This Perspective originally appeared as an article on the Knight Ridder News Service May 19, 2006.
Recently, tension over the Iranian nuclear program reached new heights. A US-backed resolution was circulated at the United Nations warning of "further measures as may be necessary" if Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities are not halted. And the Iranian Parliament warned that if the UN Security Council does not resolve the dispute "peacefully" they might review of Article 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which outlines the procedures for withdrawal from the treaty.
Last week, Russia and China, despite growing impatient with Iran's recalcitrance, led an effort to delay the resolution's consideration. And the United States and Europeans agreed to draft an incentives package to induce Tehran's cooperation.
Amid this tension lies the tantalizing possibility that Tehran and Washington could yet find a way out of this dangerous stalemate. On May 9 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a letter to President Bush proposing "new solutions" to the country's problems. It was the first personal communication by an Iranian president to his American counterpart since 1979.
US officials must not dismiss this overture as just another eleventh-hour Iranian ruse designed to avert a showdown. Instead, he Bush administration should treat the letter as an opportunity for both countries to step back from the brink.
For several years, the United States has focused on preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons by exercising incremental coercive diplomacy. This approach resulted in a stern censure from the IAEA Governing Board, referral to the UN Security Council, and a nonbinding council statement urging Iran to cease uranium enrichment within 30 days. But these are triumphs of process, not policy.
Meanwhile, Tehran has suspended short-notice IAEA inspections, manipulated Iranian public sentiment in favor of a nuclear program, and produced reactor-grade uranium. Thus, the United States today confronts an Iran whose nuclear program continues to advance, whose nuclear activities are walled off from international scrutiny, whose coffers are flush with cash with which to weather sanctions, and whose leadership seems united in refusing to capitulate to Western specifically American demands.
In response, the United States seems to be on a path toward sanctions, but sanctions are unlikely to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and may damage relations between and among major powers.
Can we do better? Yes, not by abandoning diplomacy, but by modifying and augmenting it.
First, the Bush administration should focus on de-escalation. It can start by using alternative language in the draft resolution, language that will bring Security Council members together. The Bush administration should also communicate to the EU-3, Russia, China, and separately to Iran through the Swiss channel, that it is willing to seriously consider a diplomatic opening.
Second, the United States should broaden and deepen nuclear diplomacy. Until now, the West has focused narrowly on the Iranian case. Yet the problematic aspects of the Iranian nuclear program are part and parcel of the deficiencies of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Targeting Iran in this way has fed the perception in Tehran that the campaign in the IAEA and Security Council is simply window dressing, necessary groundwork for pursuing regime change. In turn, this has only caused Iranian leaders to close ranks.
Finally, the United States must pay the price of cooperation. Statements designed to convey resoluteness often prove counter-productive: loose talk about resorting to "other coalitions"; runs the risk of undermining the very coalition that Washington has worked so assiduously to build. Offhand remarks about sanctions or military force are as likely to cause opponents to dig in their heels as to quake in their boots. The United States must do a much better job managing the message.
The administration should also tackle the issue of who is, or isn't, communicating to whom. Though the EU-3 has spearheaded the West's diplomatic efforts, the political conflict between the United States and Iran is at the core of the nuclear stalemate. To have expected the nuclear issue to be resolved without some progress toward settling the political differences between Washington and Tehran was unrealistic three years ago and remains so today. That is why in recent weeks UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and prominent American leaders from both sides of the aisle have called on the United States to open a direct dialogue with Iran.
Here the Ahmadinejad letter becomes important — not for what it did or did not contain, or even for the insight it provided into the mindset of its author, but rather because it creates an opportunity for Washington respond in a self-confident and constructive manner, so as to allow the less strident and intractable voices in the Iranian clerical establishment, if not Ahmadinejad himself some room to maneuver.
Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javan Zarif, striking a conciliatory tone, recently stated that "there are a multitude of possibilities" to resolving the nuclear dispute. The United States would be foolish not to explore them. Let's hope the Bush administration uses this opportunity to pause, de-escalate and adjust course.
John Calabrese is Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and professor at American University.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective originally appeared as an article on the Knight Ridder News Service May 19, 2006.
