The political crisis over the election of the next president has crystallized key issues facing Turkey. Behind the tactical battles waged over the election is a larger struggle over the relationship between religion and the state. At stake is nothing less than the essential character and future direction of Turkish democracy.
ANATOMY OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS
On April 14, over 300,000 demonstrators converged on downtown Ankara chanting “We don’t want an Imam for president” in an effort to deter Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan or another candidate from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) from standing for the post. Two days earlier, Chief of the Turkish General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, in a comment widely interpreted as a warning to Erdogan not to run for president, had stated bluntly, “We hope that someone who truly respects the principles of the republic [becomes president], not someone who pretends to do so.” In an address to Turkish military officers, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer too entered the fray, asserting, “For the first time, the pillars of the secular republic are being openly questioned.”
The next week, the AKP chose Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, a close ally of Mr. Erdogan, as its official candidate for president. This decision unleashed a second wave of mass protests in Istanbul, Ankara, Manisa and Izmir, and caused a strong backlash from the secular establishment. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) responded to Gul’s nomination by boycotting the parliament’s first round of balloting for president held on April 27 and challenging the legality of the vote. Just a few hours after the balloting occurred, the General Staff issued a communiqué, warning “It should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. When necessary, it will display its attitudes and actions very clearly. No one should doubt that.” On May 1, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round ballot on the grounds that less than the required two-thirds of parliamentarians were present at the time of the vote.
Against the backdrop of the high court’s ruling and failure to secure victory in a second round, Foreign Minister Gul withdrew his candidacy. Facing a standoff with the secular establishment, Prime Minister Erdogan sought and obtained from parliament approval to call early elections, which are scheduled for July 22. He also secured parliamentary approval for a package of constitutional changes whereby the president for the first time would be elected by popular vote and lawmakers’ terms would be shortened to four years, making it easier for the majority party to achieve a quorum.
With the elections just several weeks away, the secular parties are maneuvering to forge electoral alliances. On the center-left, the CHP has allied with the Democratic Left Party (DSP). On the center-right, the True Path Party (DYP) and Motherland Party (Anavatan) have joined forces under the umbrella of the new Democrat Party.
Given these recent developments, the outcome of the election itself is uncertain. One scenario is that several parties will break the 10% threshold for garnering seats in parliament, forcing the AKP into a coalition government. Another is that the AKP will muster as much or perhaps even more support at the polls than in 2002. Neither outcome is appealing. The former could lead Turkey back to the days of weak and ineffective government. The latter could tempt the AKP to overplay its hand.
UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS
On the surface, the battle over the presidency is part and parcel of the political power struggle between the ruling party and the opposition. Capturing the presidency would add to the AKP’s commanding majority in the parliament by providing control over another important state institution. The president can veto laws, and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He appoints the uniformed chief of the army, as well as all judges and university rectors. Perhaps most importantly, the president can play the role of “balancer”. In fact, President Sezer, whose term expired on May 16, is generally regarded as having been an effective counterweight to Prime Minister Erdogan, repeatedly blocking AKP legislation and appointments.
The battle over the presidency has exposed other fissures in Turkish politics and society. For one thing, it has revealed the tension between the democratic and autocratic tendencies of the entrenched Kemalist establishment. The AKP’s goals — the liberalization of the economy and accession to the EU — threaten the corporate interests of the traditional business elite and the bureaucracy, not to mention the Turkish armed forces.
For another, the battle over the presidency has laid bare deep misgivings about the true nature of the AKP, that is, whether its policy agenda is compatible with the principle of secularism enshrined in Turkey’s Constitution. The possibility that the AKP might win the presidency touches a raw nerve partly because of suspicion that its leaders are determined to challenge the country’s strict separation between religion and politics.
Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul have vigorously denied that they seek to Islamicize Turkey. In defense of these claims, they point to their policy priorities and achievements since taking office: the reduction of public debt and inflation; the increase in foreign direct investment and GDP growth; and the implementation of reforms aimed at gaining EU membership ranging from the expansion of cultural autonomy for Kurds to the elimination of capital punishment.
Nevertheless, interspersed with these initiatives and accomplishments have been statements and actions that have alarmed secularists, including proposals, later abandoned, to create alcohol-free zones and to criminalize adultery. The growth of the Islamic business sector, especially the infusion of “green money” from abroad into the economy has raised concerns about AKP financial opacity. Hard-line members of the AKP continue to call for gender segregation, which has kindled the fears of secularists. In short, many regard the AKP’s “pragmatism,” including its efforts to seek EU membership, as a strategic deception.
