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A fairly complete US military withdrawal from Iraq within two years — if not sooner — is all but inevitable. The war against the insurgency is essentially stalemated, likely to remain so, and popular support for the war in the United States continues to erode. It is important, however, that certain aspects of the withdrawal be handled carefully in order to avoid political pitfalls that would certainly condemn a post-withdrawal Iraq to increased instability or civil war.

Since it is growing ever clearer that such a withdrawal will take place in any case, the Bush Administration should act quickly if it is to garner any near-term advantage related to it inside Iraq.

First, a deadline should be set. Two years out probably would be the best all-round benchmark — far enough ahead to allow sufficient time for significant gains to be made in fielding Iraqi forces to replace ours but not near enough so insurgents could simply “wait out” the situation. As for the Iraqi government, army, and security forces, if the fundamentals for meaningful stability have not come together by that time, they probably never will.

Second, a formal announcement should be made that the US does not seek to maintain bases in Iraq, period. Both measures might help suppress the most popular — and damaging — conspiracy theories among many Iraqis, especially those most opposed to “occupation:” that the US never intends to leave because of its desire to control Iraq’s oil, and that even if most US ground forces do pull out, Washington intends to retain large bases in the country.

In the context of the withdrawal itself, certain related issues must be dealt with deftly and firmly in order not to further poison the Iraqi political well. Iraqi military and security forces must be bolstered significantly if the situation is to be prevented from deteriorating further in the course of a phased withdrawal. However, the manner in which it is conducted will have significant repercussions for what is to come after our military has departed.

The US military and the Iraqi government have resorted to the use of Kurdish and Shi’a militias against insurgents in Sunni Arab areas in an effort to flesh out battle-ready “Iraqi” forces, sometimes in concert with US forces. This must stop, regardless of the perceived tactical needs of the moment. Successes gained through the use of such tactics will not only prove to be fleeting, but will also feed the very ethnic and sectarian tensions that could well lead to civil war. At a time when militias very much wish to join the fight, Abdul Aziz Hakim’s statement last week that US forces should allow Iraqi forces more freedom of action against insurgents has potentially ominous implications.

Consequently, as we proceed with our efforts to bolster Iraqi security forces, we should make any and all such support conditional. We must be prepared to suspend assistance if militias — or ethnically or religiously lopsided army units — who are fielded against insurgents inside predominantly Sunni Arab areas, engage in revenge killings, etc. From now on, with this in mind, Washington and the government in Baghdad should consider new units of the Iraqi army battle-ready only if the units are balanced appropriately.

I chose the term “fairly complete” for a description of the US and Coalition withdrawal merely in deference to the inevitable need Iraqi military forces will have for some measure of air support. We cannot expect Iraqi military forces, no matter how well they are equipped, to be able to deal with insurgents and terrorists nearly as well as Coalition forces if they cannot call upon the real-time intelligence and tactical air support we ourselves have so heavily relied upon.

That means continued access to US intelligence platforms like the Predator and tactical air support by US fighter-bombers. Both could be based outside Iraq; the latter, at least in part, on a carrier in the Persian Gulf largely dedicated to such missions. Air support, however, must be withheld if it is clear that Iraqi forces calling for such support are operating alongside militias or lopsided Iraqi military units, and are engaging in ethnic cleansing, etc. And it goes without saying that the same holds if the Iraqi forces are found to be engaging in human rights violations.

As Coalition forces are withdrawn in phases, perhaps as soon as early next year, Washington and London must attempt to calibrate much-needed support for Iraqi government forces in a way that does not, in effect, make Coalition forces just another party to a civil war or inter-communal acts of revenge during the process of disengagement.

Despite continuing bloodshed, the ability to fashion an Iraq that does not descend into major civil strife or outright civil war — if that is still possible — remains ultimately in the political realm. But, missteps in the military arena can seriously undercut even the most well-meaning efforts toward Iraq’s desperately needed reconciliation.