The completion of an Iraqi constitution has been delayed in large part because of a debate over whether the state should be a federal one, as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) had defined it, or a unitary one. Kurdistan has enjoyed autonomy since 1991 and remains insistent on a federal system. But, many Sunni Arabs fear that too much federalism would undermine the unity of the state and exclude them from sharing the oil revenues from the fields located in Shi‘ite and Kurdish regions.

The quarrel over federalism is larger than just Iraq. The Middle East is a mosaic of minorities and ethnicities. Many minorities are small or geographically dispersed, such as the Christian populations of the Arab world, or the groups of ethnic Circassians found in the Levant. But many others are significant communities with geographical cohesion -- the Berbers in North Africa, the Kurds in the Middle East and the non-Arab populations of southern Sudan.

The presence of substantial ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities in many countries has long been a problem. A federal system granting a reasonable amount of regional autonomy would seem the natural solution. And yet, only a handful of federal experiments have succeeded.

The United Arab Emirates, in fact, is the one truly federal experiment in the Arab world that has worked over a reasonable period of time. It is something of a special case. Of the seven emirates, only Abu Dhabi and Dubai might be able to make it on their own as independent states. The others are too small and in many cases too poor, but in a loose confederation with Abu Dhabi and Dubai they have become part of one of the world’s most prosperous states.

Sudan now is experimenting with a new federal system. Sudan's earlier attempt at federalism, from 1972-1983, collapsed after the central government essentially reneged on the deal. Sudan’s new federal arrangements are still untested. The fierce rioting that followed the recent death in a helicopter crash of Southern President (and national First Vice President) John Garang is not encouraging. Besides, the peace plan gives the south the right to secede entirely in six years if the federal system does not work. The Sudanese experiment is a daring one but it is far too early to proclaim it a success.

Other attempts at federal systems have usually been linked to the chimeric efforts at Arab unity in the 1960s and 1970s. To give one example, Egyptian domination of the Syrians was so thorough under the United Arab Republic (1958-1961) that it led to the union’s break-up.

Why have federal systems mostly failed in the Middle East? The answer may be found in the tradition of centralized authority and, perhaps to a lesser extent, in past Arab nationalist ideologies.

Centralized authority has been the rule. Traditional governance in the Middle East has long centered on the major cities. When local regions did enjoy a certain autonomy, it was usually because of the inability of the central government to enforce its rules. In some of the region’s more mountainous terrain, autonomy was often the result of natural defenses that aided local resistance.

In much of the Arab world, the tradition has been reinforced in more modern times by autocratic regimes and systems under which provincial governors are appointed by the capital, not by local authorities. Autocrats worldwide tend to favor centralized authority over local autonomy. Consider the refusal of Spain under Francisco Franco to even acknowledge the linguistic rights of Catalans, Basques or Galicians, all of whom today enjoy regional autonomy. Consider too the fact that all of China, despite its size, has only one time zone: Beijing’s.

Federalism also has to confront the role of Arab nationalism and identification with a perceived al-watan al-‘arabi or Arab nation. Arab nationalism in its various forms — Nasserism, Ba‘athism, and other variants — emphasized ‘uruba, Arabism, as a national identity transcending the individual Arab nation-states. But, by emphasizing Arab identity, it left the substantial non-Arabic-speaking populations — Kurds, Berbers, southern Sudanese, and others — out of the national fabric of identity.

Ironically, the passing of the vogue of Arab nationalism may have eased some of the problems of dealing with non-Arab identities but the rise of political Islam has created similar problems of handling non-Muslim minorities in a Muslim state. Christians, Jews, Mandaeans, Zoroastrians, Yazidis and other religious minorities find themselves in an awkward position in countries that identify the state with Islam.

In Iraq today, some sort of federal solution seems inevitable, since the Kurds will obviously not settle for anything that reduces the autonomy they already enjoy. But, the provision in the Transitional Administrative Law that would allow similar autonomous regions elsewhere might not make it into the new constitution.

Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, who were the primary support group for the former nationalist Ba‘ath rule, are the least comfortable with a federal system that gives more authority to Kurds and Shi‘ite Arabs. But they are not alone in opposing it. Many Shi‘ites also worry about any arrangement that would weaken Iraq’s national identity or seem to encourage separatism.

Michael C. Dunn is editor of The Middle East Journal, a quarterly publication produced by the Middle East Institute. He is also editor of The Estimate, a biweekly newsletter that provides intelligence analysis on the contemporary Middle East and neighboring regions, and has previously taught at Georgetown University and Utah State University.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.