The August 3 coup d’état that brought to power a military junta in Mauritania was predictably met with perfunctory condemnations by the UN, EU and the African Union, joined by the United States and France, Nouakchott’s key partners. But at the same time, while the streets of the capital were mostly peaceful, even joyful, ambassadors were lining up to shake hands with the new strongman in town. Colonel Vall was a co-putschist back in 1984. Now he’s in charge. Vall’s first move was to keep the government in place and release from prison popular Islamist opponents to the previous regime.
Apparent popular support for the junta and concern for stability are leading the international community to replace its initial constitutionalist rhetoric with a more cautious realpolitik.
The deposed Mauritanian president, Ould Taya, was widely unpopular and known for his deftness at using the Islamist threat to root out his few remaining opponents and present himself as the best protection against religious extremism. In a country still deeply divided between Arabs and black Africans, with not much of a sense of shared identity let alone democratic experience, economic reforms have been undermined by growing corruption and an entrenched patronage system.
Those who have been left out from the spoils, chief among them the security forces, may have had no other way to vent their frustration than staging coups, as they did in 2003 and 2004. The coup on August 3 succeeded.
The threat of Islamist terrorism has been mostly a diversion aimed to strengthen Nouakchott’s hand in securing US political and financial support, not to mention shoring up its credentials as NATO’s key strategic partner in the fight against terrorism in the region. But Ould Taya had few friends left. He alienated many Arab allies by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, switching sides in Iraq and taking his cue from the United States. With no outside political leverage, it is hard to see how the situation can be reversed to a semblance of constitutionality.
Mauritania remains a key US ally in fighting terrorism in the Sahel region. Granted, the Sahel is not the hotbed of Islamist terrorist extremism that some in the US and the sub-region would like to think. But there are legitimate concerns that the vast and largely ungoverned Sahara Desert could be used by terrorist organizations to train or shuttle fighters and weapons to targeted areas farther north. In this context, a broad, well-balanced and sustained strategy in the Sahel could prove a most effective counter-terrorism engagement.
The initial US response to the potential threat, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), was supposed to train military units from the four partner countries, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It also included US operating bases to strengthen surveillance capacity and create combined rapid reaction capability. However, a perceived US heavy-handedness may backfire, especially if a stabilizing US presence is exploited by authoritarian regimes in the region to further crack down on opposition parties and stall democratization processes by alleging links with Islamist extremists.
Broadening PSI – through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative – into a joint US interagency effort that will cover security issues and promote democratic governance is a step in the right direction. (The TSCTI will also include Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, and perhaps Libya at a later stage.)
It stops short, however, of addressing the root causes of both terrorism and instability in the region: poverty, disease, illiteracy and widespread corruption. With over 60 percent of Niger's population currently threatened by famine, and now Mauritania heading for uncertain times, there is urgency for the United States to think bigger and more multilaterally because even its modest yet constructive involvement in the Sahel is at stake.
The greatest threat in the region does not come from ideologically driven motivations but rather from failed or “rogue” states, a category to which Mauritania may just have graduated. An unusually blunt International Monetary Fund last June warned that its three-year program was “irretrievably off-track” and “serious fiscal and monetary policy slippages in 2003 and the first half of 2004 undermined achievement of Mauritania's ambitious macroeconomic objectives and progress in implementing the poverty reduction strategy.” Furthermore, Mauritania is slated to become an oil-producing country next year. With 75,000 barrels of crude oil a day expected from its offshore Chinguetti field early next year, hopes of finding more reserves onshore could bring production to 165,000 barrels per day in 2009. At current prices of well over US $50 per barrel, oil revenue could reach $300 million a year, well above the 2003 foreign direct investment level (US$214.1 million) and the equivalent of roughly 38 percent of its 2003 external debt.
There are concerns that Mauritania is unlikely to meet its stated intention to adopt sound principles for oil revenue management and transparency. Quoting diplomatic sources in Nouakchott, the International Crisis Group reports corruption is running at 20 to 25 percent of the government budget. Given the crucial lack of independent oversight mechanisms to enforce politically sound and socially fair revenue management, this new oil money will only encourage corruption and ultimately fuel civil conflict.
It is time for the international community, particularly the United States and France, to join efforts at constructive engagement to prevent what sadly looks like a textbook case of the birth of another rogue state in a continent that has had more than its fair share and needs no more.
