We should welcome the fact that the Bush Administration has now come up with a relatively comprehensive and somewhat detailed plan for victory in Iraq. For the future, I would only hope that this administration or any of its successors would develop such a strategy before invading another country. The fact that it has taken three years to inform the American people of our goals and strategy in Iraq is at best a dereliction of duty.
One can quibble with some of the language of a strategy document. Using a loaded word, “rejectionist,” to describe the majority of our opponents in Iraq raises all the red flags in the Middle East of those Palestinians who reject peace with Israel. Is this what we are fighting about? And why did the White House invoke the “8 pillars” of victory when every devout Muslim will be reminded of the “5 pillars” of Islam and will question the implied, albeit possibly unintentional, linkage? While these points may sound like nit picking, part of the reason we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not understand the culture we were engaging or listen to those in the region who may have had a better fix for their next door neighbor than the gurus of our neo-conservative movement.
I also wonder how we can complain, in the President’s strategic pillar number eight, about the successes in Iraq being “overshadowed in the international media, including popular pan-Arab outlets” and then point to the “new independent media outlets” in Iraq being “testament to the vitality of a free press,” when the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post are all reporting that our military is buying articles and Iraqi journalists. What outrageous chutzpah.
What worries me most about the national strategy is what it doesn’t say and what it may imply. We have created a strategy for Iraq and the Iraqi people, but I cannot find in the document the National Security Council released any indication of Iraqis who embrace it or helped develop it. Does the Shiite leader Ali Sistani endorse the President’s concept of “Victory in Iraq?” How about the Kurdish leader Barzani? The strategy calls for international cooperation. Has the President secured the agreement of the international community for this strategy and this definition of victory? The neighboring states are a key component in the strategy for securing Iraq. Did the President discuss his concept of victory with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? And how are we to deal with Iran when we won’t even talk to the Iranian leadership? The Syrians are currently drumming up a nationalistic fervor among their people to stand up to the United States and the UN. Does this mean that we have to widen the war, a la Cambodia, to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border?
The President’s definition of victory has the ringing vocabulary of a good speechwriter, but I find myself lost when it comes to the details. The strategy defines our objective as “federalism” and declares that it is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq. The “strong central government” exercising the powers of a sovereign state is all well and good, but what are those powers and who is going to exercise them? The strategy is quiet on that. At the same time, it says “regional bodies” will make the decisions that protect the interests of local populations. Well, it is in the interest of the Kurdish and Shiite “local populations” that they control the oil and gas wealth of the country with crumbs left for the Sunnis. Despite our talk of preserving a unified Iraq, it would seem that the structure we are building incorporates a lot of centripetal force when it comes to the hard realities of religious and economic interests.
The strategy also talks about building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. But NATO is only now setting up the new military staff college that is supposed to help integrate these forces. What have we been doing for the past three years? Furthermore, according to the strategy, we have recruited nearly 5,000 Sunnis for the military who are “planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.” That sounds like building a force that is loyal to its local community and religious sect, not a remote central government. I don’t see any plan for getting rid of the local militias that are so important to the Kurds and some Shiite factions.
I welcome the NSC effort. But I want more. I want to know that we are providing the model for rule by law and that our Vice President and the head of the CIA are not advocating interrogation tactics that will be used by the fledgling Iraqi government as an excuse for far harsher tactics. Our press is already reporting that Iraqi government officials want to take off the kid gloves. I want to know that we stand for freedom of the press and that we don’t have to buy it. I want to know that the President does not believe, as the British press alleged, that we could bomb Al Jazeera into submission just because it reports things we don’t like. And I want to know that when the President talks about debate, he means genuine debate and not the disparagement of opponents like Congressman John Murtha.
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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We should welcome the fact that the Bush Administration has now come up with a relatively comprehensive and somewhat detailed plan for victory in Iraq. For the future, I would only hope that this administration or any of its successors would develop such a strategy before invading another country. The fact that it has taken three years to inform the American people of our goals and strategy in Iraq is at best a dereliction of duty.
One can quibble with some of the language of a strategy document. Using a loaded word, “rejectionist,” to describe the majority of our opponents in Iraq raises all the red flags in the Middle East of those Palestinians who reject peace with Israel. Is this what we are fighting about? And why did the White House invoke the “8 pillars” of victory when every devout Muslim will be reminded of the “5 pillars” of Islam and will question the implied, albeit possibly unintentional, linkage? While these points may sound like nit picking, part of the reason we are in the mess we are in today is because we did not understand the culture we were engaging or listen to those in the region who may have had a better fix for their next door neighbor than the gurus of our neo-conservative movement.
I also wonder how we can complain, in the President’s strategic pillar number eight, about the successes in Iraq being “overshadowed in the international media, including popular pan-Arab outlets” and then point to the “new independent media outlets” in Iraq being “testament to the vitality of a free press,” when the Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post are all reporting that our military is buying articles and Iraqi journalists. What outrageous chutzpah.
What worries me most about the national strategy is what it doesn’t say and what it may imply. We have created a strategy for Iraq and the Iraqi people, but I cannot find in the document the National Security Council released any indication of Iraqis who embrace it or helped develop it. Does the Shiite leader Ali Sistani endorse the President’s concept of “Victory in Iraq?” How about the Kurdish leader Barzani? The strategy calls for international cooperation. Has the President secured the agreement of the international community for this strategy and this definition of victory? The neighboring states are a key component in the strategy for securing Iraq. Did the President discuss his concept of victory with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia? And how are we to deal with Iran when we won’t even talk to the Iranian leadership? The Syrians are currently drumming up a nationalistic fervor among their people to stand up to the United States and the UN. Does this mean that we have to widen the war, a la Cambodia, to secure the Syrian-Iraqi border?
The President’s definition of victory has the ringing vocabulary of a good speechwriter, but I find myself lost when it comes to the details. The strategy defines our objective as “federalism” and declares that it is not a precursor to the breakup of Iraq. The “strong central government” exercising the powers of a sovereign state is all well and good, but what are those powers and who is going to exercise them? The strategy is quiet on that. At the same time, it says “regional bodies” will make the decisions that protect the interests of local populations. Well, it is in the interest of the Kurdish and Shiite “local populations” that they control the oil and gas wealth of the country with crumbs left for the Sunnis. Despite our talk of preserving a unified Iraq, it would seem that the structure we are building incorporates a lot of centripetal force when it comes to the hard realities of religious and economic interests.
The strategy also talks about building an officer corps that will be loyal to the Iraqi government, not a particular group or tribe. But NATO is only now setting up the new military staff college that is supposed to help integrate these forces. What have we been doing for the past three years? Furthermore, according to the strategy, we have recruited nearly 5,000 Sunnis for the military who are “planning to return to their home province and help protect it from terrorists.” That sounds like building a force that is loyal to its local community and religious sect, not a remote central government. I don’t see any plan for getting rid of the local militias that are so important to the Kurds and some Shiite factions.
I welcome the NSC effort. But I want more. I want to know that we are providing the model for rule by law and that our Vice President and the head of the CIA are not advocating interrogation tactics that will be used by the fledgling Iraqi government as an excuse for far harsher tactics. Our press is already reporting that Iraqi government officials want to take off the kid gloves. I want to know that we stand for freedom of the press and that we don’t have to buy it. I want to know that the President does not believe, as the British press alleged, that we could bomb Al Jazeera into submission just because it reports things we don’t like. And I want to know that when the President talks about debate, he means genuine debate and not the disparagement of opponents like Congressman John Murtha.
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.