The recently held Afghan presidential election is being cited by the Bush Administration as a testimony to the success of American policies in Afghanistan. Three years after the removal of the Taliban, the Afghan people have gone to the polls and, when the votes are counted, are likely to have reaffirmed Hamid Karzai’s mandate to serve as the county’s leader. Notwithstanding some balloting irregularities, the election is being hailed as clear evidence of the Afghan people’s keen desire to exercise their democratic rights. This comes on top of the approval of a national constitution last January by an indirectly elected assembly, and in anticipation of choosing members of a parliament next April.
For all of the promise conveyed by the presidential vote, there nevertheless remains some disconcerting trends and disappointments. Even while the neo-Taliban failed to disrupt the electoral process, the security environment across the country has otherwise been deteriorating over the last year. Reconstruction that offers that best hope for developing confidence in a central government is badly lagging. A warlord system continues to detract from the ability of the Karzai government to exercise its authority nationwide, and ethnic and regional factionalism can still generate armed conflict. An illicit, drug-dependent economy now accounts for between 40 and 60 percent of the country’s GDP, and could leave an elected government to compete with a parallel narco-mafia state.
These realities grow out of a number of missed opportunities and misplaced priorities for which the international community, but especially the United States as the lead nation, bear much responsibility. While donors have largely met the need for urgent humanitarian assistance, Washington’s ideological aversion to nation building delayed addressing the need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and revive governing institutions. Underestimating the costs and complexity of reconstruction slowed the pace of economic improvement countrywide. Only gradually did the United States and others come to appreciate the close inter-connection between improved security and demonstrable progress in domestic reconstruction. Security concerns were regularly cited for holding up the rebuilding of road, public buildings, irrigation systems and other development projects with direct impact on peoples’ lives. We failed to appreciate the importance of income-generating programs for creating a more secure environment. Plainly, without job opportunities, the critical internationally supported program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into the society stands little chance of success.
An impressive military victory over the regime was followed early on by several errors of judgment. Washington adopted a “light footprint,” limiting the number of American troops to 10,000, most of which were dedicated to flushing out Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Our military planners meanwhile limited the international military force, labeled the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to only 5,000, and denied it operational scope outside of Kabul. To compensate, we struck deals with local militia commanders who manipulated us into helping them settle disputes with their tribal enemies more often than they joined us in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Most observers believe that the use of these militias as surrogate forces is responsible for allowing the escape of Al-Qaeda leaders, very likely including Osama bin Laden, from the Tora Bora mountains in 2002. Despite the Administration’s denials, the war in Iraq accounts for much of this diversion of attention and resources from what should have been the main arena for confronting international terrorists.
So while the recent presidential election can be an important milestone, it is premature to declare Afghanistan as a functioning democracy and stable country. We can feel more certain that it will take the sustained commitment of the United States and the international community, including Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, for the country to have a reasonable chance for recovery. Again by contrast to Iraq, the overwhelming number of Afghans welcome an American and international presence and assistance. But to succeed the United States must do more than simply rectify its past mistakes. Our allies and we must recommit to Afghanistan through additional resources. That can only come about when Washington fully appreciates that the long-term threat of terrorism from the region involves considerably more than the capture of today’s high profile Al-Qaeda leaders.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum is a Scholar-in-Residence with the Middle East Institute and is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois. He previously served as an Afghanistan and Pakistan Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence Research at the US Department of State.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The recently held Afghan presidential election is being cited by the Bush Administration as a testimony to the success of American policies in Afghanistan. Three years after the removal of the Taliban, the Afghan people have gone to the polls and, when the votes are counted, are likely to have reaffirmed Hamid Karzai’s mandate to serve as the county’s leader. Notwithstanding some balloting irregularities, the election is being hailed as clear evidence of the Afghan people’s keen desire to exercise their democratic rights. This comes on top of the approval of a national constitution last January by an indirectly elected assembly, and in anticipation of choosing members of a parliament next April.
For all of the promise conveyed by the presidential vote, there nevertheless remains some disconcerting trends and disappointments. Even while the neo-Taliban failed to disrupt the electoral process, the security environment across the country has otherwise been deteriorating over the last year. Reconstruction that offers that best hope for developing confidence in a central government is badly lagging. A warlord system continues to detract from the ability of the Karzai government to exercise its authority nationwide, and ethnic and regional factionalism can still generate armed conflict. An illicit, drug-dependent economy now accounts for between 40 and 60 percent of the country’s GDP, and could leave an elected government to compete with a parallel narco-mafia state.
These realities grow out of a number of missed opportunities and misplaced priorities for which the international community, but especially the United States as the lead nation, bear much responsibility. While donors have largely met the need for urgent humanitarian assistance, Washington’s ideological aversion to nation building delayed addressing the need to rebuild the country’s infrastructure and revive governing institutions. Underestimating the costs and complexity of reconstruction slowed the pace of economic improvement countrywide. Only gradually did the United States and others come to appreciate the close inter-connection between improved security and demonstrable progress in domestic reconstruction. Security concerns were regularly cited for holding up the rebuilding of road, public buildings, irrigation systems and other development projects with direct impact on peoples’ lives. We failed to appreciate the importance of income-generating programs for creating a more secure environment. Plainly, without job opportunities, the critical internationally supported program to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into the society stands little chance of success.
An impressive military victory over the regime was followed early on by several errors of judgment. Washington adopted a “light footprint,” limiting the number of American troops to 10,000, most of which were dedicated to flushing out Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Our military planners meanwhile limited the international military force, labeled the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), to only 5,000, and denied it operational scope outside of Kabul. To compensate, we struck deals with local militia commanders who manipulated us into helping them settle disputes with their tribal enemies more often than they joined us in fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Most observers believe that the use of these militias as surrogate forces is responsible for allowing the escape of Al-Qaeda leaders, very likely including Osama bin Laden, from the Tora Bora mountains in 2002. Despite the Administration’s denials, the war in Iraq accounts for much of this diversion of attention and resources from what should have been the main arena for confronting international terrorists.
So while the recent presidential election can be an important milestone, it is premature to declare Afghanistan as a functioning democracy and stable country. We can feel more certain that it will take the sustained commitment of the United States and the international community, including Afghanistan’s regional neighbors, for the country to have a reasonable chance for recovery. Again by contrast to Iraq, the overwhelming number of Afghans welcome an American and international presence and assistance. But to succeed the United States must do more than simply rectify its past mistakes. Our allies and we must recommit to Afghanistan through additional resources. That can only come about when Washington fully appreciates that the long-term threat of terrorism from the region involves considerably more than the capture of today’s high profile Al-Qaeda leaders.
Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum is a Scholar-in-Residence with the Middle East Institute and is a Professor Emeritus at the University of Illinois. He previously served as an Afghanistan and Pakistan Analyst at the Bureau of Intelligence Research at the US Department of State.