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Neither before nor since Muhammad Khatami assumed the presidency in 1997 has there existed a strong consensus in Tehran in favor of reconciliation with Washington or a rapprochement with the regime in Baghdad. Though detente has been the hallmark of Iranian foreign policy under President Khatami's stewardship, reflecting the divisions and power imbalance within the clerical establishment, the steps taken by Iran to improve relations with the United States and with Iraq have been cautious, limited, and ultimately not successful. As a result, all predictions of "warming trends" and "positive breakthroughs" have proven false.

Though the Iranian government continues to treat the United States and Iraq as its chief nemeses, they do not necessarily regard these adversaries as posing an equivalent threat to the security of the nation or to the survival of the regime. Whereas the US continues to be represented as the "Great Satan" and American power is both feared and resented, the Iraqi Baathist regime led by Saddam Hussein is viewed as an existential threat. However Iranian officials may differ over tactics, they appear to be united in their conviction that the regime in Baghdad is dangerous and untrustworthy. Across the political spectrum in Iran, there is grave concern about, indeed a preoccupation with the Iraqi regime's regional ambitions and Iraq's military capabilities, especially its ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction.

These misgivings stem mainly from the experience of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.2 To many Iranians, the 1988 UN cease-fire agreement was a bitter pill to swallow — an "imposed peace." The two governments have yet to sign a peace treaty. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 588, hostilities have been suspended and a framework exists within which to negotiate the resolution of the belligerent parties' competing claims. Nevertheless, a significant number of Iranian prisoners of war (POWs) remain in Iraq. There are also large numbers of Iranian troops missing in action (MIAs) still unaccounted for. The process of repatriation of Iranian refugees has likewise been painfully slow. The file on Iranian compensation and reparations claims lodged with the United Nations remains open. And Iranian pilgrims seeking to visit Shiite religious shrines in Iraq continue to encounter obstacles.

Iranian officials have repeatedly accused their Iraqi counterparts of obstructing working-level negotiations aimed at resolving the above-mentioned issues. The frustration felt by the Iranian side is evident in the comments by Foreign Undersecretary for Arab Affairs, Dr. Muhamad al-Sadr, who remarked, "... regrettably the experience of these years has shown an Iraqi failure to respond positively to our efforts. Iraq has not exhibited the goodwill required to elevate the level of relations and surmount the war residues."3

Stoking this frustration and ill will is the fact that many of the "cultural" and "humanitarian" issues associated with the war are politically charged in Iran. Refugees' and "martyrs'" families constitute a large and vocal constituency with allies in the government. For those allies, advancing claims and grievances related to the war serves the larger political purpose of defending national honor and bolstering the populist-revolutionary credentials of a regime that is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. It Thus, it is little wonder that high-level visits (e.g., Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri's trip to Iran in late September 2002) have very seldom occurred, have sparked controversy within the ruling establishment itself, and have ultimately produced more theater than concrete results. The policy of detente has simply not carried over to Iran's relations with Iraq, where a war of complaints and accusations is the norm and where temporary truces occurring at irregular intervals have been mistaken for evidence of a new era in a poisoned relationship.

It is important to emphasize that the struggle between Iran and Iraq is not just a propaganda war; it is a state of active belligerency. The deadly game of border infiltration and retaliation4 that had been a component of Iran-Iraq rivalry before the 1975 Algiers Accord and that resumed when the Shah fell from power four years later, continues unabated. This low-intensity conflict features acts of assassination, sabotage, and terror. The Mujaheddin al-Khalq (MKO) — the main group to have claimed responsibility for many of the acts perpetrated against Iranian targets — trains in, and launches attacks from Iraqi territory. At minimum, the MKO operates at the sufferance of the Iraqi government.5 Since 1981, the MKO is believed responsible for the killings of Muhammad Beheshti, President Rajaie, Prime Minister Bahonar, and more than 70 Majlis deputies. In April 1999, the MKO assassinated Deputy Army Chief 'Ali Sayad-Shirazi, and four months later killed the head of Iran's Prisons Authority, Assadollah Lajevardi. The MKO has launched operations against Iranian patrols in remote areas of Kermanshah province, but also in population centers (e.g., grenade and mortar attacks in Tehran in February and October 2000).6 The latter occurred within days of Foreign Minister Kharrazi's visit to Iraq.7

