This perspective first appeared in the Newark Star Ledger on August 19,2007
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears to be trying to address the serious divisions in his cabinet and a parliament in disarray amid questions as to whether there is any real hope he can ever deliver on key American goals that might draw Iraq’s Sunni Arabs back into the political mainstream.
One major question is why Maliki was named prime minister in the first place. Early last year, Washington pushed hard for Maliki to replace the disappointing Ibrahim al-Jafaari. Yet, Maliki hails from the same Da‘wa Party origins, as does Jafaari. He was not the chosen candidate among the majority of Iraqi Shi‘a powerbrokers.
To become prime minister, Maliki had to draw heavily on the support of none other than firebrand anti-US Shi‘a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And there have been numerous indications since then that Maliki’s government has close ties to and employs members and affiliates of various Shi‘a militias, with their deep-seated anti-Sunni Arab agenda. His trips to Iran also suggest that he is closer to Tehran than the US would like — something that carries negative connotations not only relating to his dealings with Washington, but in the eyes of many Iraqis as well.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Maliki’s behavior of late is his criticism of US military cooperation with Sunni Arab insurgents against al-Qa‘ida in Iraq in al-Anbar, Salahedin and Diyala governates, as well as some neighborhoods in Baghdad. In some instances, Iraqi security forces supposedly answering to Maliki have actively tried to disrupt this valuable work. His opposition threatens to get in the way of what appears to be developing into the one potential US success story in Iraq at this time.
Despite all these negatives, the most significant question now is whether any prime minister of Iraq can deliver on critical issues such as unity, security and public services at this juncture. Despite the intense consultations taking place at this point in Baghdad and regular pep talks with President Bush, Maliki’s government remains broadly dysfunctional, riven by ethno-sectarian infighting, rampantly corrupt, mistrusted by a large number of Iraqis. It also has little ability to project its writ beyond the Green Zone to most areas of the country.
Indeed, with much of the country in shambles because of everything from falling supplies of already inadequate electricity to ethno-sectarian strife that has driven over four million Iraqis from their homes, one could argue that no matter how high-minded any Iraqi prime minister might be, success remains elusive.
This is especially true given the lack of unity and consensus within the current Iraqi government, with the exception of the alliance between Shi‘a and Kurds. A number of important questions, such as the status of oil-rich Kirkuk and the rights of regional entities to self-govern, appear to be pitting one major ethno-sectarian community against another in what they consider a zero-sum game.
The overall problem of governance in Iraq following massive looting, persistently high levels of ongoing violence and crime and seething ethno-sectarian hostilities is daunting. As early as 2005, when I was focusing on Iraq in the State Department, I had warned that failure was so likely on the part of Iraqi leaders under such trying circumstances that this situation might well produce a series of “revolving-door” prime ministers.
In this scenario, one failed prime minister would succeed another, with considerable disruption in governance in between as the process of choosing each new prime minister played out for months. Merely switching prime ministers would have relatively little overall impact without an improvement in the fundamental problems standing in the way of effective governance.
In Maliki’s case, however, the situation might be darker still. Given his association with a militant Shi‘a party and his seeming lack of a consistent sense of urgency regarding US priorities, it could very well be that he is not interested in progress toward goals set by Washington. His current efforts to pull things together appear only transitory at best.
The benchmarks being set generally favor Sunni Arabs so perhaps Maliki is playing for time in the hope that the US Administration will eventually lose interest in its quest to bring Iraq’s Sunni Arabs on board politically. Maliki may also calculate that Sunni Arabs, out of impatience or mistrust, could soon act rashly and send Washington reeling in a different and more pro-Shi‘a direction.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. He is a former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Office on Near East issues. White was an advisor to the Iraq Study Group.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This perspective first appeared in the Newark Star Ledger on August 19,2007
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki appears to be trying to address the serious divisions in his cabinet and a parliament in disarray amid questions as to whether there is any real hope he can ever deliver on key American goals that might draw Iraq’s Sunni Arabs back into the political mainstream.
One major question is why Maliki was named prime minister in the first place. Early last year, Washington pushed hard for Maliki to replace the disappointing Ibrahim al-Jafaari. Yet, Maliki hails from the same Da‘wa Party origins, as does Jafaari. He was not the chosen candidate among the majority of Iraqi Shi‘a powerbrokers.
To become prime minister, Maliki had to draw heavily on the support of none other than firebrand anti-US Shi‘a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. And there have been numerous indications since then that Maliki’s government has close ties to and employs members and affiliates of various Shi‘a militias, with their deep-seated anti-Sunni Arab agenda. His trips to Iran also suggest that he is closer to Tehran than the US would like — something that carries negative connotations not only relating to his dealings with Washington, but in the eyes of many Iraqis as well.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Maliki’s behavior of late is his criticism of US military cooperation with Sunni Arab insurgents against al-Qa‘ida in Iraq in al-Anbar, Salahedin and Diyala governates, as well as some neighborhoods in Baghdad. In some instances, Iraqi security forces supposedly answering to Maliki have actively tried to disrupt this valuable work. His opposition threatens to get in the way of what appears to be developing into the one potential US success story in Iraq at this time.
Despite all these negatives, the most significant question now is whether any prime minister of Iraq can deliver on critical issues such as unity, security and public services at this juncture. Despite the intense consultations taking place at this point in Baghdad and regular pep talks with President Bush, Maliki’s government remains broadly dysfunctional, riven by ethno-sectarian infighting, rampantly corrupt, mistrusted by a large number of Iraqis. It also has little ability to project its writ beyond the Green Zone to most areas of the country.
Indeed, with much of the country in shambles because of everything from falling supplies of already inadequate electricity to ethno-sectarian strife that has driven over four million Iraqis from their homes, one could argue that no matter how high-minded any Iraqi prime minister might be, success remains elusive.
This is especially true given the lack of unity and consensus within the current Iraqi government, with the exception of the alliance between Shi‘a and Kurds. A number of important questions, such as the status of oil-rich Kirkuk and the rights of regional entities to self-govern, appear to be pitting one major ethno-sectarian community against another in what they consider a zero-sum game.
The overall problem of governance in Iraq following massive looting, persistently high levels of ongoing violence and crime and seething ethno-sectarian hostilities is daunting. As early as 2005, when I was focusing on Iraq in the State Department, I had warned that failure was so likely on the part of Iraqi leaders under such trying circumstances that this situation might well produce a series of “revolving-door” prime ministers.
In this scenario, one failed prime minister would succeed another, with considerable disruption in governance in between as the process of choosing each new prime minister played out for months. Merely switching prime ministers would have relatively little overall impact without an improvement in the fundamental problems standing in the way of effective governance.
In Maliki’s case, however, the situation might be darker still. Given his association with a militant Shi‘a party and his seeming lack of a consistent sense of urgency regarding US priorities, it could very well be that he is not interested in progress toward goals set by Washington. His current efforts to pull things together appear only transitory at best.
The benchmarks being set generally favor Sunni Arabs so perhaps Maliki is playing for time in the hope that the US Administration will eventually lose interest in its quest to bring Iraq’s Sunni Arabs on board politically. Maliki may also calculate that Sunni Arabs, out of impatience or mistrust, could soon act rashly and send Washington reeling in a different and more pro-Shi‘a direction.
Wayne White is an Adjunct Scholar at the Middle East Institute. He is a former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Intelligence and Research Office on Near East issues. White was an advisor to the Iraq Study Group.