Published in the March-April 2002 issue of Middle East Insight magazine
After a brief lull, on Thursday, Jan. 17, 2002, Saudi Arabia was back on the front pages of the Washington Post and New York Times. This time, the headlines announced—incorrectly as it turns out—Saudi reluctance to continue hosting U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. By the following Sunday morning, the headlines had ceased, but administration and congressional leaders were faced with a battery of questions on the morning talk show circuit. Of course, there never was any official evidence that the Saudis had made, or were going to initiate, such a request. A scan of both papers on Monday, January 22, showed the story had cooled. But the rumors did not cease, despite direct denials from the head of Saudi intelligence and other members of the royal family.
Seeds of doubt about the fragility of U.S.-Saudi relations started taking root over a year ago with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and a perceived U.S. blind eye for often-disproportionate Israeli responses. Numerous articles and editorials in leading U.S. papers began criticizing the Saudis on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. With the events of September 11 and the discovery that a number of Saudi citizens had a hand in carrying out those horrific attacks, the Kingdom came under even more intense scrutiny. That is not to say that the oil-rich nation was the sole focus of the media. Egypt continues to face a similar barrage but mainly through scathingly critical editorials. However, with regard to Egypt, the news reporting itself is fairly accurate and impartial. The same cannot always be said of the journalistic interest taken in Saudi Arabia after September 11. The brief storm over hosting U.S. forces is just one example.
It would appear that some people in the United States, for whatever reason, want to undercut our relationships with key Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia despite the significant national security and economic interests we have in these countries. Perhaps these people seek to fray the coalition fabric that Secretary of State Colin Powell has put together in the war against terrorism so that it starts coming apart on its own. Presumably, the less we have to do with the Arab world, the easier it will be to support Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the easier it would be to wage an all out attack on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both prime targets. However, the Saudi target is much easier to hit. After all, from the complicated web of financial support for Bin Laden’s cause, to the Saudi nationality of many of the September 11 perpetrators, it is clear that the kingdom had much to answer for in the wake of those tragedies.
Yet, the sheer volume and negativity of the op-eds, commentaries, and articles in the U.S. press would leave an outsider wondering if we were not at war with Saudi Arabia itself. And this is in stark contrast to the comments of several senior administration officials who have made it clear that they have no complaint with Saudi Arabia’s level of participation in the war against terrorism. I have personally checked with sources at the Treasury Department, the National Security Council, the Central Command, and the State Department, and I have been reassured that we are getting Saudi support.
The reasons for targeting Saudi Arabia are not confined to internal politics in the United States or to differing perspectives here on Israel and Iraq. Of all the major Arab countries, Saudi Arabia best fits the stereotypes that Americans have come to believe are representative of the entire Arab world: a country of extraordinarily wealthy people who seldom work, dress in strange, flowing robes, and whose women are closeted, rarely seen or heard. Americans champion the underdog, the common man. Hence the "Rocky" phenomenon: it is the sweat of your brow that should get you ahead, not a birthright of power and privilege. At least that is the popular perception of American society, even if it does not quite fit with reality—just ask some of our minorities. Quite simply, Saudi Arabia and the United States are opposites on a cultural spectrum. In fact, only Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was more culturally remote from American-style living. And like most people, we fear that which is so remarkably different from us—as do many in Saudi society as well.
Then there is also the economic factor: oil, oil, oil. Since the oil embargo in 1973, Americans have believed that the price they pay at the pump is going directly into Saudi pockets. Most Americans, including their politicians, find it easier to blame high prices on the Saudis and other producers than apportion blame to the distribution system, oil company policies, U.S. government policies, refining capacity, speculation, other producer policies, and so on. The embargo years ago had a traumatic effect on the American political structure, and its impact continues. Its proportions have increased with political hyperbole, time, and distance.
Hidden in this antipathy is the sense that Saudi Arabia, through its oil policy, exercises a hidden power over us. And this perception of a hidden hand at work in our economy is played up by certain elements in the U.S. press and political structure that find it convenient to have an easy scapegoat for internal U.S. structural problems. In November, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial that called for a U.S. military takeover of the Saudi oil fields. And, perhaps even more disturbing, I was informed by an extremely reliable reporter that a newspaper editor directed a rewrite of a draft prepared on U.S. dependence on Saudi oil. The original story did not follow the perceived wisdom and speak about our dangerous over-reliance on this one source. Instead, the draft pointed out that in terms of total percentage of oil imported, the United States imports less from Saudi Arabia than it did a decade ago. However, the editors demanded that the article showcase U.S. dependence on Saudi oil, not the more balanced picture portrayed of our declining dependence. In the end, that was the story that millions read. Stereotypes, latent fears, and basic misunderstandings were fueled in the process.