The military threat that Iraq does, or might pose is perforce of concern to Iran. The interdiction and enforcement efforts taken in conjunction with the UN sanctions regime, to the extent that they have kept Iraq in a weakened state in conventional military terms, have been strategically beneficial to Iran. But it is also important to note that Iranian perceptions of the Iraqi threat are colored by the past. The Iranian memory of the Iran-Iraq War is vivid and the lessons for Iran compelling. From the Iranian perspective, that war was a "laboratory" for Iraq's development and use of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons.8 The recent admission by Iraq that it had used chemical weapons against Iranian forces and the disclosure that Western companies and governments had played a role in Iraq's development of this capacity vindicate Iran's longstanding claims. However, Iranian officials remain ever wary about Iraq's WMD capabilities — supportive of UN disarmament efforts but skeptical about what they have achieved or can yet accomplish.

Having experienced and remained exposed to the "scorpion's sting," Iran has an interest in ensuring Iraq's full compliance with UN sanctions resolutions and thus has an interest in common with the United States. Doubtless, many Iranian officials share the conviction of those in the Bush Administration who believe that Iraq's disarmament can only be achieved by regime change. Yet, in spite of this timely convergence of interests between Tehran and Washington, Iran-US relations overall remain locked in a confrontational mode.

For the past several decades, the cardinal objective of US policy toward the Persian Gulf has been to prevent any hostile country from gaining control of the bulk of the region's oil. Since the fall of the Shah, this "oil denial" strategy has been applied to Iran as well as to Iraq. From the Iranian perspective, the weakening of Iraq by American-led military action in 1991 and by UN-based sanctions thereafter was offset by a tightening of US economic sanctions in the mid-1990s (especially those targeting the energy sector).

The hostile rhetoric between US and Iranian officials subsided after President Muhammad Khatami's election to office in May 1997. Prompted by the latter's CNN interview in which he called for a "dialogue among civilizations," the Clinton administration explored a possible rapprochement with Iran. President Clinton authorized people-to-people exchanges and the partial lifting of sanctions; and dispatched Secretary of State Madeline Albright to participate in a round of "6 + 2" talks over Afghanistan at the September 2000 UN General Assembly meetings. Upon coming to office, President George W. Bush ordered a review of US Iran policy, thus indicating some flexibility in the new administration's approach.

Yet, within a year of the Bush administration's taking office, US-Iran relations reverted to form. In examining why the relationship again soured, Daniel Brumberg describes President Khatami's decision to extend a hand to Washington in the weeks leading up to September 11th as a bold political gambit gone wrong. According to Brumberg, Mr. Khatami and his supporters in the Majlis attempted to link the reformist domestic agenda to the idea of renewing ties with the United States, but met stiff resistance from the Conservative faction and from Spiritual Guide Ayatollah Khamenei himself, who stated authoritatively that pursuing the idea of negotiations with the present administration in Washington would be "futile," "insulting and humiliating."9 Thus, not for the first time, the debate over the relationship with Washington became enmeshed in the larger struggle for political power within the Iranian ruling establishment. The downturn in US-Iran relations prompted further criticism about the performance of the President; both he and the Foreign Ministry (under his control) were accused of being naive and incompetent. And right-fundamentalists, such as the head of the Judiciary Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Sharoudi, seized the opportunity to defend their positions by identifying reformers as allies of Iran's "warmongering arch enemy, America."10

As Brumberg himself correctly observes, additional factors contributed to the erosion of whatever goodwill had been built up between the two governments through their tacit cooperation in the initial stages of military operations and post-conflict relief/reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. On the US side, the "Karine A" incident put advocates of dialogue with Tehran on the defensive. Subsequently, allegations that Iran was harboring fugitive Al Qaeda elements, and was arming and funding Afghan warlords, scotched all talk that the US could find common ground with the present Iranian government On the Iranian side, President Bush's January 2002 State of the Union Address, in which the term the "axis of evil" was first used, strengthened the hand of opponents of reconciliation with the United States who highlighted as evidence of Washington's unremitting hostility continuing US efforts to thwart Iran's effort to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Bank, and to pressure Russia to limit conventional arms sales and to terminate cooperation in the nuclear field.

