This Perspective first appeared online in the April 26, 2007 edition of Bitter-Lemons International.
King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia caused a lot of heartburn in official Washington with his speech at last month's Arab summit in Riyadh, where he referred to the "illegitimate foreign occupation" of Iraq.
The Americans had good reason to be distressed after reading the speech, but not because of what ‘Abdullah said about Iraq. After all, he was addressing Arab conference delegates; he could hardly have endorsed the US adventure there, which everyone in his audience knew he had opposed.
No, what should have bothered the Americans was that the ruler of an important, longstanding regional ally was so unhappy over US policy and performance in the Middle East that he took the unusual step of distancing himself publicly from Washington. Saudi Arabia always prefers to express its displeasure with the United States in private conversations and diplomatic exchanges. Only rarely in the 60 years of their alliance with America have Saudi leaders felt compelled to issue a public challenge, the last notable example occurring during the oil embargo of 1973 to 1974.
What drove ‘Abdullah to say what he did, senior aides said, was seeing the Arab world in turmoil, Arabs shedding Arab blood, and US policies contributing to the problems rather than solving them. America has failed to stabilize Iraq, failed to contain Iran's influence, failed to bring peace to the Palestinians and Israel, failed to relieve the suffering in Darfur, failed to rectify Syrian behavior, failed to protect Lebanon against Israeli attack, and failed to resolve the ensuing Lebanese power struggle. Collectively, these failures pose a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia; more importantly, in the king's perception, however, they threaten the security of the entire Arab world.
Distraught over the carnage in Iraq and over the spectacle of Palestinians fighting among themselves in the internecine Fatah-Hamas struggle, ‘Abdullah concluded it was time for someone new to exert regional leadership — a role for which, at the summit conference, he offered himself.
King ‘Abdullah was in "a very emotional state" over the infighting between Palestinian factions, his foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, said in a Newsweek interview. "He just couldn't believe that Palestinian guns are turned against Palestinian people and blood is shed and people are killed and children are orphaned by them fighting against each other, while they're facing such horrendous treatment from the Israelis. He just couldn't take that."
’Abdullah is not seeking a full-scale rupture with the United States, which his country cannot afford. But he has, for many months, been pursuing policy initiatives that have deviated from Washington's preferences because he has not liked what he is seeing. He brokered the Mecca agreement between the Palestinian factions, met with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, received Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Riyadh, and invited the Iranian foreign minister to the summit conference.
All these initiatives ran counter to the American policy of isolating Iran, Syria, and Hamas. As ‘Abdullah has recognized, President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney live in an imaginary Middle East where people behave better if sent to bed without any supper. The king lives in the real Middle East, where business gets done in face-to-face negotiations. The British did not recover the sailors and marines taken captive in the Shatt Al Arab waterway by refusing to talk to the Iranians.
Americans who take a more distanced view of the region found positive elements in ‘Abdullah's speech, as they have in his recent policy initiatives. Perhaps his most constructive point was that the mess in which the Arabs find themselves is their own fault. Unlike many of his subjects and their neighbors, he did not blame Mossad, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the "crusaders." He did not even blame Bush. He blamed Arab leaders, not excluding himself.
Citing the violence among the Palestinians and in Sudan, Somalia, and Lebanon, the king said: "the real blame should fall on us, the leaders of the Arab nations. Our permanent differences, our refusal to take the path of unity - all of [this has] led the nations to lose their confidence in our credibility and to lose hope in our present and future." This assessment, and his call for "a new beginning aimed at uniting our hearts and closing our ranks," signaled a continued willingness to cut pragmatic deals that could end some of the region's divisions, a vision Washington would do well to share.
One of the pragmatic deals ‘Abdullah wants to pursue is a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that would bring about the "two-state solution" endorsed by the United States. As the king made clear in putting together the Mecca agreement, he does not share Bush's opinion that the two-state solution can be achieved by refusing to talk to the political group selected by the Palestinian people to lead their government.
Thomas Lippman is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. A former Washington Post foreign correspondent, he is the author of “Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Relationship with Saudi Arabia.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective first appeared online in the April 26, 2007 edition of Bitter-Lemons International.
