The recent controversy over missing weapons underscores how our own carelessness often has aided the insurgency as well as Iraq’s burgeoning militias. This is an old story, going back to our earliest efforts to “stand up” the Iraqi army and police during the first year after the Iraq invasion.
Originally used in the comic strip “Pogo” during the Vietnam War, the expression “we have met the enemy, and they are us,” has become all too true of so much of what has gone wrong in Iraq. The missing weapons story epitomizes these continuing failures.
While still in government and dealing with Iraq in 2003-2004, I voiced concern about how the weapons that Coalition forces were turning over to the fledgling Iraqi police in particular were being used. My concern was that such weapons and ammunition could pass into the hands of the insurgency via police cadres, some of whom were insurgent sympathizers. These concerns unfortunately appear to have been confirmed in news reports this week.
Given the lack of control and accountability in many instances, it is surprising that the number of missing weapons is not higher. More worrisome is the inadequate number of US troops in Iraq to train the Iraqi security forces and monitor them as they take over from us in an effective manner. In fact, this shortage has been a critical factor in all areas of military activity, especially the all-important missions of clearing, holding and rebuilding areas previously hosting Sunni Arab insurgents.
As for the missing weapons, those close to the Iraq issue agree that the police were too hastily fielded and have proven to be of dubious reliability. The missing weapons may only be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Police have been caught red-handed operating with insurgent elements. Many weapons, accounted for in police stations by day, could easily have been used overnight by insurgents, other equally violent types, or even criminals.
The problem of misuse almost certainly increased this year. Many police have been accused of being members of, affiliated with, or cooperating with Shi’a militias, such as the Mahdi Army of militant cleric Muqtada al-Sadr or the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Police were reported to have directly participated in some bloody sectarian rampages, such as the one a few weeks ago in the town of Balad, located north of Baghdad.
With the wave of vicious sectarian bloodletting this year, the people who are doing the killing have victimized many thousands of innocent Iraqis. Perhaps the worst area of such abuse is centered in the Mahdi Militia’s bastion of Sadr City, the vast, relatively poor and largely Shi’a section of Baghdad.
Should the US pursue a proposal now under consideration to expand the number of Iraqi security forces, the focus should be on the more highly-trained and reliable army, not the police. It is critical also that such an expansion should not divert resources intended for existing army units, many of which have not fully matured, in part because of the pressing need for more and better weapons and equipment. If existing Iraqi army units do not get what they so badly need, the overall quality of Iraqi security forces would be diluted, further delaying their ability to take to the field in significant numbers and ease the burden on overstretched Coalition forces. But that should not exempt the Iraqi army from full accountability for the weapons and equipment it receives.
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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The recent controversy over missing weapons underscores how our own carelessness often has aided the insurgency as well as Iraq’s burgeoning militias. This is an old story, going back to our earliest efforts to “stand up” the Iraqi army and police during the first year after the Iraq invasion.
Originally used in the comic strip “Pogo” during the Vietnam War, the expression “we have met the enemy, and they are us,” has become all too true of so much of what has gone wrong in Iraq. The missing weapons story epitomizes these continuing failures.
While still in government and dealing with Iraq in 2003-2004, I voiced concern about how the weapons that Coalition forces were turning over to the fledgling Iraqi police in particular were being used. My concern was that such weapons and ammunition could pass into the hands of the insurgency via police cadres, some of whom were insurgent sympathizers. These concerns unfortunately appear to have been confirmed in news reports this week.
Given the lack of control and accountability in many instances, it is surprising that the number of missing weapons is not higher. More worrisome is the inadequate number of US troops in Iraq to train the Iraqi security forces and monitor them as they take over from us in an effective manner. In fact, this shortage has been a critical factor in all areas of military activity, especially the all-important missions of clearing, holding and rebuilding areas previously hosting Sunni Arab insurgents.
As for the missing weapons, those close to the Iraq issue agree that the police were too hastily fielded and have proven to be of dubious reliability. The missing weapons may only be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Police have been caught red-handed operating with insurgent elements. Many weapons, accounted for in police stations by day, could easily have been used overnight by insurgents, other equally violent types, or even criminals.
The problem of misuse almost certainly increased this year. Many police have been accused of being members of, affiliated with, or cooperating with Shi’a militias, such as the Mahdi Army of militant cleric Muqtada al-Sadr or the Badr Organization of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Police were reported to have directly participated in some bloody sectarian rampages, such as the one a few weeks ago in the town of Balad, located north of Baghdad.
With the wave of vicious sectarian bloodletting this year, the people who are doing the killing have victimized many thousands of innocent Iraqis. Perhaps the worst area of such abuse is centered in the Mahdi Militia’s bastion of Sadr City, the vast, relatively poor and largely Shi’a section of Baghdad.
Should the US pursue a proposal now under consideration to expand the number of Iraqi security forces, the focus should be on the more highly-trained and reliable army, not the police. It is critical also that such an expansion should not divert resources intended for existing army units, many of which have not fully matured, in part because of the pressing need for more and better weapons and equipment. If existing Iraqi army units do not get what they so badly need, the overall quality of Iraqi security forces would be diluted, further delaying their ability to take to the field in significant numbers and ease the burden on overstretched Coalition forces. But that should not exempt the Iraqi army from full accountability for the weapons and equipment it receives.
Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, US Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations.