This Perspective originally appeared as an Op-Ed in the January 19, 2006 edition of The Washington Examiner.
All agree that, following Ariel Sharon's recent stroke, his period of public service, which has lasted nearly six decades, has come to an end.
For most of his life, Sharon personified the tough Israeli. Jews had been oppressed for centuries and Sharon represented the determination of his generation (he was born in 1928 in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine) that no one would push them around. He fought in Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and later, during the 1950's. He commanded a renowned (or notorious) battalion - known as Unit 101 - which was famed for its retaliation against raids of fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas). Despite being known for being headstrong and occasionally for disobeying orders, Sharon rose in the ranks to major general, gaining a reputation for courage and decisive leadership, but Sharon also was known for being willing to sacrifice his men's lives for victory, as well as not being overly careful of the lives of Arabs, whether enemies or noncombatants. When he was not chosen as chief of staff, he left the army, but returned in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when he led Israel's attack on the West Bank of the Suez Canal.
After the war, he turned his formidable talents to politics. He was the leading figure in creating the Likud Party, which won the 1977 elections. Four years later, after Prime Minister Menachem Begin had concluded peace with Egypt, Sharon was appointed minister of defense, Israel's most important Cabinet post after the prime minister.
He was the leading strategist of Israel's War in Lebanon, which some called its first "war of choice" and many believed he was trying to remake the map of the Middle East. After the massacre at the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla near Beirut, carried out by Lebanese Forces while Israeli troops were outside the camps and apparently unaware, public outcry forced his dismissal. Most felt his political career was over.
However, he returned to a series of important posts and became the chief architect of the settlements in the territories Israel had occupied in 1967. As minister of housing in the period 1990-92, he built tens of thousands of housing units there and helped to plan the settlements that are a major focus of Israeli-Palestinian violence.
Through the 1990s he was still seen as politically unacceptable by much of the Israeli population. But when Benjamin Netanyahu lost the election of 1999, he turned the position of Likud party leader over to Sharon, probably confident that he could return whenever he wanted. In fact, however, following the failure of the Camp David negotiations and the beginning of the Palestinian uprising in 2000, Sharon was elected prime minister in February 2001, under the slogan, "Only Sharon Can" (deal with the uprising).
He called another election in early 2003 and won by a wide margin. Meanwhile, Palestinians and others criticized the brutality of Israeli army tactics and his steadfast refusal to negotiate with the then Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. Israelis, while generally feeling that there was no alternative to Sharon's strategy of closure and, eventually, building a barrier that at points followed the "green line" armistice line and at times snaked into the West Bank, also grew tired of their sons being killed defending settlers who had chosen to live in parts of the territories, such as Gaza, that were densely populated by Palestinians.
In December 2003, to the astonishment of virtually all Israelis and the fury of most settlers, who had been among his most ardent supporters, Sharon announced his determination to evacuate the 8,000 settlers living in Gaza among 1.2 mlliion Palestinians. Despite threats, demonstrations and calls to disobey orders, the Army carried out the evacuation in August 2005. Polls showed that a significant majority of Israelis strongly approved.
In the last few months, as new elections approached, Sharon formed a new party, Kadima (Forward), in order to distance himself from many in the Likud who opposed the withdrawal and the possibility of future withdrawals. His new party, it was predicted, would win the elections.
Sharon was struck down at a point in which he had become the uniquely indispensable man of Israeli politics. Many of those who had despised him earlier as bloodthirsty now admired his ability to rally the Israeli public behind withdrawal. His acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state (while giving no indication of acceptable borders) was also a change. Many who were planning to vote for him would never have conceived of doing so a few years earlier. Conversely, many of those who had supported him for decades openly prayed for his death.
Sharon always held his cards close to his vest. No one really knows what he would have done after the elections. Some felt that his dream was to use his unparalleled clout in Israeli society to help create borders that the two sides could live with, even if they might not sign a peace treaty. His reputation for strength and willingness to use force helped convince many Israelis that they could safely withdraw from Gaza and perhaps parts of the West Bank in the future.
No one person or group can provide Israelis with the sense of security that Sharon did. Thus, the new prime minister, who will very likely be Ehud Olmert, Sharon's closest political ally in the last few years, might find it difficult to carry out Sharon's intentions, even if he knows what they are.
Sharon was hated by most Arabs. But there now seems to be a reluctant recognition that they knew where they stood with him and that, in turn, he had begun to recognize that Israel would not be at peace until Palestinians had achieved a measure of control over their own lives. It will take them a while to take the measure of his successor(s).
The United States will almost certainly miss Sharon. His experience and, at least in his last years, his willingness to bow to American strategic goals, gave Washington a sense that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not blow up. His successors are not hotheads, but their ability to deal with the situation on their own is not clear.
Sharon leaves a very mixed legacy. Many will claim they are wearing his mantle. But no one knows what it really is. Like Joseph's coat in the Bible, it has many colors.
Paul Scham is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. He is the co-editor of the recently released book, Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue, and has worked on joint Israeli-Palestinian projects at the Truman Institute at Hebrew University and served as the Washington representative for Americans for Peace Now.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective originally appeared as an Op-Ed in the January 19, 2006 edition of The Washington Examiner.
