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US-Saudi Bond Grew Under Fahd

 
MEI Commentary
US-Saudi Bond Grew Under Fahd
August 03, 2005
Wyche Fowler

This Perspective originally appeared in the August 03, 2005 edition of The Atlanta Journal Constitution.

The death of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd is another step in the leadership transition taking place throughout the Middle East, as one long-serving monarch after another, from Morocco to Jordan to Syria to the United Arab Emirates, has passed from the scene.

Like his counterparts in other Arab countries, Fahd played a pivotal role as a nation-builder and in regional and global politics.

As US ambassador to Saudi Arabia from l996 until March 2001, I had a unique opportunity to observe firsthand and appreciate Fahd's leadership before his declining health incapacitated him. The sad occasion of his death allows us to reflect anew on how much the strong US-Saudi relationship and Saudi political stability grew out of his initiatives and policies.

From the US perspective, the late king should be remembered gratefully as a steadfast ally who played an important role against communism, for Arab-Israeli peace and for stability in the Gulf. Fahd should be remembered as a modernizer who pushed his subjects to abandon their insularity and join the modern world — and as an institution builder.

From the late l970s until the fall of the Soviet Union, under his guidance Saudi Arabia was a staunch ally against the spread of communism, witnessed most clearly in the Saudi-US cooperation with the Mujahiddin fighting the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

The support that Saudi Arabia now extends to the Middle East peace process relies on initiatives that Fahd proposed almost 25 years ago. Although the hard-line Arab consensus at the Baghdad conference in l979 pushed the Saudis to reject the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, the king persuaded the conference not to apply economic sanctions against Egypt in retaliation. In l981, he proposed a settlement for the conflict with Israel (known as the "Fahd plan," it was presented to the Arab Summit in Morocco in l982) that provided at least a psychological basis for the Arabs to support the current peace process.

More recently, Abdullah, as crown prince, building on the king's earlier initiatives, delivered a peace plan to President Bush that recognized Israel and promised normal relations in return for Israel's withdrawal from Palestinian territories.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, in what must stand as one of his most courageous decisions, Fahd invited US forces into Saudi Arabia to help defend the kingdom and liberate Kuwait — against the advice of members of senior leadership and in the face of vehement opposition from many religious leaders.

The war effort cost the Saudi government $60 billion and served as a catalyst to unleash an Islamic opposition movement, murdering Americans and Saudi soldiers and civilians in both our countries and around the world.

The Kingdom's battle against terrorists on its own soil, aided by strong cooperation between US and Saudi intelligence services, has reinvigorated the historic cooperation between our countries.

Looking back over the nearly 30 years during which Fahd ruled Saudi Arabia, first as regent, then as king, perhaps his most important achievement has been the seamless transition of power to Abdullah when his health declined, ensuring that the kingdom would have its new king experienced and prepared to govern the country at Fahd's death. With his passing the United States loses a friend but gains in Abdullah a leader of integrity, experience, and wisdom — and a king committed to continued reforms in his country and expanded friendship with the United States.

Author: Wyche Fowler is Chairman of the Middle East Institute’s Board of Governors. From 1996-2001, Fowler served as US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, and was formerly a US senator and congressman from the state of Georgia.

Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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