Iranian perceptions of threat and of the United States as a threat have been shaped not just by this run of events, but by aspects of US policy related directly or indirectly to the showdown with Iraq. The American decision to support the UNMOVIC weapons inspections process notwithstanding, the Bush administration's approach to Iraq seems to have been squarely centered on regime change, and has been interpreted that way by Iranian officials. Whatever solace Tehran can take from the prospect of Saddam's removal from power is offset by worry about what the United States might have in store for Iran (as will be discussed). That the Bush administration's emphasis on regime change in Iraq has blossomed into a "vision" of a democratic Middle East and a consequent geopolitical reordering of the region raised concerns in Iran regarding what this might portend for the nation and for the regime. In this context, the July 12th Bush radio address expressing solidarity with Iran's people in their struggle against "unelected leaders" came across in Tehran not just as another in a series of vague threats, but as possibly foreshadowing more concrete US actions to destabilize the Iranian government. Coupled with the growth of American military power in Iran's surrounding neighborhood, this tightening of US pressure on Iran has upped the stakes and further complicated Iranian decision-making with respect to the Iraq crisis.

Multiple Sources of Apprehension —

1. The US Factor:
Iranian reactions to the US military buildup in preparation for a possible war in Iraq ran the gamut from anxiety to bravado. That said, nearly all such statements reflected the same general sentiment of heightened insecurity, coupled with the conviction that for Tehran to remain passive in the face of the risks and uncertainty associated with military action in Iraq would be dangerous and irresponsible.

According to Defense Minister 'Ali Shamkani, a US presence in Iraq would "increase the threat to and vulnerability of Iran in terms of security."11 Mohsen Rezai, a former head of the Revolutionary Guards and now a senior member of the Expediency Council, discussed impending US military action in Iraq in terms more explicit and ominous, warning that "A major event is coming in this region, and sooner or later, after Iraq, the United States will be looking to do the same in Iran."12 Ayatollah Khamene'i, in comments following a meeting with military leaders stated: "The Iranian nation, in line with their anti-hegemonic attitude, will never initiate an aggression. But, if anybody challenges them or threatens their interests, the answer of the Iranian nation will be strong, making the aggressors regretful."13 Commander of the Islamic Revolution's Guards Corps (IRGC), Brigadier General Yahya-Rahim Safavi, warned that Tehran will respond to any possible invasion "with force."14

It is difficult to gauge how grave are the fears of officials in Tehran that Iran might be next in the firing line after Iraq, that is, that US forces might strike Iran. Iranian officials can derive some comfort from the fact that relations with Russia (which, in the face of pressure by Washington, continues nuclear cooperation) and with the European Union (which launched negotiations for a landmark framework trade agreement) are on track. However, progress in these relationships affords no access to Washington's plans or true intentions regarding Iran, nor does it constitute a check on US power sufficient in itself to safeguard Iran's interests in the surrounding region and to ensure the regime's survival.

What is clear, however, is that Iranian officials have serious reservations about what a US-led war in Iraq and an extensive American military presence in Iraq, combined with a dominant American political influence in post-Saddam Iraq might mean for Iran. A preemptive American or even Israeli military strike against Iranian nuclear installations during, or some time after, war in Iraq cannot be ruled out. Nor can the continuation, perhaps even the expansion, of operations by the MKO and other opponents of the clerical regime from Iraqi territory. Defense Minister 'Ali Shamkani seemed to have this possibility in mind when he warned the United States against "using armed Iranian opposition groups based in Iraq" to attack Iran.15 Were neither of these scenarios to materialize, officials in Tehran would still regard an American military presence in Iraq — completing Iran's "encirclement" — as threatening.