Nationalism is also one of the roots of this public conflict with Saudi Arabia. Many Americans—among them several members of Congress—are intolerant of any criticism from Saudi Arabia due to the overwhelming role we played in planning and waging the Gulf War. When Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz sent his famous letter to President George W. Bush suggesting that the continuing impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian front might cause us to part company, critics of Saudi Arabia blasted the crown prince and tarred him as an ingrate. Of course, among those loud voices were individuals who are wary of any change in U.S. policy that could be interpreted, however loosely or inaccurately, as weakening our support for Israel. Many are overly fond of telling audiences that Saudi Arabia would not be a freestanding nation right now had it not been for U.S. leadership and the sacrifices of the men and women in the U.S. military.
You can notice a trend here. Basic misconceptions and the actual reality of the cultural divide are the filter through which we suspiciously eye one another’s actions. And then there was Khobar. The deaths of American military personnel and the leaked reports of frustrated federal investigators that the Saudi government was not cooperating in locating the perpetrators further deteriorated the American public’s view of the country.
Now add into this mix my earlier point regarding unilateralists in the administration and in a number of policy centers at the heart of conservative Republican thought. Currently, there are several senior policy officials who have traditionally sought to press for unilateral U.S. action in foreign affairs through our military and economic strength. They would have us impose our will on the world. These people represent a cross-section of the American political structure, starting as acolytes of the Democrat, Henry Jackson, but migrating to the Republican Party Right. They are not, as some Arab journalists have claimed, the "Jewish Lobby." And while they support Israel, their cause is not Israel. This political phenomenon is particularly opposed to multilateralism, whether in the sense of U.N. action or U.S. efforts to build coalitions of countries to achieve our goals. In the current context, they seem to believe that the sooner we recognize the futility of coalition building, the faster we will get along with taking care of our enemies directly.
What better way to scuttle coalition building than to discredit the support we are getting from our major Arab allies? And this was clearly the basis of several of the initial attacks on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But once the floodgates were opened, the commentators and talking heads began to pile on, particularly on Saudi Arabia, exposing their frustrations, prejudices, and ignorance. The articles and their implications are unfair, but they are backed by a long gestation period of anti-Saudi feelings.
And what actions has the kingdom undertaken to head off this onslaught? I can only point to glossy pullouts in major newspapers and a spate of advertisements. Sadly, such ingrained negativity will scarcely flinch in the wake of a major marketing campaign. Even worse, there are the eyewitness accounts and testimonials that offer unflattering glimpses into Saudi Arabia. A former senior intelligence officer recalls being forced to take the service elevator to brief General Staff at the Defense Ministry because she is a woman. Cultural difference, most assuredly. But does that sort of story play well when repeated in the United States? No. Every expatriate has his or her own story to tell, and they are all too willing to divulge their most humiliating or maddening moment.
It does not have to be this way. But if Saudi Arabia wants to avoid these harsh judgments, then there must be a real commitment to playing an active role in turning the story around. Cultivating both good and reliable journalism at home as well as seeking it abroad is going to be the best weapon in the public relations arsenal. I know for a fact that a very highly regarded nationally televised program was seeking appointments with senior Saudi officials to deliver a more nuanced picture of the kingdom. Unfortunately, their visa approval came too late. The show had to air without including what I believed were important voices from within Saudi Arabia. Worrying over negative publicity without doing anything to give the Saudi viewpoint on a story will only net more negative stories. No amount of PR work by high-priced public relations firms will turn this around.
In recent weeks, I have been greatly heartened by the orchestrated efforts of a number of senior Saudi officials to create some effective counter-spin. From sophisticated polling of American opinions on the kingdom, to facilitating press access and expediting the visa process, change is underway. These efforts are a small, welcome step in the right direction. Of course, reaching common ground while agreeing to allow our respective and divergent cultures some breathing room is no easy feat. Yet, I am convinced that in the tragedy of September 11 are new opportunities to do just that.
But September 11 should also be viewed as a clarion call to the senior princes. Saudi Arabia is in trouble. Bin Laden was taken seriously enough to exile, yet his rants against the ruling family received the financial assistance and moral backing of many Saudis. Since he ran his operations from the relative safety of Afghanistan, he was not viewed as a significant threat. Exporting problems, however, does not solve them.
