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The news from Gaza and the Lebanese-Israeli border is bad and getting worse.

Unfortunately, Israel’s response follows in the footsteps of the American response to 9/11, that is, purporting to “hold responsible” parties who cannot really control the situation.

According to reports at the time (later confirmed in a July 12 article in The New York Times by Michael Slackman and Souad Mekhennet), Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit’s kidnappers were not connected with the Hamas government of the Palestinian Authority, and likely not even with the “outside leadership” of Khalid Meshal in Damascus. Despite this, Israel has repeatedly announced that it is holding Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh responsible for Shalit’s welfare, and has launched punishing air and ground strikes— many of which succeeded in killing only civilians. At this point, there is little reason to believe that either the mainstream Hamas leadership or the Palestinian Authority President has any real control over Shalit’s fate.

On the contrary, those who are holding Shalit have no interest in a peaceful resolution. They are playing the role that Hamas did until a few years ago, basing their strategy on the assumption that the more violence, the better for them. This is the jihadist, al-Qaeda worldview and indeed the Times article indicates that Arab intelligence services see Shalit’s kidnappers as ideologically embracing this strategy. These groups actively welcome Israeli attacks in the belief that they serve to radicalize the population and to delegitimize the Palestinian Authority.

In the last few days the Lebanese border has also exploded in violence and even there the Israeli response has been equally misguided. Israel, like any sovereign state, cannot tolerate attacks on its territory, but it must recognize that the Lebanese government is not sovereign in various respects—especially with regard to Hizbollah, which is conducting the attacks and is generally considered a proxy for Iran.

If anything, Iranian influence in Lebanon has grown since the formal withdrawal of Syrian forces last year. In the maze of Lebanese politics, some members of the government support Hizbollah, while others oppose it, but it is clear that the Lebanese government is not in a position to suppress Hizbollah’s operations. Attacks on Lebanese cities will not prevent future attacks. On the contrary, with further attacks which kill civilians, Israel will fall into the jihadist trap, in which it is already enmeshed in Gaza.

Israel was apparently willing to agree to the phased withdrawal plan arranged by Egyptian President Mubarak (Mubarak blamed unspecified “pressures” on Hamas for the failure of the prisoner exchange). It would have been in the interest of both Israel and the Palestinian leadership to end the violence as quickly as possible. Israel must recognize that if it does not deal one way or another with the de facto and de jure Palestinian leadership—namely Hamas—it will be strengthening the jihadist forces which are not the same as Hamas, but rather much worse for Israel and for the West. All Islamists are not the same, an inconvenient fact that both Israel and the United States must, in the current climate, learn to deal with. Israel does not have to deal with Hamas face-to-face, but there are ample precedents for using third party intermediaries, such as the Turks or Egyptians.

Israel’s strategy of retaliation dates back to the 1950’s when it was largely conducted by a young officer named Ariel Sharon. Its efficacy has consistently been questioned, but its central assumption rested on the belief that it was in the interest of neighboring governments, whether Jordanian, Egyptian, or Lebanese, to quell terrorist groups in order to prevent disproportionate attacks by Israel. The assumption falls apart when, as in the current case in Gaza and Lebanon, the neighboring government is not in control of significant armed forces operating from its territory.

Israel’s leaders must take a hard look at the current reality and recognize that its own interests, and the interests of the Hamas government in Gaza and of the Lebanese government in Beirut, lie in ending the current violence as quickly as possible. All have strong interests in preventing the emergence and strengthening of jihadist groups, whose strategy is primarily to exacerbate conflict. It is important to note that most Arab governments, especially those of Egypt and Jordan, share this desire to quell the violence as expeditiously as possible.

This means that Israel has to accept mediation, or even covert direct contacts, with the Hamas government based on their immediate shared interest in ending the current crisis. It also has to work with foreign governments to come to an agreement which will return the captured and end the attacks on its territory. Bombing Beirut will not accomplish these goals. Recognition of current realities offers the best chance for the return of the captives and defusing the crisis.