2. The Iraq Factor:
Iranian officials have made little attempt to conceal their disdain for, and mistrust of, the Iraqi regime. They are on record as saying that they will not just welcome the end of the regime, but celebrate it. Muhammad-Reza Khatami, the head of the Islamic Iran Participation Front (IIPF), the leading reformist party, and the younger brother of the president, was widely quoted as saying: "Saddam's fall, through whatever means, would be the happiest day for the Iranian nation."16 Jafar Golbaz, one of many Majlis deputies to have echoed this sentiment, stated: "It will be the happiest day for all Iranians to see Saddam toppled, no matter by whom."17

Yet, in addition to the concerns described above, Iranian officials worry about a number of other effects of a US-led war to oust the Iraqi regime. Hasan Qashqavi, a member of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Majlis, identifies three such concerns: "What guarantees exist that Iraq will not be partitioned? What if Saddam uses chemical weapons against its neighbors? Who says Iraqi refugees won't rush to our borders?"18 The worry about a possible refugee crisis is, in fact, widely shared outside Iran, as illustrated by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Ruud Lubbers' warning that "A war in Iraq will be a disaster from the humanitarian perspective."19 In coping with the conflict, Iran faces both legal/political and economic/social challenges: (1) how to uphold its international obligations and demonstrate its concern for Iraqi people while insulating the regime from potential fifth columnists; and (2) how to safeguard the Iranian population from water-related disease epidemics, given the already severely weakened water supply and sanitation systems in Iraq. That Iranian officials have struggled to find the right formula for meshing together and pursuing these goals is evident from some of the conflicting statements they have made in planning for a response to a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Initially, Iranian officials indicated that they would confine refugees to camps along the border. Subsequently, Interior Ministry official Ahmad Hosseini: "We will allow Iraqi nationals to cross into Iran if their lives are in jeopardy, but they will not be allowed to enter Iranian cities."20

The additional worry that war in Iraq might inflict further damage on the Iranian economy is cited in remarks by government officials and in the Iranian press. Disruption of oil tanker traffic cannot be ruled out. Nor can oil price volatility. Regarding the latter, Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh voiced the concern that war in Iraq (including possible damage to Iraqi oil installations), especially in the context of the unsettled situation in Venezuela, might trigger an initial price spike, followed by a steep drop in prices once Iraq re-enters the market and ramps up production.21

Arguably the greatest source of Iranian anxiety is the long-term question of Iraq's political future. A protracted period of political instability or violent upheaval in Iraq is not unthinkable. In spite of the show of solidarity shown at the conference in London in December 2002, the "Iraqi opposition" is riven by factionalism. The results of the conference give little reason for confidence that Iran's national interests can be, much less will be accommodated.

Countdown to Conflict —
Given the multitude of challenges discussed above, what approach has Tehran followed with respect to the US showdown with Iraq? Is the basic thrust of this approach clear? Are its constituent elements internally consistent? As this section will demonstrate, Iran has employed a variety of levers and channels to exploit the crisis over Iraq and to gird itself against the dangers associated with a US-led invasion of Iraq.

1. Maintaining "Active Neutrality":
To the extent that Iran had a clear official policy regarding the Iraq crisis, as senior officials have insisted is the case, that policy is one of "active neutrality." Tehran's appropriation of this term could be interpreted as an attempt by Tehran's contending factions to "split the difference." It might also represent a "hedging" approach by the Iranian ruling establishment — an attempt to navigate between the unpalatable options of siding with either Baghdad or with Washington. (These two possible interpretations of Iran's active neutrality are not necessarily mutually exclusive.) So much for the term "active neutrality" itself. What of its content?
Iran's active neutrality rested on three pillars: (1) preference for a political solution to the crisis, (2) focus on disarmament, and (3) commitment to a multilateral approach. A consistent theme in the public remarks of senior Iranian policy-makers is that war should be a last resort. President Khatami sounded this theme during a state visit to Spain in October 2002,22 where he called for members of the international community to join forces to avert war.23 Similarly, during a visit to Brussels that followed shortly after Iraq agreed to readmit UN weapons inspectors, Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi stated: "Now that the Iraqi government has accepted to receive the inspectors and has committed itself to fully comply with the resolution of the Security Council, we have to do our best ... to avoid any new war against Iraq ... There should be political means and ways to implement the resolution of the Security Council."24 In a press conference in Tehran, Hassan Rowhani, Chair of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), stated that further actions in the war against terrorism, including any actions against Iraq, "should be headed by the United Nations."25

Predictably, Iranian officials were careful to point out that these positions are consistent with international legal precepts and norms. Hadi Khaniki, advisor to President Khatami, in an interview with the Arab newspaper Al-Majallah, underscored Iran's "principled" stand: "The time of colonial mandates and hegemony is a thing of the past and we reject interference in the affairs of other nations. We also reject wars being waged against them. This is because these are less than democratic policies. Which means that we will under no circumstances stand for any strike against Iraq. There should be a respect for international organizations and their resolutions in that regard."26 But it is impossible to overlook the practical considerations that motivated Iran to adopt such principles in the Iraq case, most notably Iran's own interest in championing consensus and collective action for the purpose of restraining US power.

