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Muammar Qadhafi is still in charge and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. But the leader’s current direction is the most reality-based and promising of more than three decades in power. I recently returned to Libya, nearly 33 years after working there as a young US diplomat. What I saw and heard was encouraging, but progress remains fragile.
Qadhafi seems to have recognized that Libya’s security is best assured by wary but peaceful relationships with the US and other major governments, and that Libyan involvement with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had left Libya less safe. Qadhafi now actively seeks acceptance by the West, integration into the global system and interaction with private companies representing the best technology and management that Libya’s oil and gas revenues can buy or attract for investment.
The strategic benefits to the United States are immense. Libya is no longer an adversary state located on the Mediterranean basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community.
Libya has considerable assets for positive development, if it establishes a sound macro-economic system, legal reforms and a globally competitive business climate. Its assets include a growing number of educated and assertive women seeking productive employment, along with their male counterparts. It also has substantial financial reserves, the potential for rapidly growing oil and gas revenues and, following Qadhafi’s decision to give up programs to develop unconventional weapons, a mutually non-threatening relationship with the US and Europe.
A theme I heard over and over was that Libya had done so much – offering up its citizens for trial at The Hague, providing a generous settlement to the Pan Am 103 families, giving up chemical weapons and its option to develop nuclear weapons – and had gotten so little in return.
Libya has gained a great deal, but three elements are still lacking. Libya remains on the US terrorism list, the US is delaying the issuance of visas in Tripoli, and relations are still well below the full ambassadorial level.
Removal of Libya from the terrorism list awaits some kind of resolution of the serious accusation of a Libyan attempt to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah. While not actually denying the allegations, Libyans charge that the US is seeking any excuse to delay this step.
The lack of visa issuance in Tripoli and Washington impedes immediate expansion of US-Libyan contacts in commerce, tourism or education. The holdup on the US side is purely technical and depends on building a secure facility in Tripoli. Libya now enjoys full diplomatic relations with virtually every major government except the United States. Qadhafi did not embark upon the dramatic changes in his foreign policy to be spurned as somehow not respectable enough to have a US Ambassador in Tripoli who would deliver the occasional letter from the president.
There are steps that Libya should initiate itself to reassure the US of its commitment to change, but let me focus on moves the Bush administration could make to show its readiness to reciprocate. Set a target date for issuing visas in Tripoli. Inform the Libyan government of the date but say implementation depends on meeting practical requirements connected with the security of the US mission in Libya. This should encourage the Libyans to issue visas in Washington. Assure Libya that the US is reviewing their listing as a state sponsor of terrorism with an open mind and will not simply accept the Saudi claims. Formulate proposals for dialogue between Libyan and US entities about the process of economic and political reform. Endorse the establishment of private sector business groups in both the US and Libya to present the concerns of our respective business communities to the governments in each capital. Send a high-level visitor to Tripoli to convey these points to the Libyans. The US could also make public statements about Libya that are neither unduly gushing nor insensitive to their national pride.
Libya’s policy shift, even with its shortcomings, has been a dramatic success for both Libya and its former adversaries in Europe and the United States. The strategic gains, as well as the benefits for business, are nearly self-evident. Less obvious, but perhaps more important in the longer term, is the potential for ordinary Libyans to achieve economic and political reforms as a result of the country’s new openness to the global community. Neglect of the budding US-Libyan relationship would only put these gains at risk.
David L. Mack is Vice President of the Middle East Institute. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and US Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and also held diplomatic postings in Iraq, Jordan, Jerusalem, Lebanon, Libya, and Tunisia.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective is a summary of a full-length article available by clicking here.
Muammar Qadhafi is still in charge and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. But the leader’s current direction is the most reality-based and promising of more than three decades in power. I recently returned to Libya, nearly 33 years after working there as a young US diplomat. What I saw and heard was encouraging, but progress remains fragile.
Qadhafi seems to have recognized that Libya’s security is best assured by wary but peaceful relationships with the US and other major governments, and that Libyan involvement with international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction had left Libya less safe. Qadhafi now actively seeks acceptance by the West, integration into the global system and interaction with private companies representing the best technology and management that Libya’s oil and gas revenues can buy or attract for investment.
The strategic benefits to the United States are immense. Libya is no longer an adversary state located on the Mediterranean basin. Instead, it can be a positive example to the North Koreas and Irans of the world of how to come in from the cold and become a respectable member of the global community.
Libya has considerable assets for positive development, if it establishes a sound macro-economic system, legal reforms and a globally competitive business climate. Its assets include a growing number of educated and assertive women seeking productive employment, along with their male counterparts. It also has substantial financial reserves, the potential for rapidly growing oil and gas revenues and, following Qadhafi’s decision to give up programs to develop unconventional weapons, a mutually non-threatening relationship with the US and Europe.
A theme I heard over and over was that Libya had done so much – offering up its citizens for trial at The Hague, providing a generous settlement to the Pan Am 103 families, giving up chemical weapons and its option to develop nuclear weapons – and had gotten so little in return.
Libya has gained a great deal, but three elements are still lacking. Libya remains on the US terrorism list, the US is delaying the issuance of visas in Tripoli, and relations are still well below the full ambassadorial level.
Removal of Libya from the terrorism list awaits some kind of resolution of the serious accusation of a Libyan attempt to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah. While not actually denying the allegations, Libyans charge that the US is seeking any excuse to delay this step.
The lack of visa issuance in Tripoli and Washington impedes immediate expansion of US-Libyan contacts in commerce, tourism or education. The holdup on the US side is purely technical and depends on building a secure facility in Tripoli. Libya now enjoys full diplomatic relations with virtually every major government except the United States. Qadhafi did not embark upon the dramatic changes in his foreign policy to be spurned as somehow not respectable enough to have a US Ambassador in Tripoli who would deliver the occasional letter from the president.
There are steps that Libya should initiate itself to reassure the US of its commitment to change, but let me focus on moves the Bush administration could make to show its readiness to reciprocate. Set a target date for issuing visas in Tripoli. Inform the Libyan government of the date but say implementation depends on meeting practical requirements connected with the security of the US mission in Libya. This should encourage the Libyans to issue visas in Washington. Assure Libya that the US is reviewing their listing as a state sponsor of terrorism with an open mind and will not simply accept the Saudi claims. Formulate proposals for dialogue between Libyan and US entities about the process of economic and political reform. Endorse the establishment of private sector business groups in both the US and Libya to present the concerns of our respective business communities to the governments in each capital. Send a high-level visitor to Tripoli to convey these points to the Libyans. The US could also make public statements about Libya that are neither unduly gushing nor insensitive to their national pride.
Libya’s policy shift, even with its shortcomings, has been a dramatic success for both Libya and its former adversaries in Europe and the United States. The strategic gains, as well as the benefits for business, are nearly self-evident. Less obvious, but perhaps more important in the longer term, is the potential for ordinary Libyans to achieve economic and political reforms as a result of the country’s new openness to the global community. Neglect of the budding US-Libyan relationship would only put these gains at risk.
David L. Mack is Vice President of the Middle East Institute. He served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs and US Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, and also held diplomatic postings in Iraq, Jordan, Jerusalem, Lebanon, Libya, and Tunisia.