All agree that, following Ariel Sharon's recent stroke, his period of public service, which has lasted nearly six decades, has come to an end.
For most of his life, Sharon personified the tough Israeli. Jews had been oppressed for centuries and Sharon represented the determination of his generation (he was born in 1928 in what was then the British Mandate of Palestine) that no one would push them around. He fought in Israel's War of Independence in 1948 and later, during the 1950's. He commanded a renowned (or notorious) battalion - known as Unit 101 - which was famed for its retaliation against raids of fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas). Despite being known for being headstrong and occasionally for disobeying orders, Sharon rose in the ranks to major general, gaining a reputation for courage and decisive leadership, but Sharon also was known for being willing to sacrifice his men's lives for victory, as well as not being overly careful of the lives of Arabs, whether enemies or noncombatants. When he was not chosen as chief of staff, he left the army, but returned in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, when he led Israel's attack on the West Bank of the Suez Canal.
After the war, he turned his formidable talents to politics. He was the leading figure in creating the Likud Party, which won the 1977 elections. Four years later, after Prime Minister Menachem Begin had concluded peace with Egypt, Sharon was appointed minister of defense, Israel's most important Cabinet post after the prime minister.
He was the leading strategist of Israel's War in Lebanon, which some called its first "war of choice" and many believed he was trying to remake the map of the Middle East. After the massacre at the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla near Beirut, carried out by Lebanese Forces while Israeli troops were outside the camps and apparently unaware, public outcry forced his dismissal. Most felt his political career was over.
However, he returned to a series of important posts and became the chief architect of the settlements in the territories Israel had occupied in 1967. As minister of housing in the period 1990-92, he built tens of thousands of housing units there and helped to plan the settlements that are a major focus of Israeli-Palestinian violence.
Through the 1990s he was still seen as politically unacceptable by much of the Israeli population. But when Benjamin Netanyahu lost the election of 1999, he turned the position of Likud party leader over to Sharon, probably confident that he could return whenever he wanted. In fact, however, following the failure of the Camp David negotiations and the beginning of the Palestinian uprising in 2000, Sharon was elected prime minister in February 2001, under the slogan, "Only Sharon Can" (deal with the uprising).
He called another election in early 2003 and won by a wide margin. Meanwhile, Palestinians and others criticized the brutality of Israeli army tactics and his steadfast refusal to negotiate with the then Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat. Israelis, while generally feeling that there was no alternative to Sharon's strategy of closure and, eventually, building a barrier that at points followed the "green line" armistice line and at times snaked into the West Bank, also grew tired of their sons being killed defending settlers who had chosen to live in parts of the territories, such as Gaza, that were densely populated by Palestinians.
In December 2003, to the astonishment of virtually all Israelis and the fury of most settlers, who had been among his most ardent supporters, Sharon announced his determination to evacuate the 8,000 settlers living in Gaza among 1.2 mlliion Palestinians. Despite threats, demonstrations and calls to disobey orders, the Army carried out the evacuation in August 2005. Polls showed that a significant majority of Israelis strongly approved.
In the last few months, as new elections approached, Sharon formed a new party, Kadima (Forward), in order to distance himself from many in the Likud who opposed the withdrawal and the possibility of future withdrawals. His new party, it was predicted, would win the elections.
Sharon was struck down at a point in which he had become the uniquely indispensable man of Israeli politics. Many of those who had despised him earlier as bloodthirsty now admired his ability to rally the Israeli public behind withdrawal. His acceptance of the idea of a Palestinian state (while giving no indication of acceptable borders) was also a change. Many who were planning to vote for him would never have conceived of doing so a few years earlier. Conversely, many of those who had supported him for decades openly prayed for his death.
Sharon always held his cards close to his vest. No one really knows what he would have done after the elections. Some felt that his dream was to use his unparalleled clout in Israeli society to help create borders that the two sides could live with, even if they might not sign a peace treaty. His reputation for strength and willingness to use force helped convince many Israelis that they could safely withdraw from Gaza and perhaps parts of the West Bank in the future.
No one person or group can provide Israelis with the sense of security that Sharon did. Thus, the new prime minister, who will very likely be Ehud Olmert, Sharon's closest political ally in the last few years, might find it difficult to carry out Sharon's intentions, even if he knows what they are.
Sharon was hated by most Arabs. But there now seems to be a reluctant recognition that they knew where they stood with him and that, in turn, he had begun to recognize that Israel would not be at peace until Palestinians had achieved a measure of control over their own lives. It will take them a while to take the measure of his successor(s).
The United States will almost certainly miss Sharon. His experience and, at least in his last years, his willingness to bow to American strategic goals, gave Washington a sense that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would not blow up. His successors are not hotheads, but their ability to deal with the situation on their own is not clear.
Sharon leaves a very mixed legacy. Many will claim they are wearing his mantle. But no one knows what it really is. Like Joseph's coat in the Bible, it has many colors.
Paul Scham is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. He is the co-editor of the recently released book, Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue, and has worked on joint Israeli-Palestinian projects at the Truman Institute at Hebrew University and served as the Washington representative for Americans for Peace Now.