That Iranian policy-makers welcomed Baghdad's decision to allow UN weapons inspections to resume27 reflected not just their concern about the threat posed by Iraq's WMD programs, but their relief that war was, if only temporarily, avoided: "Now that Iraq is fully cooperating with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) teams' inspectors there seems to be no justification for mounting military build up, and resorting to military solutions that can only destabilize the whole region."28

Although the underlying principles and rough outlines of Iran's policy of active neutrality, as stated, seem reasonably clear, does this policy mean the same thing to different people? Part of the answer to this question lies in determining who speaks for Iran. And, as the Iraq crisis has unfolded, it appears that many voices have joined the mix. At least one Majlis member, Jafar Golbaz, suggested publicly that "...Tehran might even decide to cooperate with the United States if it receives assurances that its interests will be respected."29 In sharp contrast, Defense Minister 'Ali Shamkani stated unequivocally that Iran would not take sides. Former UN envoy Saaid Rajaie Khorassani remarked that, "If the U.S. enabled the formation of a popularly acknowledged administration that looked after the people in Iraq, then we would have no problems (with the attack)."30 And, in an effort to elucidate Tehran's official position, Mr. Kharrazi stated: "Iran has announced its opposition to the American unilateral action and considers any military action against that country as totally void. Thus, the escalation of the Iraq crisis has caused uneasiness and further dissension within the ranks of the ruling establishment; the policy of "active neutrality" has barely managed to paper over these differences.

2. Capitalizing on Baghdad's Weakness:
For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has sought, using "oil diplomacy" and other means, to drive a wedge between the US and other Security Council members, and to garner sympathy and support from around the region and the world. Growing American pressure on the Iraqi regime has caused the latter to reach out to old adversaries as well as old friends — including Iran. In mid-2002, Baghdad eased travel restrictions on Iranian religious pilgrims. In August of that year, the deadlock in negotiations over the repatriation of another contingent of refugees from the Iran-Iraq War was broken.31 A couple of weeks later, Iraqi Foreign Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan met privately on the sidelines of the OPEC summit held in Caracas, Venezuela with President Khatami. The next month, Foreign Minister Kharrazi made a well-publicized visit to Iraq.

This sequence of events, followed soon thereafter by the signing of five agreements on trade, transport, and transit, seemed to presage a "warming trend" in Iran-Iraq relations. But did this flurry of activity substantially alter the course of Iran-Iraq relations? It is useful to bear in mind that previous "charm offensives" by Iraq (e.g., Iraqi Deputy Trade Minister Fakhri Rishan trips to Iran in December 2000 and January 2001) had not produced a positive breakthrough. This latest round appears to have been no different. The relaxation of restrictions on religious worshippers proved to be limited and temporary. The volume/dollar value of trade contemplated by the latest bilateral trade agreements is quite modest.32 Furthermore, progress on issues such as the negotiation and implementation of POW exchanges continued to move at a snail's pace.33 Tellingly, the two sides remained mired in a state of confrontation and denial concerning their respective support for opposition groups.34

It is clear that Tehran tried to turn Baghdad's weakness and vulnerability to its own advantage. It is also clear that Tehran has sought to extract as many concessions from Baghdad as possible, but at the least cost and risk. The Iranian government has "held the line" in a number of respects: The terms of the bilateral economic accords signed in 2002 were laid out in strict accordance with the framework of UNSC 986. In timing official visits to Baghdad, Iran has been careful to follow the example of other international and regional actors. Iranian officials have reportedly been willing to discuss the US military buildup and war preparations with their Iraqi counterparts, but have reportedly rejected any form of military cooperation (e.g., the return of Iraqi planes confiscated during the 1991 Gulf War, the sale of military equipment, etc.).35

3. Cultivating the Iraqi Opposition:
In providing support to Iraqi opposition groups over the years, Tehran has consistently followed two immediate objectives: pressuring the Iraqi regime and containing the Iranian Kurdish opposition. In borader terms, this support has also aimed at preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq, preventing the United States from gaining a strategic foothold on Iran's western border, and upholding the rights/claims of Iraq's Shiite majority. In pursuing these objectives, Iran has forged tactical alliances with individual Iraqi opposition groups.

