This Perspective was picked up by the McClatchy Newspaper Company on August 17, 2006.
After 33 days of rockets, bombing and increasing ground combat, the guns have fallen (nearly) silent in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. To the surprise of many, initial reports indicate that, except for a few comparatively minor incidents, the ceasefire voted unanimously by the UN Security Council on Friday is holding.
Many are also surprised that both sides are vigorously claiming victory not only to the world but, much more importantly, to their own populations. And, strangely enough, both have some reason to. Some perception of accomplishment on both sides is a crucial component of any movement towards a more positive relationship between Israel and its northern neighborhood and, just as conceivably, toward a more stable situation in the region.
There are certain significant similarities to the situation after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which Arabs refer to as the “October” or “Ramadan” War. While the nature of that war was totally different – Israel was attacked massively and unexpectedly by the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, and it was primarily a war between armies, with few civilian casualties – the results, after 23 days of fighting, bear comparison. In conventional terms, Israel won on points. It repelled the attack, protected its heartland, and carried the fight to the enemy. Arab losses were significantly greater, and Israel was clearly on the offensive when it was stopped by a U.N ceasefire.
In 1973, Israeli politics also went through an upheaval, as is already beginning now. Prime Minister Golda Meir was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin, and other senior officials resigned. On a less visible level, Israelis also examined and condemned what was called the “Konzeptzia,” the fixed idea until the War that the Arabs simply were incapable of mounting a successful attack against Israel. One can likewise see the Israeli expectation of an easy victory in a few days as reflecting an outmoded and inappropriate “Konzeptzia.” It may be that Israel will have to find a way to coexist with Hezbollah on its borders, and Hezbollah will have to tacitly accept Israel’s existence.
However, the main, and perhaps overriding difference between 1973 and today is the role of the US. At that time, even though the Americans had provided desperately needed arms to Israel during the war while the USSR re-supplied the Arabs, the US was regarded as a respected and effective broker and could deal with all parties. Now, by contrast, many Arabs see the US as effectively allied with Israel and even, to some degree, as an instigator. In addition, the US refuses to deal with Iran and Hezbollah, two of the major actors in this conflict, and in effect does not negotiate with Syria, an equally important player.
This war has sharpened the differences between those who believe compromise is possible and those, led by President Bush and the conservative, unilateralist wing of the Republican Party, who do not. President Bush declared soon after 9/11, “If you’re not with us, you’re against us.” Largely as a result, pro-American Arab leaders and others now say “there are no longer moderates in the Middle East.” Dangerously, the former moderates are not allying with the US. In other words, the American unwillingness to deal with our declared opponents, and putting them all in an axis of evil, is denuding the US of effective allies.
Syria is generally recognized as the key. If the US retains its unwillingness to deal with it, and encourage Israel not to do so as well, there is no reason for the Syrians not to re-arm Hezbollah. This will bring us back to where things were before. On the other hand, frank negotiations can help to weaken the Syrian alliance with Hezbollah and Shi’ite extremists in Iran. But for that to happen, and to move the Middle East forward with creative diplomacy, we need leadership with an open mind that does not divide the world into black and white, with no shades of grey.
After years of denigrating the United Nations, the US found it a very useful forum for brokering this cease-fire. Perhaps we should learn from this experience and recognize that multilateral diplomacy, either through the UN or another forum, has advantages that unilateralism lacks. This would not please some of the President’s more conservative supporters, but it just might prevent another war in the region.
Paul Scham is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute and formerly a Research Associate at the Truman Institute for Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is co-editor of “Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue.”
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective was picked up by the McClatchy Newspaper Company on August 17, 2006.
After 33 days of rockets, bombing and increasing ground combat, the guns have fallen (nearly) silent in northern Israel and southern Lebanon. To the surprise of many, initial reports indicate that, except for a few comparatively minor incidents, the ceasefire voted unanimously by the UN Security Council on Friday is holding.
Many are also surprised that both sides are vigorously claiming victory not only to the world but, much more importantly, to their own populations. And, strangely enough, both have some reason to. Some perception of accomplishment on both sides is a crucial component of any movement towards a more positive relationship between Israel and its northern neighborhood and, just as conceivably, toward a more stable situation in the region.
There are certain significant similarities to the situation after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which Arabs refer to as the “October” or “Ramadan” War. While the nature of that war was totally different – Israel was attacked massively and unexpectedly by the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces, and it was primarily a war between armies, with few civilian casualties – the results, after 23 days of fighting, bear comparison. In conventional terms, Israel won on points. It repelled the attack, protected its heartland, and carried the fight to the enemy. Arab losses were significantly greater, and Israel was clearly on the offensive when it was stopped by a U.N ceasefire.
In 1973, Israeli politics also went through an upheaval, as is already beginning now. Prime Minister Golda Meir was replaced by Yitzhak Rabin, and other senior officials resigned. On a less visible level, Israelis also examined and condemned what was called the “Konzeptzia,” the fixed idea until the War that the Arabs simply were incapable of mounting a successful attack against Israel. One can likewise see the Israeli expectation of an easy victory in a few days as reflecting an outmoded and inappropriate “Konzeptzia.” It may be that Israel will have to find a way to coexist with Hezbollah on its borders, and Hezbollah will have to tacitly accept Israel’s existence.
However, the main, and perhaps overriding difference between 1973 and today is the role of the US. At that time, even though the Americans had provided desperately needed arms to Israel during the war while the USSR re-supplied the Arabs, the US was regarded as a respected and effective broker and could deal with all parties. Now, by contrast, many Arabs see the US as effectively allied with Israel and even, to some degree, as an instigator. In addition, the US refuses to deal with Iran and Hezbollah, two of the major actors in this conflict, and in effect does not negotiate with Syria, an equally important player.
This war has sharpened the differences between those who believe compromise is possible and those, led by President Bush and the conservative, unilateralist wing of the Republican Party, who do not. President Bush declared soon after 9/11, “If you’re not with us, you’re against us.” Largely as a result, pro-American Arab leaders and others now say “there are no longer moderates in the Middle East.” Dangerously, the former moderates are not allying with the US. In other words, the American unwillingness to deal with our declared opponents, and putting them all in an axis of evil, is denuding the US of effective allies.
Syria is generally recognized as the key. If the US retains its unwillingness to deal with it, and encourage Israel not to do so as well, there is no reason for the Syrians not to re-arm Hezbollah. This will bring us back to where things were before. On the other hand, frank negotiations can help to weaken the Syrian alliance with Hezbollah and Shi’ite extremists in Iran. But for that to happen, and to move the Middle East forward with creative diplomacy, we need leadership with an open mind that does not divide the world into black and white, with no shades of grey.
After years of denigrating the United Nations, the US found it a very useful forum for brokering this cease-fire. Perhaps we should learn from this experience and recognize that multilateral diplomacy, either through the UN or another forum, has advantages that unilateralism lacks. This would not please some of the President’s more conservative supporters, but it just might prevent another war in the region.
Paul Scham is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute and formerly a Research Associate at the Truman Institute for Peace of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is co-editor of “Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue.”