Now, the ruling elites must face certain undeniable facts: over 50 percent of the Saudi population is under the age of 25; the job market is not keeping pace with the population growth rate; the educational system ceded, in part, to the religious extremists has produced a generation more familiar with the Qur’an than skills relevant to the job market; the mosques are the only outlet where free statement is tolerated, and the sentiments found in a great majority instill intolerance.
There is an urgent need for economic and political reform in the kingdom. There is no way to sugar coat this message. I have some experience with previous administrations’ aversion to including mention of such difficult issues in discussions with Saudi rulers as well as other leaders in the region. "It’s the peace process, stupid!" would be the most useful analogy. But we did ourselves and a vital ally in the region a great disservice by allowing conversations on reform to be hijacked by the peace process. Actually, moves toward regional peace and stability must include discussions about maintaining such an outcome. Repressive tactics will not, in the end, sustain peace. And, the kingdom will find itself increasingly challenged to avoid internal fissures and outright conflict if it does not begin to confront the root causes of Saudi participation in the tragedies of September 11. Yes, anti-American sentiment was a key motivational device. But it was certainly not the only reason so many Saudis willingly gave their lives to serve Bin Laden’s diabolical cause.
Prior to September 11, Abdullah had undertaken a number of steps forward on the economic front that would make investing in Saudi Arabia more palatable and less bureaucratically daunting for foreign companies. His program to increase the number of Saudis working for private companies was also taking shape. But much more needs to be done. More dramatic steps will have to be taken to meet the very real economic and social challenges facing the regime. Due to widespread antipathy toward the United States, any dialogue with the kingdom on these challenges should be arranged through a mutually acceptable third party. We must be extremely cautious in our approach, creative in our delivery method, but absolutely firm in pressing for change.
Finally, it is time for us to accept that the reason people in this part of the world view the United States with antipathy does have something to do with our policy toward Israel. This is not a popular viewpoint to articulate for fear that if we reach such a conclusion it will somehow diminish our support for Israel. But, if our policy toward Israel stands up to the test of national interest, we should not have to apologize for it or hide it. Let us make the case openly and in terms that our friends in the region can understand. If the cause of national interest is not served, however, then it is time to take a hard look at the policy.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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Published in the March-April 2002 issue of Middle East Insight magazine
After a brief lull, on Thursday, Jan. 17, 2002, Saudi Arabia was back on the front pages of the Washington Post and New York Times. This time, the headlines announced—incorrectly as it turns out—Saudi reluctance to continue hosting U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. By the following Sunday morning, the headlines had ceased, but administration and congressional leaders were faced with a battery of questions on the morning talk show circuit. Of course, there never was any official evidence that the Saudis had made, or were going to initiate, such a request. A scan of both papers on Monday, January 22, showed the story had cooled. But the rumors did not cease, despite direct denials from the head of Saudi intelligence and other members of the royal family.
Seeds of doubt about the fragility of U.S.-Saudi relations started taking root over a year ago with the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and a perceived U.S. blind eye for often-disproportionate Israeli responses. Numerous articles and editorials in leading U.S. papers began criticizing the Saudis on both domestic and foreign policy fronts. With the events of September 11 and the discovery that a number of Saudi citizens had a hand in carrying out those horrific attacks, the Kingdom came under even more intense scrutiny. That is not to say that the oil-rich nation was the sole focus of the media. Egypt continues to face a similar barrage but mainly through scathingly critical editorials. However, with regard to Egypt, the news reporting itself is fairly accurate and impartial. The same cannot always be said of the journalistic interest taken in Saudi Arabia after September 11. The brief storm over hosting U.S. forces is just one example.
It would appear that some people in the United States, for whatever reason, want to undercut our relationships with key Arab states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia despite the significant national security and economic interests we have in these countries. Perhaps these people seek to fray the coalition fabric that Secretary of State Colin Powell has put together in the war against terrorism so that it starts coming apart on its own. Presumably, the less we have to do with the Arab world, the easier it will be to support Israel’s policy toward the Palestinians and the easier it would be to wage an all out attack on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt are both prime targets. However, the Saudi target is much easier to hit. After all, from the complicated web of financial support for Bin Laden’s cause, to the Saudi nationality of many of the September 11 perpetrators, it is clear that the kingdom had much to answer for in the wake of those tragedies.
Yet, the sheer volume and negativity of the op-eds, commentaries, and articles in the U.S. press would leave an outsider wondering if we were not at war with Saudi Arabia itself. And this is in stark contrast to the comments of several senior administration officials who have made it clear that they have no complaint with Saudi Arabia’s level of participation in the war against terrorism. I have personally checked with sources at the Treasury Department, the National Security Council, the Central Command, and the State Department, and I have been reassured that we are getting Saudi support.