The two groups which Iran has rather consistently supported are SAIRI and the PUK. The SAIRI (the largest of the Islamic Iraqi opposition factions) is a Shiite group that is based on Iranian territory whose fighters are equipped and trained by Iran. Iranian support for this group is focused on pressuring Iraq from the east and south. Support for the PUK, one of the two leading Kurdish factions, is aimed not only at pressuring the regime in Baghdad from the north, but is also intended as a means for restraining the rebel Iranian Kurdish faction, the Iran Kurdistan Democartic Party (IKDP).

Though recounting in detail the history of Iran's dealings with Iraqi factions is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note four recent adjustments in Tehran's approach. First, determined to ensure that Iranian interests are represented in any post-Saddam government, Tehran appeared to give a "green light" to SAIRI leader Baqir al-Hakim to consult with US officials and to participate in the conference of Iraqi opposition groups in London in December 2002. Second, in conjunction with the SAIRI leadership, Tehran made at least the pretense of endorsing a non-theocratic federal regime in Iraq on condition that the Shiite representation in a future government is proportionate to its population percentage.36 In this respect, Iran's policy is reminiscent of the position it adopted with respect to the Hazara Shiites in the Afghanistan case. Third, Iranian authorities appeared to approve of, if not directly authorize, the SAIRI leadership's offer to share intelligence about location Iraq's WMD facilities and stockpiles.37

Fourth, in an effort to broaden its contacts in the run up to the London conference, Iran attempted to mend fences with the KDP, ending the almost complete estrangement that had prevailed since 1995; renewed its effort to persuade the PUK to set aside differences with Islamist factions in northern Iraq in the interest of launching joint operations against the regime in Baghdad; and extended a hand to the Pentagon's stepchild, welcoming Ahmad Chalabi to Tehran to meet with Massoud Barzani (for the first time since 1996) in preparation for the London conference.38

4. Putting Détente to Work:
In addressing the challenges related to the US showdown with Iraq, Iran was very active on the international and regional diplomatic fronts. Systematically yet cautiously, Iran staked out a position as a member of what might be referred to as a coalition of the reluctant and the unwilling.

At the regional level, Iran relied on diplomacy to keep the strategic alliance with Syria intact, détente with the Arab countries (especially with Saudi Arabia) on track, and relations with Turkey stable. Accordingly, Iranian officials have emphasized in their meetings with their counterparts and in their public statements the importance of preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq.39 They also came out in support of Saudi and other regional initiatives aimed at averting war.
Similarly, at the international level, Iran sought to align its position with those members of the UN Security Council and others averse to a US-led invasion of Iraq. However, consultations with Russian, Chinese, German, French, and Japanese officials served two additional purposes: building political capital to head off possible future US action against Iran, and winning sympathy and support for Iran for having been a victim of Saddam's sting. As if to remind the international community that Iran's "good behavior" stands acknowledged and should continue to be rewarded, Iranian diplomats have characterized recent progress in relations with the European Union (EU) as a "spectacular leap" and the precursor of "... a dawn of a new era in EU-Iranian ties."40 And, anticipating the danger that Iran might continue to face from Iraq even after Saddam is removed from power as well as seeking to paint a picture of Iran as a victim rather than a sponsor of terror, Iranian officials ramped up diplomatic efforts to isolate/neutralize the MKO.41

Two other elements of Iranian dipomacy are worth noting. The first element is part of Iran's effort to brace for a humanitarian crisis in Iraq following an invasion. In addition to establishing an interagency special headquarters to deal with an influx of refugees from Iraq in the event of war, Iranian representatives have consulted with the UNHCR (as well as with international NGOs) to plan for this contingency.42 The second element is aimed at removing the pretext for a confrontation with the United States. Here, meetings with British officials have served to present Iran's interests and concerns with respect to Iraq. In comments marking the conclusion of his visit to Tehran in October 2002, Britain's Foreign Secretary Jack Straw suggested how an open channel of communication between Iran and Britain can prove useful, stating that such dialogue "underlines the importance of Iran's role in the region, but also that no durable or definitive peace is possible without taking into account the position of the Islamic republic."43 Similarly, President Khatami pointed out that, "There is no obstacle to the American government's position being transmitted to Iranian officials by the British or any other government."44