Jacques Roussellier is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He previously was spokesperson for the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara, political affairs officer for UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The August 3 coup d’état that brought to power a military junta in Mauritania was predictably met with perfunctory condemnations by the UN, EU and the African Union, joined by the United States and France, Nouakchott’s key partners. But at the same time, while the streets of the capital were mostly peaceful, even joyful, ambassadors were lining up to shake hands with the new strongman in town. Colonel Vall was a co-putschist back in 1984. Now he’s in charge. Vall’s first move was to keep the government in place and release from prison popular Islamist opponents to the previous regime.
Apparent popular support for the junta and concern for stability are leading the international community to replace its initial constitutionalist rhetoric with a more cautious realpolitik.
The deposed Mauritanian president, Ould Taya, was widely unpopular and known for his deftness at using the Islamist threat to root out his few remaining opponents and present himself as the best protection against religious extremism. In a country still deeply divided between Arabs and black Africans, with not much of a sense of shared identity let alone democratic experience, economic reforms have been undermined by growing corruption and an entrenched patronage system.
Those who have been left out from the spoils, chief among them the security forces, may have had no other way to vent their frustration than staging coups, as they did in 2003 and 2004. The coup on August 3 succeeded.
The threat of Islamist terrorism has been mostly a diversion aimed to strengthen Nouakchott’s hand in securing US political and financial support, not to mention shoring up its credentials as NATO’s key strategic partner in the fight against terrorism in the region. But Ould Taya had few friends left. He alienated many Arab allies by establishing diplomatic relations with Israel, switching sides in Iraq and taking his cue from the United States. With no outside political leverage, it is hard to see how the situation can be reversed to a semblance of constitutionality.
Mauritania remains a key US ally in fighting terrorism in the Sahel region. Granted, the Sahel is not the hotbed of Islamist terrorist extremism that some in the US and the sub-region would like to think. But there are legitimate concerns that the vast and largely ungoverned Sahara Desert could be used by terrorist organizations to train or shuttle fighters and weapons to targeted areas farther north. In this context, a broad, well-balanced and sustained strategy in the Sahel could prove a most effective counter-terrorism engagement.
The initial US response to the potential threat, known as the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), was supposed to train military units from the four partner countries, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It also included US operating bases to strengthen surveillance capacity and create combined rapid reaction capability. However, a perceived US heavy-handedness may backfire, especially if a stabilizing US presence is exploited by authoritarian regimes in the region to further crack down on opposition parties and stall democratization processes by alleging links with Islamist extremists.
Broadening PSI – through the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative – into a joint US interagency effort that will cover security issues and promote democratic governance is a step in the right direction. (The TSCTI will also include Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Nigeria and Tunisia, and perhaps Libya at a later stage.)
It stops short, however, of addressing the root causes of both terrorism and instability in the region: poverty, disease, illiteracy and widespread corruption. With over 60 percent of Niger's population currently threatened by famine, and now Mauritania heading for uncertain times, there is urgency for the United States to think bigger and more multilaterally because even its modest yet constructive involvement in the Sahel is at stake.
The greatest threat in the region does not come from ideologically driven motivations but rather from failed or “rogue” states, a category to which Mauritania may just have graduated. An unusually blunt International Monetary Fund last June warned that its three-year program was “irretrievably off-track” and “serious fiscal and monetary policy slippages in 2003 and the first half of 2004 undermined achievement of Mauritania's ambitious macroeconomic objectives and progress in implementing the poverty reduction strategy.” Furthermore, Mauritania is slated to become an oil-producing country next year. With 75,000 barrels of crude oil a day expected from its offshore Chinguetti field early next year, hopes of finding more reserves onshore could bring production to 165,000 barrels per day in 2009. At current prices of well over US $50 per barrel, oil revenue could reach $300 million a year, well above the 2003 foreign direct investment level (US$214.1 million) and the equivalent of roughly 38 percent of its 2003 external debt.
There are concerns that Mauritania is unlikely to meet its stated intention to adopt sound principles for oil revenue management and transparency. Quoting diplomatic sources in Nouakchott, the International Crisis Group reports corruption is running at 20 to 25 percent of the government budget. Given the crucial lack of independent oversight mechanisms to enforce politically sound and socially fair revenue management, this new oil money will only encourage corruption and ultimately fuel civil conflict.
It is time for the international community, particularly the United States and France, to join efforts at constructive engagement to prevent what sadly looks like a textbook case of the birth of another rogue state in a continent that has had more than its fair share and needs no more.
Jacques Roussellier is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute. He previously was spokesperson for the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Western Sahara, political affairs officer for UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic.