways these developments in Lebanon show a healthier state of affairs than in the other Arab countries we have discussed. On the one hand, there emerges a strong public opinion which could also hold itself in check, and on the other hand there emerges an army which in spite of the examples of Syria and Egypt preferred the path of self-renunciation. The new President Shamun has rightly refused to be carried away by revolutionary fervor. He is preparing a quiet atmosphere for new elections according to a new electoral law which he passed by decree. The new electoral law will considerably diminish the hold of the feudal lords over the constituencies. Shamun has also started a purge of the

civil service, an action long overdue. The intervention of the army in the Lebanese *coup* was negative and belated but was, nevertheless, a decisive, if not the decisive, factor in bringing it about.

In Iraq, the traditional clique was as corrupt as anywhere in the Arab world and suffered an equal loss of prestige as a result of the Palestine War. Considering that the participation of the army in Iraqi politics dates back to 1936, one would have expected the Iraqi army to follow, or indeed to set, the precedent for Syria and Egypt. But an important point to remember is that following the anti-Hashemite and anti-British *coup* of 1941 a thorough purge in the officer class of the Iraqi army was carried out, leaving the army under strong royalist influence and control. How long this honeymoon will last no one can predict. Much will depend on the ability of the Iraqi palace to carry out the much-needed reforms in almost every sphere of Iraqi life. The financial means to carry through these reforms are now available to the Iraqi ruling class in the form of the fifty-fifty division of oil revenues. In the meantime, in the first major political crisis in Iraq since the Palestine War, the ruling class has, as it were, carried a *coup d'etat* against the opposition. A cabinet, formed temporarily by the Iraqi Chief-of-Staff, has supervised the latest Iraqi election according to the new electoral law which substituted the direct to the previous two-stage voting system. The result shows an overwhelming majority for the traditional ruling clique. But this victory can best be maintained, or maintained at all, only by a wise, constructive and honest program of reform.

The last decade in the Arab world has seen the advance of the Arab countries towards greater control of their affairs and as members of the United Nations they are now sharing fully in the affairs of the family of nations. The decade has also seen the beginning of an experiment in closer Arab co-operation. Both trends are largely the outcome of World War II. The Palestine War came as an early test of Arab political maturity. If political maturity it did not show, the Arab world has at least shown considerable vitality and a sincere desire to improve and reform in the reactions to its failure in the War.

A notable development since 1948 has been the appearance of military dictatorships in Syria and Egypt, in many respects the two most important Arab countries. These new rulers and their backers represent a healthy type of Arab statesmen. They are vigorous, Western-orientated, moderate and reformist and so deserve the whole-hearted support of the West.

While one must deplore all authoritarian regimes, it is difficult not to be thankful that the Middle East is being given a real chance to reform itself through its own efforts and with almost complete absence of bloodshed.

The shocking social and economic conditions in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, could never have been seriously treated through normal Arab parliamentary channels, especially when the parliaments, themselves, were merely the instruments of the selfish ruling classes. The choice was between paying hypocritical deference for a non-existent democracy—with the ultimate open invitation to communism which it carried—or the assumption of power à la Nagib.

But consolation and hope may also be drawn from the fact that in Turkey an authoritarian regime was merely the prelude to a democratic one. May it be so throughout the Arab World!

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Presiding: SIDNEY SHERWOOD, *The Export-Import Bank*

ECONOMIC EVOLUTION

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IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY, economists invented the concept of the economic man. Today he seems, indeed, a curious fellow. He always bought in the cheapest market and he always sold in the dearest. He had complete mobility in his own movements. If he were a laborer, he was able to sell his services to the best monetary advantage at all times. If he were a capitalist, he was able to invest his funds in the enterprise and on the location which was, on commercial grounds, most attractive to him. In his social life he was recognized to have two mainsprings of action: one, the desire to get and to accumulate funds and other forms of wealth; and this desire held in check his other fundamental human impulse, the desire to beget. These principles of his conduct made it possible to predict a happy future for mankind, if its rulers had the good sense to let the ameliorating forces of nature and human intelligence have, within reasonable limits, full sway. Prosperity was sure to follow freedom in division of labor and free exchange of production.

While this greatly-over-simplified concept of humanity has been relegated to the limbo of discarded notions, we sometimes turn wistfully to the concept of the economic man and wish that he were back on today's stage. Our ideas on the liberalization of trading and commercial practices have been framed in the belief that it would be in the interest of mankind, in the aggregate, to behave more and more like the economic man invented by the nineteenth century political economist. Within national boundaries, we foster the freedom of movement of goods, of capital funds and even of people. We often preach the advantages of similar freedom on an international scale. But, when we turn to the Middle East, we often wonder whether the economic man has ever, indeed, existed. May we inquire whether it would not be a happier world if the Middle Easterner took more often the viewpoint of the economic man and less often the viewpoint of the political man?

Other papers at this conference will undoubtedly do full justice to the political man of the Middle East and will refer to the crises and tensions which plague North Africa, Egypt, Iran and the Arab states. I shall not trespass on their allotted territory, except to point out an often-expressed hope that economic well-being might go far to assist in ameliorating these political tensions.

We are told that throughout all Asia there is revolt among the peoples, a revolt arising from new aspirations for better social and economic conditions. This is a natural reaction of those who have seen such benefits achieved through the spread of material well-being elsewhere in the world. I know that many of our Arab friends, in whose wisdom we have the greatest confidence, consider that frequently this Western approach, hoping to find solutions for problems in the field of economic development, is most naïve.

Economic development, however, must be one of the tools to which we turn in our efforts to help peoples throughout all of Asia to fulfill their expressed aspirations to take their full part in the life of the twentieth century. Economic development must, in the long run, be a key to social stability, to greater defensive strength and to the development of the political institutions under which the individual can find it possible to play his full role of self-development in an atmosphere where he is healthy, strong, well-educated and fully productive. I believe that the political crises in the Middle East cannot be disconnected from frustrations that have arisen in the economic field. Surely, we all agree nowadays that it is increasingly difficult to determine at which point political issues cease to be political and become economic, and *vice versa.*

It may be profitable to review more fully some of the fundamentals underlying wise economic development in the Middle East. We should examine basic premises and the nature of the possibilities, lest the revolution of rising expectations, through misunderstanding of what should and can be done, becomes the revolt of unfulfilled aspirations or the revolt of frustrated peoples who feel that they have been led to believe that great things are possible in a short time and who, thus, have been sorely disappointed. To set unattainable goals and fail to achieve them will result in a letdown all the more serious because it is so clearly unnecessary.

I am going to suggest, first of all, that the Middle Eastern economic man cannot prosper unless he recognizes that none of the countries in

which he dwells, and not even the region as a whole, possesses the balanced resources, similar to the resources of the North American continent or of Europe, that will enable him to prosper in a frame of economic autarchy. Grant an exception, perhaps, in the case of South Asia, and surely this is a tenable thesis.

The wealth of the Middle East is in land, provided the land receives adequate water, and in petroleum. The region lacks the timberlands and mines which have enabled other countries to become increasingly self-sufficient. It would seem axiomatic that the Middle Easterner's hope for economic improvement can be fulfilled only if he adopts the premise that his skills and his natural resources, not found in such relatively great quantities elsewhere, must be exchanged with goods from abroad on fair terms, and axiomatic that he cannot hope to duplicate, within any time period which we can now foresee, the panoply of industrial development which has characterized many Western nations. We see today an attempt to build up a more or less self-sufficient state in Israel. Israel is depending on the skills of her workmen to overcome deficiencies in her natural resources. Watching the progress of Israel's industrial development, even her most friendly critics are increasingly skeptical of the possibilities of establishing economically sound industries on any large scale in that country.

In a highly competitive world, considerations of the economic man dictate relationships between factory locations and sources of raw materials to be fabricated. In such a world, transport costs can be all-important, indeed, are all-important in the production of materials such as steel, aluminum and other metals, fertilizers and other bulky materials that are the basis of modern economics. Here our political man of the Middle East is up against stubborn and ugly facts. He would like to think that having achieved political independence, his economic future is automatically assured. It is not. Unless he relies in increasing measure on exchange with the industrial West, his people cannot prosper. If he builds for the future in the secure knowledge that material prosperity and political security are based on the intermarriage of his economy with the economy of the West and that trade implies exchanges from which both sides profit, he is, then, on the track to better things. Least of all peoples on earth can the Middle Eastern afford to turn isolationist, economically or politically.

Among the programs which have been pressed by the United States

Government both before and after World War II has been the negotiation of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Such treaties are designed to create conditions under which trade between the parties can be conducted more freely and to improve the prospects for the investment of private funds in enterprises abroad. If we analyze United States thinking today, when the slogan, "Trade—Not Aid," is a current catchword, it may well be fair to assume that this is a policy which the United States is likely to continue. It is a policy which offers attractive possibilities to the Middle East. One basic aim of provisions in our standard Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is to safeguard investors against non-business hazards of foreign operations. The investor is left to take the economic risks of loss to which venture capital is always subject. It is believed that it is possible to overcome other grave hazards of a non-business nature through agreements made on an international level. Such hazards have become increasingly characteristic in overseas business operations in recent years. They assume many forms: inequitable tax structures, confiscatory expropriation laws, rigid employment controls, special favors to state-owned businesses, drastic exchange restrictions and other discriminations against foreign capital. Such restrictions are a formidable obstacle to the foreign investor or trader. Would it not be in the interests of the Middle East to remove these hazards, or fear of these hazards, by negotiating treaties which establish mutually-agreed upon standards of treatment for the citizens and enterprises of both contracting countries?

When we suggest that the future hope of the Middle East in the material sphere must lie in interchange with the West, we must not fall into the trap of believing that the economic future of the Middle East lies in its becoming a vast farm and oil field. This is not true, either. But it is primarily on its relative advantages in possession of ample sources of fuel and on the availability of agricultural products, that those who hope to build up industry in the Middle East must rely. Therefore, while we applaud efforts undertaken by Middle Eastern countries to diversify the occupations of their people, to get people off the farm and into other fields of activity, planners must recognize that they cannot succeed unless they fully recognize that for decades ahead there must be interchange of goods with other parts of the world on an increasing scale if Middle Eastern peoples are to achieve higher material standards.

A great hope for the future must be that one of the assets of the Middle

East, petroleum, can be exchanged with the West on fair terms to enable the Middle East, in turn, to receive from the West resources which will enable its people to improve their own capital plant and equipment, both in agriculture and industry. These oil resources are a wasting asset. This suggests they be exchanged for other capital assets, rather than for current consumer goods.

Why is oil a wasting asset? Not necessarily because supplies will some day run out. The Middle East must also reckon with possible changes in the technology of the West. While today petroleum appears essential to Western economies, this may not always be the case. Other forms of energy will challenge the predominance of petroleum in Western industrialization and transport. It would bode ill for the Middle East if long-range plans did not take this possibility into account and if such plans neglected the consideration that it would be rash to depend indefinitely on a continuing flow of petroleum in increasing volume and at high prices.

There is a good case in the Middle East for the protection of certain infant industries. This case should be studied on a highly selective basis. There is a case to protect those industries which can be expected to find their own sound economic foundation within a reasonable period of time. Elsewhere the economic man, possibly not the political man, advocates a policy of free trade or of liberalized trade in other segments of the industrial economy which cannot reasonably be expected to compete on economic terms with friendly rivals in other countries.

The Middle East could thus forge an unbreakable economic link with the West based on mutual interdependence of exchanges of goods. The East can look to the West for sources of capital goods which could develop its basic economic structure. It can look to the West for assistance in developing ports, roads, air transport and possibly railroads, though building of railroads has today gone out of fashion in many countries because commercial considerations dictate other measures on grounds of economy. The Middle East can look to the West for development of presently unused water resources, and marry its interest with those of Western engineers and designers who could speed the process of development in intensive agriculture.

There are many barriers on such a course, but fortunately steps are already being taken to overcome them. There is the barrier of language. There is the barrier of insufficiently-trained experts in various fields in the

Middle East. There are colleges in being and colleges to come which will overcome this barrier. There is the barrier of lack of skills at secondary mechanical levels, which is being remedied and which must be remedied on an increasing scale through provisions for vocational education.

There is the tendency to conservatism on the part of all peoples; perhaps, the Middle Easterners are especially conservative. We must, if this development is to take place, expect to see a gradual change in many habits and customs of the Middle East, as nomadic people become settled and as agricultural and pastoral people find their way into the new industries which can be established. This will cause stress and strain in the social and in the political fabric. All the wisdom of social scientists will be needed in order to minimize the effects of these stresses and of these strains.