Conclusion
With the war in Iraq underway, Iran finds itself in a precarious position. Iran's relations with both of the primary actors in this confrontation — Iraq and the United States — have been poisoned by the past. In spite of the official suspension of hostilities in 1988, Iran and Iraq have remained locked in a state of active belligerency. Similarly, those few attempts made in recent years to nudge Iran-US relations in a positive direction have failed.

The forcible removal of Saddam Hussein poses for Iran a number of risks and uncertainties. Foremost among these is what will become of Iraq in the weeks and months following an invasion. Of necessity, Iran must prepare to cope with a variety of spillover effects from such a war, not least how to bear the burdens associated with a postwar humanitarian crisis.

Of no less concern to officials in Tehran is what the United States may have in store for Iran, and the wider latitude that a postwar American military occupation of Iraq can give for the Bush administration to act on its otherwise vague threats against the regime.

Against the backdrop of these dangers and uncertainties, the approach that Iran has followed with respect to the US showdown with Iraq in recent months is unsurprising. Iran's posture has been cautious and defensive. Iran has utilized a variety of levers and channels, in the first instance, for the purpose of averting a US-led war in Iraq and, as conflict loomed ever closer, for the purpose of ensuring that its security interests (as these relate to postwar Iraq) are protected. Thus, with respect to the issue of war, Iran has joined the coalition of the reluctant and the unwilling. But in recognition of the high likelihood of war, Iran cast a wide net in making plain its sympathy and support for the Iraqi opposition.

Insofar as US policy toward Iraq is concerned, it is therefore premature, at best, to cast Iran in the mold of either tacit partner or spoiler. For, clearly, Iran has chosen to defer making that choice. The great temptation is to ask: What, then, will determine how much and for how long Iran remains on the sidelines? And, what, if anything, can the United States do to enhance the prospect that Iran will refrain from interfering in Iraq? Though these are relevant, indeed important matters to consider, they skirt the first order questions: Is it possible to conceive of, let alone ensure stability in Iraq and in the Gulf as a whole without Iran's active cooperation? And, what if anything, can the United States do to elicit such cooperation other than through intimidation, which is likely to prove futile and counter-productive?

The military defeat of Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein from power will be a strategic watershed. Were this defeat in conventional military terms to be accompanied by successful efforts to strip Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, the military balance in the Gulf would be fundamentally altered, thus completing a process that began with the Gulf War of 1991. As a result, Iran would emerge as the dominant power in the Gulf. Ironically, the United States would have produced an outcome that many observers have long held to be the cherished goal of the Iranian clerics, as of the Shah before them. Yet, Iran's emergence as the de facto military power in the Gulf is in some ways as paradoxical as it is ironic. For, as already discussed, from the perspective of Tehran, the strategic advantage arising from Iraq's defeat and disarmament will come at a steep cost: encirclement by American forces.

The weeks and months ahead present a strategic window of opportunity for the United States with respect to Iraq's future and that of its neighbors, including Iran. The greatest danger for the United States lies in either assuming that Iran is predisposed to make mischief in postwar Iraq, or in succumbing to the temptation that Iran can be cowed into passivity. It would be prudent for the United States to acknowledge publicly that Iran has legitimate security interests at stake in Iraq and that a constructive role by Iran in postwar Iraq (as in the wider region) is welcomed. To be sure, this would not guarantee that Iran will become Washington's pliant partner. But it might help to reduce the tension in US-Iran relations and to rekindle the debate in Iran concerning relations with the United States. More broadly, it might begin to set in motion the process, long overdue, of building a regional security regime that, by virtue of being all-inclusive and multi-dimensional in scope, focuses on the manifold social and economic challenges common to many and threatening to all of the Gulf countries. Thus, the question of whether the United States will choose to tighten or relax its grip on Iran is of critical importance not just in mapping possible scenarios for postwar Iraq but in charting for the region a future that is less grim than it has been in the recent past or than it is today.

