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In the 1950s, when I was growing up in Iraq under the monarchy, all school children would assemble in the schoolyard every Thursday morning to raise the Iraqi flag and to sing the national anthem. In the evenings, family and friends would sit by the Tigris until the wee hours of the morning and return home safely to the other side of Baghdad. Although people perennially complained about the government, the legendary statesman, Nuri al-Sa’id, at least used to choose his minister from those with proven records of experience or among young Ph.D. holders who finished their studies in Europe or the US. In those days there was a certain degree of respect for human rights and the value of the individual. In the mid-1950s, for example, I recall the arrest of a well-known Communist professor, Dr. Safa al-Hafidh, for publishing an article critical of the government in the leftist quarterly, al-Thaqafa-l-Jadida [The New Culture]. This arrest was met with such severe criticism in the Iraqi press and among the opposition in Parliament that the Minister of Interior, Sa’id Qazzaz, had to justify the action by coming to Parliament and reading from the article. The professor was released after a couple of weeks.

These days are almost unimaginable now. Today, Iraq as a whole does not even have a national anthem or a flag that is accepted by all Iraqis. Children feel lucky if they can make it to school and back home without being killed by bombs or sniper bullets. Iraq is facing multiple challenges that include a sectarian civil war, a stalled economy, internal and external migration by millions of Iraqis, rampant corruption and a government so weak that it is unable to assure the safety of its citizens. The Kurds constantly threaten the Iraqi government with separation if their demands are not met, while ethnic, sectarian and even tribal identities have replaced a feeling that individuals are Iraqi before anything else.

The major new political parties established after the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003 have aggravated the crisis of identity in Iraq. These parties and political groups were so eager to hold power in the elections of 2005 that they ran on sectarian platforms (Shi'a versus Sunni) or on the basis of ethnic nationalism in the case of the Kurds. Political party leaders were able to manipulate religious and ethnic feelings in their communities to make political gains. Secular parties, such as that of Ayad Allawi, who campaigned on a non-sectarian basis, were unorganized, intimidated and accused of being pro-American by their religious foes. The Iraqi Left, mainly represented by the Communist Party, which is well known for gathering recruits on a non-ethnic, non-sectarian basis, made a poor showing; they have never recovered from the severe persecution by the short-lived Ba‘th regime which came to power in February 1963, after the Qasim regime.

As a result of these contradictions, the newly established national assembly has been paralyzed by ethnic and sectarian feuds and is unable to make important decisions, such as constitutional reform and a national oil law. Cabinet government is also hampered by the fact that the new Iraqi leaders in the government and the national assembly, after decades of dictatorship, lack experience or even a basic understanding of the parliamentary system. This is not an excuse, however, for their unwillingness to learn or to try to compromise on matters of national interest. As a result of these failures, the Iraqi people have lost confidence in their national leadership. Many Iraqis are also turning their anger towards the American government whom they blame for not doing enough to help solve their problems.

It is difficult to blame any particular sect or ethnic group for these failings — indeed there is more than enough blame to go around, including the United States. The Sunnis have paralyzed the work of the new Iraqi institutions by boycotting the first elections in 2005 and hence excluding themselves from the work of the committee charged with drafting the constitution. Sunnis must also be blamed for their initial support for the insurgents and al-Qa‘ida. The Shi’a were responsible for allowing the militias and death squads to operate freely and almost unsanctioned, while the call of some Shi’a for a weak central government and a federation of the southern and central provinces raises fears of a Shi’a state in southern Iraq. The Kurds have moved relentlessly toward independence, symbolized by their use of a separate flag and slogans such as “Welcome to Kurdistan”— not “Welcome to Iraq” — on the borders of Kurdish controlled areas in the north.

As a result of its travails, Iraq is already a failing state in danger of total collapse. But despite increasing pessimism about its survival, calls for a permanent division of Iraq — especially into ethnic and sectarian zones — are premature and will lead to more problems than they solve. Such a division will be an open invitation for other countries to intervene — even more than they currently are. But preventing such an outcome will require more time and patience than Americans seem to have. There are no quick or magic solutions. National reconciliation will require recognition of shared interests and even values, and will have to come from the hearts of religious, political and tribal leaders of all communities. Iraqi government leaders, like Nuri al-Maliki, must once again feel that they are Iraqis, before they are Shi’a, Sunni or Kurd. And these values must again be instilled in Iraqi society — in the educational system, in civic societies, and in symbols and rituals like those I used to participate in as a youth.