The reasons for targeting Saudi Arabia are not confined to internal politics in the United States or to differing perspectives here on Israel and Iraq. Of all the major Arab countries, Saudi Arabia best fits the stereotypes that Americans have come to believe are representative of the entire Arab world: a country of extraordinarily wealthy people who seldom work, dress in strange, flowing robes, and whose women are closeted, rarely seen or heard. Americans champion the underdog, the common man. Hence the "Rocky" phenomenon: it is the sweat of your brow that should get you ahead, not a birthright of power and privilege. At least that is the popular perception of American society, even if it does not quite fit with reality—just ask some of our minorities. Quite simply, Saudi Arabia and the United States are opposites on a cultural spectrum. In fact, only Taliban-ruled Afghanistan was more culturally remote from American-style living. And like most people, we fear that which is so remarkably different from us—as do many in Saudi society as well.
Then there is also the economic factor: oil, oil, oil. Since the oil embargo in 1973, Americans have believed that the price they pay at the pump is going directly into Saudi pockets. Most Americans, including their politicians, find it easier to blame high prices on the Saudis and other producers than apportion blame to the distribution system, oil company policies, U.S. government policies, refining capacity, speculation, other producer policies, and so on. The embargo years ago had a traumatic effect on the American political structure, and its impact continues. Its proportions have increased with political hyperbole, time, and distance.
Hidden in this antipathy is the sense that Saudi Arabia, through its oil policy, exercises a hidden power over us. And this perception of a hidden hand at work in our economy is played up by certain elements in the U.S. press and political structure that find it convenient to have an easy scapegoat for internal U.S. structural problems. In November, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial that called for a U.S. military takeover of the Saudi oil fields. And, perhaps even more disturbing, I was informed by an extremely reliable reporter that a newspaper editor directed a rewrite of a draft prepared on U.S. dependence on Saudi oil. The original story did not follow the perceived wisdom and speak about our dangerous over-reliance on this one source. Instead, the draft pointed out that in terms of total percentage of oil imported, the United States imports less from Saudi Arabia than it did a decade ago. However, the editors demanded that the article showcase U.S. dependence on Saudi oil, not the more balanced picture portrayed of our declining dependence. In the end, that was the story that millions read. Stereotypes, latent fears, and basic misunderstandings were fueled in the process.
Nationalism is also one of the roots of this public conflict with Saudi Arabia. Many Americans—among them several members of Congress—are intolerant of any criticism from Saudi Arabia due to the overwhelming role we played in planning and waging the Gulf War. When Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz sent his famous letter to President George W. Bush suggesting that the continuing impasse on the Israeli-Palestinian front might cause us to part company, critics of Saudi Arabia blasted the crown prince and tarred him as an ingrate. Of course, among those loud voices were individuals who are wary of any change in U.S. policy that could be interpreted, however loosely or inaccurately, as weakening our support for Israel. Many are overly fond of telling audiences that Saudi Arabia would not be a freestanding nation right now had it not been for U.S. leadership and the sacrifices of the men and women in the U.S. military.
You can notice a trend here. Basic misconceptions and the actual reality of the cultural divide are the filter through which we suspiciously eye one another’s actions. And then there was Khobar. The deaths of American military personnel and the leaked reports of frustrated federal investigators that the Saudi government was not cooperating in locating the perpetrators further deteriorated the American public’s view of the country.
Now add into this mix my earlier point regarding unilateralists in the administration and in a number of policy centers at the heart of conservative Republican thought. Currently, there are several senior policy officials who have traditionally sought to press for unilateral U.S. action in foreign affairs through our military and economic strength. They would have us impose our will on the world. These people represent a cross-section of the American political structure, starting as acolytes of the Democrat, Henry Jackson, but migrating to the Republican Party Right. They are not, as some Arab journalists have claimed, the "Jewish Lobby." And while they support Israel, their cause is not Israel. This political phenomenon is particularly opposed to multilateralism, whether in the sense of U.N. action or U.S. efforts to build coalitions of countries to achieve our goals. In the current context, they seem to believe that the sooner we recognize the futility of coalition building, the faster we will get along with taking care of our enemies directly.
