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For the region, it is hard to see much good, if any, coming out of the Iraq tragedy. Rather than seeking a facile solution, we need a new US strategy for a long struggle to manage the fallout from the decision to launch the 2003 invasion and from its bungled aftermath. There is a Turkish proverb which says, “if a mad man throws a stone into a well, 40 wise men would find it hard to get the stone out of the well.” It has become too easy to criticize the Bush Administration. Critics of the Bush Administration policies must acknowledge that there are no fail-safe parachutes. Painful though it is, we cannot simply walk away from Iraq.

Most understand that the intoxicating visions of regional transformation and other goals for our Iraq adventure are unattainable. But there is a substitute for victory. The Administration has already been using more realistic metrics for success. This “mission crawl back” has been driven by facts on the ground, but it has not been articulated by the Bush Administration in a consistent and convincing way.

This was part of what the Iraq Study Group tried to do, and the ISG recommendations are reflected in much of the current Congressional debate. Changing the nature of the US military presence while gradually disengaging from combat operations against Iraqis is one part. A second part would be maintaining a robust political and economic engagement in partnership with the international community. International measures would give a priority to stability, rather than democracy, and they would focus on containing both the level and the spread of the violence while dealing with the human tragedies and economic burdens of refugee flows both within Iraq and across its borders.

That may not sound heroic, but changing the character and size of our military involvement in a manner that does not make a bad situation much worse will be a huge challenge requiring both continuing sacrifices by the US military and skilled diplomacy. It will take strong presidential leadership working with leaders in both parties of the Congress to sell this to the American people and to make our position clear to Iraqis, all of their neighbors and other key countries. We must find overlapping interests, even with traditional adversaries, and build cooperation on this basis rather than saber rattling.

Here is the paradox. Few will participate in such efforts if the US is in full control of them and sets the agenda. But no international efforts can succeed without strong US backing. We must try to avoid a scenario whereby Iraq’s implosion sets off a regional power struggle in which the dominant victor is our adversary and losers become our dependent clients. If we continue striving for regional primacy, we may forfeit the chance for equal treatment and future respect.

The ISG recommendations for an Iraq International Support Group are intended to be one way of achieving this. The idea of the Support Group would not be that much of a stretch for the government in Baghdad, since it has already joined the Contact Group of Iraq’s neighbors and Egypt, an ad hoc group that started in Istanbul in 2003 and has met roughly twice a year since. Obviously, Iraq's neighbors have very disparate interests and views. However, the rather sparse public statements of the group indicate their nominal support for the principles of Iraq's territorial integrity, unity and independence. Despite doubts about the intentions of various members, the Iraqi government has publicly welcomed the group's position. Ideally, Iraq would chair meetings of the International Support Group.

The difference would be to add the weight of the international community to an existing institution already pledged to respect Iraq’s independence and to seek to secure it borders. Far from suggesting that Iranian nuclear ambitions or Syrian influence in Lebanon would be conceded in exchange for their cooperation regarding Iraq, the ISG Report stated that the US would continue to address the Iranian nuclear issue in alliance with the European Union and to deal with Syro-Lebanese matters in the context of the United Nations process. The precedent for dealing with Iran regarding Afghanistan is an encouraging example of how Tehran’s behavior can improve when it is admitted to the table as a partner rather than being addressed in public communiqués as an adversary.

The recent National Intelligence Estimate stated that outside actors are not likely to be a major driver of either violence or the prospects for stability because of the self-sustaining character of Iraq’s internal sectarian dynamics. We should have no illusions. The governments in Tehran and Damascus do not have clean hands regarding the violence. But at the end of the day, neither Iran nor Syria wants a failed state or outlaw region on their borders, providing a safe haven for terrorists and setting off a new tidal wave of refugees. Both governments seek indications that the US has priorities other than regime change in mind for them. Other neighbors need the assurance they will not be abandoned to deal alone with the consequences of an Iraqi implosion, a new Muslim civil war and increasing Iranian power.

What is novel about the proposed Support Group is that it would require an unaccustomed degree of modesty for the United States. It is hard to see a major downside to offering both Iran and Syria a chance to be part of the solution rather than it being assumed that they would always and inevitably contribute to Iraq's problems. Diplomatic dialogue is not a seal of approval for current or past policies. Rather, it is a tool for engaging both friends and adversaries in finding areas where our interests overlap. For the near term, the US can deploy great military power in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. But it has never been clearer that military power outside of a strong diplomatic context is wholly inadequate. Moreover, it has been an unpopular war at home and abroad. As a result of this and neglect of the Arab-Israel peace process, our soft power is much less than it was in 2003. As our military and economic inputs start to decline, we need to take up the slack with subtle, daring and effective diplomacy throughout the region to stabilize Iraq and stop the spread of violence and suffering. We must be present at the creation of this new international framework for it to have credibility, but it would be better if we shared the stage with others.