Middle Eastern thinking and Middle Eastern customs must, if the ideal of the economic man is to be achieved, be somehow brought into tune and harmony with the measure of Western technology. The genius of Western production is mass production based on division of labor. The genius of the Middle East is often expressed in individual craftsmanship and in family craftsmanship. One cannot have it both ways. If the Middle East is to become more productive, it must look to Western methods in the future and turn its back on many of its habits and customs, so attractive in themselves, which have lingered for so long in the culture of the Middle East.

We might well turn now to a few specific cases, both by way of warning and by way of hope of what can be done when the technology of the West is married to the economy of the Middle East in the endeavor to raise living standards. Take a case in Egypt. For a period of some thirty years, from 1890 to 1920, there were no less than five thousand technical experts from abroad resident in Egypt, largely devoted to control of the waters of the Nile, to develop power and to make possible perennial irrigation in increasing measure in the valley and delta of the river.

As a result of this joint effort of Western and Middle Eastern cooperation in the major field of water development, the acreage cultivated in Egypt increased effectively no less than one hundred percent, taking into account the fact that the new methods of irrigation enabled an average of one and a half crops per annum to be harvested from certain lands. During the same period, the population of Egypt has more than

doubled, and reliable observers point out that the continuing increase of the population has resulted in a diminution rather than in increase of the standard of living.

In spite of this development of land, large areas of Egypt remain in what we identify as the underdeveloped category, in the sense that its peoples have a low standard of living and this standard is not presently being increased as the years go by. The population continues to increase at a rate of about two percent per annum against what is now a static supply of land; crop yields have declined despite increasing use of fertilizer. Now, here is a development which can hardly be described as one which will reduce social tensions or increase the stability and the well-being of the peoples along the lines which we idealize. The engineer and the financier have done their part. Much remains to be done, and the example of this development on the Nile is a continuing challenge to those who advocate a course of increasing the fertility of the land and do not at the same time consider the doctrines of Malthus and the correctives that might be undertaken in the field of human fertility.

Had history come to a stop sometime in the early 1940's, we might have cited the case of Palestine as an example where the result of economic development had been of substantial and proven benefit to a large section of the Middle Eastern populace. As a result of reasonably good government, rather large sums spent on capital development and intelligent exploitation of natural resources, the population in Palestine was moving forward along lines which had substantially ameliorated the economic lot of the Arab and had enabled him in large numbers to join in an educational movement which resulted in a high percentage of literacy.

Hand in hand with the growth of education there was an increase in agricultural production, both as a result of the physical development of new lands and adaptation of new techniques, of which a specific and especially valuable example was the development of the citrus industry. In the notions of my nineteenth-century economic man, this was an ideal sort of development. The soil and climate of Palestine are especially suitable for the growth of the best sort of oranges, grapefruit and lemons which command a world-wide market. Trading in such products with Europe brought advantages, both to the producing country which shipped its citrus and to the producing country which, in turn, shipped its manufactures. On fair terms of trade, there could be no more advantageous economic relationship than such as this.

The West can bring a great deal to the Middle East with its ability to engineer and carry out projects in the field of transport. There could not be a better way to assist in the economy of the Middle East or a more effective instrument for the Middle East to use in developing hitherto unused lands and in facilitating exchange of merchandise among neighboring states. Clearly, also, the Western influence in air transport is one which the Middle East will wish to cultivate and to emulate. Intensification of air traffic, for passengers and freight, should be the order of the day and must be to the best interests of all concerned. The magic of the Mecca airlift which was arranged through our own Departments of State and Defense in August, 1952, will not soon be forgotten.

But it is in the field of the development of the water resources of the Middle East that most can and should be done in the years ahead. A good start is being made in Iraq in control of the floodwaters of the Tigris River through a magnificently-conceived project in which the West participates with Iraq through the operations of the International Bank. This is just the beginning of what is possible with the resources of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers. Further developments lie ahead on the Orontes, on the Litani and on the Jordan, to say nothing of the Nile or of the rivers of Iran.

Irrigation was invented in the Middle East many centuries before the Christian era. It reached a high stage of development in the days of the early Arabs, and many of the magnificent works built in those days still survive. Others have been destroyed. Western machines and Western engineering techniques can here find a useful role on a scale which should enable the man-land ratio to be modified to such a degree that the value of the man, as compared to the value of the acre, takes a relationship in which the man is the scarce article. Thus, and only thus, the economic man can sell his services in a relatively advantageous market.

In such a course, however, there are barriers and pitfalls ahead. I would dismiss the barrier of lack of capital as perhaps the least significant, as it can be overcome readily by resources in the region, itself, and by other resources from abroad when the case for its utility is proven.

What is still lacking is specific planning, and here, in the short run, is the source of vexatious frustration. The Middle East is tired of surveys, so are its Western friends. But the engineer approaches his subject with great reserve and caution, and after his general recon-

naissance, which he calls a "survey," he will, before he commits himself on a specific design, generally carry out his studies in "phases," and his final phase, the blueprint which can be turned over to the contractor, is a long time in preparation. When his calculations depend on political agreements between sovereign states, looking to agreements on division of waters, yet another series of discussions must precede action. The point, then, is not that there are too many surveys, but that there are too few blueprints. Only with blueprints—not general surveys—in their hands can our Middle Eastern friends go to construction firms and say, "Make me a bid on this project," or to banks and say, "Will you finance this project, and what are your charges?"

An example of what still lies ahead is found in the case of Lebanon's Litani River. A survey was proposed in 1949, discussed in 1950, begun in 1951 and is now expected to reach a phase of final design late in 1953. Knowing what I know of the infinite pains that must precede action on the scale and of the importance involved in the development of a river, are we not prudent in allotting a part of 1954 to the review of these specific proposals, and more months still to the development of financial —and social—considerations before we see structures rising in this valley?

Another specific development urged at the same time by the Clapp Mission was the Ghab swamp on the Orontes. Here specific planning was needed to make it possible to win a very productive area for the benefit of Syria's economy. 1949 has moved on to 1953, and we understand that the blueprint of the Ghab will soon be ready.

These two cases are special in that the engineer's problems do not cross international boundary lines. When one considers other possibilities —the Tigris, Euphrates and Jordan—the multinational significance of engineering plans will involve other factors of necessary delay. Those statesmen of the Middle East who hope for great development of these rivers have their own task to provide the setting of international agreement without which these great resources cannot be put to their best use. Along with their work must go the training of those who are to be entrusted with the all-important work of operation and maintenance. Otherwise, the nations will have built useless monuments to futility.

We hear much today on the subject of land reform. Our own government policy has been to encourage sound plans, leading to more equitable shares of production as between landowner on the one hand and tenant on the other, and to encourage more widespread ownership of the land by

the man who tills it. The great hope of improving such relationships lies not only in legislation which can correct many abuses but also in reclamation measures which will improve the man-land ratio. As long as teeming millions are pressing on limited areas of land, an equalitarian division is not going to suffice to raise living standards to any considerable extent. While improvements may be possible in cutting the pie of production, what is needed above all is to bake a much bigger pie. It is to this end that the great reclamation schemes can prove effective.

Revolt in the Middle East! It is here in the revolution of rising aspirations. Reform and Change! They can meet the revolution and find beneficent channels for the revolt. These channels must be buoyed by those with knowledge of the seaway and the desired location of the harbor. The seaway has shoals and rocks marked xenophobia—economic nationalism—self-sufficiency. When we reach the harbor we will find that in the exchanges of commerce we have achieved a fruitful result in material well-being, just as we do in other ways when we exchange our ideas, freely, in a liberal university or at a conference such as this one being held by The Middle East Institute.

Third Session, Part I, Friday evening, March 6th
Presiding: FERDINAND KUHN, *The Washington Post*

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE UNITED STATES

ALLAH-YAR SALEH
Ambassador of Iran in the United States

IT IS A SOURCE OF PLEASURE for all Middle Eastern people to know Americans are making rapid strides towards a better knowledge of Middle Eastern countries. It is, indeed, remarkable how much progress has been made, within a short period in recent years, by private institutions in bringing about a better understanding of the Middle East in America. Little more than a month ago some of us took part in the very useful meeting of the American Friends of the Middle East at their annual banquet in New York. Another helpful institution is the Near East Foundation, about which I am sure you already know. It seems that Asia, and particularly the Middle Eastern countries, are now obtaining the attention which they have deserved for many years. Only recently another American institution, The American Academy of Asian Studies, presented to the Diplomatic Corps in Washington a film, called, *Mahatma Gandhi, Twentieth Century Prophet.* I am sure many of you are familiar with another valuable institution, called, The Asia Institute, in New York, which has been sponsored by a number of distinguished Americans, including Professor and Mrs. Upham Pope and Dr. Ackerman. These names will be everlastingly remembered for the precious work which produced the six volumes, called, *A Survey of Persian Art.*

In addition to these institutions, which have been organized for the purpose of disseminating knowledge about Asia, and particularly the Middle East, useful work is being done by the countries, themselves. I am sure all of you have looked with admiration upon the progress of construction on the beautiful mosque while passing along Massachusetts Avenue here in Washington. This religious center, sponsored by Islamic countries, is part of a larger cultural project to promote a better understanding of Islam in the United States.

I understand the Arab League is now seriously contemplating the extension of this idea by building similar centers in the United States.

Individual philanthropists from Middle Eastern countries are also making valuable contributions. In this connection, I must mention the name of my compatriot Mr. Mohammad Nemazee, who has created the well-known Iran Foundation in New York. This Foundation has already accomplished considerable municipal, health and sanitation work, bringing to the famous city of Shiraz in the province of Fars a modern hospital and clinical facilities and a scientifically planned water works—the first in all Iran.

American universities and colleges are giving close attention to studies concerning the Middle East. I believe Princeton and Columbia Universities are taking the leading role in this pursuit, although there are other colleges and universities throughout the United States which are becoming more and more interested in Middle Eastern studies. Last December, Macalester College at St. Paul, Minnesota, celebrated the millenium of Avicenna, the great Iranian philosopher and scientist.

The Cooperative Forum in Washington, D. C., as many of you are well aware, has also been giving time and attention to problems concerning the Middle East. There, Americans and nationals of other countries with knowledge and experience have made valuable speeches and have exchanged opinions in regard to conditions in these countries and the methods of handling various problems.

Having attended several conferences and having talked with many American friends, I have come to the conclusion that considerable success has been achieved and that a larger number of Americans, some of them holding responsible positions in public life, have come to understand numerous facts about Middle Eastern countries, among which are the following:

1. The Middle East is the crossroads between Europe and Asia, and contains more than half of the entire world's proven oil resources;

2. The security of the Middle East is closely related to the security of the United States and Western Europe;

3. The Muslim world of three hundred million people yearns to be counted upon as members of the world community, working for peace and human progress;

4. Vast national resources are available in this area to support a great economic development which would benefit not only the Muslim people, but also the United States and Europe, which are becoming more dependent on imported raw materials;

5. With improved agricultural methods and irrigation, the Middle East can support its population in accordance with the well-fed and health standards familiar to Americans;

6. Certain reform laws, particularly those concerning land, are being enacted;

and 7. In spite of the Point Four Program and various other helpful projects, the situation in the Middle East is rapidly deteriorating and Communist infiltration is growing. The Middle East is in dire need of economic development, promotion of health and popular education, far beyond the scope of present programs.

