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Lebanon's history and the history of peacekeeping elsewhere have much to teach us as we try to move from ongoing warfare to resolve both the current crisis and to lay a foundation for lasting peace in the relations between Lebanon and Israel. I was in Beirut when the Israeli Air Force attacked the International Airport … in 1968. Nearly four decades later, I wonder what has changed. We have not resolved the intertwined problems of Israel's security, infringements on Lebanon’s sovereignty and the survival and well- being of the Lebanese people.

Lebanon's government may be weak but at least it is not an autocratic regime. Lebanon's last elections were relatively free. Lebanon has a long history of constitutionalism and a dynamic civil society. It would seem to offer an opportunity for the success of freedom and democracy in an Arab country. Unfortunately, Lebanon has an even longer history of political instability, personal insecurity and an inability to control its borders. Combined with intrusive neighbors, this can give democracy a bad name.

President Bush says Hizbollah has suffered a defeat because, “there’s going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon, and that’s going to be a Lebanese force with a robust international force to help them seize control of the country.” This is far from a done deal but we should try to make it a reality.

It is doubtful that international peacekeeping will be sustainable -- to use a politically fashionable Bush Administration word -- if it does not lead to political agreements and to material support that build up Lebanese government institutions.

The Lebanese Army will have to become much stronger in order to come close to maintaining order in southern Lebanon, as Syria does in those parts of Golan under its control. In the short term, this requires a working alliance with an international force that provides the Lebanese Army the military muscle and political will to stand between Hizbollah and the Israeli Defense Forces. In the long term, it would also require better equipment for the Lebanese armed forces, domestic political accommodations and international concessions by Syria and Israel intended to strengthen the coalition government in Beirut.

Domestically, there might be a political deal whereby Hizbollah finally gives the Lebanese government sovereignty over the use of armed force. Hizbollah’s compliance is questionable, but it will never happen unless it gets in return a greater role in the Lebanese governing coalition. The Lebanese government is not going to go to war against Hizbollah, and a US tolerated Israeli strategy that relied on making life so painful for Lebanese that they would move in that direction has clearly failed.

Internationally, Syria has been a large part of the problem. But it does not follow that Syria cannot be part of the solution. Syrian objectives in regard to Lebanon are quite different than Iranian goals. They are far more defensive in nature. Moreover, Syria wants to see Israel’s eventual withdrawal from the Golan Heights, Damascus desires better relations with Washington and Bashar Al-Asad’s government needs a Lebanese neighbor that is not hostile to Syria’s economic and security interests. Within a diplomatic structure, these factors can be motivations for Syrian cooperation in preventing the re-supply of arms to Hizbollah.

Public US threats and the drastic curtailment of American contacts with the Syrian government have been unhelpful, aside from gratuitously hobbling US diplomacy in this crisis.

Whatever the rationale for Syria’s decision to cede to Lebanon its claim over the disputed Shebaa Farms area, this provides an additional opportunity to build up the reputation of the Lebanese government led by Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. Israeli withdrawal from this occupied region could demonstrate that international diplomacy succeeded for Lebanon where Hizbollah had failed.

Aside from Israeli occupation, one of the reasons why Hizbollah emerged in 1982 and flourished politically in the following two decades was the failure of the government in Beirut to provide the economic and social safety net for the deprived elements of Lebanon’s Shi’a plurality. Instead, it was Hizbollah that took on this role.

The race is now on between the international community, with a scheduled donor conference in Stockholm at the end of the month, and Hizbollah, with Iranian backing. Right now, Hizbollah is clearly in the lead. Aside from humanitarian aid, the Lebanese economy has been dealt a body blow. The billions of dollars required for economic reconstruction probably will not be forthcoming in the short term from private Lebanese capitalists.

This is another challenge for sustainable peacekeeping. If the Beirut government is prepared to commit its human resources and leadership to this effort, the Bush administration and the Congress should be unstinting in their political and financial support. The alternative is too awful to contemplate.