This Perspective was originally published in the April 2004 MEI Bulletin.
The Administration wants to find a way to accommodate Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral program of withdrawal from parts of Gaza and the West Bank and, at the same time, to hold fast to the Presidents concept of a two state solution for the Palestinian problem. The Administration does not want to be drawn into a confrontation or even a public dispute with Sharon in this election year. On the other hand, the Administration does not want to appear to be abandoning the Middle East Peace Process or the President’s own publicly declared positions for fear of giving Senator Kerry ammunition in the campaign.
The reality is that Prime Minister Sharon has long since managed the situation in such a way as to make declared US policies virtually irrelevant. Sharon has gradually imposed his own vision, which he has described as an extended interim arrangement of some fifteen years before it will be possible to deal with final status issues. This vision of a protracted interim period would seem to be incompatible with the agreements previously reached under Oslo and is only marginally compatible with the concepts outlined in the Road Map. Indeed, Sharon has exhibited a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Road Map and outright opposition to the results of Oslo.
In this regard, Sharon has consistently undermined the reach and authority of the core Palestinian elements of Oslo; the Palestinian Authority, its security services, and its national leadership. He has established the principle that Israel has the right at any time or place to intervene militarily in the West Bank and Gaza. Even the Europeans have given up protesting Israeli interventions, attacks, and assassinations, while the White House long since stopped protesting such actions. As a result, the Palestinian Authority exists more in name than in practice. It is increasingly fragmented into localized remnants of governance and security.
Meanwhile, Sharon seems to be in the process of isolating the Palestinians from the outside world and from each other. While it is still too early to see exactly where Israel is headed with regard to the Palestinians, what seems to be taking shape is a situation in which Israel will be able to deal with relatively disparate, weak local leaders in a number of non contiguous parcels of the West Bank which are linked by an easily controlled road network. At this point, I do not see any plans to give Palestinians the independent access to the outside world through air, sea and land routes as contemplated in the Oslo process. Gaza would be sealed on all sides by Israel or Israeli forces. The West Bank would be removed from access to Jordan. And it is not even clear that there would be free movement possible between Gaza and the West Bank – as also contemplated in Oslo.
Clearly, the wall is a key element in Sharon’s plan. And while it may have a legitimate security rationale - the fencing of Gaza has worked - it could only be effective if it actually fully encloses the Palestinian population. Just as the world has become accustomed to Israeli military intervention at will in the West Bank and Gaza, it is now also becoming used to the idea of the wall.
Sharon’s idea of eliminating some settlements in Gaza and the West Bank is hardly the “breakthrough.” Sharon has never supported the isolated island settlements in the center of Gaza or the West Bank. They complicate the security situation for the Israeli Defense Forces and are continuing points of vulnerability. By putting the bulk of the Palestinian population behind barbed wire and Israelis on the other side, security for the average Israeli will in theory be enhanced.
By all accounts, the Administration seems to be willing to buy into these plans with a few cosmetic changes. Putting this problem in the pending file for the next decade may seem attractive to some. And so the Administration may be willing to make a trade with Sharon. They will acquiesce in the growth of settlements he intends to keep and incorporate in expanded Israeli borders in return for the elimination of outposts, illegal even under Israeli law, in the West Bank and some of the more troublesome isolated settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Certainly the idea of eliminating some settlements is attractive, but we should be cautious about assuming that such a move would either create a precedent or lead to further concessions on either side.
What is very clear about the direction that things seem to be going is that taken to its likely conclusion, there could be no viable economic or political basis for building an independent state. The territory that the world thought was open for discussion only a few years ago will be far more limited under the extended transitional period than the proposals discussed at Camp David under President Clinton. We were talking about a Palestinian state on some 90 plus percent of the West Bank. Now what we seem to be talking about is localized and fragmented Palestinian home rule for an extended period on some 40 plus percent of the land.
Much as many people would like to believe differently, the Oslo process seems already to be dead, the December 2000 Clinton parameters that so many believe is the inevitable solution is on life support, the roadmap is road kill, and the two state solution is a disappearing dream, at least for the foreseeable future. Given the chaos that is rapidly developing in the West Bank and Gaza, the disinterest of the Administration, growing apathy in the Arab world, and the lack of courageous leadership among the Palestinians, perhaps Sharon is right and the only thing we can hope for is some kind of extended transition where Palestinians are walled off. It is hard to believe, however, that such a solution will stop terrorism. In fact, it is more likely that people without hope of freedom and national expression will only be more inclined to join as recruits for terror attacks. And while a wall may offer temporary respite, walls have proven in the past to be notoriously vulnerable. Even if they work in Israel, we still have the problem of Palestinian and Muslim frustration reinforcing the ranks of international terrorism. And while Israelis might have a safer life at home for a temporary respite, we all would face an even greater threat abroad. So it is worth thinking long and hard about the direction we are taking with our friends in Israel.
Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He has served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and as Ambassador to Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective was originally published in the April 2004 MEI Bulletin.