What better way to scuttle coalition building than to discredit the support we are getting from our major Arab allies? And this was clearly the basis of several of the initial attacks on Saudi Arabia and Egypt. But once the floodgates were opened, the commentators and talking heads began to pile on, particularly on Saudi Arabia, exposing their frustrations, prejudices, and ignorance. The articles and their implications are unfair, but they are backed by a long gestation period of anti-Saudi feelings.
And what actions has the kingdom undertaken to head off this onslaught? I can only point to glossy pullouts in major newspapers and a spate of advertisements. Sadly, such ingrained negativity will scarcely flinch in the wake of a major marketing campaign. Even worse, there are the eyewitness accounts and testimonials that offer unflattering glimpses into Saudi Arabia. A former senior intelligence officer recalls being forced to take the service elevator to brief General Staff at the Defense Ministry because she is a woman. Cultural difference, most assuredly. But does that sort of story play well when repeated in the United States? No. Every expatriate has his or her own story to tell, and they are all too willing to divulge their most humiliating or maddening moment.
It does not have to be this way. But if Saudi Arabia wants to avoid these harsh judgments, then there must be a real commitment to playing an active role in turning the story around. Cultivating both good and reliable journalism at home as well as seeking it abroad is going to be the best weapon in the public relations arsenal. I know for a fact that a very highly regarded nationally televised program was seeking appointments with senior Saudi officials to deliver a more nuanced picture of the kingdom. Unfortunately, their visa approval came too late. The show had to air without including what I believed were important voices from within Saudi Arabia. Worrying over negative publicity without doing anything to give the Saudi viewpoint on a story will only net more negative stories. No amount of PR work by high-priced public relations firms will turn this around.
In recent weeks, I have been greatly heartened by the orchestrated efforts of a number of senior Saudi officials to create some effective counter-spin. From sophisticated polling of American opinions on the kingdom, to facilitating press access and expediting the visa process, change is underway. These efforts are a small, welcome step in the right direction. Of course, reaching common ground while agreeing to allow our respective and divergent cultures some breathing room is no easy feat. Yet, I am convinced that in the tragedy of September 11 are new opportunities to do just that.
But September 11 should also be viewed as a clarion call to the senior princes. Saudi Arabia is in trouble. Bin Laden was taken seriously enough to exile, yet his rants against the ruling family received the financial assistance and moral backing of many Saudis. Since he ran his operations from the relative safety of Afghanistan, he was not viewed as a significant threat. Exporting problems, however, does not solve them.
Now, the ruling elites must face certain undeniable facts: over 50 percent of the Saudi population is under the age of 25; the job market is not keeping pace with the population growth rate; the educational system ceded, in part, to the religious extremists has produced a generation more familiar with the Qur’an than skills relevant to the job market; the mosques are the only outlet where free statement is tolerated, and the sentiments found in a great majority instill intolerance.
There is an urgent need for economic and political reform in the kingdom. There is no way to sugar coat this message. I have some experience with previous administrations’ aversion to including mention of such difficult issues in discussions with Saudi rulers as well as other leaders in the region. "It’s the peace process, stupid!" would be the most useful analogy. But we did ourselves and a vital ally in the region a great disservice by allowing conversations on reform to be hijacked by the peace process. Actually, moves toward regional peace and stability must include discussions about maintaining such an outcome. Repressive tactics will not, in the end, sustain peace. And, the kingdom will find itself increasingly challenged to avoid internal fissures and outright conflict if it does not begin to confront the root causes of Saudi participation in the tragedies of September 11. Yes, anti-American sentiment was a key motivational device. But it was certainly not the only reason so many Saudis willingly gave their lives to serve Bin Laden’s diabolical cause.
Prior to September 11, Abdullah had undertaken a number of steps forward on the economic front that would make investing in Saudi Arabia more palatable and less bureaucratically daunting for foreign companies. His program to increase the number of Saudis working for private companies was also taking shape. But much more needs to be done. More dramatic steps will have to be taken to meet the very real economic and social challenges facing the regime. Due to widespread antipathy toward the United States, any dialogue with the kingdom on these challenges should be arranged through a mutually acceptable third party. We must be extremely cautious in our approach, creative in our delivery method, but absolutely firm in pressing for change.
Finally, it is time for us to accept that the reason people in this part of the world view the United States with antipathy does have something to do with our policy toward Israel. This is not a popular viewpoint to articulate for fear that if we reach such a conclusion it will somehow diminish our support for Israel. But, if our policy toward Israel stands up to the test of national interest, we should not have to apologize for it or hide it. Let us make the case openly and in terms that our friends in the region can understand. If the cause of national interest is not served, however, then it is time to take a hard look at the policy.