There is good reason to remain concerned over the possibility of US military action against Iran. The President’s intense focus on anything remotely posing a so-called “existential” threat to Israel and related US contingency planning strongly suggest that this crisis will not fade away. But, for the time being, the “military option” appears to have been pushed to the back burner. That said, absent timely and meaningful Iranian concessions the military option could once again become the solution of choice -- and despite all the risks associated with an attack on Iran.
Initially, I tended to dismiss Secretary Rice’s May 31 initiative for the US to join the European talks with Iran. A reading of the political body language since then suggests, however, that senior Administration policymakers may have learned enough to realize just how messy military action against Iran would be. Such action would likely involve not only taking out widely dispersed nuclear-related targets and nearby anti-aircraft defenses, but also portions of the Iranian air force assigned to defend these targets. And that’s just for starters.
In order to reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate in the Persian Gulf, such a plan probably would also include taking out Iran’s array of anti-ship missiles along the northern coast of the Gulf, its Kilo-Class submarines, other naval assets and maybe even some targets related to Iran’s long-range missile capabilities.
In other words, the military option could more closely resemble war than a limited package of surgical strikes (although even the latter would, of course, represent an act of war). And if Tehran were to be stripped of much of its ability to strike back militarily in the Gulf, Iraq would beckon that much more as an arena for Iranian payback.
At any time over the next year--and probably well beyond--such Iranian action would occur while Iraq’s first permanent government is seeking to plant solid roots against formidable odds. There would be quite a few Iranian options for punishing the US and its allies in Iraq, either directly or through various surrogates. Moving the necessary arms, people or money across a still porous Iraqi border would be fairly easy.
With crude prices near an all-time high and this fall’s mid-term elections just over the horizon, the Administration is doubtless more sensitive to the likely impact of a major crisis in the Gulf on the world price of crude. Many Republicans in Congress believe the President is insensitive to their plight related to elections in which Iraq and the price of gasoline are sure to be two of the leading issues. Some Republican concern is well placed. The White House also shares some of these concerns, although not with quite the same level of intensity.
On another front, despite the rhetoric, Administration policymakers may now have a more realistic notion of how difficult it would be to effect regime change in Iran. Actions such as the President’s January 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech and continuing threats related to Iran’s nuclear program have thrown many Iranians otherwise weary of clerical rule and eager for improved ties with the US into a more defiant, nationalistic mood antithetical to regime change.
A combination of all these factors probably was the genesis of the Administration’s decision to assume a more active role on the diplomatic front. In this situation, Iran’s actions could have more weight than ever before in determining the ultimate outcome—diplomatic or military. One might, of course, argue that whatever the situation, Iran has certain rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or that a nuclear double standard is being unfairly applied in Iran’s case. But such considerations do not count for much at this stage of the game, in part because of Iran’s own irresponsible actions and rhetoric.
Despite US misgivings concerning the military option, Iran still must concede enough to enable the US to back off. Iran has begun, albeit too slowly, to move toward accommodation and away from bravado and defiance, but significant concessions on the all-important nuclear fuel enrichment issue will be necessary in order to push the US military option definitively off the table.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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There is good reason to remain concerned over the possibility of US military action against Iran. The President’s intense focus on anything remotely posing a so-called “existential” threat to Israel and related US contingency planning strongly suggest that this crisis will not fade away. But, for the time being, the “military option” appears to have been pushed to the back burner. That said, absent timely and meaningful Iranian concessions the military option could once again become the solution of choice -- and despite all the risks associated with an attack on Iran.
Initially, I tended to dismiss Secretary Rice’s May 31 initiative for the US to join the European talks with Iran. A reading of the political body language since then suggests, however, that senior Administration policymakers may have learned enough to realize just how messy military action against Iran would be. Such action would likely involve not only taking out widely dispersed nuclear-related targets and nearby anti-aircraft defenses, but also portions of the Iranian air force assigned to defend these targets. And that’s just for starters.
In order to reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate in the Persian Gulf, such a plan probably would also include taking out Iran’s array of anti-ship missiles along the northern coast of the Gulf, its Kilo-Class submarines, other naval assets and maybe even some targets related to Iran’s long-range missile capabilities.
In other words, the military option could more closely resemble war than a limited package of surgical strikes (although even the latter would, of course, represent an act of war). And if Tehran were to be stripped of much of its ability to strike back militarily in the Gulf, Iraq would beckon that much more as an arena for Iranian payback.
At any time over the next year--and probably well beyond--such Iranian action would occur while Iraq’s first permanent government is seeking to plant solid roots against formidable odds. There would be quite a few Iranian options for punishing the US and its allies in Iraq, either directly or through various surrogates. Moving the necessary arms, people or money across a still porous Iraqi border would be fairly easy.
With crude prices near an all-time high and this fall’s mid-term elections just over the horizon, the Administration is doubtless more sensitive to the likely impact of a major crisis in the Gulf on the world price of crude. Many Republicans in Congress believe the President is insensitive to their plight related to elections in which Iraq and the price of gasoline are sure to be two of the leading issues. Some Republican concern is well placed. The White House also shares some of these concerns, although not with quite the same level of intensity.
On another front, despite the rhetoric, Administration policymakers may now have a more realistic notion of how difficult it would be to effect regime change in Iran. Actions such as the President’s January 2002 “Axis of Evil” speech and continuing threats related to Iran’s nuclear program have thrown many Iranians otherwise weary of clerical rule and eager for improved ties with the US into a more defiant, nationalistic mood antithetical to regime change.
A combination of all these factors probably was the genesis of the Administration’s decision to assume a more active role on the diplomatic front. In this situation, Iran’s actions could have more weight than ever before in determining the ultimate outcome—diplomatic or military. One might, of course, argue that whatever the situation, Iran has certain rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or that a nuclear double standard is being unfairly applied in Iran’s case. But such considerations do not count for much at this stage of the game, in part because of Iran’s own irresponsible actions and rhetoric.
Despite US misgivings concerning the military option, Iran still must concede enough to enable the US to back off. Iran has begun, albeit too slowly, to move toward accommodation and away from bravado and defiance, but significant concessions on the all-important nuclear fuel enrichment issue will be necessary in order to push the US military option definitively off the table.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division.