The Administration wants to find a way to accommodate Prime Minister Sharon’s unilateral program of withdrawal from parts of Gaza and the West Bank and, at the same time, to hold fast to the Presidents concept of a two state solution for the Palestinian problem. The Administration does not want to be drawn into a confrontation or even a public dispute with Sharon in this election year. On the other hand, the Administration does not want to appear to be abandoning the Middle East Peace Process or the President’s own publicly declared positions for fear of giving Senator Kerry ammunition in the campaign.
The reality is that Prime Minister Sharon has long since managed the situation in such a way as to make declared US policies virtually irrelevant. Sharon has gradually imposed his own vision, which he has described as an extended interim arrangement of some fifteen years before it will be possible to deal with final status issues. This vision of a protracted interim period would seem to be incompatible with the agreements previously reached under Oslo and is only marginally compatible with the concepts outlined in the Road Map. Indeed, Sharon has exhibited a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the Road Map and outright opposition to the results of Oslo.
In this regard, Sharon has consistently undermined the reach and authority of the core Palestinian elements of Oslo; the Palestinian Authority, its security services, and its national leadership. He has established the principle that Israel has the right at any time or place to intervene militarily in the West Bank and Gaza. Even the Europeans have given up protesting Israeli interventions, attacks, and assassinations, while the White House long since stopped protesting such actions. As a result, the Palestinian Authority exists more in name than in practice. It is increasingly fragmented into localized remnants of governance and security.
Meanwhile, Sharon seems to be in the process of isolating the Palestinians from the outside world and from each other. While it is still too early to see exactly where Israel is headed with regard to the Palestinians, what seems to be taking shape is a situation in which Israel will be able to deal with relatively disparate, weak local leaders in a number of non contiguous parcels of the West Bank which are linked by an easily controlled road network. At this point, I do not see any plans to give Palestinians the independent access to the outside world through air, sea and land routes as contemplated in the Oslo process. Gaza would be sealed on all sides by Israel or Israeli forces. The West Bank would be removed from access to Jordan. And it is not even clear that there would be free movement possible between Gaza and the West Bank – as also contemplated in Oslo.
Clearly, the wall is a key element in Sharon’s plan. And while it may have a legitimate security rationale - the fencing of Gaza has worked - it could only be effective if it actually fully encloses the Palestinian population. Just as the world has become accustomed to Israeli military intervention at will in the West Bank and Gaza, it is now also becoming used to the idea of the wall.
Sharon’s idea of eliminating some settlements in Gaza and the West Bank is hardly the “breakthrough.” Sharon has never supported the isolated island settlements in the center of Gaza or the West Bank. They complicate the security situation for the Israeli Defense Forces and are continuing points of vulnerability. By putting the bulk of the Palestinian population behind barbed wire and Israelis on the other side, security for the average Israeli will in theory be enhanced.
By all accounts, the Administration seems to be willing to buy into these plans with a few cosmetic changes. Putting this problem in the pending file for the next decade may seem attractive to some. And so the Administration may be willing to make a trade with Sharon. They will acquiesce in the growth of settlements he intends to keep and incorporate in expanded Israeli borders in return for the elimination of outposts, illegal even under Israeli law, in the West Bank and some of the more troublesome isolated settlements in Gaza and the West Bank. Certainly the idea of eliminating some settlements is attractive, but we should be cautious about assuming that such a move would either create a precedent or lead to further concessions on either side.
What is very clear about the direction that things seem to be going is that taken to its likely conclusion, there could be no viable economic or political basis for building an independent state. The territory that the world thought was open for discussion only a few years ago will be far more limited under the extended transitional period than the proposals discussed at Camp David under President Clinton. We were talking about a Palestinian state on some 90 plus percent of the West Bank. Now what we seem to be talking about is localized and fragmented Palestinian home rule for an extended period on some 40 plus percent of the land.
Much as many people would like to believe differently, the Oslo process seems already to be dead, the December 2000 Clinton parameters that so many believe is the inevitable solution is on life support, the roadmap is road kill, and the two state solution is a disappearing dream, at least for the foreseeable future. Given the chaos that is rapidly developing in the West Bank and Gaza, the disinterest of the Administration, growing apathy in the Arab world, and the lack of courageous leadership among the Palestinians, perhaps Sharon is right and the only thing we can hope for is some kind of extended transition where Palestinians are walled off. It is hard to believe, however, that such a solution will stop terrorism. In fact, it is more likely that people without hope of freedom and national expression will only be more inclined to join as recruits for terror attacks. And while a wall may offer temporary respite, walls have proven in the past to be notoriously vulnerable. Even if they work in Israel, we still have the problem of Palestinian and Muslim frustration reinforcing the ranks of international terrorism. And while Israelis might have a safer life at home for a temporary respite, we all would face an even greater threat abroad. So it is worth thinking long and hard about the direction we are taking with our friends in Israel.
Ambassador Edward S. Walker, Jr. is President of the Middle East Institute. He has served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and as Ambassador to Israel, the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, and Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.