King ‘Abdullah of Saudi Arabia caused a lot of heartburn in official Washington with his speech at last month's Arab summit in Riyadh, where he referred to the "illegitimate foreign occupation" of Iraq.
The Americans had good reason to be distressed after reading the speech, but not because of what ‘Abdullah said about Iraq. After all, he was addressing Arab conference delegates; he could hardly have endorsed the US adventure there, which everyone in his audience knew he had opposed.
No, what should have bothered the Americans was that the ruler of an important, longstanding regional ally was so unhappy over US policy and performance in the Middle East that he took the unusual step of distancing himself publicly from Washington. Saudi Arabia always prefers to express its displeasure with the United States in private conversations and diplomatic exchanges. Only rarely in the 60 years of their alliance with America have Saudi leaders felt compelled to issue a public challenge, the last notable example occurring during the oil embargo of 1973 to 1974.
What drove ‘Abdullah to say what he did, senior aides said, was seeing the Arab world in turmoil, Arabs shedding Arab blood, and US policies contributing to the problems rather than solving them. America has failed to stabilize Iraq, failed to contain Iran's influence, failed to bring peace to the Palestinians and Israel, failed to relieve the suffering in Darfur, failed to rectify Syrian behavior, failed to protect Lebanon against Israeli attack, and failed to resolve the ensuing Lebanese power struggle. Collectively, these failures pose a threat to the security of Saudi Arabia; more importantly, in the king's perception, however, they threaten the security of the entire Arab world.
Distraught over the carnage in Iraq and over the spectacle of Palestinians fighting among themselves in the internecine Fatah-Hamas struggle, ‘Abdullah concluded it was time for someone new to exert regional leadership — a role for which, at the summit conference, he offered himself.
King ‘Abdullah was in "a very emotional state" over the infighting between Palestinian factions, his foreign minister, Saud Al Faisal, said in a Newsweek interview. "He just couldn't believe that Palestinian guns are turned against Palestinian people and blood is shed and people are killed and children are orphaned by them fighting against each other, while they're facing such horrendous treatment from the Israelis. He just couldn't take that."
’Abdullah is not seeking a full-scale rupture with the United States, which his country cannot afford. But he has, for many months, been pursuing policy initiatives that have deviated from Washington's preferences because he has not liked what he is seeing. He brokered the Mecca agreement between the Palestinian factions, met with Syrian President Bashar Al Assad, received Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Riyadh, and invited the Iranian foreign minister to the summit conference.
All these initiatives ran counter to the American policy of isolating Iran, Syria, and Hamas. As ‘Abdullah has recognized, President George W. Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney live in an imaginary Middle East where people behave better if sent to bed without any supper. The king lives in the real Middle East, where business gets done in face-to-face negotiations. The British did not recover the sailors and marines taken captive in the Shatt Al Arab waterway by refusing to talk to the Iranians.
Americans who take a more distanced view of the region found positive elements in ‘Abdullah's speech, as they have in his recent policy initiatives. Perhaps his most constructive point was that the mess in which the Arabs find themselves is their own fault. Unlike many of his subjects and their neighbors, he did not blame Mossad, the Central Intelligence Agency, or the "crusaders." He did not even blame Bush. He blamed Arab leaders, not excluding himself.
Citing the violence among the Palestinians and in Sudan, Somalia, and Lebanon, the king said: "the real blame should fall on us, the leaders of the Arab nations. Our permanent differences, our refusal to take the path of unity - all of [this has] led the nations to lose their confidence in our credibility and to lose hope in our present and future." This assessment, and his call for "a new beginning aimed at uniting our hearts and closing our ranks," signaled a continued willingness to cut pragmatic deals that could end some of the region's divisions, a vision Washington would do well to share.
One of the pragmatic deals ‘Abdullah wants to pursue is a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that would bring about the "two-state solution" endorsed by the United States. As the king made clear in putting together the Mecca agreement, he does not share Bush's opinion that the two-state solution can be achieved by refusing to talk to the political group selected by the Palestinian people to lead their government.
Thomas Lippman is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. A former Washington Post foreign correspondent, he is the author of “Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Relationship with Saudi Arabia.