At an even deeper level, the clash over the presidency reflects a profound social transformation that has been under way in Turkey since the mid-1970s. This transformation is marked by the emergence of an observant Islamist middle class and growing entrepreneurial elite that is socially and culturally more conservative than the republican establishment. These social forces have given birth to a new modernizing political class — the defender of whose interests is the AKP. But as the wave of demonstrations has shown, secular identity in Turkey is itself broad-based and robust, by no means the exclusive preserve of a narrow elite.
TURKEY BEYOND CRISIS?
The calling of early elections defused a political crisis but did not settle the controversy over the choice of the next president. Nor can the upcoming elections be expected to settle questions of even greater magnitude facing Turkey: Is it possible for an Islamist to occupy the presidency without fundamentally breaking with the Kemalist tradition? Can moderate secularists and moderate devout Muslims find common ground and thereby help forge a national consensus that redefines secularity?
Given that there is so much at stake of greater importance than the results of elections in July will be the lessons drawn from this crisis and how they are applied in the coming weeks and months by the AKP, the leadership of the secular parties, and the senior military brass. The optimal outcome for Turkey is one where all three of these sets of actors show foresight and forbearance.
If the AKP succeeds in preserving or expanding its commanding position in the Grand National Assembly, the challenge for Prime Minister Erdogan will be to exercise restraint — to avoid the temptation to regard that status as a license to govern Turkey as though it were a one-party state. Whether or not the AKP retains its control of the parliament, the challenge for the secular parties will be to look beyond the formation of ephemeral electoral alliances and mobilization of mass public protests, toward the longer term objectives of infusing new blood into their leadership and ranks and crafting a positive agenda. The challenge for the armed forces will be to accept political decisions that grow out of the democratic system, and thus the principle that military intervention is a contradiction rather than an integral part of the democratic system of checks and balances.
John Calabrese is Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and professor at American University.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The political crisis over the election of the next president has crystallized key issues facing Turkey. Behind the tactical battles waged over the election is a larger struggle over the relationship between religion and the state. At stake is nothing less than the essential character and future direction of Turkish democracy.
ANATOMY OF THE POLITICAL CRISIS
On April 14, over 300,000 demonstrators converged on downtown Ankara chanting “We don’t want an Imam for president” in an effort to deter Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan or another candidate from the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) from standing for the post. Two days earlier, Chief of the Turkish General Staff Yasar Buyukanit, in a comment widely interpreted as a warning to Erdogan not to run for president, had stated bluntly, “We hope that someone who truly respects the principles of the republic [becomes president], not someone who pretends to do so.” In an address to Turkish military officers, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer too entered the fray, asserting, “For the first time, the pillars of the secular republic are being openly questioned.”
The next week, the AKP chose Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, a close ally of Mr. Erdogan, as its official candidate for president. This decision unleashed a second wave of mass protests in Istanbul, Ankara, Manisa and Izmir, and caused a strong backlash from the secular establishment. The Republican People’s Party (CHP) responded to Gul’s nomination by boycotting the parliament’s first round of balloting for president held on April 27 and challenging the legality of the vote. Just a few hours after the balloting occurred, the General Staff issued a communiqué, warning “It should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces are a side in this debate and are a staunch defender of secularism. When necessary, it will display its attitudes and actions very clearly. No one should doubt that.” On May 1, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round ballot on the grounds that less than the required two-thirds of parliamentarians were present at the time of the vote.
Against the backdrop of the high court’s ruling and failure to secure victory in a second round, Foreign Minister Gul withdrew his candidacy. Facing a standoff with the secular establishment, Prime Minister Erdogan sought and obtained from parliament approval to call early elections, which are scheduled for July 22. He also secured parliamentary approval for a package of constitutional changes whereby the president for the first time would be elected by popular vote and lawmakers’ terms would be shortened to four years, making it easier for the majority party to achieve a quorum.
With the elections just several weeks away, the secular parties are maneuvering to forge electoral alliances. On the center-left, the CHP has allied with the Democratic Left Party (DSP). On the center-right, the True Path Party (DYP) and Motherland Party (Anavatan) have joined forces under the umbrella of the new Democrat Party.