While many people in the United States now seem to be well informed on the points just mentioned, there are other facts which still need to be considered.

a—The insurgence of nationalism in the Middle East is not aimed at isolation, but at self-determination. This is not anti-foreign, but anti foreigners who would impose their control over Middle East countries. Middle Eastern people have proven time and again their interest in and respect for Western institutions. Iran alone has today approximately twelve hundred of its students in the United States and an equal number in various countries of Western Europe. Middle Eastern nationalism is generally based on democratic ideology. It is evidence of strength and popular vitality which is directed toward achieving freedom. This cannot be regarded as a menace, but as a contribution to the peace of the free world.

b—The Middle Eastern people are awakened. They are demanding that their governments be more responsive to them and to accomplish administrative, social and economic reform.

c—The extension of technical and economic assistance to the people of the Middle East will not bring forth the desired results, unless it is accompanied by recognition by the West of the political aspirations of the Middle East.

d—The people of the Middle East, whether in Iran or Egypt or any other country, want a change from foreign domination to complete independence. While this popular expression takes the form of nationalism, it recognizes the new world order of interdependence of states.

e—The Middle East countries are making a big jump from the status of dependent areas, as we are frequently called, to responsible independent states. If this big jump is to be successful we need the help of

the American people who know how to help other people without considering it necessary to control them.

f—The chief reason for a certain amount of Communistic progress in the Middle East is that Communists have been able to take advantage of traditional policies of Western governments as they affected the Middle East. Some of these governments have pursued colonial policies towards Middle Eastern countries and in some instances they are still following those policies. The West will not be able to rule over nations in the Middle East by means of arms, but it can obtain their cooperation through friendship.

g—Thanks to nationalism, Middle Eastern countries are more willing and able to defend themselves against aggression today than before the war. So, for example, in the case of Egypt, I believe the Suez Canal can better be protected to the eventual advantage of Western countries by the proud and patriotic people of Egypt, themselves. I would feel more confident of protection of the Suez Canal by the Egyptians than by an imposed foreign army.

h—Fighting for the sake of justice is encouraged in Islam. Martyrdom (particularly in my own country) is idealized. Thousands would risk their lives for noble ends. This is contrary to some Western conceptions that Middle Eastern people would yield to anything for philosophical reasons.

i—The basis for unity in the Middle East exists in the religion of Islam. Also in each country of the Middle East, besides religion, there are other bases for unity. For example, the Iranian nation has a basis in race and language for its own unity, as well as the pervasive influence of Persian art and culture.

j—It is no longer possible to negotiate with governments in the Middle East over the heads of their people. There is developing a public opinion that is asserting itself.

k—The West must in all wisdom try to understand these things and encourage the right to live, freedom and constructive action. A great majority of the people in the Middle East are still devoted to America and for this reason the problem of the Middle East, which seems to be very alarming to many Americans (who often judge conditions in that area by exaggerated reports or by hasty trips), is not difficult to solve.

l—The West should take advantage of American popularity in the Middle East and, by accepting its leadership, should try to preserve

the friendship of Middle Eastern countries for the West. Middle Eastern people ask the United States not to forget the basic principles of men and nations, which are the basis of your own democratic development.

I, therefore, propose that American institutions like the American Friends of the Middle East and The Middle East Institute devote more attention to studying problems of the Middle East from the points of view just mentioned and then see whether or not the application of moral principles by America as the leader of Western civilization will not produce a solution of existing problems. The people of the Middle East are looking to America with hope. They are anxiously awaiting an expression of policy from Washington which will rally the spirit of the Middle East and direct its resources towards a better life and greater security. Nationalist groups in these countries have tried to check Communists from taking power, chiefly through giving such hope to the majority of people—the hope that the United States will, before it is too late, fulfill the duties of Western leadership.

The recent statement by President Eisenhower after he had received Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia created hope in the hearts of the Middle Eastern people. According to a White House statement issued on March 2nd, "The President expressed his concern over some evidence that there had lately occurred a deterioration in relations between Arab nations and the United States." He stated that "it would be his firm purpose to seek to restore the support of confidence and trust which had previously characterized these relations."

Some clauses in the splendid Inaugural Address of the President have also been looked upon as good news in the Middle East. Among them two statements were specifically noted:

"Honoring the identity and the special heritage of each nation in the world, we shall never use our own strength to try to impress on another people our own cherished political and economic institutions.

"We reject any insinuation that one race or another, one people or another is in any sense inferior or expendable."

These expressions of policy from the President revive in the hearts of the Middle Eastern people the confidence that was created by the Fourteen Points declared by the late President Wilson. They give reassurance that America is the supporter of justice among nations, large and small, alike.

As people in the Middle East learn more of their apparent hopeless lot

in life and of the better conditions that are coming to pass in other parts of the world, a burning sense of resentment and revolt possesses them and because of this they incline towards extreme solutions. Some nations see these signs only as a threat to their own economic and political privileges in the Middle East. "Strategic interests" afford the plausible excuse for the pursuit of colonial polices by these nations towards the Middle East. But the United States has demonstrated to the world that strategic interests, correctly defined, can be protected by cooperation with local people. Its leadership in promoting this policy in the Middle East must meet the test of overcoming the influence of the traditional policies of other nations, which are already proved to be wrong. Such a test is now being waged on the Iranian oil dispute which has shut down Iran's main industry and principal source of foreign revenue. Here the big question is how far will America's traditional polices of the "open door" and equality among nations be pursued in opposition to the traditional attitude of political capitulations and economic privilege which is still very much in evidence as the oil dispute drags on and on.

Without any political intent and with only a desire to help the people of these countries, the United States has poured mountains of friendship and millions of dollars into Middle Eastern schools, hospitals and institutions of higher learning. It has, thereby, gained a prestige and popularity which provide a sound basis for America's leadership in this critical area of the world. It is the earnest desire of all Middle Eastern people that this leadership will be affirmatively expressed before it is too late.

The solution of the Middle Eastern dilemma lies in the words of your great Abraham Lincoln, who said, "Let us have faith that right makes might and in that faith let us to the end dare to do our duty as we understand it."

Third Session, Part II, Friday evening, March 6th
Presiding: FERDINAND KUHN, *The Washington Post*

THE INDUSTRIAL FUTURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST

JAMES TERRY DUCE
Vice President, Arabian American Oil Company

WHEN I ACCEPTED THE INVITATION to speak tonight, I did not know that the other speaker would be the Iranian Ambassador. In view of the critical political situation in Iran, had I known, I might well have hesitated, but it is now too late to draw back and I shall hew to the line and let the chips fall where they may.

Industry is, of course, an old word, first meaning hard work, and later in history having come to mean that development that results from the interaction among natural resources, labor and management, or possibly I should say planning. We have to have the three elements to make a successful industrial enterprise—the materials to work with, the workers to carry on the work, and the planners to plan the efficient application of labor to the resource. Beyond these, one has to have two other things—capital and customers. As an industrialist, I can assure you that both are necessities—the one to provide the working funds and machines so necessary in modern times, and the other to provide a market. No matter how efficiently one operates, if one produces something no one wants, the enterprise will be a failure.

Let us look at these elements in the Middle East. First, there are the natural resources. Unfortunately we know all too little about the resources of the Middle East, and here I must for a moment turn to geography. I will include the area from Egypt to Afghanistan excluding Turkey. This great area includes about 2,500,000 square miles or about two-thirds of the area of the United States. Only on its fringes and in the mountains is there adequate rainfall. Its rivers are small, even the famous ones, the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates combination, are relatively small rivers when compared in volume to the other great rivers of the world and, further than that, they are subject to immense seasonal variations. This is a long way of saying that most of the area is desert. The ground water resources of the area have been but poorly explored.

If important resources are found underground, their development will need to be most carefully regulated, for the intake which supplies this is from the sparse rainfall of the desert. As water is one of the fundamental needs of industry, I might add at this point that it may well be that, in the end, the basic limitation on the development of manufacturing industry in the Middle East may be the inadeqate water supply. It is certainly the limiting factor on agriculture.

Furthermore, it is my belief that, inadequate though these water resources be, a tremendous amount of work needs to be done to provide for their efficient use. In arid countries this is an essential. Dams and regulatory works are needed on practically all of the streams, and some of them must form part of an international scheme, for the main rivers rise in several countries and pass through others to the sea. The rivers should be treated as units even if boundaries cross them. I might add in passing that a general survey of the water resources of the area is badly needed and, if possible, means of diverting additional water into the area should be studied. There is every reason to believe the necessary regulatory works can be successfully financed, for they convert practically useless desert land into areas of great agricultural value. Agricultural land thus won from the desert might add as much as ten percent of the area to the agriculturally productive area. However, the distribution of that new irrigated land will fall largely in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Afghanistan. Fundamental research on the conversion of sea water to fresh water is of paramount interest to the people of the Middle East. If at a reasonable economic cost we can freshen sea water we face an entirely different problem.

Let us turn from the problem of water to that of minerals. I shall leave oil and gas to the last. Contrary to the usual impression, we know practically nothing of the metallic mineral resources of the Middle East. I suspect that one of the reasons has been the laws applicable to minerals. Prospecting is a thing men do if they can see the vision of possible wealth. If they know that they will not profit by their discoveries, they will not set out on the search. Outside of the iron deposits of Egypt, we cannot, at this time, say there are any major deposits of the metallic ores in the Middle East. Gold and silver, to be sure, are mined in Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia, but the great metal industries noted in ancient times in the area have no modern counterparts. Perhaps the answer is "The deposits are not there." But I suspect it is otherwise—no adequate search has been

made. With mining laws so written as to encourage exploration, commercial deposits may well be found. The copper discoveries in the Negev are of interest in this respect. In contrast to the metallic ores, non-metallic resources are very great—the clays, the various salts, the cement materials (limestones and gypsums), silica for glass, potash and phosphates are found in more than adequate quantities. It is probable, too, that sulphur, mineable by the Frash process, will be discovered sometime on the salt domes of the Persian Gulf, but I would warn you that hunting for such sulphur deposits is much more of a gamble than hunting for needles in a haystack. The great sulphur deposits of the American Gulf Coast were found accidentally only in the search for oil.

Let us turn for a moment to the fuels—the proved oil reserves of the Persian Gulf are approaching seventy billion barrels. With the oil occurs natural gas and we might estimate that five hundred cubic feet of gas occurs in the area with each barrel of oil; so gas reserves may now lie in the neighborhood of thirty-five billion thousand cubic feet. The oil is equivalent to about fifteen billion tons of coal and the gas to one and one-half billion tons. Here we should make two observations: first, that the fuel reserves even now are available for any possible contingency; and second, that their exploration has just begun. We drill some 7,000 wildcats in the United States per annum. In all history we have yet to drill three hundred such wells in the entire Middle East. We can find much more oil and gas so the future discoveries are likely to be great.

What is needed here is markets. You might note here that the world consumes about twelve million barrels of oil per day. Of this amount, the United States consumes seven million barrels per day. At the same time the United States' proved reserves of crude oil are 27,468,000,000 barrels. This does not include natural gas liquids of which there are 4,724,000,000 (1952 figures). Please do not get enmeshed in speculation over these figures for the permutations and combinations that affect them are of infinite complexity. Let us stop these considerations with this observation. First, most of these fuels must be sold outside the Middle East, and, second, the supply is evidently adequate for any demand that may be put on it. If fuel were the only problem of industrialization, we would have no problem.

Now let us turn to the labor supply. We have within the area of which we are talking some fifty million people. They range from rulers and intellectuals to the fellaheen, from prince to pauper. The general standard

of living is low and the incidence of disease is high. Nevertheless, latent skills are great and the people are in the main industrious. We must not forget that the dwellers in the Middle East created the basis of the civilization we so much prize today. My own experience is that the Middle Easterner learns rapidly and is easily adapted to the practices of industry. I would suspect we may find a shortage of labor in the future and there are at present many things wrong with the labor supply. Bad health is one and inadequate training is another. It is not difficult to find well-trained engineers, lawyers and other intellectuals, but the great gap lies in the artisans' group so characteristic of the United States, the mechanics who can repair or build a car, the construction foremen who can take the blueprint of a dam or a road and produce the article the engineers design. One should not be surprised at this for in a primitive economy there is little demand for such people. The gap is being filled by training in schools and industry.

Granted, then, that we have the raw materials and the labor—where will we find the capital? First, let me say that I believe the volume of hoarded capital in the Middle East is relatively large, but it is in stocks of gold and silver in vaults and in back rooms. There is a lack of those financial institutions such as banks, finance companies and building and loan associations by which this hoarded capital can be drawn out of hiding and put to work. But be that as it may, the large part of the capital needed in the Middle East must be brought in from the outside. How much investment does the Middle East require? If we consider taking a large period of time, the requirements become almost incalculable. Communications, alone—roads, railroads and ports to modernize the Middle East—will swallow up immense sums. Before industry can develop, means must be found to build those communications upon which the swift and sure interchange of goods depend. Schools, hospitals and similar institutions will consume other large capital sums—this without any consideration for industrial expansion. Some of the projects are self-liquidating. Many are not. Fortunately, government revenues in the oil-rich states, if properly administered, may provide the capital for these purposes. Outside of these states the problem is more difficult.

