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A series of apparent US ultimatums and veiled political threats aimed at the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in recent weeks—especially Maliki himself—is but the latest example of excessive US involvement in the Iraqi political process.

Some rather intense US involvement in various aspects of the Iraqi political scene in the Green Zone has continued well beyond the point at which this sort of thing was slated to become much reduced: the handover of sovereignty to the government of Iyad Allawi in late June 2004. At that time, Ambassador Negroponte signaled—I believe correctly—that the new US embassy in Baghdad would endeavor to assume a considerably lower profile.

This was meant to contrast with the high-profile dominance of Iraqi internal affairs by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). CPA was deeply involved in the full range of Iraqi political, military, economic and security matters because it was, essentially, a government of occupation. Yet, especially since 2005, driven in part by the activism of Negroponte’s successor, Zalmay Khalilzad, the US has continued to intervene at a number of key junctures in the Iraqi political process.

Last year, Khalizad reportedly was a player in a number of closed-door sessions held to draft the permanent Iraqi constitution, apparently even proffering actual language in some cases. Following the latest Iraqi elections, the US intervened forcefully in order to overturn the initial decision of Iraq’s dominant Shi’a political block to extend Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s term as prime minister. Instead, Nouri al-Maliki was installed, ironically, in part, because of the support of the militant, anti-US Muqtada al-Sadr.

Maliki, however, appears to have fared little better than Jaafari in addressing Iraq’s welter of problems. This should come as no surprise to those familiar with how daunting these many challenges have proven. Nonetheless, the US appears to be reaching a point at which it might well begin pressing for the replacement of Maliki. Unfortunately, the age-old game of reshuffling political players in the face of much deeper, fundamental problems usually solves very little and wastes valuable time: in Iraq, many critical months are lost every time a new government must be formed.

And there are other compelling reasons why such intense US political interference, particularly at this late stage of the game, is ill-advised. The Iraqi government is now supposed to be fully sovereign and not nearly so subject to the whims of American politicians. Also, the overall situation is so serious that one Iraqi politician is unlikely to perform all that much better than another in effecting meaningful progress toward restoring the normalcy Iraqis so desperately crave. And, so long as the US hovers ever so closely over the Iraqi political scene, Iraqi politicians, instead of trying to work out problems among themselves, will continue to turn frequently to the US to function as a broker of sorts.

Additionally, to the extent Washington remains a major player in Iraqi politics, with the power to make or break governments, it will share a hefty portion of the blame, and rightly so—inside Iraq, the broader Middle East, and in the eyes of the international community—for likely failures in governance to come.

Many will argue that senior Iraqi politicians have not shown the ability to address the many pressing problems at hand. Persistent US meddling at the very core of the Iraqi political process is thus driven by profound—and rising—frustration over the seeming inability of any players in the current Iraqi political mainstream to stabilize the country. US impatience and political activism is therefore understandable, to some degree, because of the stakes involved. However, Washington’s repeated forays into Iraqi politics since mid-2004 have not resulted in any real improvement.

Consequently, it is time that setting the overall direction of Iraqi politics must be left to Iraqis, for better or worse. Washington must recognize that it cannot orchestrate political success in that tortured land through still more heavy-handed political tampering. And stepping back from the Iraqi political fray is a prerequisite for any overall exit strategy.