Given these recent developments, the outcome of the election itself is uncertain. One scenario is that several parties will break the 10% threshold for garnering seats in parliament, forcing the AKP into a coalition government. Another is that the AKP will muster as much or perhaps even more support at the polls than in 2002. Neither outcome is appealing. The former could lead Turkey back to the days of weak and ineffective government. The latter could tempt the AKP to overplay its hand.
UNTANGLING THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS
On the surface, the battle over the presidency is part and parcel of the political power struggle between the ruling party and the opposition. Capturing the presidency would add to the AKP’s commanding majority in the parliament by providing control over another important state institution. The president can veto laws, and is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. He appoints the uniformed chief of the army, as well as all judges and university rectors. Perhaps most importantly, the president can play the role of “balancer”. In fact, President Sezer, whose term expired on May 16, is generally regarded as having been an effective counterweight to Prime Minister Erdogan, repeatedly blocking AKP legislation and appointments.
The battle over the presidency has exposed other fissures in Turkish politics and society. For one thing, it has revealed the tension between the democratic and autocratic tendencies of the entrenched Kemalist establishment. The AKP’s goals — the liberalization of the economy and accession to the EU — threaten the corporate interests of the traditional business elite and the bureaucracy, not to mention the Turkish armed forces.
For another, the battle over the presidency has laid bare deep misgivings about the true nature of the AKP, that is, whether its policy agenda is compatible with the principle of secularism enshrined in Turkey’s Constitution. The possibility that the AKP might win the presidency touches a raw nerve partly because of suspicion that its leaders are determined to challenge the country’s strict separation between religion and politics.
Not surprisingly, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul have vigorously denied that they seek to Islamicize Turkey. In defense of these claims, they point to their policy priorities and achievements since taking office: the reduction of public debt and inflation; the increase in foreign direct investment and GDP growth; and the implementation of reforms aimed at gaining EU membership ranging from the expansion of cultural autonomy for Kurds to the elimination of capital punishment.
Nevertheless, interspersed with these initiatives and accomplishments have been statements and actions that have alarmed secularists, including proposals, later abandoned, to create alcohol-free zones and to criminalize adultery. The growth of the Islamic business sector, especially the infusion of “green money” from abroad into the economy has raised concerns about AKP financial opacity. Hard-line members of the AKP continue to call for gender segregation, which has kindled the fears of secularists. In short, many regard the AKP’s “pragmatism,” including its efforts to seek EU membership, as a strategic deception.
At an even deeper level, the clash over the presidency reflects a profound social transformation that has been under way in Turkey since the mid-1970s. This transformation is marked by the emergence of an observant Islamist middle class and growing entrepreneurial elite that is socially and culturally more conservative than the republican establishment. These social forces have given birth to a new modernizing political class — the defender of whose interests is the AKP. But as the wave of demonstrations has shown, secular identity in Turkey is itself broad-based and robust, by no means the exclusive preserve of a narrow elite.
TURKEY BEYOND CRISIS?
The calling of early elections defused a political crisis but did not settle the controversy over the choice of the next president. Nor can the upcoming elections be expected to settle questions of even greater magnitude facing Turkey: Is it possible for an Islamist to occupy the presidency without fundamentally breaking with the Kemalist tradition? Can moderate secularists and moderate devout Muslims find common ground and thereby help forge a national consensus that redefines secularity?
Given that there is so much at stake of greater importance than the results of elections in July will be the lessons drawn from this crisis and how they are applied in the coming weeks and months by the AKP, the leadership of the secular parties, and the senior military brass. The optimal outcome for Turkey is one where all three of these sets of actors show foresight and forbearance.
If the AKP succeeds in preserving or expanding its commanding position in the Grand National Assembly, the challenge for Prime Minister Erdogan will be to exercise restraint — to avoid the temptation to regard that status as a license to govern Turkey as though it were a one-party state. Whether or not the AKP retains its control of the parliament, the challenge for the secular parties will be to look beyond the formation of ephemeral electoral alliances and mobilization of mass public protests, toward the longer term objectives of infusing new blood into their leadership and ranks and crafting a positive agenda. The challenge for the armed forces will be to accept political decisions that grow out of the democratic system, and thus the principle that military intervention is a contradiction rather than an integral part of the democratic system of checks and balances.
John Calabrese is Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and professor at American University.