The question of industrial expansion is something else. In the first place, the oil companies have put at least two billion dollars in the oil developments in the various states. This has been invested in plants, pipelines and other facilities. I would estimate that they have invested

considerably more than this in facilities outside the area to market oil products shipped out of the Middle East, and I shall return to this subject a little later. As to its capital requirements, industrial development in the Middle East may roughly be divided into three categories. First, there are industries which produce products mainly for export. Oil lies in this classification, and if any large metallic mineral deposits are found they will probably occupy the same status. For such developments capital must come from outside the area. The amounts are so great and the industries, themselves, have immense capital requirements outside the region in order to market the product. Further than that, the very existence of this type of industry depends upon extensive roots abroad. The visible part of such an industry in the Middle East is only a small part of the total organization, for, like the floating iceberg, four-fifths of the enterprise lies abroad in the pipelines, tankers, refineries and distributing facilities. The lack of understanding of these difficulties has been at the core of the Iranian oil problem.

The second group are those industries which depend largely on local consumption with some part of their products going abroad. Such industries are those manufacturing nitrogenous fertilizers, cement, potash and similar products. Here the capital, it seems to me, should be at least partially local and only a portion should come from outside the area.

The third class of industry is that which is carried on primarly to supply consumers in the area and local capital should certainly be dominant in such industries. I would include in this such industries as textiles, leather, glass, structural materials other than iron and steel, etc.

Now, as I look down the road from my particular ivory tower, it seems to me that I see multiple possibilities for such industrial development of the Middle East. First, there are the oil developments which I expect will continue to enrich the area providing they are not interfered with by political events. If oil prices do not fall, I would expect the foreign exchange equivalent of something like sixty cents a barrel to flow into the Middle East in taxes, as well as large funds for wages, purchases and other payments to local people. Associated with these developments are such projects as that recently discussed for the transmission of gas to Europe, and possibly later, eastward into India. These are great international projects needing immense quantities of capital and whose construction is frought with the most complicated and delicate of political

problems. It may be, indeed, that the political factors may well tip the balance against these desirable projects.

Satellitic to the oil industry and dependent upon it for fuel, we may see the development of a whole series of new industries in which local capital participates with foreign capital. Let me mention a few of the possibilities. The manufacture of nitrogenous fertilizers and carbon black from natural gas and the provision of large units of power for such industries as textiles and cement are huge developments requiring large quantities of capital and very considerable diplomatic and managerial skill. From a recent examination we have made of these industries, the indication is that the return of capital will take a considerable period of time. Political stability is therefore essential to their growth.

Lastly, we come to those industries which are purely local and which again depend upon the oil industry for fuel. Some of these are glass, brick and tile, food processing, shoe making and similar local industries. In addition to these, one might think of the application of gas to the pumping of water on a large scale for irrigation. Such industries must depend largely upon local capital, though they may import the managerial skills when necessary to supplement the local skills.

I am not trying to draw an exact picture of the future nor could I at this moment, and I would now raise the question with you as to whether or not industrialization is worthwhile. For my part, I believe that it is greatly worthwhile, for, if properly applied, it will greatly raise the standard of living and permit the establishment of adequate health standards and educational institutions. Some of our friends in the Middle East might argue that they are perhaps better as they are without the complications of modern life. There is possibly some philosophical doubt here and I am reminded of a discussion which a doctor had with me in which he indicated that all this fuss about health was probably not for the general good for, being a Malthusian, he thought that the world would become overcrowded if we solved our medical problems. Be that as it may, if industrial development results in the increase in well-being and health of the people, it would be almost everybody's choice.

The other important factor which we must remember is that industrialization strengthens the ability of a country to maintain its political independence and the freedom of its people. If the Middle Eastern countries had been strong, if they had adequate industrial development and, paralleled with them, had developed educational institutions and

trained their manpower for national service, some of the events of the last few years might not have happened.

The great necessity in the Middle East, indeed, is to strengthen all portions of the body politic. Industrialization is one of the means to this end and, in order to have industrialization, it is necessary to create an inflow of capital. Now the modern world with its intricate industrial and financial organizations is dependent primarily upon the promises men make to one another. The performance of these promises is astonishingly consistent throughout the modern world. The repayment of bank deposits, which are merely promises of a bank to pay, is rarely if ever dishonored. Even when it comes to the poorest of people, it has been found that simple credit can be freely extended upon their word. If nations had within themselves the same moral principles that lie within the individual, I am sure that our problem of inducing the flow of capital into countries like the Middle East would be small, indeed.

But capital will not flow unless it is protected from confiscation. I am not suggesting here that contracts entered into which have obvious defects should necessarily be inviolate, but when such defects arise they should be corrected by careful negotiation. It is only when nations establish the reputation for fair treatment that capital from abroad can be induced to come in and help develop them. Further than that, it is my strong opinion that capital for such development should be private capital. I am not speaking here of government projects, but of industrial projects. It should be private because the private capital is solely interested in the problem in which it is working and is not likely to become involved in political matters which are separate and a part from the actual problems of production.

I might stop here and remark that the Israelis are in one sense showing what can be done and I am not suggesting to this audience that the Israeli venture is a model. As a matter of fact, it has always seemed to me to be a kind of a desperate effort. A great many hundreds of millions of dollars have been poured into it from outside and continue to be sent from outside sources and, at the same time, the Israelis benefited by the confiscation of innumerable Arab properties, including whole cities in the Palestinian plains for which no compensation has yet been paid—a factor not even contemplated in the United Nations Resolutions which only dealt with political matters. It has always seemed to me that the first step towards peace would be a willingness in principle, without

political strings, to pay for the properties of the people who have been so summarily dispossessed.

I believe that we will see the gradual industrialization of the Middle East and the matters that are merely visions to us who live in the ivory towers of industrial management will ultimately come to reality—they will come about because they are to the benefit of all people—because the Middle East cannot be permitted by its own people to languish forever with low standards of living—because many of the things found in the Middle East are needed by the world community.

The great traditions of classic times will revive again. To do this, the Middle East must of itself do many things. Legislation should be passed to encourage development of new industries by private capital. Why do I say private capital? Becase it involves no political commitments. Intergovernment loans have a tendency to dry up private sources. There is a sort of Gresham's law that applies to such loans and to capital investments. If such a program were developed, I would guess that total wealth of the Middle East as measured in production would rapidly outrun population growth. From this industrial development would grow the financial and political strength so greatly to be desired. I would remind you that the Middle East is an essential link in the free world, between the East and West. It should be strong and independent. Industrial development is one of the roads to this goal.

Fourth Session, Part I, Saturday morning, March 7th
Presiding: W. WENDELL CLELAND, *Department of State*

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CARLETON STEVENS COON
The University Museum, University of Pennsylvania

OTHERS MAY QUESTION, as Dr. Badeau did, the validity of linking together the two words and the two concepts, "social" and "evolution," on the grounds that since evolution is a genetic term it cannot be applied to social or historical phenomena. In a friendly fashion I beg to disagree. In my opinion evolution can, in a wide sense, be applied to the social and historical disciplines, since human behavior is nothing more than an extension of the biological realm. Both genetics and culture are parts of the overall pattern of life, which evolves.

In biology we are familiar with the old rule that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, or more simply, that the embryo passes through every stage from that of a single cell to that of a newborn babe. At one moment you have gill-slits, a little later you have flippers, and finally you come into the world looking and behaving like a youthful human being. During this process, however, everything does not grow at the same rate. First the brain enlarges, and the eyes become big early in the process of growth, and then change little in size. The same thing happens in social evolution, particularly when one part of the world is advancing more rapidly than another. First, country A will advance rapidly, causing lopsided changes in B, and then B twists A.

It is frequently said that we of the West owe much to the Middle East for its incalculable gifts to us, but this debt is not one sided. Moreover, as Messrs. Gardner, Duce, and others have so clearly stated, the specific items which constitute our influence on the Middle East have not been issued in the same sequence in which we ourselves have received them. Only as byproducts of a general advance in technical skill, heavy industry, and scientific research were our ancestors able to invent and perfect the printing press, railroad, telegraph, telephone, radio, automobile, truck, airplane, and television, to name but some of the more important means of transport and communication which characterize the modern world.

When the nations of the Middle East acquired these devices they did so directly, without taking over the preliminary steps. Most of these devices must be bought from us rather than being manufactured locally. Transportation and communication devices always tend to unify politically the units of geography which they serve, for with newspapers, the telegraph, and radio people who can move about on trains, buses, and planes become increasingly aware of their mutual responsibilities and their membership in a given unit of humanity. However, in the Middle East the size of the political units is still based on a set of boundaries dictated by a handicraft type of industry. The nations which arose there after the breakup of the Turkish empire are too small for the next step, industrialization. Had they received industry first and modern transport and communication later, and had they not been chopped up into units to suit the convenience of rival "protecting" powers, there might have been but a single country stretching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. However, the division is recent and not deeply rooted, as in the undersized countries of western Europe.

Confusion which arises when one country or culture area receives innovations out of order will eventually disappear as an adjustment is made. I presume that an example of this process is the arrival of Christianity in the West; we evidently were not ready for it and all sorts of changes had to be made before our society became adjusted to it.

In order to examine this general thesis a little more carefully, I shall consider it historically and in the depth of time. No phenomenon can be studied successfully and with understanding without considering the dimension of time in a manner similar to Dr. Einstein's, who includes the speed of light in his equation concerning energy and matter. Without the speed of light, he could not have explained the nature of the universe. Without the depth of time we cannot understand what has happened to the evolution of social institutions in the Middle East or in any other part of the world. It is necessary to go back a very long way. I shall go back to the third inter-glacial period which probably was situated sometime between 100,000 and 40,000 B. C. That may seem to have very little to do with what Dr. Mossadeq wants, with oil royalties, or with anything of that kind, but I think that it does have a great deal to do with them.

During the third inter-glacial period we know that human beings very similar to ourselves were already alive. Man had evolved com-

pletely, but some stray types still lurked around that were different from the ones still living today. Neanderthal man was still alive and there may have been some half-brained ape-men surviving in Java, and other remote islands. But, by and large, most of the human beings in the world were normal human beings just as capable of cultural development as we are. If you could reach back, grab, and tie up a third inter-glacial man, and then send him to school, he would probably be able to stand up here and give a splendid lecture.

Geographically speaking, the world was about the same as it is today, for this is an inter-glacial period, but the capacity of human beings to move about was quite different from what it is today. A big mountain barrier, the Himalayas and dependent systems, separated the Far East from Central Asia. The mountains were high and cold, and the people who lived in those distant days lacked the equipment, including clothing, to aid them in crossing over this barrier very frequently.

These mountains, sweeping into Southeast Asia, cut the world into two pieces—the Western world and the Eastern world. The former included Europe, Africa, the Middle East, India, and Pakistan. The rest of the world was the Far East, including Indonesia, China, Eastern Siberia and the Americas. The principal road by which people could go from the east to the west and vice-versa was across Central Asia, and, as I said, it was rather cold and probably not many people made the crossing. Among those who did may have been Neanderthal men going west, and some of the more modern types moving eastward. But still that barrier was sufficient for racial differentiation to take place in these two areas, and that is the reason why people in each of these parts of the world are so different from each other physically.

Something else happened at the onset of the fourth glacial period. An ice-cap formed all across the north of Europe and Western Siberia, the northward flowing rivers were blocked, and the water from them backed up until it spilled into the Aralo-Caspian basin, which became a series of great inland lakes and swamps which, in turn, spilled out into the Black Sea. Some of the mountains of Iran were glaciated, with the result that the Western world was almost completely sealed off from the Eastern world, and connection with India was maintained only by a narrow strip of land. That is the reason why the people of this western area, including Pakistan and India, have always had a great deal

in common, physically, culturally and in other ways, because they were one world during the entire last age of ice.

During this period of maximum ice, the Sahara Desert was a fertile and well-watered grass and forest land, teeming with game. The same was true of Arabia. Out on the Cherty plain along the TAPline, great fields of flint now may be seen where ancient hunters during the fourth glacial period lived richly on game. Probably the Semitic speaking peoples originated there as hunters, when they had this great supply of food. In post-glacial times, when the plain dried up, they moved southward toward Yemen and northward into the Fertile Crescent.

