This Perspective is a summary of a full-length article available here.
Over the past year, the Bush administration has prodded the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Tehran to clarify the details of the Iranian nuclear program. The fact that the United States chose a multilateral approach to address this issue was welcomed by European officials, who, like their American counterparts, are concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as they are about the deficiencies of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. European officials, like their US counterparts, also desire a non-nuclear Iran, and hope to avoid yet another traumatic Euro-Atlantic policy dispute. These shared concerns have led to an unprecedented degree of US/EU policy coordination with respect to Iran as well as to an uncharacteristically unified and assertive European diplomacy.
Yet, the IAEA investigative process has yielded troubling discoveries and omissions about the nature and extensiveness of the Iranian nuclear program, casting doubt on the veracity of Iranian claims that their nuclear activities are dedicated exclusively to civilian purposes. With each successive turn of the IAEA reporting and Board of Governors deliberation cycle, frustration on all three sides – US, European, and Iranian – has been mounting. With the next round of IAEA reports and negotiations just weeks away, observers are pondering doomsday scenarios and idealized eleventh-hour outcomes. Both are plausible, but neither seems likely. Unless either Washington or Tehran stumble into a confrontation, the three sides will probably find it in their interests to defer the issue to a second Bush administration or its successor.
In the meantime, it may be useful to explore both where we are and how we got here. This paper develops three arguments. First, the EU has made substantial progress in building an institutionalized framework for relations with Iran that, in its current form, addresses some of the key concerns voiced by critics of engagement. Second, the US and EU approaches to Iran, specifically regarding the nuclear issue, have narrowed significantly, mainly as a consequence of a European course adjustment. Third, despite this convergence, it appears that Washington and Brussels have yet to find the fulcrum – Iran remains immovable.
Dr. John Calabrese is the Book Review Editor for The Middle East Journal and is an expert in European & Middle East Policy. He is also the author and editor of many articles including Gulf & Asia Energy Security (1999) and The Future of Iraq (1997).
Disclaimer: Assertions and opinions in this Commentary are solely those of the above-mentioned author(s) and do not reflect necessarily the views of the Middle East Institute, which expressly does not take positions on Middle East policy.
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This Perspective is a summary of a full-length article available here.
Over the past year, the Bush administration has prodded the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Tehran to clarify the details of the Iranian nuclear program. The fact that the United States chose a multilateral approach to address this issue was welcomed by European officials, who, like their American counterparts, are concerned about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as they are about the deficiencies of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. European officials, like their US counterparts, also desire a non-nuclear Iran, and hope to avoid yet another traumatic Euro-Atlantic policy dispute. These shared concerns have led to an unprecedented degree of US/EU policy coordination with respect to Iran as well as to an uncharacteristically unified and assertive European diplomacy.
Yet, the IAEA investigative process has yielded troubling discoveries and omissions about the nature and extensiveness of the Iranian nuclear program, casting doubt on the veracity of Iranian claims that their nuclear activities are dedicated exclusively to civilian purposes. With each successive turn of the IAEA reporting and Board of Governors deliberation cycle, frustration on all three sides – US, European, and Iranian – has been mounting. With the next round of IAEA reports and negotiations just weeks away, observers are pondering doomsday scenarios and idealized eleventh-hour outcomes. Both are plausible, but neither seems likely. Unless either Washington or Tehran stumble into a confrontation, the three sides will probably find it in their interests to defer the issue to a second Bush administration or its successor.
In the meantime, it may be useful to explore both where we are and how we got here. This paper develops three arguments. First, the EU has made substantial progress in building an institutionalized framework for relations with Iran that, in its current form, addresses some of the key concerns voiced by critics of engagement. Second, the US and EU approaches to Iran, specifically regarding the nuclear issue, have narrowed significantly, mainly as a consequence of a European course adjustment. Third, despite this convergence, it appears that Washington and Brussels have yet to find the fulcrum – Iran remains immovable.
Dr. John Calabrese is the Book Review Editor for The Middle East Journal and is an expert in European & Middle East Policy. He is also the author and editor of many articles including Gulf & Asia Energy Security (1999) and The Future of Iraq (1997).