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Sunni Arabs turning against al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements in their midst is perhaps the first profoundly positive turn of events in Iraq since 2003. However, this does not mean that the US should remain in Iraq hoping this trend will herald more sweeping successes on other fronts. Quite the contrary.

A very bright spot in the otherwise typically dismal scene in Iraq has been the spreading phenomenon of Sunni Arabs taking on al-Qaeda. The trend began with tribal-based elements centering primarily on the al-Anbar Governate. It has expanded to include hardcore insurgents and portions of Diyala Governate, along with one major neighborhood in Baghdad. Former insurgents also now are working as scouts for American forces in many communities. As a result, al-Qaeda in Iraq has suffered a number of reverses and violence in some previously very dangerous areas like al-Anbar has dropped considerably.

As early as 2004, Iraq-watchers within the US intelligence community knew that resentment was building among Sunni Arabs against al-Qaeda and other fanatical jihadis. These tyrannical militants had dominated many communities, meting out brutal punishments, forbidding various activities and bringing death and destruction to many innocents around them. It was only a matter of time before Iraqis previously hosting such elements would begin pushing back.

Some might view this as an affirmation of the US administration’s position that staying the course would, one way or another, build momentum for trends in Iraq to turn Washington’s way. One can always hope, but such an assumption would be premature and rather shaky.

Sunni Arabs are, by far, the most anti-occupation of Iraq’s various ethno-sectarian communities. They also have the deepest mistrust for the largely Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad, which is shielded by American security, and behind which most Sunni Arabs see Iran.
-- whether true or not.

Consequently, as welcome as is this turn of events may be, the cooperation of even many battle-hardened insurgents with US forces against al-Qaeda and other terrorists is most likely a rather fragile—and temporary—marriage of convenience.

By turning against al-Qaeda, Sunni Arabs rid themselves of a vicious loadstone around their collective necks. In addition, for the first time, they are filling the ranks of the local police in large numbers. Despite denials, the US apparently has provided munitions or at least exercised much greater tolerance toward the acquisition and carrying of arms by Sunni Arabs for use against a common enemy. Such US-Arab Sunni military cooperation and the admission of many thousands of Arab Sunnis into the police has made the Shi’a-led Iraqi government visibly uncomfortable.

Iraqi Shi’a are very conscious of something the US must not overlook: if and when al-Qaeda in Iraq and its ilk have been crushed, those same Sunni Arabs who helped accomplish this might well turn against their American occupiers and the Iraqi central government, the next two parties on their long-standing hit list.

However, there are possible opportunities to consider. If the threat from al-Qaeda in Iraq were substantially reduced, then car-bombings aimed mainly at Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds, could fall off significantly. That could improve the atmosphere for the inter-communal reconciliation needed to jump-start the stalled Iraqi political process. Yet, with all the blood already spilt, ethno-sectarian cleansing and zero-sum issues like the status of Kirkuk still simmering, notable success on the political front remains a very iffy proposition.

The real opportunity for improving US relations with Iraq’s Sunni Arabs relates to withdrawal. A timely US withdrawal, coupled with assurances that the US does not intend to retain bases in Iraq, would provide a chance for a far more peaceful disengagement from what were previously the most violent regions of the country.

And the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq would vastly reduce the likelihood that a US withdrawal would leave behind a major terrorist threat. The threat of a post-withdrawal civil war would not be eliminated. Regrettably, preventing that outcome almost certainly is no longer within our power. It is a matter that now must be left to the Iraqis to address.