Geologically speaking, the essential unity of the area follows a sequence of patterns. When the ice melts, peoples get through from the east; when the ice has crept back, people have trouble getting through; when the ice is there, the deserts become fertile; and, as at present, when the ice is gone, the deserts return and the southern part of the Western world is cut off from its northern part. This pattern has repeated itself time and again throughout history. It is the basic reason for the differentiation between what we call the West and the East—the Middle East and Europe, which are parts of a single geographical realm, as contrasted to the Far East and the Americas.

In the last glacial period and in the immediate post-glacial time, two groups of hunters became differentiated. One was that of the hunters in Arabia and the Sahara, who turned into the Mediterranean race, and the others were the hunters in the Caspian and Black Sea region in southern Russia, who turned into the Nordic race. Members of both groups were very similar in appearance, were desert adapted, and were of the lean, water-saving body type. However, one was blond and the other brunette, undoubtedly though different types of adaption to ultraviolet penetration in the system's need for vitamin D. So, a Nordic is a man who can absorb more vitamin D than a Mediterranean can. These are the principal differences between Nordics and Mediterraneans. Among the heavy stocky mountain peoples of Armenia, Asia Minor, the Alps, and Scandinavia, we see a form of adaption for forests, mountains, and the cold.

In the fourth glacial period two rich regions provided really first-class hunting. One was the Arabian Desert and the Sahara, and the other, the edge of the ice, near which hunters lived on big game such as mammoths, wooly rhinoceros, horse, bison and the ancient giant ox.

To say what were the social institutions of these hunters is not the easiest thing in the world, but it can be roughly determined by comparison with living hunters of today. A band of hunters, basically, consists of a few related families, whose members hunt together and share together, who have an intense local loyalty to their little clan, tribe, and group of related families, and who defend and revenge each other and act as a sovereign state. Education is conducted by age grades so that the young respect the old, the old teach the young, and the initiation of boys teaches respect for their elders. Healers, prophets and religious leaders are men who satisfy the ritual needs of their people on a part time basis when they are not out looking for game. This is a sketch of the probable social institutions in both areas, and is true of nomads and other such peoples today. There has been no change in this set of attitudes among the descendants of these hunters because they are still functional.

About 5,000 B.C. each half of our Western world was greatly affected by the beginnings of agriculture and animal domestication. It is still disputed where this first occurred, but it probably started in Iran, Trans-Caucasia, Turkestan, and Afghanistan, and then moved into the Fertile Crescent, because it was from these regions that the wild plants and animals came. Each half, the North and the Fertile Crescent, shared in this development, because the Neolithic came from a region in between the two and then moved in either direction. As this culture spread, differences arose in local methods of agriculture.

In the north it was a question of clearing a patch of forest, slashing, log-rolling, burning piles of logs, and ringing trees. In the south, the procedure was one of patching up fields on the sides of hills, making terraces, and digging irrigation canals. In the north, the ox and the pig were the principal animals, while in the south sheep and goats prevailed. Europeans were pig and ox people, and the Middle Easterners became sheep and goat people. In the south, the advance was more rapid because there were fewer trees to fell, the soil was looser, and stone and brick could be used. Plenty of good clay was available and the stone was on the surface and was easily worked. In the north, the chief material was wood, which had to be hewn with stone axes, a slow and tedious process.

Society thus became more complex in the south, with nobles and commoners developing as two classes, the commoners being concerned

with technical things and the nobles with human relations. The nobles also branched out into a priesthood who dealt with another form of human relations and particularly with calendars as a means of helping people regulate their agricultural year. A fairly elaborate system of social institutions thus arose in the Middle East during the Neolithic Age with large families, a fairly complex state, religious institutions of considerable elaboration, and a sharp division of labor. In the north, however, these great divisions and specializations had not yet taken place.

The Bronze Age began around 3,000 B.C. again in this intermediate zone in Armenia, the Caucasus, the Elburz, and in that general region, because these are the places particularly favored with metal deposits and plenty of good wood for charcoal. Probably Azerbaijan was a big center. From this neighborhood it spread into the Middle East, and to the north and west into Europe. Again the peoples of two different areas received parallel diffusions from the same place.

Many statements have been made by romanticists that during the Neolithic and Bronze Ages the family in the Middle East was matrilineal, that a great Mother Goddess was worshipped with all sorts of orgiastic rites symbolizing the supremacy of the female, and that many such customs still survive. I do not believe it, for the development of this line of civilization involved work for both men and women. The men went from hunting to herding, and the women from gathering roots to hoeing village plots. The man, too, became a farmer by plowing with oxen. Thus, the division of labor between the sexes suffered no change, and if there is no such change there is no reason for any change in the basic social system or in inheritance through either line. This was true in the north as well as in the south and, in both, the social continuity of hunters was preserved.

In Egypt, the political institution became very complex, but in the earliest days there was almost no foreign trade. All the king had to do to get metal was to send people out into the desert. This did not involve traders; the king kept a stable of craftsmen. In Mesopotamia, however, the metals had to come from inhabited places. Thus, an elaborate trade pattern arose with the development of a special class of traders as well as one of artisans. Trade on an elaborate style began in Iraq rather than in Egypt.

In the Bronze Age of each Middle Eastern country one finds a succession of periods. There will be a period of great cultural efflorescence in

which are made pretty statues such as one finds today in museums. These bear nice inscriptions, and people say, "Art! Ah! This must have been a great period!" not realizing that high art is not always an indication of social progress. Then there are other periods in which invaders come in. People stop writing, and everybody says "This is a dark period, caused by the horrid Hyksos," or other invaders from the north. But what happened was that every time an invasion from the north or the west brought in a dark period, the unspecialized and undifferentiated newcomers loosened up the tight social situation which had developed in the Middle East as a result of overpopulation on a deteriorating landscape.

In the north, the people were fighting, not each other, but nature; they were fighting the cold, the forest, and water. Each man had learned to take care of himself. Specialization was not as easy as in the Middle East and progress was not as fast. However, once invaders had come in, they started this whole cycle all over again. Then came another efflorescence of culture, and this pattern continues through the whole scheme.

About 1,000 B.C. the Iron Age created a great change. Iron was a metal that every man could use because it was cheap. The ordinary peasant or farmer no longer was simply a stone-age man; he could have metal just as well as could his king and his king's craftsmen. The farmer could defend himself a little better. Though the security of the realm would not necessarily be as great, the king could now equip a large army, send it out, and conquer all sorts of peoples who spoke different languages and worshipped different gods. During the Bronze Age, each nation had consisted of a small number of people living in a relatively small area, in which the rulers controlled their subjects through religion. Relations with peoples who did not believe in the state religion were by the sword.

That changed in the Iron Age. The Egyptians, the Assyrians, and the Hittites tried out the empire business, but they carried on the old Bronze Age technique, whereby when another nation is conquered, most of its citizens are slaughtered, a few slaves are brought home along with several thousand head of cattle, and the land is left waste. This waste was due to the fact that under Bronze Age technology, adequate communications could not be maintained. These empire builders did not reach the point where they could rule different kinds of people.

The Persians, however, started an empire in the modern sense, not so much by the use of iron, as by the invention of riding on the backs of large horses, which they had probably domesticated in the Hamadan area. With these horses the Persians also invented the postal system. They also developed a new system of government which was a more or less kindly autocracy, by means of which all sorts of different people in different places were allowed to live inside their own cultures, but had to pay respect to the emperor of the central power. This was a new idea. The Persians started it and various others followed—Alexander, the Romans, the Byzantines, Arabs and Turks.

In the Iron Age a mosaic system thus became the standard pattern of Middle Eastern empires and this pattern itself was made possible by improvements in transportation, communication, and methods of warfare, all of which were in turn dependent on the discovery that a man could ride and fight from a horse, and on the domestication of the camel, which took place about the year 1,100 B.C.

Thus, in the Iron Age not only empires but also nomads came into being. Nomads could never have been very effective without camels and horses. A Bakhtiari could never have hoped to drive his sheep up over a mountain unless his chiefs had horses to ride on. The Badu could not have moved out onto the desert without camels. The Turkomans would never have been able to conduct their raids without horses. Inside of huge empires, zones of relative security and insecurity arose through the development of these new means of transportation and the spread of this new metal.

From the stand-point of religion, people learned tolerance in the Iron Age. A political state with peoples of different religions became acceptable. Tolerance did not always travel an even and easy pattern, and during certain periods persecution appeared, but at least it was recognized that separate peoples within a state had the right to worship God in their own way. With this came the spreading out of peoples of different skills into different places and into various colonies so that instead of all of the iron workers being in one city, some would go to live in each city. One of the clearest examples of this budding-out was the dispersion of the Jewish people, who went as far as England, France, Germany, Spain, Morocco, and all over the world as specialists in trade, art, science and other special skills. Persians went to Spain, and Englishmen went to Constantinople to serve in a special guard. People moved

all over, and this moving about and the forming of special colonies were extremely important factors in the general cultural progress which took place during the Iron Age.

As part of this cultural progress, the economic institution grew. Although manufacturing remained small in scope and personal in ownership and performance, trading institutions grew large and complex with the rise of large merchant houses operating with overseas branches and recognizing the principle of credit. These institutions were, in turn, dependent on the caravan and the merchant ship. Wholesale merchants arose as a class, and shopkeepers as another; between them they formed the upper and lower levels of a middle class. This had existed only in a nascent form during the Bronze Age.

Since such a middle class needs structure, a whole network of associations such as guilds and brotherhoods appeared. Merchants trading in distant lands needed to know geography, and navigators astronomy. Educational institutions emerged as separately endowed foundations, virtually independent of both state and church. In the medieval universities a division of labor, for the first time in history, was created among professors, each teaching different subjects. This was one of the greatest advances in human history, for which we can probably thank the Arabs, the Italians, or both in concert.

During the Iron Age the north affected the south many times, as Persians, Parthians, Scyths, Celts, and the Germanic tribes all came from the north. Greek civilization was a happy blend of elements from all quarters, with slaves, mostly of Middle Eastern extraction, doing the skilled work. The Roman empire, in extension, carried Eastern culture to the west and north, to Spain, France, Britain, and Germany. The Byzantine empire, which grew out of the Roman, was more Eastern than Western in culture, and served as a bridge to the Slavs. Christianity also carried Eastern culture westward, as did Islam. During the Iron Age we see the record of a continuous process of give and take, a natural interplay of influences between two related geographical regions, two parts of a whole, peopled by human beings of the same genetic and cultural origins, a process of mutual benefit.

With the invention of firearms the Turks took over the lands of the Middle East to the west of Iran, and from the middle of the fifteenth century onward the Turks relayed Western influences to the Arab countries through an Islamic screen. After the discovery of America, they

passed on maize, which some Arabs call Turkiya, and tobacco, while giving the west coffee, which came from Ethiopia via Yemen. The very presence of the Turks athwart the old trade routes to China and India stimulated the western Europeans to mount cannon on ships, to improve their navigation at the Sagres Academy, in which Jews, Muslims, and Christians worked together for the Portuguese Prince Henry, and to sail around the world.

Not only did the Westerners find their own ways to reach India and China but they also discovered a new world, from which the Spaniards drew great wealth in gold and silver, and in which the English found room for the establishment of new nations. Thus did the westernmost half of our twofold western world leap ahead of its more ancient counterpart. Great trading companies arose, and middle class manufacturing, particularly of steel and cloth, boomed. Meanwhile, the Arab countries suffered a loss of trade, and their social system became crystallized. Soon the Western nations moved on into the Age of Coke, which by the substitution of mineral fuel for charcoal permitted a great increase in steel production in England, Germany, and America. Steel meant factories and engines and ships, and the export of manufactured goods to all the non-industrial nations of the world.

In the Middle East this rang the death-knell of craftsmanship. Oil tins replaced beautiful vases, and put potters out of work. Pieces of old rubber tire were crudely fashioned into sandals, throwing tanners into idleness, and cheap cotton from Manchester and Lawrence replaced delicate tissues formerly woven by thousands of nimble fingers in the shady streets of eastern cities. The East had much to take and little to give. Meanwhile, thousands of students from the Middle East went to Western schools and colleges. Since in the old Middle East the man who can read and write considered himself above working with his hands, Eastern cities became overloaded with intellectuals.

If the period of disequilibrium reigning in much of the Middle East is to come to an end, these intellectuals must all realize, as many already do, that change begins not at the top, but at the bottom. Natural resources must be discovered, exploited within reason, and where possible, as with forests, conserved. Non-intellectuals must be trained in modern technology, and a middle class, which made the Middle East great, must be restored. When these things are done the intellectuals will feel no need to choose between atheism and fanatacism, but will find in their

own ancient faith the symbolic and intellectual content needed to progress to levels higher than ever before.

