Amnesty proposals for Iraqi insurgents have angered many Iraqis and Americans alike. But if there is to be a realistic chance of removing large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents from the battlefield, such an amnesty must be as inclusive as possible. The government also must be able to keep its side of the bargain.
An amnesty might exclude indigenous Iraqi insurgents with blood on their hands, or, as Shi’a leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim reportedly declared on July 3, “Saddamists and takfiris” (presumably former Ba’th Party cadres and anti-Shi’a Sunni Arab militants). That would leave many thousands in the field to continue the fight themselves, assist fanatics associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq, and to shame or strong-arm other insurgents eligible for amnesty to keep fighting alongside them.
The situation on the ground in Iraq remains serious. It requires boldness if there is to be any hope of breaking the bloody stalemate between the government, Coalition forces and much of the Sunni Arab heartland. Nonetheless, the sheer scale of Sunni vs. Shi’a bloodshed, much of it on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Shi’a militias, makes the Shi’a dominated government’s thoroughgoing amnesty offer very difficult.
The notion of an amnesty that includes those who have shed blood is not all that new. In fact, by one description or another, such sweeping amnesties often have been recognized as the only way to bring a certain amount of hope to especially bloody or potentially serious conflicts. George Will noted in a recent commentary an important amnesty in American history was that given to Confederate soldiers at the end of the Civil War, many thousands of whom had killed Union soldiers in the course of that long and terrible war.
Perhaps more relevant to the case of Iraq is Algeria’s late-1990’s amnesty to insurgents. The Algerian amnesty is instructive because it provides one way of dealing with insurgents who would not otherwise qualify (i.e. those already with blood on their hands). Those who had inflicted casualties on government forces, but who had not engaged in atrocities such as murder, rape, etc. against civilians, were eligible for a partial amnesty—a reduced penalty for what they had done. This combined full and partial amnesty package removed from the battlefield virtually the entire armed wing of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). It led to the isolation today of Algeria’s few remaining GSPC-affiliated terrorists.
One problem with an amnesty proposal is the Iraqi insurgency is still quite robust. Situations involving amnesty work best when the party offering amnesty already has gained the upper hand over those on the receiving end. It is likely that many Iraqi insurgents still believe they can prevail, regardless of whether they are eligible for whatever amnesty formula might emerge from this debate.
One other issue is critically important, terribly basic and a major obstacle to any offer of amnesty: trust. Those insurgents who accept amnesty must be reasonably confident that when they turn themselves in, they would not be killed or otherwise ill-treated. With respect to those who might respond to a more inclusive amnesty, they must be sure they could benefit from due process of law. Although the regime in Algiers was notoriously heavy-handed and authoritarian, the government did succeed in convincing those being offered amnesty that it would keep its end of the bargain.
Large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents will not turn themselves in if they run the risk of being murdered by government security forces dominated by Shi’a militias, militias themselves (or Kurdish Peshmergas), or other ethno-sectarian vigilantes.
In the end, the issue of amnesty takes us right back to bedrock issues continuing to plague governance in Iraq: widespread ethno-sectarian violence, an inability to maintain law and order (regarding not only the insurgency, but also serious crime), and failure to disarm and disband powerful militias.
Governance in Iraq is an iffy affair beyond the Green Zone, to say the least. Ministries and courts face an enormous challenge just to do their jobs. Therefore, the ability of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to convincingly offer safety to those who might take advantage of an amnesty is clearly as important as the nature of the amnesty itself.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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Amnesty proposals for Iraqi insurgents have angered many Iraqis and Americans alike. But if there is to be a realistic chance of removing large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents from the battlefield, such an amnesty must be as inclusive as possible. The government also must be able to keep its side of the bargain.
An amnesty might exclude indigenous Iraqi insurgents with blood on their hands, or, as Shi’a leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim reportedly declared on July 3, “Saddamists and takfiris” (presumably former Ba’th Party cadres and anti-Shi’a Sunni Arab militants). That would leave many thousands in the field to continue the fight themselves, assist fanatics associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq, and to shame or strong-arm other insurgents eligible for amnesty to keep fighting alongside them.
The situation on the ground in Iraq remains serious. It requires boldness if there is to be any hope of breaking the bloody stalemate between the government, Coalition forces and much of the Sunni Arab heartland. Nonetheless, the sheer scale of Sunni vs. Shi’a bloodshed, much of it on the part of al-Qaeda in Iraq and Shi’a militias, makes the Shi’a dominated government’s thoroughgoing amnesty offer very difficult.
The notion of an amnesty that includes those who have shed blood is not all that new. In fact, by one description or another, such sweeping amnesties often have been recognized as the only way to bring a certain amount of hope to especially bloody or potentially serious conflicts. George Will noted in a recent commentary an important amnesty in American history was that given to Confederate soldiers at the end of the Civil War, many thousands of whom had killed Union soldiers in the course of that long and terrible war.
Perhaps more relevant to the case of Iraq is Algeria’s late-1990’s amnesty to insurgents. The Algerian amnesty is instructive because it provides one way of dealing with insurgents who would not otherwise qualify (i.e. those already with blood on their hands). Those who had inflicted casualties on government forces, but who had not engaged in atrocities such as murder, rape, etc. against civilians, were eligible for a partial amnesty—a reduced penalty for what they had done. This combined full and partial amnesty package removed from the battlefield virtually the entire armed wing of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). It led to the isolation today of Algeria’s few remaining GSPC-affiliated terrorists.
One problem with an amnesty proposal is the Iraqi insurgency is still quite robust. Situations involving amnesty work best when the party offering amnesty already has gained the upper hand over those on the receiving end. It is likely that many Iraqi insurgents still believe they can prevail, regardless of whether they are eligible for whatever amnesty formula might emerge from this debate.
One other issue is critically important, terribly basic and a major obstacle to any offer of amnesty: trust. Those insurgents who accept amnesty must be reasonably confident that when they turn themselves in, they would not be killed or otherwise ill-treated. With respect to those who might respond to a more inclusive amnesty, they must be sure they could benefit from due process of law. Although the regime in Algiers was notoriously heavy-handed and authoritarian, the government did succeed in convincing those being offered amnesty that it would keep its end of the bargain.
Large numbers of Sunni Arab insurgents will not turn themselves in if they run the risk of being murdered by government security forces dominated by Shi’a militias, militias themselves (or Kurdish Peshmergas), or other ethno-sectarian vigilantes.
In the end, the issue of amnesty takes us right back to bedrock issues continuing to plague governance in Iraq: widespread ethno-sectarian violence, an inability to maintain law and order (regarding not only the insurgency, but also serious crime), and failure to disarm and disband powerful militias.
Governance in Iraq is an iffy affair beyond the Green Zone, to say the least. Ministries and courts face an enormous challenge just to do their jobs. Therefore, the ability of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to convincingly offer safety to those who might take advantage of an amnesty is clearly as important as the nature of the amnesty itself.
Wayne White is an adjunct scholar with the Middle East Institute. Before his retirement in 2005, he served as Deputy Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Near Eastern Division.