Notes
1 Former President Hashemi-Rafsanjani in response to a question about whether Iran should side with the United States or with Iraq, October 13, 2002.
2 Tareq Ismael, Iran and Iraq: Roots of Conflict (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982); Kamran Mofid, The Economic Consequences of the Gulf War (London: Routledge, 1990).
3 Interview in the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Majallah, published in London, December 2, 2002, p. 47, as reported in FBIS-NES, December 15, 2002.
4 Regarding retaliatory IRGC missile attacks, see Amin Tarzai, Nonproliferation Review 8:2 (2001), pp. 125-33.
5 Iraqi missile attacks in retaliation, IRNA, reported in FBIS-NES, April 19, 2001.
6 The Independent, June 16, 1999; Deutsche Presse-Agentur, February 7, 2000; The Financial Times, February 7, 2000; The Economist, October 28, 2000; and The Sunday Times of London, December 10, 2000.
7 The Economist, October 28, 2000.
8 See Lee Waters, "Chemical Weapons in the Iran-Iraq War," no. 70 Military Review (October 1990), pp. 56-63; W. Andrew Terrill, "Chemical Weapons in the Gulf War," Strategic Review, no. 14 (Spring 1986), pp. 51-58; Thomas McNaugher, "Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons: The Legacy of the Iran-Iraq War," International Security no. 15 (Fall 1990), pp. 5-34.
9 IRNA, in FBIS-NES, May 23, 2002.
10 Iran Times, August 9, 2002.
11 IRNA, in AFP, September 17, 2002.
12 Reported in AFP, December 21, 2002.
13 IRNA, in FBIS-NES, February 7, 2002.
14 IRNA, in FBIS-NES, February 8, 2002.
15 IRNA, in AFP, September 17, 2002.
16 Deutche Presse-Agentur, December 10, 2002.
17 Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "To Iran, Iraq May Be the Greater Satan," The New York Times, November 3, 2002.
18 Reported in AP, October 13, 2002.
19 Quoted in The Independent (London), December 29, 2002.
20 Associated Press, November 9, 2002.
21 Remarks by Iran's Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh, reported in FBIS-NES, December 25, 2002 and in AFP, December 26, 2002.
22 AFP, October 29, 2002.
23 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, November 19, 2002.
24 Agence France Presse (AFP), November 18, 2002.
25 AFP, July 17, 2002.
26 Al-Majallah, February 2, 2002, p. 38, reported in FBIS-NES, February 3, 2002.
27 AP, September 18, 2002.
28 BBC-NES, December 31, 2002.
29 Quoted in Elaine Sciolino, "To Iran, Iraq May Be the Greater Satan," The New York Times, November 3, 2002.
30 Deutche Presse-Agentur, December 10, 2002.
31 BBC-NES, August 27, 2002.
32 AFP, November 5, 2002; BBC-NES, November 6, 2002.
33 See, for example, MIA exchanges, in Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 16, 2002, BBC-NES, July 21, 2002 and BBC-NES, September 17, 2002, and AFP, October 30, 2002.
34 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 15, 2000, p. 4, reported in FBIS-NES, October 15, 2000.
35 Qusay Hussein reportedly met with IRGC Deputy Commander in Tehran seeking to buy military equipment, but request rejected. See UPI, July 22, 2002; and Deutsche Presse-Agentur, July 22, 2002.
36 Reported in Al-Sharq al-Awsat, appearing in FBIS-NES, December 11, 2002.
37 Tehran Times, in FBIS-NES, December 2, 2002; AFP, December 28, 2002.
38 Tehran Times, appearing in FBIS-NES, December 10, 2002.
39 See, for example, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister for International Affairs Mohammad-Javad Zarif's statement while in Istanbul for meeting of the OIC and sidebar discussions with Turkish counterparts, reported by IRNA, appearing in FBIS-NES, February 11, 2002.
40 See comments by Iranian Ambassador to Brussels Abolghasem Delfi, quoted by IRNA, in FBIS-NES, December 22, 2002.
41 IRNA, in FBIS-NES, May 3, 2002.
42 Deutsche Presse-Agentur, September 10, 2002.
43 Quoted in AFP, October 2, 2002.
44 AFP, October 25, 2002; The Daily Telegraph, October 25, 2002.