Now that oil is pouring in such floods from Middle Eastern fields the countries which produce it possess, for the first time in millenia, an economic advantage. If wisdom shall prevail, this resource will be used not as a bone of international conflict, nor as a means of enriching the few and thus causing more trouble than already exists, but as the key to health and education and industry, to produce inner strength and healthier relations without. The temptation is great to use this as a bargaining point between the Communists, who fall outside the two halves of our common culture, and the West. The observation that the Russian mind seems to work more slowly than the lightning mental processes of Arabs and Persians does not mean that Russians can be fooled any more than it was possible to outwit Hulagu. The stakes are high and such a game can be of profit to no one.

History has shown that the Middle East and the lands to the north and west are two essential and complementary halves of a single geographical, racial, and cultural system. Biologically speaking each has served as a balance wheel to the other. As with plants and animals, an undifferentiated strain has been vital to the preservation of a more rapidly progressing strain of the same species. Western influences on the Middle East have always brought disorder at first, followed by a cultural refreshing. When the two have blended harmoniously as in Greece, Rome, and Muslim Spain, great cultural advances have been made.

Influences from the northeast on the Middle East have always been destructive, for they come from another system. If repeated they would only impose a greater rigidity than ever before, and if regimentation has been the principal hazard of the Middle East, more of it would be fatal. The Middle Easterners, themselves, must see this, as of course many of them do. If we all keep our heads, relax, and think things out dispassionately and quietly, considering our subject not piecemeal but as a whole, we will realize that we are all one people, Christian, Muslim, and Jew, and if we remember that from the Middle East came the great religious concept of the dignity and equality of man, while from the West came resourcefulness and versatility, we will find a way to maintain our ancient partnership, which has lasted since man became human, to the glory of our common God and the mutual profit of all.

Fourth Session, Part II, Saturday morning, March 7th
Presiding: SYDNEY N. FISHER, *The Ohio State University & The Middle East Institute*

REPORT ON ISRAEL

SALO W. BARON
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IT IS EXTREMELY difficult to compress the economic, political, social and cultural evolution of any country into the space permissible for a paper such as this, but it is doubly so for a dynamic society like that of Israel. Many a statement, even if entirely correct at the time of the presentation of the paper, is likely to become obsolete by the time of publication. Yet there are several lines of evolution in the last fourteen months which might deserve consideration.

The year of 1952 and the beginning of 1953 marked a period of consolidation in the history of the young state, consolidation after the rapid advance of the first three and one-half years. This is particularly true in the case of immigration, for only some 24,000 Jews entered Israel in 1952, whereas in the preceding years there were many months in which that figure was exceeded. Plans are now under way to accommodate another twenty-odd thousand in 1953. Israel has not abandoned, however, her intention to admit every Jew willing to settle there, for the "Law of Return," as it is called, is still valid. Though not a true law, as was suggested in the original draft constitution of the state, the dominant theory still insists that the country is obligated to admit Jews, forever, as a constitutional principle. Recently, the disturbances behind the Iron Curtain have highlighted the difficulties of the Jews living in the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. The Jewish Agency openly stated that it would arrange for any Jew leaving Russia or her satellites to go to Israel, if he is ready to go.

This is an indiscriminate type of immigration. Among the people admitted have been many aged, infirmed or permanently disabled persons. One of the largest movements was the immigration of children. Clearly all of these people are not economic assets; even in the case of children, they are liabilities for many years. But, with an almost irrational emotional insistence, the Israeli public is prepared to take in indiscriminately any Jew who is willing to come. This phenomenon

has struck outside observers as something entirely unusual, and it cannot be understood without a perspective in depth and the whole historic background.

The realization of the State of Israel has, from the outset, been quite exceptional. I remember that years ago, when the discussion between Zionists and anti-Zionists within the Jewish camp was raging, the latter usually advanced the argument that colonization had never taken place in history without a mother country. The Phoenicians colonized the Mediterranean world. When the Dutch, the Spaniards, the English or the French colonized, there was always a state, a mother country, a navy and a treasury behind such effort. The anti-Zionists, therefore, said, "What hope have the Jews, a dispersed people without a state, to colonize and ultimately to create a state?"

I also remember, however, that Zionists used to answer that, while there were these usual historical processes, two exceptions for the Jewish people have been made in the past. Certainly, the Second Commonwealth, after the Babylonian exile, was founded by a Diaspora, principally by Babylonian Jewry. One might argue that the First Commonwealth was founded by a dispersion, too, by Jewish exiles from Egypt. In 1948 a dispersion has created a state for the third time, inverting the usual processes of history. For this reason, the new state, an offshoot of the dispersion, is conscious of its historic origin and is prepared to continue the role of child, or in some respects, mother, of dispersed Jewry and to keep the boundaries open for all time to Jewish refugees who want to come.

Can this state carry on? Can it continue admitting so many Jews without breaking down? Opinions may differ on that score. However, we must bear in mind that the Western world has been haunted by the problem of over-population for the last century and a half. Yet, it has been shown that Malthus was wrong, at least thus far, for the means of production and the means of livelihood and subsistence have increased more rapidly than population, despite the fact that there has never been in history such a rapid population increase.

During the mandatory period there was much debate about the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine. I well remember a German economist, a professor at the University of Berlin, advancing even before the end of World War I the theory that, based on economic calculations, Palestine could accommodate a population of five million with the then

existing techniques. My own studies of the ancient history of the First and Second Commonwealths have persuaded me that at least twice in history, in the days of David and Solomon and in the days of the first century A. D., the population density in Palestine exceeded the present population density of 1953 by a considerable margin. It should be remembered that in those previous times there were no large cities. The largest city was apparently Jerusalem with a maximum population in antiquity of about 120,000. Today Tel Aviv, which did not exist fifty years ago, has 320,000.

The present possibilities seem almost unlimited. Certainly the population density of Lebanon and Egypt, Israel's two neighbors, is greater. Anyone traveling in Israel today is bound to see how many brown spots there still are even in Galilee and how much land still is to be cultivated and made habitable, not to speak of the Negev which is an almost complete desert. Just a few weeks ago was completed a four-inch pipeline, eight kilometers out of Beersheba to a hitherto arid district inhabited by five Tiyaha tribes. Within a year or two these 13,000 beduins will turn from nomadic life to a settled agricultural life and add to the agricultural production of the country.

Also there still are untold possibilities in connection with industrial expansion, and thus, I, for one, would suspend judgment as to the population maximum of Israel, or for that matter, of any country in the world. With changing technological developments, any number of people, determined to work and to live, can probably live in various areas. Certainly Japan and Switzerland, without any significant natural resources, are examples of what can be achieved by the will of man.

Does this mean that the economic man, already discussed by Mr. Gardiner, is to be disregarded completely? Has he no role to play in Israel's evolution which must be taken into consideration? Not at all! The second outstanding feature in Israel in the last fourteen months has been the so-called new economic policy. That policy had been started even before 1952 but was set in motion fully with the partial devaluation of currency in February, 1952. At that time, the pound, artificially pegged at $2.80, was partially devalued by establishing three exchange rates, one at $2.80, one at $1.40, and one at $1.00. In June, 1952, all holders of currency had to exchange it for new currency, less ten per cent which was held by the State Bank as an enforced loan.

Today Israel is discussing property taxes and other measures designed to stabilize the currency and to stem inflationary forces.

Ironically, inflation was to a very large extent due to the control of prices. These controls were effected by subsidizing food imported at the artificial value of $2.80 to the pound. When the subsidizing of food was discontinued, the government raised the price of food and various other articles. On the other hand, this action undermined the existence of the black market, and since then it has become possible to de-ration many foods and other articles of daily living and to make life, if not more pleasant, less exacting.

These new economic policies have been particularly pronounced in the last several months since the establishment of a new coalition government which includes parties representing the classes favoring free enterprise. In some respects, the new government pursues policies similar to the new administration in Washington. It is trying to reduce government controls, to streamline the civil service, dismissing quite a few officials, and to give impetus to private enterprise, even by extending a number of privileges to foreign investors.

To say that the Israeli government and the American government are very much alike may be very much to the point; yet one must not forget their differences in background. Here the change was accomplished by a successful election which brought to power the Republican Party which had long been in opposition to New and Fair Deal policies. There it is being done, essentially, by the same men. Ben Gurion is still Prime Minister and he still applies the same general ideology.

America, moreover, had a tradition of free enterprise; it became a great nation because of the uncontrolled economy. Israel was built from its inception, even in the mandatory period, by Jews who were determined to have a social democracy, a socially-controlled democracy. All along, the collective farms were a practical application of the ideology of social democracy, and almost since the beginning of the century their growth was a protest against free trade and against free enterprise untrammeled by government or social controls. Even further back, the First and Second Commonwealths in ancient times were confronted by these very problems. The greatest intellectual spokesmen of Jewry, the prophets in the First Commonwealth, and the Pharisaic sages of the Second Commonwealth protested against the free economy which had led to the exploitation of the weak by the strong. That was the great

message of Amos. The whole tradition of social justice underlying the ancient development of the two Jewish Commonwealths is still operative within the ideology of Israel today. Yet, while adhering to these general principles, the present government is pragmatic enough and realistic enough to call a halt to untenable social controls.

This does not mean that during this period of consolidation, 1952–1953, the economy has stopped growing. On the contrary, we need but consider the development of both the industrial and the rural economies in Israel in terms of the consumption of electric power. From July, 1951, to July, 1952, this consumption increased from 98,000,000 to 120,000,000 kilowatt hours, a jump of over twenty per cent in twelve months. Even more remarkable is the increase in consumption of power for irrigation projects and for agriculture—the increase here was more than forty per cent.

Within the next four months it is expected that the potash works at the Dead Sea will be reopened. When I visited that region in 1937, the British major in charge of engineering at those works pointed out that that area had the greatest bromide deposits in the entire British empire. This was particularly significant at that time, when World War II was speedily approaching, for bromides were important for munitions—a fact which the British openly recognized. Unfortunately these works have not been operating during the last few years, but they are to be reopened in June, 1953.

Oil is another major possibility. During a recent visit to Israel, I heard the Israeli Parliament debating oil policies at great length. If there is oil in Israel, many of the country's economic difficulties would be solved. To begin with, Israel's oil consumption is one of the highest per capita consumptions, even if compared with Western Europe, except Sweden. Israel is spending more than $40,000,000 a year in importing oil, much of it from Venezuela. If anyone looks for a remarkable illustration of the distress of our present day world, of the illogical situation characteristic of world affairs, he needs but to consider the great Haifa refinery importing oil from Venezuela, when there is a great supply in the immediate vicinity which might flow in short shrift if the pipeline terminating there could be reopened. Certainly, those $40,000,000 could be spent more profitably in the immediate vicinity to the benefit of the neighboring oil-producing countries.

Agriculture has been making tremendous progress. In 1937, I recall,

milk and dairy products were very scarce. Hardly any poor person could, at that time, afford to drink milk or to buy cheese for they were mostly imported from abroad at high prices. At the beginning of 1953, a statistical account shows, the per capita consumption of milk and dairy products in Israel is exceeding that of most Western European countries. There are many plans to develop agriculture further, with the hope that the country might become self-sustaining in five or six years. Already a kind of agricultural revolution has taken place. Between the years 1948 and 1952, the rural population of Israel has increased from thirty per cent to forty-eight per cent of the total population. This is a reflection of the great drive to make agriculture a mainstay of the economy and to eliminate all or nearly all imports. The great citrus production, of course, is not meant to be merely for local consumption. It has been a major export article and, though damaged greatly during World War II, the present season which began in the fall of 1952 is showing a marked advance in shipments, particularly to the British Isles, over those of preceding years.

Still, the economy of Israel is very strained. No one will deny, for a moment, that Israel badly needs foreign investments and foreign financial support. One must not forget the mortgage resting on Israel—the indemnification of the Arab refugees for lands they have abandoned. That indemnity will some day have to be paid. The government of Israel has made it perfectly clear from the beginning that it is prepared to pay that indemnity, provided it can sit down to a peace conference and make these payments to neighbors with whom it is not at war. That mortgage is there.

