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Libya's long anticipated decision to meet the requirements of the UN sanctions resolution recognizes the reality of a changed world. The Muammar Qadhafi that I first met in 1969 as an interpreter for the US Ambassador remains unpredictable. Still, it seems likely that the passage of 34 years has not been without benefit. History is unlikely to view Qadhafi as a statesman, but experience has made him more cautious and more aware of what the Libyan people need if they are to prosper in the twenty-first century.

Qadhafi's reluctant decisions to cooperate with an unprecedented Scottish court established to try two Libyan agents and, now, to fulfill requirements for compensation of family members of the Lockerbie victims have been a rare victory for the United Nations and international sanctions against a terrorist act. The sanctions were effective in modifying Libyan behavior because they were well crafted and, especially, because they were multilateral. We should be under no illusion that unilateral US sanctions would be even partially effective.

This is an expensive pill for Libya and a bitter one for the families. Moreover, the agreed language for Libya to meet the other UN requirements, such as acceptance of responsibility, will be very controversial both in Tripoli and in Washington. However, these steps may make it possible for Libya to eventually become a respectable member of the international community and for the US government to press Libya directly to deal with other issues of major concern to us. These include Libya's history of seeking destabilizing weapons, the imperative for more constructive international behavior and Libya's human rights record.

It is premature to follow the British lead in moving to full diplomatic relations and a normal commercial relationship, but it would be appropriate to start a regular diplomatic dialogue at a lower level. Diplomatic relations of any kind are a means to further our interests, not an end. They are preferable to conducting a dialogue through either public invective or third parties. We also need a new strategy to guide our diplomacy. To this end, the Bush Administration should conduct an urgent policy review of the accumulated unilateral commercial sanctions and travel restrictions to see if any of them are really serving US interests.

Most importantly, we need to take advantage of a Libyan willingness to cooperate in dealing with extremist groups that have targeted the Libyan government as well as our own. President Bush rightly challenged governments to either stand with us or pay the consequences. In Afghanistan and Iraq we showed evidence of what the consequences would be. But we need to show how a former state supporter of terrorism can stand with us. While Libya's limited cooperation may have been for reasons of its own security, finding the areas where interests overlap and developing those areas makes sense. Why not put Libya's own motivations to work for a common purpose? In the end, the war on terrorism will only succeed when diverse governments find it in their interest to unite to deal with this scourge.

In July 1969, when I arrived in Tripoli as a political officer, Libya seemed on the threshold of great economic promise. A favorable geographic location and abundant resources of oil and gas attracted major international investment and some technology transfer. Existing treaties with Italy, the UK and the US were to some extent relics of a colonial past that was rapidly becoming untenable. They disappeared, along with the airbases and special privileges, once the new revolutionary government made its demands clear and accepted the end of benefits from the treaties. The oil companies also yielded to Libyan negotiators and raised the prices they paid for the black gold they were extracting from Libyan fields.

Unfortunately for Libya, Qadhafi followed increasingly radical political, economic and cultural paths. Libyan leaders squandered the country's wealth and alienated their Arab and African neighbors and great powers alike. Turning to support of international terrorism, Libya became an international outlaw. Today, despite its central location on the Mediterranean, Libya is in most respects a backwater, lagging behind less well endowed countries in measures of economic and cultural importance to the Libyan people.

Muammar Qadhafi appears to be adjusting to a rapidly changing world that would otherwise leave Libya farther and farther behind. The US government should demonstrate that it will recognize progress, even partial and grudging progress, and turn that to our advantage. Raising new obstacles to a common sense relationship with Libya would show that Washington has failed to adjust to reality.