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Israeli-Turkish relations can be compared to a late-life love affair. Two parties who have known each other for years suddenly develop a near-passionate relationship, to the astonishment of their friends – and their enemies. However, after a while, passion cools and one party may be playing the field. Will they get back together or become “just friends?” Watch for the next episode.

Having just returned from six weeks in Turkey and Israel, where I delved into this relationship and heard a variety of points of view in the process, I believe that the passion may have subsided, but mutual interest will prevent the relationship from deteriorating too far. A lot has changed, however, since the 1990s, when the Turkish-Israeli romance thrived.

Turkey and Israel have had diplomatic relations since 1950. As non-Arab Middle Eastern nations, their mutual interests in a difficult neighborhood were clear. Israel would have liked closer relations, but there was little in it for Turkey, though the secular leadership admired aspects of Israel and certainly used it as a counterweight to Arab pressures.

Turkey, having been continually rebuffed by the European Union, facing increased violence with its Kurdish problem, losing its status as a Cold War battleground for NATO’s confrontation with the Soviet Union, and suffering economic hardships resulting from the 1991 Gulf War, began to feel somewhat isolated in the early 1990s. Given the circumstances, military, economic, and political relations with Israel grew rapidly. By 1996, Israel was in the midst of the Oslo peace process and in the good graces of much of the world, and had become a high tech, economic, and military powerhouse. As the military relationship flourished, there was talk of a Turkish-Israeli alliance. Economic relations burgeoned and the two countries supported each other diplomatically. This continued through several changes of governments in both countries—most notably, the installation of an Islamist government in Turkey, the end of the Oslo process and three years of Intifada, and the Iraq War.

However, in the spring of 2004, the relationship seemed to founder. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s highly popular Prime Minister, denounced Israeli “state terrorism” in the wake of Israel’s assassination of Palestinian Islamist leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdul Aziz Rantisi, and highly publicized house demolitions in Rafah, in the Gaza Strip. During this period, the Turkish Ambassador in Israel was withdrawn “for consultations.” In June 2004, an article by Seymour Hersh alleging that Israel’s Mossad was training Kurdish separatist fighters in Northern Iraq appeared in The New Yorker, and Turkish displeasure became quickly evident. Israel has vehemently denied this, and no additional evidence has substantiated the charge. Many, however, feel this was deliberate Turkish disinformation warning Israel to be careful. In July, Israel’s Deputy Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, visited Turkey and the Turkish press insisted he had been snubbed by Erdogan, though both blandly proclaimed relations were fine.

In fact, there is probably less than meets the eye. In the wake of the recent Iraq War and the decrease in the perceived Kurdish danger, Turkey has more options among its neighbors. Turkish statesmen insist they are under internal pressure to denounce Israeli treatment of Palestinians, which probably has some truth to it. Neither the U.S., perceived as Israel’s patron, nor Israel itself, are seen as favorably as they were in the ‘90s. Turkey is almost certain to begin the EU accession process in December, which is the primary national goal at this moment, and it may be harmonizing with Europe’s coolness to Israel. Israel is now engaged in the fourth year of Intifada, and most Israelis believe that its course is existentially dictated, and there is simply no Palestinian partner with whom to pursue a peace process. Turkey is rather insistently offering its services as an intermediary in the peace process, and is annoyed at Israel’s continual refusals.

All of this does not add up to enmity. There are no serious bilateral disagreements between the two countries and both are happy with their growing economic relationship. However, some Israelis feel there is a darker side. They contend that Erdogan’s Islamist party has a hidden anti-Israel agenda that is becoming more apparent. Turks, and many Israelis as well, disagree vehemently.

Clearly, Turkey is at a transition point. Based on my meetings in the last two months, I feel it is unlikely that its relations with Israel will attain the warmth of the late 1990s, but equally unlikely that they will go into the deep freeze that now characterizes Israel’s relations with, for example, Jordan and Egypt. And the next few years clearly promise, as they say, to be “interesting.”