Israel has many other difficulties. As long as large-scale immigration continues and the defense budget is as high as it now is, the country could not possibly survive economically without foreign support. I do not know whether this is any less true in regard to Italy or France. British Cabinet Ministers are now here in Washington pleading with the American government that Britain cannot survive economically and carry the full appropriations for rearmament without some sort of subsidy, either through aid or through trade. Likewise, Israel could break down economically. However, looking back through the records of history, I do not find the case of a country ceasing to exist because of economic difficulties. Countries may become economically weakened and ripe for invasion. But, without military conquest or a direct assault,

they do not lose their independence. Germany after World War I suffered many economic crises because of the destruction of the war and the numerous dislocations afterward. Yet Germany survived and twenty years later engaged in another war to conquer the world. Germany is on her feet again, after having suffered from terrible bombings and after having been partitioned between East and West. Her recovery is so great that France is haunted by the specter of that neighbor soon resuming her march toward European hegemony. Thus, economic difficulties are not decisive in regard to the survival or non-survival of a country. However, they do mean much in the domestic evolution of a country.

Under the circumstances, is it any wonder that Israel has heard voices that because of the economic crises she cannot quite afford to implement the compulsory public education law which requires free education for all? That process, nevertheless, is continuing. Data, concerning the Arab minority, shows that 27,700 Arab children attend public school and that 6,000 more, mostly Christian Arabs, attend missionary schools. It shows that eighty per cent of Arab boys and sixty per cent of Arab girls are in school, percentages which are much higher than in any other Middle Eastern country. That there is not full attendance is largely owing to the shortage of teachers, though their number in the last four years has increased from 250 to 700. In this connection, the Minister of Education has recently complained of the shortage of teachers, not only in Arab schools, but in Jewish schools as well. In Hebrew schools there are some 3,000 teaching positions open.

Textbooks are not up to date. I have been told of Arabic textbooks in the social sciences which do not take cognizance of the rise of the new state. They still use the terms of a mandatory Palestine. It would be as if American textbooks after the Revolution referred to George III as "our king."

The Hebrew language has undergone a remarkable rejuvenation. This ancient language has become a pliable instrument for daily intercourse and for scientific discussion. A language academy is being formed to serve as a kind of catalyst, like the Academie Française, for the development of language. There is a great output of books, magazines and newspapers, in Hebrew, German, French, Yiddish and many other languages.

A few years ago a representative of a Hebrew publishing company in

Jerusalem was discussing the problems of a Hebrew encyclopedia of the type of the Britannica, which was scheduled to appear in twenty-odd volumes. He expected three to four thousand copies to be sold. To his surprise there were some ten thousand subscribers for the first volume. With the fourth volume there were twenty-five thousand subscribers and just recently the government raised the allocation of paper so that thirty-five thousand might be printed. Now there are thirty-five thousand subscribers. In comparison, it would be as though the "Britannica" in English were sold in seven or eight million copies. There are still other encyclopedias—a Biblical and a Talmudic encyclopedia, an encyclopedia for Palestinology and others.

This extraordinarily vigorous intellectual life in Israel can be explained only by the immemorial traditions of the love for learning of the Jewish dispersion, a love which has been inherited from that dispersion by the new State of Israel. But the dispersion took it from the ancient Commonwealths. Eighteen centuries ago Josephus was claiming before his Greco-Roman audience that every Jewish boy knew the laws of Judaism, even in such detail as in regard to the laws of purity and impurity, and contrasted this with the low state of public education in the Roman empire.

Many other developments in Israel of recent months would well deserve special consideration if time would allow. Among major political developments, there are the questions of the absence of a written constitution, the political party system and the new electoral reform. The latter is now under way and an attempt is being made to reduce the number of parties so that there would be a more workable parliamentary system. One might also consider the new citizenship law which was passed in July, 1952, and the significance of only two per cent of the Jewish inhabitants "opting-out," which means that they have not accepted citizenship of Israel.

But for the lack of space, one would also wish to discuss some of the basic problems of a Western country, not a westernized country, in its Middle Eastern setting. It is Western country whose population had largely grown up under Western conditions. It has become somewhat less Western now both because of the immigration of non-Western Jews and because of its immediate environment.

In conclusion, it must be pointed out that many of these problems, political, economic, social and cultural, would be greatly simplified for

Israel and her neighbors if permanent peace were established. Peace, of course, is indivisible. I have never found anyone in Israel who believes that a "second round," as it is called there, could take place without embroiling the entire world in a third world war. The hope of all mankind is that no such contingency will occur and that peace will be kept everywhere, including the Middle East.

Fourth Session, Part III, Saturday morning, March 7th
Presiding: SYDNEY N. FISHER, *The Ohio State University & The Middle East Institute*

REPORT ON TURKEY

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THIS OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT a report on Turkey is most welcome. At the outset, however, I wish to point out that this is not a scholarly analysis of the events and developments which have been taking place in Turkey in the last two years. It is only a simple straightforward account of what has been going on in the Republic since May, 1950, when the Democratic Party carried the elections.

This Party's liberal policies in all of the various aspects of life in Turkey, as proclaimed in its platform, are yielding through careful application, as we shall observe, abundant and welcome crops. It is a fact that Turkey has made more progress in the last two years than in any similar period in her history. With this observation, I beg the indulgence of this enlightened audience and call my remarks, A Progress Report from Turkey.

That fully seventy-three percent of Turkey's registered voters went to the polls in the general elections of 1950 is indicative of the political consciousness of the Turkish nation. It meant, unquestionably, that a huge majority of the people were acting to take full advantage of the Constitution, promulgated thirty years ago, which guarantees that sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. The vote also indicated, clearly and unmistakably, that the people as a whole were now ready to take a fuller share of the responsibilities of self-government. Whereas general trends and currents, in many parts of the world, made others afraid of even minor changes, Turkey went boldly forward into new experiences. It is heartening to know that this courage stems from a general realization on the part of the Turkish people that nothing can deal a deadlier blow at freedom than the fear from freedom.

The existence of social democracy in the country, long before political democracy was attained, accounts for the fact that transition from the one to the other was easily achievable. Resolution and self-reliance are inherent in the Turkish character. In the acquisition of his political rights,

these traits, no doubt, played their part for the average citizen. An independent and free press—and I feel the urge to stress the word free—also took the cause of democracy to heart. In the ensuing struggle between the parties, democracy, itself, was not attacked. Issues were raised, rather, on whether or not certain acts, measures, rules and standards were anti-democratic in concept and practice.

That democracy has taken root in Turkey is irrefutable. But the establishment of a stable democratic system in the country has taken more than a century. We must not forget that the first move to adopt Western ideas and methods dates back to 1839, when the first Charter of Reforms was proclaimed. Against this background, the gains recorded in the last two years in the fields of our foreign relations and of industrial and economic development are many.

First, and foremost, however, I wish here to repeat that the cornerstone of our foreign policy is peace. Peace at home and abroad is the cornerstone on which our foreign policy has been based. Since its pronouncement by the great leader, Atatürk, and its general acceptance and embracement by the people, we have been working relentlessly and untiringly in this direction. We are proud to be able to announce that we have achieved success with this policy in the last thirty years. Since peace is not achieved by preaching and/or wishful thinking, and since no effort is too great to safeguard it, we have done, and will continue to do, all that lies within our power to preserve it. We also believe that one of the best means of safeguarding peace lies in the banding together of like-minded peoples, not forgetting that one of the easiest ways of inviting the disaster of war is moral and physical weakness. It is for this reason that Turkey believes in collective security and international cooperation. Our prompt decision to take part, in the first collective effort to stop aggression in Korea, was motivated by a desire to give proof that we are determined to uphold the Charter of the United Nations. The decision of the government in this instance was fully approved by the people of Turkey. Although a half-hearted effort was made by the opposition to reap political hay from the decision, the people stood firmly behind the government in the fulfillment of our obligation.

Alluding to the troubled world situation, President Celal Bayar, in his annual state of the nation message to the Turkish National Assembly, said, "To lose courage and faith and retreat into a corner in resignation would constitute nothing short of suicide for those who are weak enough

to allow themselves to be drawn into such a state of mind. In the face of difficulties and dangers we are determined to remain wide awake, firm, prepared and united to the fullest extent."

This vigilance in terms of military preparedness is costing us from forty to fifty percent of our annual budget. But so far as we can see, it is a good investment for peace. Some may ask, how long? Well, the answer is, as long as necessary. Patience and perseverance are not alien to the Turkish character. We know that the cost of preserving peace is high. Moreover, it is causing us to sacrifice a great deal from our program of economic development.

Turkey has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization since February, 1952. There is no doubt that the United States played the leading part in asking Turkey to join this organization. The peaceful purposes for which this alliance came into existence has been further strengthened by Turkey's and Greece's admission. There is sufficient evidence for all to see that the moral and spiritual values attaching to this treaty are shared with equal fervor by the Turks.

If the press of your country is a good criterion of public opinion in the United States—and do not doubt that it is—I can then boastfully say that the Americans stood, overwhelmingly, behind the decision to ask Turkey to join. I have seen more than six hundred editorials, not only in larger metropolitan newspapers but also in the small-town papers, first advocating then lauding Turkey's joining the NATO. The vote in the Senate of the United States, 73 to 2, was equally imposing and gratifying.

A new manifestation of Turkey's efforts toward safeguarding peace is now to be seen in the Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav rapprochement. This, like similar efforts in the same direction, is also an imposing achievement of Turkish foreign policy. Here again, an overwhelming majority of the newspapers of your country have and are continuing to support this move. For a number of months past, at first in batches of two's and three's and now in batches of fifty's, my envelope from the clipping service brings me editorials from hundreds of American newspapers with the opinion that Turkey has again made an exemplary move forward. Contributing to the foundations of peace, the Turkish Foreign Minister, Fuat Köprülü, said, "Turkish-Greek-Yugoslav cooperation is an advance towards peace and solidarity, which will add greatly to the strength and prosperity of the whole community of free nations. I would like to

stress that the outcome is full of promise, of extremely suspicious nature for the future."

If it is permissible to predict the future from past achievement, one can see indications that further optimism is not just wishful thinking.

Turkey's achievements in the fields of economic and industrial development, and above all in agriculture, are no less considerable. By encouraging free enterprise to the fullest extent, the liberal policies of the Menderes government in these fields of endeavor have paid dividends, which two years ago were thought impossible of achievement.

A law for the promotion of foreign capital investment in Turkey went into effect in August, 1951. While this law in itself may not constitute the only incentive for foreign investment in Turkey, it does show that we are ready to enter into partnership with friendly nations in the development of our resources in a manner beneficial to both. Already there are three American companies in Turkey doing business in partnership with the Turks. Lever Brothers now has a plant for the manufacture of soap and vegetable oil products in Istanbul. General Electric, in partnership with a Turkish firm, has a plant for the manufacture of electric bulbs. Squibb & Sons is engaged in the manufacture of pharmaceutical products in Turkey.

The trend to do away with state ownership of industries is gaining momentum. Their uneconomical operation is now well established in the minds of all concerned, and it is only a matter of time when private enterprise will take their place. The recent decision to denationalize oil is yet another step in this same direction.

The continuing expansion in the production of grain, cotton and minerals, in addition to such money crops as tobacco, figs and filberts, has added a great deal to our purchasing power abroad, and, in turn, the government has not felt the need for any extensive restrictions on imports.

Our road building program and the construction of bridges are proceeding according to schedules and the report is that they are outstandingly successful. It is the opinion of those who are experts in this field that the Turkish road program is now well established and that, already, service is possible on Turkish roads for twelve months of the year instead of only seven as previously. As a result, highway transportation costs in persons and property continue to decline.

The construction of a number of meat packing plants, hydroelectric

projects and grain elevators as well as the building of the Seyhan and Sariyar Dams are in progress.

Eleven of our harbors on the Black and Mediterranean Seas are either being built anew or additional facilities erected. These, especially in view of our expanding volume of exports, are of paramount importance in our future trade.

In agriculture, in which fully seventy-five percent of our people are engaged, we have made more than outstanding progress. American know-how and tractors have no doubt played the leading role in the increase of our production. The agricultural program started with 2,500 tractors. The number now exceeds 35,000, with resultant increases in planted acreage.

Our harvest of grain in 1952 of over 12,000,000 tons showed an increase of 1,600,000 tons over that of 1951. In wheat we have hit a new mark by passing Argentine and becoming the free world's fourth largest wheat producer in 1952. Production of cotton showed an increase of nearly one hundred percent, jumping from 122,000 tons in 1950 to about 210,000 tons in 1952. As a result of this increased production, some Turkish farmers have been able to put aside enough cash to buy their own tractors. Others, less fortunate, have chipped in to buy the agricultural machinery to be used by the whole village. I am sure that mechanized agriculture has come to Turkey to stay.

This is important from the point of view that once the agricultural potential of the country has thus been established, and the possibility of grain exports to needy areas explored, Turkey has and will further fulfill her obligations under the Mutual Assistance Act. Last year, the exportable surplus of grain was 1,500,000 tons, a great deal of which has already been shipped to countries as far distant as Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

While on the subject of grain, a significant forecast, based on expert authority, has been made that, by the increased use of fertilizers and the improvement and extension of irrigation methods, the present production of 12,000,000 tons can be increased one hundred percent. While it would be rash to expect this increase in the next few years, it will, within the foreseeable future, be realized, thus enabling Turkey to contribute fully to the grain requirements of the world. Needless to say, this is a goal we are striving to reach. It is a means by which we raise the standard of living of our rural communities, which predominate in all parts of Turkey.

Alongside of agriculture, we have recorded great progress in livestock raising. Land distribution to tenant farmers or share-croppers has also been accelerated to a great extent. Nearly 63,000 farming families have been allotted a total of 288,751 hectares of land in the last two years. This type of farmer is also receiving financial credit facilities in the forms of working capital and investment in farming equipment. These credits are extended on a twenty-year basis. A considerable number, at the present rate, will be able to pay back, in full, their loans from the Agricultural Bank within five or six years.

Progress in agricultural methods, as already evidenced in increased production, has and will continue to enhance the purchasing power of our farmers. This, in turn, causes an increased demand for consumer goods. Thus, we are creating a two-way street to raise the standard of living of our people.

I am glad to be able to report remarkable progress in education. Over one thousand schools have been built in the farming districts in the last two years. We are planning to build a university in Van, close to the Iranian and Soviet borders. Increased facilities for education have emphasized again the need for more school teachers. The plan is to raise the number of resident primary school teachers from 9,000 to 16,000 in the next four years.

But it is needless to point out that education is a field in which demand always exceeds the supply. We are exerting every effort in this direction.

The role which the American colleges have played in Turkey in the education of Turkish boys and girls, in the last sixty years or more, is indeed outstanding. Thirty years ago, with attendance much less than at present, only a fraction of the student body was Turkish; today Turkish students constitute more than ninety percent of those attending. In bringing new ideas and knowledge to the young people of Turkey, these American institutions have done a great service in Turkey and the Middle East, generally.

This optimistic report must not lead you to believe that Turkey has reached Utopia. Turkey has not reached that stage in human progress and is about as near to it as most other countries. We have our problems and our difficulties. Those who set their sights high always have. Yet, these do not appear to be insurmountable and there is room, therefore, for optimism. Turkey is a country of brave men and women, and leadership is not one of the qualities, the lack of which should cause us worry.

This short report from Turkey would be woefully incomplete without reference to Turkish-American partnership. The outstanding characteristic of this partnership is that it is a free partnership, freely offered and freely accepted. The only strings attached are that the two nations are equally concerned in the safeguarding of peace, to which, I venture to remark, no sane mind can object.

Our partnership has enable us to increase our military strength to be able to ward off possible aggression. Instead of quoting figures in dollars which Turkey has received in economic aid from the United States, I would rather say that this aid represents hardly two and one-half percent of total foreign aid America has contributed to the welfare of the world. That it has paid the highest dividends, both in the economic and military spheres, is a generally accepted fact. Those who have visited Turkey and examined conditions locally agree that dollar for dollar no other country has been able to make better use of United States aid.

As *The New York Times* said lately and kindly, "the main credit, however, for the Turkish success story goes to the Turks themselves; who in their determination to survive, have worked hard, made sacrifices and shown readiness to accept American innovations."

It is my belief that our partnership goes further than the realm of mutual assistance. The bonds which unite us are those of the common heritage of love of independence and freedom. We desire peace and understanding for all mankind. We covet no territory and seek no selfish ends. We uphold the same principles of human dignity, honor and freedom.

If Turkish-American partnership has paid dividends beyond most expectations, it is due, if not wholly at least mainly, to the community of ideals and mutual understanding of each other's goals and problems. No obstacle is too great when people set themselves diligently and sincerely to the task of creating enduring friendship and understanding. Turkish-American friendship is a shining example of free partnership.

If I have not been able to define it eloquently, it is because we feel it so strongly.

SUMMARY

EDWIN M. WRIGHT
Board of Governors, The Middle East Institute

IT IS A MOST DIFFICULT assignment to try to summarize a series of discussions covering as wide a range of topics in time and space as has been done here. But as I have been listening to these topics, relating to religion, economics, anthropology and political science, one fact does seem to stand out that is common to all. That fact seems to parallel a movement that took place in our own nation between the years of 1870 and 1890. For the sake of the simile, let me, in a few sentences, recapitulate our own history in those two decades.

I have just been reading Morison's and Commager's two volume history of the United States—a pastime that I advocate anyone else doing. In summarizing the post-civil-war period, these two authors point out the shattering effect upon American thinking and morals, produced by four years of most destructive civil war. Before any genuine reconstruction could take place, the whole concept of the universe was changed by the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species.* The effect of these two factors was basic in re-orienting man's philosophy of his world. The old philosophies had been transcendental, believing that truth was revealed by divine power and was absolute in nature. The source of authority had always been in the past. This concept of truth was challenged and a new philosophy emerged—that of pragmatism leading to a belief in agnosticism and relative truth only. We have not yet been able to find new authority to take the place of the old.

This shaking of philosophical foundations had its effect upon all phases of life. In philosophy it marks the difference between an Emerson and a Dewey. In education, one can contrast Jonathan Edwards with Horace Mann. Religion shifted its emphasis from theological dogma to the social implications of the Gospel. The concept of a morally integrated and disciplined society gave way to extreme individualism and the "law of tooth and fang" was applied to exploitation of weaker and unorganized people by unscrupulous men of power. In the United States it was the age of the "robber barons," when bought state legislatures and purchased governors were servants of the predatory will of the masters of wealth. It was also a period when the United States paid little attention to foreign affairs and concentrated on gaining

control of the resources that existed within our own borders—the winning of the great plains of the mid-west and the west.

Have we not heard this theme repeated in the discussions the past two days? The impact of forces which remolded our civilization between 1870 and 1890 seems now to have been repeated on the peoples of the Middle East. Dr. Badeau recalled that the Muslim peoples seem to have made one final effort to make Islam work—and if it does not, they will get along without Islam. The theological is giving place to the pragmatic. Dr. Hanania outlined the break up of medieval institutions with the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the "imposition" of foreign-made political constitutions—transcendental in that they were established by a foreign power and were "revealed" rather than evolved out of the society of the Middle East. They are now being discarded and we witness the emergence of a trial and error technique to find political forms which grow out of the society, itself—accompanied by dictatorship for the time being. Dr. Kurani emphasized the same change in education. Even though there has been a steady trend away from medieval, theological schools to a Western secularized type, Dr. Kurani urges more pragmatism and the development of skills commensurate with the technical needs of the area. Dr. Baron pointed out that the new coalition government in Israel is vigorously attacking economic problems. Israel has only had five years of modern life. Yet, in that short time, it has passed through this phase. The first governments were made up of the socialist groups cooperating with the religious groups. This produced an unusual amount of coloration of a transcendental tinge—an effort to re-establish the so-called divine law of the Torah upon a modern state. The effort failed and for the moment Israel has dropped questions concerning "revealed" laws of antiquity in order to face the practical problems of economic survival. Even Dr. Ziada has given illustrations of this theme in the development of modern literature. There is little significant literature of mysticism or devotion. Thinkers are concerned with real problems—social forces, history, national life, while poetry is appearing in blank verse.

With this dissolution of ancient and revealed authority, there has arisen an age of undisciplined individualism. The new mores have not yet become sufficiently clear to curb the predatory desires of certain individuals. So, in the recent past, the Middle Eastern societies have produced their "robber barons"—men who thought primarily in terms

of exploiting office in order to enrich self and family. We have seen the sudden disappearance of many of these in Iran. The first president of Lebanon, Bisharah al-Khuri, and Faruq, king of Egypt, have left, and others like them will probably not last long. The emphasis by the new leaders is upon work, unity and discipline. Because of this attitude of introversion and a focusing of attention on the winning of their internal battles, they, like the United States in the period from 1870 to 1890, are relatively disinterested in the threat of the Big Bad Wolf of the U. S. S. R., watching them from the north. One cannot press the analogy of United States history too much in detail or, naturally, certain discrepancies will emerge. There is, however, an amazing amount of similarity, as though the forces molding our life have begun to show a delayed reaction in the Middle East. Perhaps, we are on the verge of witnessing the emergence of a more practical, rational and socially disciplined society.

In this connection, Dr. Badeau last night told me a story about General Muhammad Nagib in Egypt which, very briefly, illustrates this changed attitude. In former years, all greetings, telegrams and messages have followed rather rigid formalities, usually including references to God as "In the name of God," or "By God's will." But last July, the day after King Faruq had been exiled from the country, General Nagib decided to send a telegram to a British colonel who had served as adviser to the Egyptian armed forces and who had earned the respect and affection of General Nagib. His telegram was a very brief one. He just said, "Colonel ————, how's that?"

Now, there is pragmatism with a vengeance. Authoritarianism is no longer bothering him. That spirit, it seems to me, is one that is beginning to be felt throughout the whole area. "How's that?" is a question that is being asked more and more. As a result I am inclined to believe that problems between the Middle East and the West will be approached a little more intelligently today than formerly when problems between the two were considered on the basis of outmoded and outworn authorities and traditions which tended to separate rather than to unite.

One point in Dr. Coon's statement was to me a very dramatic one. It was that the unity of this area goes back to the fourth glacial period. I do not know how many glacial periods there have been but unity for over one hundred thousand years is not to be minimized. In the

past many have failed to recognize this unity, but today with better communications and various economic forces which are operating within society we are beginning to understand once more this unity. It is, evidently, a basic factor that must never be forgotten.

This unity, however, is threatened at the present time by a force that is very pragmatic. Darwin, if he knew of this ideology at all, thought of this force as Marxism—later on it received various other names such as Leninism and Stalinism, and, since day before yesterday, Malenkovism. Whatever may be the various names given to it, it is a threat against the unity of this area, and let us say not only its unity but its spiritual heritage.

In spite of the fact that transcendentalism is vanishing, there is one element that does mark the history of this whole area over these thousands of years. Dr. Northrop brings it out in his book, *The Taming of the Nations.* He asserts that when one leaves the Indian world and enters the Middle Eastern world one feature of society suddenly appears that no one can possibly miss. It is that in the society which developed Babylonian and Egyptian civilization, the Hebrew prophets, Christian thought and Islamic leaders there is a stronge sense of moral obligation and responsibility which differentiates the societies of the Middle East from any other societies.

Transcendentalism might be able to express this factor in varying ways but it is, nevertheless, a factor of importance because it is that which gives to the area this basic unity which has lasted for such a long time. At the present time, the unity is threatened, let us say, by the "fifth ice age" or the cold war which is coming down from the north. This unity has been disrupted by physical glaciers coming from the north. Let us not forget that when unity has been disrupted a tremendous amount of damage has been done and civilization, over a long period, has seemed to disappear completely.

Today, we are facing such a situation. Unless we can begin to realize that this unity is absolutely essential, it is possible that the next glacial age will descend upon us rather suddenly and not by a process over many generations. It might be within a year for, with the death of Stalin and the emergence of untried leadership, there are new forces and new factors appearing in the Middle East today that might possibly bring on more rapid action than is usual in glacial movements of a geological age.

It seems essential, therefore, to protect the unity of the Middle East,

Europe and the West. In the light of a pragmatic approach towards the problems of the Middle East, the United States and Europe, itself, we must do one or two or perhaps three things. First of all, I think, we must confess that all of us have, at one time or another, been in error. Secondly, we must, I think, be willing to extend our horizons. Our vision has been too limited; it has been confined to local units; and it has been restricted to rather selfish national interests. None of these is sufficient for survival under the forces operating in our modern society. Thirdly, we must understand the unity which exists there. We must cover it with flesh and blood and then give it heart and brain, or perhaps we will not have a Middle East about which to hold a conference next year.

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