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US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's trip to the Middle East, which begins today, will be aimed at convincing the so-called "moderate Arab states" of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia that the United States is finally ready, after six years of promises, to help Palestinians achieve their state. While good-faith American mediation would be welcomed, many Arabs will greet her visit with well-founded skepticism, questioning why a Bush administration that is seemingly locked at the hip with Israel now wishes to roll up its sleeves and help the Palestinians.

Six years of empty promises have bred considerable skepticism. Calls shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks for a Palestinian state, the pressure applied by President George W. Bush on then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to end the first siege of Yasser Arafat's Ramallah compound in 2002, and even the 2002 "road map" for peace were all viewed as no more than attempts to placate the international community, especially moderate Arabs, in order to prepare for war in Iraq. Without Arab cooperation, particularly from Jordan and Saudi Arabia, US plans to depose Saddam Hussein would have ended up in the same jar of formaldehyde as we now know was reserved for the Palestinian issue.

In instances where the Bush administration chose to momentarily focus on Palestine, the international media rushed to applaud the US commitment, hoping hands-on involvement would follow. This was particularly true once the 2004 presidential elections passed. Bush was expected to reward the coalition allies that had confronted Iraq by producing the oft-promised Palestinian state.

Then came Sharon's announcement in 2004 that Israel would unilaterally disengage from the Gaza Strip in 2005 - a move that allowed the Bush administration to keep focused on Iraq while blunting pressures created by virtual peace proposals indigenous to the region, namely the unofficial Geneva Initiative between the Israeli Yossi Beilin and the Palestinian Yasser Abed Rabbo. Although the road map called for at least a provisional Palestinian state by 2005, the administration calculated that Sharon's "generous" gesture would put the onus on Palestinians.

But the Arab world feared that "Gaza first" would be "Gaza last." In November 2005, Rice visited the region to secure the Agreement on Movement and Access to help breathe life into Gaza. The agreement is still unimplemented, the excuse this time being that the 2006 Palestinian election led to a Hamas victory, despite the administration's earlier pledge that the Arab pursuit of democracy would be matched by America's support for freedom.

Moderate Arabs were not opposed to the harsh US-led response to the Hamas victory. By their interpretation, a successful Hamas would spell victory for the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamists threatening their rule. When depriving the Palestinians to bring Hamas down didn't work, the administration began more aggressive, undemocratic steps. As Fatah-Hamas unity government talks stalled, the US decided if politics would not work then it would arm its side to the teeth. The American channeling of money to and training of President Mahmoud Abbas' Presidential Guard, while Egypt and Jordan provided the weapons, sent the clearest signal that the US expected Fatah to put down Hamas.

Beyond eliminating Hamas and blocking the rise of Sunni Islamic movements lies the rising power of Shiite Islam and Iran's far-reaching tentacles throughout the region - from Iraq to Lebanon to Palestine. As the Bush administration comes to realize that success in Iraq may never be, and with pressure mounting domestically and internationally to build regional credibility through the Palestinian issue, the US has to look for new ways to shape its legacy, and Palestine isn't it. As Vietnam demonstrated, superpowers faced with a defeat tend to make matters worse, broadening the conflict in the name of withdrawing with dignity.

America doesn't necessarily need to take the lead as the argument for Israel's existence gains currency. And make no mistake: No American politician, including the Democrats, will protest Israel's actions once it presents its dossier that Iran is near to building a nuclear weapon.

With two years left in office, the Bush administration wants to see Iran's regime humbled, if not toppled. Neoconservatives who have had their sights set on Iran are buoyed by the new arrangement where Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Israel find themselves on the same page when it comes to confronting Iran's uranium enrichment program. They all want to do business together, including with Israel – which has the motive and means to degrade Iranian targets through air strikes – but moderate Arabs demand progress on the Palestinian issue to retain some measure of legitimacy and avoid public embarrassment.

The question that should be asked now is how low the bar will be set by Arab moderates. Will nominal rhetorical gestures suffice as before the Iraq war? Will the anti-Iran bloc be pacified by pledges to really open the Karni crossing in Gaza this time and "humanize the checkpoints" with a new coat of paint? Will Arab moderates help Rice tube-feed Abbas on the notion of accepting a state with provisional borders and nominal sovereignty along the route of Israel's separation wall?

The difference here will be that Palestinians want and need an end to the conflict and occupation to get on with their lives, while moderate Arabs, Israel, and most significantly the US want the Palestinian problem contained, at least until Iran is taken care of. By then Palestine will be some other administration's mess to sort out.