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What to Expect from the Arab Summit

 
MEI Commentary
What to Expect from the Arab Summit
March 18, 2002
Dr. Murhaf Jouejati

On March 27, heads of state from the Arab League will convene a two-day summit in Beirut, beginning a newly established schedule of regular annual meetings. Dominating the agenda will be the current violence between Israel and the Palestinians. The issue of Iraq and US threats against it will also figure prominently. Whatever resolutions Arab leaders adopt, this summit promises to be among the most important in the Arab League's history and might become a watershed in Arab-Israeli and US-Arab relations.

Background and Venue

The very fact of this meeting is a victory for the 57-year-old Arab League, demonstrating its new vitality under Secretary-General Amre Moussa. While Arab leaders last year called for regular annual meetings, it was not clear that they would follow through. The meeting occurs despite lingering intra-Arab discord over Iraq's war on Kuwait in 1990 and despite significant differences among Arab state in how to approach the Arab-Israeli crisis.

Beirut hosts the summit, showcasing Lebanon's recovery from decades of violence. The city means to demonstrate its newfound stability by handling a large, high-profile gathering with intense security requirements. The summit's spotlight on Beirut can also be seen as a victory for Syria, Lebanon's "protector" and stabilizer. For this reason, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was the first to be officially invited to the summit by the Lebanese government.

Who Will (and Won't) Attend?

Among the key uncertainties of next week's summit is the presence or absence of PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat. Saudi Arabian Prince Abdullah has already made clear that, without Arafat, he will not table his much-touted peace initiative at the summit for discussion. Thus, Arafat's absence would kill the most promising Arab political initiative in the peace process in years.

Although Israel lifted its restrictions on his movement in the West Bank and Gaza, Arafat must still seek Israeli permission to depart the West Bank for Beirut. Israel is likely to agree, but the request will highlight Arafat's continued weakness and Israel's continued domination of the Palestinians.

Libya's Muammar Qaddafi may also absent himself from the proceedings in Beirut. Lebanese Shi'a, who now constitute a majority, have demanded an accounting of the fate of Imam Moussa Sadr, a renowned Lebanese mystic and senior Shi'a cleric whose plane disappeared during a flight between Beirut and Libya. Many Shi'a believe Qaddafi had Sadr kidnapped and killed, and he has been warned not to set foot in Lebanon unless he brings Sadr with him.

Out of security concerns, Saddam Hussein of Iraq will also likely forgo personal attendance at the summit.

Israel and the Palestinians

The Palestinian issue will be the order of the day. Unlike previous summits in which Arab leaders paid lip service to the Palestine issue, several leaders now find themselves under real pressure at home. With mass access to satellite television, Arab constituencies can see firsthand the brutality and the humiliation the Palestinians endure. They object to the fact that their leaders maintain relations with the United States, Israel's staunch supporter, while Israel punishes fellow Arabs for what they perceive as resistance to occupation.

As a result, the "Arab street" has become increasingly agitated and unruly, venting its anger against pro-American Arab governments. Recent Islamist rallies in Egypt and demonstrations at universities and in refugee camps in Jordan in protest of Israel's policies illustrate the pressures that moderate Arab regimes might face in the days ahead if no solution is found to ease Palestinian suffering.

The Saudi peace plan

Enter the Saudi peace plan. The idea Crown Prince Abdullah floated in mid-February - that Arab states normalize relations with Israel in return of Israel's withdrawal from territories it seized in 1967 - is a superior alternative to current Arab approaches. The 'resume-the-negotiations'

approach that Egypt and Jordan have been pushing to end Israeli-Palestinian violence and the 'escalate-the-Intifada' approach that Syria has been championing have both failed. With the hard-line Ariel Sharon at the helm in Israel, the likelihood that he will negotiate away the West Bank and Gaza is, at best, minimal. The likelihood that Palestinians will exhaust the superior Israeli army in the West Bank, as Hizbollah did in southern Lebanon almost two years ago, is even smaller.

Hence the significance of Crown Prince Abdullah's idea. It legitimizes normalization with Israel, a political taboo that much of the Arab world has been unable to break, and offers Israel the normalcy it has long sought. The initiative was well received internationally. It also got positive reviews in most Arab states, including, most importantly, in Syria and the Palestinian Authority.