Recently, tension over the Iranian nuclear program reached new heights. A US-backed resolution was circulated at the United Nations warning of "further measures as may be necessary" if Iranian enrichment and reprocessing activities are not halted. And the Iranian Parliament warned that if the UN Security Council does not resolve the dispute "peacefully" they might review of Article 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which outlines the procedures for withdrawal from the treaty.
Last week, Russia and China, despite growing impatient with Iran's recalcitrance, led an effort to delay the resolution's consideration. And the United States and Europeans agreed to draft an incentives package to induce Tehran's cooperation.
Amid this tension lies the tantalizing possibility that Tehran and Washington could yet find a way out of this dangerous stalemate. On May 9 President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad sent a letter to President Bush proposing "new solutions" to the country's problems. It was the first personal communication by an Iranian president to his American counterpart since 1979.
US officials must not dismiss this overture as just another eleventh-hour Iranian ruse designed to avert a showdown. Instead, he Bush administration should treat the letter as an opportunity for both countries to step back from the brink.
For several years, the United States has focused on preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons by exercising incremental coercive diplomacy. This approach resulted in a stern censure from the IAEA Governing Board, referral to the UN Security Council, and a nonbinding council statement urging Iran to cease uranium enrichment within 30 days. But these are triumphs of process, not policy.
Meanwhile, Tehran has suspended short-notice IAEA inspections, manipulated Iranian public sentiment in favor of a nuclear program, and produced reactor-grade uranium. Thus, the United States today confronts an Iran whose nuclear program continues to advance, whose nuclear activities are walled off from international scrutiny, whose coffers are flush with cash with which to weather sanctions, and whose leadership seems united in refusing to capitulate to Western specifically American demands.
In response, the United States seems to be on a path toward sanctions, but sanctions are unlikely to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear ambitions and may damage relations between and among major powers.
Can we do better? Yes, not by abandoning diplomacy, but by modifying and augmenting it.
First, the Bush administration should focus on de-escalation. It can start by using alternative language in the draft resolution, language that will bring Security Council members together. The Bush administration should also communicate to the EU-3, Russia, China, and separately to Iran through the Swiss channel, that it is willing to seriously consider a diplomatic opening.
Second, the United States should broaden and deepen nuclear diplomacy. Until now, the West has focused narrowly on the Iranian case. Yet the problematic aspects of the Iranian nuclear program are part and parcel of the deficiencies of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Targeting Iran in this way has fed the perception in Tehran that the campaign in the IAEA and Security Council is simply window dressing, necessary groundwork for pursuing regime change. In turn, this has only caused Iranian leaders to close ranks.
Finally, the United States must pay the price of cooperation. Statements designed to convey resoluteness often prove counter-productive: loose talk about resorting to "other coalitions"; runs the risk of undermining the very coalition that Washington has worked so assiduously to build. Offhand remarks about sanctions or military force are as likely to cause opponents to dig in their heels as to quake in their boots. The United States must do a much better job managing the message.
The administration should also tackle the issue of who is, or isn't, communicating to whom. Though the EU-3 has spearheaded the West's diplomatic efforts, the political conflict between the United States and Iran is at the core of the nuclear stalemate. To have expected the nuclear issue to be resolved without some progress toward settling the political differences between Washington and Tehran was unrealistic three years ago and remains so today. That is why in recent weeks UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and prominent American leaders from both sides of the aisle have called on the United States to open a direct dialogue with Iran.
Here the Ahmadinejad letter becomes important — not for what it did or did not contain, or even for the insight it provided into the mindset of its author, but rather because it creates an opportunity for Washington respond in a self-confident and constructive manner, so as to allow the less strident and intractable voices in the Iranian clerical establishment, if not Ahmadinejad himself some room to maneuver.
Iran's ambassador to the United Nations, Javan Zarif, striking a conciliatory tone, recently stated that "there are a multitude of possibilities" to resolving the nuclear dispute. The United States would be foolish not to explore them. Let's hope the Bush administration uses this opportunity to pause, de-escalate and adjust course.
John Calabrese is Book Review Editor of The Middle East Journal, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and professor at American University.