Abdullah's idea also has its critics. Other than Hizbollah, Hamas, and the PFLP, all of whom have rejected it, Libya and Iraq both voiced their skepticism. Despite its objections, however, Iraq is likely to temper its opposition to the Saudi plan in order to enlist Saudi and Gulf (minus Kuwait) support for a strongly worded resolution that opposes the use of American force against Iraq.

What Will Happen at the Summit

The plan presented in Beirut will specify what territories Israel must yield in order to achieve peace: most likely, it will spell out the need to withdraw from the Golan Heights for Syria, the Shebaa Farms area for Lebanon, and all of the West Bank and Gaza, along with East Jerusalem, for the Palestinians.

Wrangling over the Abdullah initiative at the summit will focus on the fate of Palestinian refugees. Syria endorsed the Abdullah plan only after a visit to Riyadh assured him that the plan would include a "just settlement" of the Palestinian refugee issue, an issue of critical political and demographic importance to both Syria and Lebanon, another frontline state. But Syria's interpretation of justice requires Israel to adhere to UN General Assembly Resolution 194, which called for the repatriation or compensation of refugees. This view, far less flexible than Abdullah's "just settlement," is also shared by Libya, Iraq, and the Palestinians.

Any mention of Resolution 194 in the summit's endorsement of the Abdullah plan would likely doom the plan to irrelevance. Israel would immediately reject the demand as "demographic suicide," and would find a friendly ear in Washington for its position. But if the Arab states can agree on ambiguous language regarding justice for the refugees, the Abdullah plan can shift the burden for movement in the peace process from the Arab parties to Israel.

What the Abdullah Plan Will Mean

Barring surprises, Arab leaders will ultimately approve the Abdullah Plan at the summit, albeit with some reservations. The major challenge will be for Arab leaders to modify the text in ways that are both moderate enough to win international support, yet strong enough to appease radicals in the Arab world, a difficult balancing act that will probably fall on the shoulders of Egypt and Jordan. Should Arab leaders be satisfied with moderate language, they will have succeeded in shifting the onus onto Israel. Should they adopt tough language and unreasonable demands, they will have let Israel off the hook.

Whatever language they adopt, Arab leaders are expected to endorse the call for the establishment of a Palestinian state, urge the international community to deploy international monitors to the area, and respond positively to Palestinian appeals for increased Arab economic assistance.

The United States and Iraq

Arab leaders will also discuss US threats against Iraq. Most Arab leaders recognize that Iraq and its alleged stockpile of weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat to the security of the region. Despite his success at signing trade agreements with many Arab states in the past several years, Saddam Hussein remains fairly isolated and universally distrusted in the region.

But because of the public pressure noted above, they feel they cannot afford to support an American attack against a fellow Arab state while Israel persists in its clampdown on the Palestinians. Arab leaders, even the most-pro American among them, view an American attack against Iraq in the current circumstances to be potentially destabilizing to the entire region.

In light of this, the nine Arab leaders with whom Vice-President Dick Cheney held talks during his recent Middle East tour will reiterate publicly what they told him privately: Arab states are opposed to a unilateral American strike against Iraq. Moreover, they will urge the UN to lift its economic sanctions on Iraq so as to relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people.

The wording of the relevant resolution, however, will call on Iraq to free Kuwaiti POWs (to accommodate Kuwaiti reservations) and allow international inspectors (to accommodate UN demands). It will also, at the urging of Egypt, include a call for the removal of all weapons of mass destruction from the region - a statement meant to refer not only to Iraq's weapons program but also to Israel's nuclear capability.

It is the intersection of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis with the American targeting of Iraq that is making Arab leaders nervous. If there is significant progress in post-cease-fire negotiations, with hope for an independent Palestinian state on the horizon, then Arab leaders would be more inclined to tolerate an intervention in Iraq, should Iraq not abide by relevant UN resolutions. But even in that case they would prefer a multilateral action backed by UN authority.

Conclusion

With violence between Israelis and Palestinians at a fever pitch, and with the United States gearing up to strike Iraq, the region has seldom been so volatile. In light of the threatening situation facing the region, there seems to be an acute awareness among Arab leaders of the urgent need to unify ranks and act to protect regional stability. Whether they will live up to the challenge is an open question.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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